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Abstract 
 
 
Over the last two decades labour market flexibility has gained recognition as 
an important factor for good economic performance. Over the same period, the UK 
has followed a significant labour market deregulation programme, achieving probably 
the most flexible labour market in Europe.  
The main purpose of this study is to offer a concrete analysis of labour market 
flexibility and measure the impact that changes in flexibility in the UK have had on 
its regional economic performance. The thesis starts with a review of the forces that 
have created the conditions for enhanced labour market flexibility. This includes a 
discussion of the elements of flexibility, identifying its different forms, types, sources 
and targets. Through a systematic literature review the relationship between labour 
market flexibility and economic performance is examined. Some original 
international empirical evidence is also offered, based on a panel of data from the 
OECD.  
I then proceed to develop a technical economic model, examining the effects 
of labour standards deregulation on economic outcomes and inequalities in economic 
opportunities. This is followed by a theoretical discussion of regional dynamics in 
relation to labour market flexibility, where issues of spatial dependence are 
considered. In the main body of the empirical analysis, a large number of flexibility 
measures are developed and their evolution over time and across space is thoroughly 
discussed. Then, the economic effects of labour market flexibility are formally 
examined.  
The conclusion of this empirical analysis is that, on balance, labour market 
flexibility seems to have improved economic performance in the UK regions, 
although efficiency gains have coincided with larger inequalities in labour 
compensation and economic opportunities. The various elements of flexibility, 
however, are found to have variable, often opposing effects, suggesting that the issue 
of flexibility and improved economic performance is not purely quantitative, but 
mostly related to the specific combination of labour market arrangements which can 
lead to better or worse social and economic outcomes. It follows that this issue cannot 
be studied in isolation from its socio-economic environment, as the economic benefits 
of flexibility are not universal but rather place- and context-specific.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
SETTING UP THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 Presented in this thesis is an in-depth investigation of labour market flexibility 
and its impact on national and regional economic performance. We start by considering 
the conditions under which labour market flexibility has become a critical issue for the 
economy and society at large. The nature and characteristics of the flexible arrangements 
observed in contemporary labour markets is analytically discussed. We then turn to the 
economic effects of labour market flexibility, which are examined through a review of 
the relevant literature, an enquiry into economic theory and a set of empirical 
investigations at the national and regional levels.  
 The study falls into the broader area of economic analysis and, although in many 
respects social considerations are explicitly made, issues of social behaviour and social 
organisation are often put aside. Although the main research question is of a labour 
economics nature, the analytical perspective employed is largely macro-economic. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that the study acknowledges the importance of space (and 
place), and actually does investigate the relationships of interest at the regional scale, it 
may seem to give this important spatial dimension of labour relations and their influence 
on economic outcomes too little attention, especially in its first part (chapters two to 
five).  
Ch.1: The context of the study 
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 There is, however, a very pragmatic reason for employing such an approach. The 
main body of literature on which this study draws gives no consideration to either the 
space or the place at which the investigated phenomena occur. As an extreme -but 
factual- example of the literature, trends in unionisation rates and wage inequalities are 
often compared across countries and inferences for economic theory are often drawn, 
with scant attention paid to historical cross-country differences in unionisation rates, 
social security systems and traditions. Arguably, to examine the determinants and 
economic consequences of labour market flexibility at any level, one needs a concrete but 
admittedly difficult to construct analytical framework. Hence, rather than introducing the 
topic of investigation in isolation to the relevant literature, we follow a gradual approach. 
We start with an a-spatial analysis and introduce the notion of space only when the 
analysis reaches a certain point of clarity regarding the relationships under investigation 
(chapter six).  
 The spatial analysis of the later chapters is nevertheless far from being a 
comprehensive enquiry into the spatial dimension of labour market flexibility. A 
thorough investigation is conducted at the regional scale, where space is treated 
rigorously with the use of spatial econometrics. However, the notion of place is 
effectively neglected here. Local-specific socio-economic conditions and the influence of 
the local environments in which they are formed are consciously ignored. Attending to 
these conditions would understandably require extensive theoretical and empirical 
research, which is not possible to integrate into the present endeavour.  
 Nevertheless, this study makes a significant contribution, as a unique attempt to 
place the issue of the economic impact of labour market flexibility onto solid spatial-
Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Economic Performance 
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economics foundations. A large number of regional-level labour market flexibility 
indicators directly related to theory and the more general discussions on the topic, are 
presented. Such a set of indicators is effectively missing on an annual time-series basis 
not only at the regional, but also at the national and international levels. Furthermore, we 
analyse in significant detail the cross-regional dependencies in the determination of 
labour market flexibility and their regional (and cross-regional) economic impacts. It is 
hoped that these contributions will be followed by detailed case studies that will pursue 
the investigation of the research questions specified here at a more micro-level, by taking 
explicit account of the local specificities of labour markets and identifying the factors and 
contexts which make some flexible arrangements work and some not. To put it 
differently, in the present study we take the topic from the national to the regional level 
and use the regional-level information to assess the economic impact of labour market 
flexibility. Further research is needed to identify any local-specific effects and attribute 
them to local-specific structures.  
 Such a reading of the present study and its contributions implies an assumption, 
which is not disproved by the results obtained from the empirical analyses. We view the 
(flexible or rigid) institutions and regulations governing local labour markets as 
representing a local-specific set of assets (amenities or disamenities) that help shape 
economic outcomes. Under such a perspective, identifying the direct but aggregate effects 
of labour market flexibility (even at the regional level) is only a first step towards the 
investigation of the impact that labour market flexibility has on the economy. Further 
steps require the investigation of the effects of flexibility on the relationships between 
economic conditions and economic outcomes (e.g., how do unemployment benefits affect 
Ch.1: The context of the study 
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the way in which unemployment impacts on productivity?) and the investigation of the 
appropriate mixes of labour market flexibility in order to achieve specific outcomes (e.g., 
how much -and in which direction- does numerical flexibility have to change, if 
functional flexibility increases by 1%, for employment growth to remain stable?). Only 
the first step is pursued in the present study, while the other questions are left for future 
research. 
 In the remainder of this chapter we turn to the specific economic, social, 
ideological and technological conditions that have brought the issue of labour market 
flexibility to the position that it occupies today. The discussion stands apart from the 
analysis in successive chapters, but this was considered necessary in order to shape the 
context of this study. In the last section of this chapter we introduce the contents of the 
chapters that follow and explicitly specify our research questions.   
 
1.2. Economics and the economic context 
 The study of economics is historically inter-related with the question about the 
role of government intervention in the economy. From the “invisible hand” of Adam 
Smith, which pointed to the separation of governance from the economic sphere, through 
the Keynesian interventionist legacy which followed the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
to the dominance of neoclassical economics after the oil shocks of the 70s, the debate on 
the role of policy intervention has always been on the agenda of economic enquiry.  
 In the last fifteen years or so, significant developments in the fields of Growth 
Theory and Economic Geography (including the “New Economic Geography”, but 
mainly the literature on Local Economic Development) have led to important changes in 
Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Economic Performance 
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the way the role of policy intervention is interpreted and appreciated. Development in 
endogenous growth theory led to the recognition of the impacts that fiscal policy can 
have on the growth rates of an economy (for example, Romer 1990, Barro 1990, King 
and Rebelo 1990, Greiner 1996). Specifically, by “endogenising growth”, economists 
began to point at government intervention as a potential source of mobilising economic 
growth. Equivalently, the recognition by regional economists and economic geographers 
of the importance of local-specific factors in shaping the “growth potential” of a region, 
gave new insights into the role (central or local) governments can play by providing 
infrastructure, education, and the like.  
Under these developments, the neoclassical view of negative (or at best, 
negligible) effects of government intervention on growth and economic performance is 
being questioned, assisted by the growing academic interest in inequality, both between 
states or regions (the convergence debate) and within states and regions (among people). 
Of course, this latest readdressing of government intervention policy is in many respects 
different from the Keynesian-type interventionist legacy of the post-War period. The 
focus is more on the supply-side of the economy, than on the demand-side. This trend 
applies in both economics and economic geography. Policy intervention is regarded more 
as a means of enhancing market efficiency (labour, financial, or product markets) and the 
quality of intangible economic assets (human and public capital: vocational training, 
education and infrastructure) in order to increase aggregate welfare, than as a tool for 
achieving social goals, such as income redistribution and social security, and increasing 
aggregate demand. The focus, in other words, is more on efficiency and less on equality.   
Ch.1: The context of the study 
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 Despite that, recent research on income inequality shows how related these two 
policy intervention approaches actually are. For some researchers, the two approaches 
can be characterised as competitive or even contradictory. Economic efficiency is not 
necessarily compatible with equality and the elimination of income inequality does not 
seem to promote economic growth (Benabou, 1996). For other researchers 
complementarity is more likely. Income inequality leads to under-investment and other 
sub-optimal outcomes, with detrimental effects to economic growth (see for example 
Hongyi et al., 1998). Under this assumption, reducing income dispersions can, under 
certain conditions, even be seen as a tool for promoting economic growth. Unfortunately, 
the trade-off between equality and growth has not yet been fully explored, despite its 
profound importance for both social and policy design reasons. 
 Despite the growing interest in the role of government intervention and fiscal 
policy for (national or local/regional) economic development, the main focus is relatively 
narrow, on topics like education (or human capital formation –Lucas, 1988; Romer, 
1990), infrastructure (Nijkamp, 1994), political stability (Alesina and Perotti, 1996) and 
taxation (King and Rebelo, 1990; Greiner, 1996). A number of important facets of policy 
intervention, which might be equally important for the growth and inequality debates, are 
consequently ignored. Among them, labour market intervention is perhaps the most 
important. Nevertheless, with efficiency wage theories and the literature on the economic 
impact of trade unionism as possible exceptions, growth models have failed thus far to 
structurally include aspects related to the organisation of labour relations, labour 
standards and, in general, labour market regulation. To the extent that labour market 
institutions matter in the determination of economic outcomes, it should be realised that 
Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Economic Performance 
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both growth and local economic development theories should account for labour market 
intervention in a more direct and explicit way (Boyer, 1994). 
 The issue of labour market deregulation and flexibility was of high priority in the 
agenda of the EU economic (and social) policy during the 1980s and 1990s and is still 
very important today. It is moreover one of the most controversial issues debated inside 
and outside academia (Rodgers, 1994), as the need for flexibility appears to be real rather 
than rhetorical, following the big changes that have occurred in the international 
economy and its organisational structure during the last two decades. These 
developments and their connection with the issue of the organisation of labour relations 
are synoptically presented in the following sections of this chapter1. 
 
1.3. Globalisation, localisation and flexible accumulation 
 It is widely acknowledged in both economics and (economic) geography that the 
internationalisation of the economic system after the Second World War, the dominance 
of large transnational corporations (TNCs), the recent entrance of former communist 
countries into the international -capitalist- economic system and the revolutions in 
information technology and telecommunication systems, led to the appearance of a new 
phase of capitalist development, the “global economy”. The establishment and gradual 
domination of a number of international and supranational organisations (such as the 
IMF, the World Bank and the G7) increased the degree of openness and interdependence 
of national economies and fostered their integration (Hamilton, 1991). Amin and Thrift 
                    
1
 See also the more detailed discussion of specific developments in the regulation of labour markets and 
their causes in the second chapter.  
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(1994) identify seven characteristics that are connected -either as driving forces or as 
results- to the globalisation of the economic system: the increasing power of the financial 
structure over the sphere of production, the increasing importance and 
internationalisation of knowledge, the acceleration and diffusion of technological 
progress, the rise of global oligopolies, the “globalisation of state power” (i.e., the 
emergence of a number of supranational organisations), the increase of global cultural 
flows (“fusion of different narratives and local vernaculars”) and the rise of a “new 
geography” that is “globally local”. 
 The globalisation of the economic system is therefore associated with increased 
volatility, openness, competitive pressures and uncertainty (ILO, 1997). These 
characteristics cannot be compromised with the static, rigid and inflexible organisation of 
the socio-economic sphere that prevailed for the three decades after World War II, under 
the so-called Fordist mode of accumulation.2 From the late 70s Fordist capitalism, based 
on mass production, economies of scale, taylorist production processes (moving 
assembly line), growth of waged labour and expansion to new markets, and “regulated” 
by a Keynesian-statist method of regulation (unemployment benefits, the “welfare state”, 
increased trade union power and high wages to stimulate demand and, hence, growth), 
                    
2
 The term “mode of accumulation”, together with the terms “method of regulation” and “hegemonic 
structure” were developed by the “school of regulation” (see for example Aglietta, 1979; Boyer 1988; 
Lipietz, 1987), as an alternative to the Marxist “linear” theory of capitalist development (and crises) and its 
set of analytical tools. Regulation theory considers capitalist development as a “non-linear” process that “is 
characterised by a sequence of specific social formations, which differ from each other greatly, based on an 
unvarying basic structure in their forms of production and exploitation, conditions of socialization and 
class, as well as in the character of the state and the political rule” (Esser and Hirsch, 1994, p.73). 
Throughout this work we refer to the regulationist approach in a wider sense, to included effectively all 
non-marxist structuralist approaches.   
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entered a period of crisis and reconfiguration.3 To respond to these new developments, 
many authors assert that a new mode of accumulation and a consequent new method of 
socio-economic regulation, the so-called “post-Fordist era” is being formulated.4 
However, this new regime is not yet dominant in all the facets of economic activity. 
Rather, “in a national and international context, the situation is characterised by a 
complex mixture of alternative strategies for overcoming the crisis” (Esser and Hirsch, 
1994, p.76).  
More orthodox approaches view these changes from a less structuralist 
perspective but equally recognise that globalisation and technological progress 
necessitate increases in the flexibility of product and labour markets. Besides the 
methodological and epistemological differences, there seems to be common agreement 
that the new era is described by the increased importance of technology and a turn 
towards flexible specialisation (Piore and Sabel, 1984) and a flexible mode of 
accumulation (Harvey, 1987). These elements include the geographical diffusion of 
production, the increased importance of SMEs, networking, “competition through co-
operation” and quality-based competition, information and technology diffusion, 
subcontracting, and the reorientation of production in accordance with a changing and 
differentiated (heterogeneous) demand. But they also include another factor, namely the 
re-organisation of labour relations, as we discuss further in later chapters. 
                    
3
 For an analytical discussion of the transformation of the Fordist regime, see Dunford (1995, especially 
pages 127-140) and the references presented there.   
4
 Tickell and Peck (1992), Peck (1994) and others have correctly mentioned that, although in the post-
Fordist era flexible accumulation and its characteristics have been well identified, the method of flexible 
regulation is still neither apparent nor well studied. The juxtapositions of the new regime complicate the 
identification of the new forms of socio-economic regulation. 
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 These developments, the so-called “global challenge”, have significant spatial 
effects. The dominance of the nation as the basic economic entity is under scrutiny, 
mainly because of two trends. On the one hand, the internationalisation (globalisation) of 
the economy, the integration of national markets and consequent emergence of a number 
of supra-national institutions, weaken the powers of national states (“hollowing-out” of 
nation state power) in designing and implementing their own economic policies (Bennett, 
1991). On the other hand, the diffusion and differentiation of production increases the 
importance of local (or regional) economies (Granados-Cabezas, 1992). Moreover, “the 
compression and transgression of time and space barriers (i.e., globalisation) ascribes a 
greater salience to place, since firms, governments and the public come to identify the 
specificity of localities as an element for deriving competitive advantage” (Amin and 
Thrift, 1994, p.6). In this sense, there is a new role emerging, not simply for local 
economies, but for local economic development (LED) and its governance as well. The 
implication is that localities can control their own economic performance by exploiting 
their growth potential and integrating into the global economy.5 In other words, 
                    
5
 Within this context a number of scholars stress the importance of the “institutional thickness” of a region 
in promoting its integration to the global economy and fostering its economic development (see for 
example Hodgson, 1993; Hudson, 1994). Of course, not all scholars are optimistic about the ability of local 
economies (and local economic governance) to play an active role in the global economy. Such authors (see 
for example Harvey, 1987; Ohmae, 1990;  Hirst and Thompson, 1996) emphasise the role of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) in “running” the global economy and determining the fate of local economies. 
Additionally, they question the analytical validity of the notion of “glocalization” (the simultaneous 
existence of two opposite tendencies: globalisation and localisation), arguing that localisation is not an 
autonomous tendency of the economic system. Instead, it is the globalization of the economy that, through 
the hollowing out of national states, exaggerates the importance of local economies. Sabel (1994), although 
listing five developments that contribute to the “reconsolidation of the region as an integrated unit of 
production”, advocating the idea of the regionalisation (localization) of the world economy, appears skeptic 
about the degree of independence and autonomy (in one word, the power) that regions can have in a 
globalised economy. For related arguments, see also Amin and Robins (1990).  
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globalisation has led to (or is accompanied by, depending on one’s theoretical view) a 
simultaneous “localisation” of the world economy.  
 Together with the increased importance of regions and their local economies, the 
trends discussed here have also enhanced “the autonomy of the enterprise” (ILO, 1997, 
p.82). In an era of increased volatility and uncertainty the firm has to adapt by changing 
its strategies and objectives. Flexible, differentiated products, with small stock holdings 
and just-in-time production methods (Koshiro, 1992) are unquestionable requirements for 
enterprise success. Flexible methods of labour use and new management methods to 
enhance the flexibility and adjustability of a firm’s policies are seen as preconditions for 
a firm’s survival and expansion.   
 Evidently, then, the need for change in product and labour markets and in their 
social relationships (between workers and employers, between employers and the State), 
affects the behaviour of all the parties involved. The area where this need for change has 
been more urgent and the effects of the consequent changes more evident is the labour 
market. In the next section we look at the structuralist debate on the relationship between 
the aforementioned preconditions for change and their effects on the regulation of labour 
markets.   
 
1.4. Flexible accumulation and flexibility in labour markets 
 As noted above, the forces related to the new mode of accumulation and the new 
method of regulation, affect all facets of government intervention and economic activity: 
regional and national development policies, income distribution and redistribution 
measures, provision of infrastructure and education (public and human capital 
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formation), trade policies, taxation, housing policies and labour market intervention.6 
Labour market deregulation in particular has gained increasing importance in the last two 
decades and claims a special position in the debate on the changing international 
economic order.  
 The labour market is the area where the pressures for change have been most 
severe, since the evaporation of Keynesianism as a method of socio-economic policy has 
re-defined the social and economic role of waged labour. Moreover, the labour market is 
where the impact of “globalisation” and “post-Fordism” has been felt more strongly, as 
the re-configuration of the economic system directly affects labour incomes, labour 
relations and employment opportunities. The relatively poor labour market performance 
of the 1980s and early 1990s internationally, has in many respects made the position of 
labour in the economy less favourable. Although unemployment is more recently less of a 
problem, wage inequalities, employability and skills depreciation (with low-skilled 
workers becoming increasingly more vulnerable to poverty and social exclusion) are real 
problems that the re-configuration of the economic system has yet to solve. Furthermore, 
employment growth (full-time employment growth in particular) has not yet fully 
recovered from previous declines. These labour market developments have 
contemporaneously been followed by a tendency towards lower labour standards that is 
supported by the neo-liberal search for increased labour market flexibility (deregulation), 
both in the political sphere (“Thatcherism”) and in the academia.  
                    
6
 At a first glance, it may seem contradictory to focus on governmental intervention policies when we 
simultaneously talk about the “hollowing-out of nation states” (and authority). Nevertheless, nation states 
(and their governments) are still the main actors of socio-economic regulation. Furthermore, government 
intervention is a term wide enough to include policies implemented by supra-national organisations and 
institutions as well as by local authorities.  
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 Of course, the mere fact that changing labour market conditions have coincided 
with (i) the emergence of the “post-Fordist mode of accumulation” on a notable scale and 
(ii) the generalisation of the tendency towards globalisation, is not a sufficient condition 
for one to claim a causal relationship between the levels and quality of labour standards 
and the new economic order. Many authors (Wilkinson, 1983; Peck, 1989; Hudson, 
1989) advocate that “there is no straightforward connection between flexibility in 
production and flexibility in labour markets” (Peck, 1992, p.329). 
 Despite such critics, the recognition of the importance of labour market flexibility 
in the new era of capitalism, for the competitive position of an economy or for its growth 
rates, is apparent in documents and policies employed by supra-national organisations, 
such as the EU and the WTO, or in international agreements, such as GATT and NAFTA 
(see Hufbauer and Schott, 1993 and Krugman, 1996 for a critical discussion of relevant 
references). Apart from the importance of alleviating unemployment and wage inequality 
for economic stability and social justice, the ways in which governments intervene to 
regulate their labour markets can have different effects on relative factor prices, the size 
of the active labour force, labour demand, sectoral structures and, consequently, rates of 
economic growth. Mainstream economic analysis, although using a different terminology 
than the one used here, finds labour market deregulation (higher flexibility) not only 
justifiable but even necessary (as we will discuss more extensively later) exactly because 
of “globalisation” and the changes in the regime of accumulation (increased volatility and 
uncertainty of the world economy). The differentiation of demand and shortening of 
products’ life-cycles, what in neo-Schumpeterian terms has been labelled “creative 
destruction” (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Caballero and Jaffee, 1993), have increased 
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uncertainty in production and created “the need for enhanced flexibility in production 
systems” (Scott and Cooke, 1988, p.241). This has been partially achieved through 
automation and partially through the functional re-organisation of the production process 
and the externalisation of some of its parts (subcontracting, casual and temporary 
employment, R&D co-operation networks, etc.). This has necessarily led, not simply to 
the re-organisation of labour relations but, as some scholars have argued, even to a new 
social and spatial division of labour.7 
 The main benefit of labour market flexibility and the consequent re-organisation 
of labour relations is that it constitutes a source of competitive advantage (Ozaki, 1999). 
The use of alternative forms of non-standard employment, the benefits from wage 
flexibility and the advantages of production methods that enhance functional flexibility, 
as will be explained in the following chapters, help increase productivity and reduce 
production costs. More importantly, they allow the firm to enhance its ability to adjust to 
changing demand and wider economic conditions. Among all benefits this is considered 
to be the most important. In an era of high uncertainty and volatility, the merits of high 
profitability and lower costs may possibly be less significant than the achievement of 
sustainable production.  
 
 
                    
7
 We do not discuss further the issue of the new (social and spatial) divisions of labour under the mode of 
flexible accumulation. This is because this issue relates to the emergence of a new geography of production 
(“new industrial spaces”, “sub-urbanisation” of the “secondary labour market”, new forms of 
agglomeration) and to the restructuring of gender, class and ethnic (racial) relations, in both the economic 
and social spheres. For a discussion of these issues, see Massey, 1984; Scott and Storper, 1986; Scott and 
Cooke, 1988; Scott, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c; Nielsen, 1991).   
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 The re-organisation of labour relations (to increase labour market flexibility) has 
taken place at three levels: first, at the level of wage determination, with the 
individualisation of employment relations and the weakening of workers’ bargaining 
power; second, at an intra-firm level, through the promotion of group-work, multi-
skilling and intra-firm mobility of labour (internal flexibility); and third, at an inter-firm 
(market) level, through part-time and temporary employment, subcontracting, and other 
forms of “quantitative adjustments in the labour intake” (external flexibility) (Storper and 
Scott, 1990, p.575). These distinctions, among the various forms and sources of 
flexibility, regulation and deregulation, will be investigated in greater detail in the next 
chapter.   
 
1.5. The limits of flexibility? 
 The direction in which the re-organisation of labour relations is heading raises 
two questions. First, are these developments intrinsic to the new regime, or are they 
ephemeral, residuals of earlier (pre-Fordist) phases of capitalist accumulation; and 
second, do they constitute sustainable (reproducible) economic structures.  
Regarding the first question, one strand of the literature suggests that the new 
flexible labour relations are not specific to the present. As Peck (1992, p.329) puts it, 
“many of the so-called flexibility strategies are established means of deepening control 
over the labour process in ways of which F. Taylor might have been proud”. Moreover, 
“far from being a recent phenomenon flexible labour markets have a long history” 
(p.330). Nevertheless, one has to acknowledge that the specific forms of labour market 
deregulation in post-Fordism seem to be characteristic of (and historically specific to) the 
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new regime, despite lack of homogeneity in their strategic implementation.8 For example, 
the pre-Fordist “sweatshops” have been replaced in the post-Fordist era by production 
units characterised by the increased use of high-technology (e.g., computers) and an 
“emphasis upon skill and quality” (Piore, 1990, p.44), at least in the developed world. As 
a consequence, the labour force is not so easy to control (in that it is relatively specialised 
in non-firm-specific skills and is therefore potentially mobile). Although many of the 
labour market flexibilities existing today seem to closely resemble the flexibilities of the 
early 20th century, there are both qualitative and quantitative differences in their 
inspiration and their enforcement. As a result, it is difficult to sustain the argument that 
contemporary flexible labour arrangements are residuals of the pre-Fordist period.   
 With respect to the second question, a number of contradictions have been noted 
in the literature that lead one to question the ability of flexible labour markets to 
reproduce themselves. Internal flexibility increases the importance of workers to the 
production process (due to the increased number of tasks undertaken by each worker, and 
greater responsibility and participation in the design/management of production), while 
multi-skilling increases their attractiveness and “tradability” in the external labour 
market. Hence, both their bargaining power and the turnover rates increase, with adverse 
effects on the degree of internal flexibility observed in the labour market. In addition, as 
Mahon (1987) among others has stressed, the differentiation of products across firms also 
                    
8
 Deregulation is not necessarily seen from a functionalist point of view. It is not only dependent on the 
variations in the form of “flexibilities” that emerge with the re-organisation of labour markets (see for 
example the discussion about the “competitive” versus “structured” flexibilities, by Leborgne and Lipietz, 
1988), but also on variations that accrue from the different “logics” that different places (localities) have, 
according to the locally-specific regulatory and social milieux (Peck, 1992). We return to this issue in parts 
of chapters two and six. 
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makes the latter depend on their internal labour markets, thus increasing job-security.9 
According to Streeck (1985, as quoted by Mahon, 1987), “steady employment may in fact 
be required by a flexible production strategy”. External flexibility, with the segmentation 
of the labour market and the externalisation of production reduces the firms’ control over 
the workers (Michon, 1987) and hinders on-the-job, firm-specific skill formation (Peck, 
1992). The importance of firm-specific skills can in many cases act against labour market 
flexibility. We provide a treatment of this issue in the dual labour demand model set out 
in chapter five.  
 These endemic contradictions in the process of transformation from Fordism to 
flexible accumulation, it has been argued, may act as destabilising factors for the new 
regime. Industrial disintegration and labour market segmentation, that can be the result of 
unregulated labour market flexibility, can potentially lead to “under-investment in 
technology innovation and skill formation [and] undermine the nascent growth model of 
flexible accumulation itself” (Peck, 1992, p.334). Labour market segmentation can also 
hinder local economic growth by widening socio-economic inequalities and political 
(class or ethnic) tensions (Saxenian, 1983). It can also lead -together with the absence of 
labour market regulation, job security and guaranteed minimum wages- to reduced 
worker effort and, hence, productivity (Piore, 1990).10 Finally, productivity slow-downs 
can also occur from the management side. Flexible specialisation and accumulation foster 
                    
9
 We do not provide definitions for the various forms of labour market flexibility here, as this will be done 
thoroughly in chapter two.   
10
 This rationale, advocated by the neo-institutionalist literature of labour economics, is in complete 
accordance with the “efficiency-wage hypothesis”. In the context of the neo-institutionalist approach, 
however, effort is not simply a function of wages (as for example in Yellen, 1984) but, more broadly, a 
function of the overall labour standards (Herzenberg et al., 1990).  
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the emergence of small firms and promote home-working, basically because of the need 
to reduce as much as possible all the fixed costs of the firm (Piore and Sabel, 1984). At 
an extreme, when “all costs are variable costs, [which] are borne by the worker, [then] no 
one has an incentive to worry about productivity” (Piore, 1990, p.39). Although it can be 
argued that workers still have an incentive to be more productive, to receive higher 
wages, such productivity gains are limited by the absence of economies of scale, 
investment in physical capital and new technologies, which can also be attributed to 
enhanced labour market flexibility under the cost-reduction strategies assumption.   
 To state this argument in a more general way, despite the fact that higher 
flexibility in production (i.e., output adjustments and product differentiation) and the 
labour market is a response to greater uncertainty and volatility in the economic system, 
higher levels of flexibility induce fewer risks with respect to costs and greater risks with 
respect to investment in physical capital and skill formation. In other words, the 
externalisation of production and the increased external flexibility in the labour market 
constitute externalities that lead to under-investment in both physical (promotion of 
labour-intensive technologies) and human (reduced on-the-job training) capital. In the 
words of Streeck (1989, p.91), “firms acting ‘rationally’ are only in exceptional cases 
able to [proceed to] human resource investment in new and higher skills. It appears that 
the skills needed for industrial modernisation have so peculiar collective [(i.e.: public)] 
goods properties that they can not even be generated by unilateral state provision”.  
Although this argument is somewhat extreme, it is closely related to what the 
recent literature on endogenous growth (human capital accumulation, learning-by-doing) 
identifies as non-linearities in the aggregate production function, that create increasing 
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returns to scale at an aggregate level (“external economies of scale”, for the economy as a 
whole) but constant returns for each individual firm, leading to Pareto sub-optimal 
equilibria (under-investment) and hindering economic growth (Romer, 1987; Barro, 
1990; King and Rebelo, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Greiner, 1996; and 
others).11 
 We take a closer look at this in chapter three, when we present an analytical 
discussion of the different approaches to labour market flexibility and deregulation. For 
now, our conclusion based on the discussion conducted thus far is the following. Labour 
market flexibility is a profit-maximisation response by firms to changing economic 
conditions and structures. Despite that, however, the deregulation of labour relations can 
potentially create as many problems as it can actually solve. For this reason, a careful re-
configuration of labour relations, rather than their complete deregulation, seems to 
emerge as the best policy response.  
 
1.6. The structure of the present study 
 So far we have quite briefly discussed the wider changes that have altered the 
conditions governing economic relationships, their relation to the organisation of labour 
relations and the prospects of the new forms of regulation and accumulation (production). 
This discussion was necessary in order to set up the context of the analysis. The relevance 
of the issues considered here is that they inform us about the social, economic and 
political climate that generates the need for enhanced flexibility in the labour market and 
                    
11
 Monastiriotis (2001) presents a direct empirical test for the existence of such non-linearities in the UK 
regions.  
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elsewhere. Throughout the reminder of the analysis this climate is taken for granted. Our 
focus switches from the wider to the more specific, as we examine in detail the nature 
and forms of labour market flexibility and their impact on national and regional 
economic performance.  
 There are four specific research questions that this study addresses and attempts 
to answer, either at a theoretical or at an empirical level, each with multiple offshoots. 
Our first question is what is labour market flexibility? Which are its types, forms and 
manifestations? But, further, what are the origins and determinants of labour market 
flexibility and -more importantly- of the changes in labour market regulation? After 
pursuing this question, the second issue clearly emerging refers to the economic impact 
of flexibility. How does labour market flexibility affect the economy? How do the 
different elements of flexibility impact on the economy and to what extent does this 
impact differ for different elements? Which are the economic indicators that are affected 
most? Moreover, how can one conceptualise (and possibly model) the labour market 
outcomes related to changes in labour market regulation, both at an a-spatial and at a 
regional level?  
For the next two general research questions the focus turns to the case of the UK 
and becomes explicitly regional. Hence, our third question is how has labour market 
flexibility evolved in the UK and its regions over the last two decades? Have the regional 
labour markets converged in terms of the labour relations prevailing in each of them? Has 
flexibility advanced faster in the most backward regions? Has it instead advanced faster 
in regions more exposed to the international economy? Or has the deregulation of labour 
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markets, that was followed during most of the period under consideration, produced 
spatially even changes in labour market flexibility?  
Finally, the fourth and most significant question we investigate refers to the 
specific regional economic impact of enhanced labour market flexibility. We examine 
empirically how changes in labour market flexibility in the UK changed regional 
economic performance. Further, we examine whether and to what extent the regional 
economic balance and the cross-regional dependencies have changed due to enhanced 
labour market flexibility. 
The structure of the present study essentially follows the order in which these 
questions were asked. In chapter two we analyse and attempt to explain labour market 
flexibility. In chapters three and four we deal with the economic impact of labour market 
flexibility. Chapters five and six focus on the conceptualisation of the regional and labour 
market effects of labour market flexibility. The examination of the evolution of labour 
market flexibility in the UK is undertaken in chapter seven and in chapter eight we 
perform a number of detailed econometric investigations to locate and measure the 
specific effects of labour market flexibility on regional economic performance in the UK 
over the last two decades. The final chapter summarises the analysis, outlines a number 
of implications and concludes. In more detail: 
 In the next chapter we define “labour market flexibility” and identify its 
constituent elements. Specifically, we first examine the definitions of, and 
differences between, the terms flexibility, regulation, deregulation and 
flexibilisation. We then present a number of decompositions of these terms to 
identify what is meant in reality by the notion of flexibility. We further consider 
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different theoretical approaches under which the constituent elements of 
flexibility can be integrated into an analytical model of the evolution and change 
of labour market institutions. Finally, we analyse the labour market flexibility 
and deregulation experience of the OECD countries over the last two decades in 
an attempt to relate the theoretical discussion to the stylised facts.  
 Chapter three outlines various theoretical considerations and empirical 
evidence relating to the economic and labour market effects of regulation, 
deregulation and flexibility. With regard to the discussion of the previous 
section, we first review the main points of the neoclassical analysis of labour 
market flexibility before turning to less orthodox (post-Keynesian) and even 
heterodox (neo-institutionalist and neo-Ricardian) approaches. The discussion in 
this chapter is not conclusive, as the main purpose is to account for the multitude 
of different effects and mechanisms identified in the literature. This procedure is 
meant to enhance our theoretical understanding of and inform our empirical 
investigation on the issue.  
 A first part of the empirical investigation is presented in chapter four. We 
investigate the effects of the various degrees of regulation in the OECD labour 
markets on their economic performance, as well as on their performance in terms 
of wage inequalities. Following the discussion of the third chapter, this 
investigation is split into two parts, one relating to the wage inequality effects 
and the second relating to the wider effects on economic performance. Results 
from these empirical investigations seem to verify the views taken in 
contemporary research that the impact of labour market flexibility differs both 
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qualitatively and quantitatively across its different elements. This further 
supports the theoretical discussion of chapter two. 
 Chapter five is dedicated to the development of a theoretical model for the 
economic analysis of labour standards. Starting with some considerations 
regarding the nature of labour standards as an element affecting productivity, 
production costs and worker utility, we build a model which explicitly 
incorporates labour standards in the analysis of labour-market and wider 
economic outcomes. Most of the discussion in chapter five is based on a 
diagrammatical analysis, which allows us to speculate on the wage and 
employment effects of labour market deregulation. Introducing trade unionism 
(as well as unemployment benefits and minimum wages) in the diagrammatical 
analysis enables us to explain the trends in inequalities that have been identified 
in the world economy, both with respect to wages and with respect to labour 
standards.  
 In chapter six we expand this analysis and transfer it to the regional level. 
With a particular focus on the UK, we discuss the importance of the regional 
dimension of the issue under investigation. We identify regional mechanisms and 
dynamics, which are not clear in an a-spatial analysis, and we discuss the ways in 
which they can be incorporated into the empirical analysis. We then outline the 
context for the regional empirical investigation of chapter eight. In doing so, we 
also discuss the issue of scale and our selection of the region as our unit of 
analysis.  
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 The regional empirical analysis begins in chapter seven. We present the 
evolution of the main indicators of regional economic performance in the UK 
and discuss the differences and similarities of the economic structures of the UK 
regions. We also present a large number of labour market flexibility indicators 
that we have constructed for the UK regions, for the period 1979-1998. As 
already mentioned, these indicators represent a unique attempt to measure labour 
market flexibility (and its changes over time) in the UK and are in complete 
reference to the theoretical discussions of chapters two and three. Together with 
the presentation of these indicators, some empirical results, mainly referring to 
the evolution of regional labour market flexibility and its determinants, are also 
presented in chapter seven.  
 The main body of the empirical analysis is actually presented in chapter eight. 
The chapter introduces the empirical investigation with some theoretical and 
technical considerations, before the presentation of the main empirical findings. 
We also provide a number of alternative estimates as a check for robustness and 
examine in detail the issue of spatial dependence. The empirical findings offer a 
large amount of information, the wider implications of which are related to our 
earlier theoretical discussion in the concluding sections of the chapter.  
 With chapter eight we conclude our investigation of the regional economic 
effects of labour market flexibility. The last chapter is a summary of the 
theoretical discussion and an assessment of the empirical evidence. The 
empirical findings are related to the theoretical discussion, suggesting a refined 
view of the entire issue of labour market regulation and flexibility, both for a-
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spatial and space-specific analysis. An organised discussion of the implications 
of the obtained findings deepens our understanding of the social and economic 
role of labour market regulation and flexibility. We close the chapter by 
identifying directions for further empirical and theoretical research on the issue, 
especially at the regional and local levels.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LABOUR MARKET (DE)REGULATION  
AND LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY 
 
2.1. Introduction: regulation, deregulation and flexibility  
 This chapter looks at the issues of labour market flexibility, regulation and 
deregulation, with our main focus being to define what is meant (and understood) by 
these terms, what forms do they take, and what is their relationship with each other. 
Specifically, in this chapter we provide broad definitions for these terms before 
narrowing down to relate them to the contemporary academic and policy debates. 
Further, we look at the various types of flexibility from a functionalist perspective, 
identifying the elements that make a labour market flexible. Next, we scrutinise from 
a more practical perspective the forms that these flexible labour market arrangements 
assume. We then attempt to relate the forms and types of flexibility to one another, 
suggesting ways in which they can be integrated into a wider model, to facilitate a 
greater understanding of their interactions. We close with a review of the changes in 
(de)regulation and flexibility as experienced by different OECD countries, with a 
special focus on the UK. To put it succinctly, we proceed by investigating the 
following questions: (i) what is flexibility and (de)regulation? (ii) what are their 
ingredients, from both a functional and a practical perspective? (iii) how are these 
ingredients integrated? and (iv) what are the country experiences of all this? To put it 
differently, the first step (pursued here) is to locate (define) these terms; the second is 
to decompose them into their constituent elements; the third step is to provide an 
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organic re-integration of these elements; and last is to relate this theoretical exercise 
to the stylised facts. Hence, we next discuss the meaning and history of these terms 
and provide some definitions. 
 
2.1.1. Labour market flexibility 
 A very simple and rather convincing definition of labour market flexibility is 
that labour market flexibility is the extent to which the labour market is allowed to 
operate under the influence of market forces. In other words, labour market flexibility 
is the extent to which labour market forces determine labour market outcomes. 
Hence, a totally flexible labour market is the one where no financial, institutional, 
linguistic, political and cultural impediments (or indeed any impediments) are 
present.12 In this respect, any factor entering the labour market other than the forces 
of demand and supply -themselves determined by the profit and utility maximising 
economic agents and their preferences-, potentially impose rigidities in the labour 
market and lead to labour market inflexibilities.  
The latter are naturally producing inferior economic outcomes, as in their 
absence optimality would emerge. Under this definition, there are many factors that 
can be related to labour market rigidities. By far the most important, however, (or at 
least the most deeply discussed and analysed factor in the context of labour market 
analysis) is government labour market intervention or, in other words, labour market 
regulation. A more detailed definition of labour market flexibility would then be the 
state of a labour market in which there are no unemployment benefits, no legislation 
                                                 
12
 Housing market inflexibilities and the friction of space are two other important factors creating (or 
sustaining) labour market inflexibilities. However, such factors are not directly related to the design 
and implementation of labour market policies. In this respect it is difficult to define the limits between 
flexibility in the labour markets and flexibility in the housing markets or geographical flexibility. It 
should be clear, however, that absolute labour market flexibility cannot be achieved in the absence of 
total market flexibility.  
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on work-schedules, working time and fire-and-hire procedures, no trade unions to 
bargain on wages, working conditions and redundancies and so on. This is probably 
the most common definition of flexibility, although it is rather technical and non-
exhaustive.13   
This is because labour market regulations are widely acknowledged as the 
main sources of labour market inflexibilities (rigidities), for two apparent reasons. 
The first is practical. Labour market regulations are particularly binding, as they are 
normally enforced by law and (when monitored appropriately) cover the whole of the 
labour market. They are, moreover, insensitive to labour market and general 
economic conditions. A regulation covering a specific aspect of labour relations can 
be in force for years (if not decades), while labour market conditions (in terms of 
demand and supply and of labour market equilibria) can change much faster.  
The second reason is rather ideological. Labour market regulations represent 
and constitute a form of government intervention. Despite the recognition even in 
some strands of neoclassical economic analysis (e.g., welfare economics and versions 
of the endogenous growth theory) that government intervention can correct certain 
“market failures”, mainstream economic analysis still identifies government 
intervention as the main source of economic inefficiencies in broad areas of economic 
activity. With respect to labour market analysis and the analysis of labour market 
flexibility in particular, government intervention and trade unionism are the most 
widely acknowledged sources of economic inefficiency, more so than any other 
economic or non-economic externality. But what are the other externalities that can 
also constitute labour market rigidities? 
                                                 
13
 The phrasing presented here is extreme, as is the case that it describes: the case of total flexibility or 
total absence of any form of regulation in the labour market. 
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One main factor of labour market inflexibilities, which occupies, nevertheless, 
a peripheral position, especially in the non-academic strand of the debate about labour 
market flexibility, is labour market power from the side of firms or individual 
employees. Specifically, although much of the labour market flexibility literature 
focuses on workers’ market power, which is attributed to trade unionism and 
legislation on collective worker rights, less discussion is directed towards the impacts 
of monopsony (or oligopsony) power, or of monopoly power of some segments of the 
workforce (e.g., highly skilled IT specialists, or financial analysts and executives). It 
is common knowledge in economics (but effectively outside the labour market 
flexibility debate) that monopsony power in the labour market produces inferior 
economic outcomes in all respects: lower levels of employment, lower levels of 
production (output), higher prices and lower wages. The same may be true for some 
types of labour monopoly power, as has been shown for example in the insider-
outsider literature (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). Such factors are therefore important 
barriers to labour market flexibility and are perhaps as important as labour market 
regulation itself.14  
This returns us to the question of what is labour market flexibility, as it must 
be something more than simply the absence of government-imposed regulations in 
the labour market. Indeed, that was explicitly discussed by Prof. R. Solow in his 1997 
Keynes Lecture in Economics for the British Academy. An alternative definition of 
labour market flexibility would then be that “[a] perfectly flexible labour market [is 
the] one that interposes no obstacle to the frictionless matching of an unfilled job and 
an unemployed worker with the appropriate skills [so that] vacancies and 
                                                 
14
 In this respect it is quite ironic that labour market deregulation seeks the removal of the institutional 
arrangements in place precisely to counterbalance these externalities. This observation illustrates 
clearly the ideological element in the search for labour market flexibility and deregulation.  
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unemployment [can] never coexist” (Solow, 1998, p.4).15 Despite the fact that such a 
definition may seem rather narrow, interestingly it accounts for a large number of 
other labour market externalities and rigidities. Racial or gender discrimination, 
labour market segmentation, linguistic, geographical and legal barriers to labour 
mobility, trade unionism, high reservation wages, monopsony power and restrictions 
imposed by the housing and financial markets, are factors that can all potentially 
increase the mis-match between job vacancies and unemployed persons, thus 
allowing for vacancies and unemployment to co-exist. 
 
2.1.2. Labour market regulation 
With this definition of labour market flexibility we depart from the rather 
short-sighted view of the latter being effectively the opposite of labour market 
regulation. Although many of the labour market rigidities relate to the regulation of 
labour markets, a large number of them do not. For example, attitudes towards 
minorities (discrimination), non-legal barriers to labour mobility (linguistic, cultural, 
geographical and other), imperfections in the financial and housing markets and so 
forth, are strictly beyond the reach of labour market intervention. This perspective 
allows one to consider labour market regulation outside the narrow and restrictive 
issue of labour market flexibility. Labour market regulation is the sum of the 
regulations, restrictions and laws governing the operation of labour markets and the 
relations between the workers and their employers at a given time and place. Such 
restrictions and regulations serve a totally unrelated to the performance of a labour 
                                                 
15
 With such a definition, a very appealing practical suggestion as to how to measure labour market 
flexibility is by using the distance of the Beveridge Curve from the unemployment and vacancies axes 
(see Cheshire, 1973, for an early elaboration on the unemployment/vacancies relation). On the other 
hand, as Solow (1998) acknowledges, there are limitations to the appropriateness of the Beveridge 
Curve as a measure of thus defined labour market flexibility, mainly due to the endogeneity of both 
unemployment and vacancy rates.  
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market purpose. Indeed, most labour laws are introduced to protect the workers from 
firms’ power. Trade unions were formed to allow the workforce to organise and 
negotiate with the employers on a more equal basis. Regulations regarding working 
hours per year, week or day were introduced to reflect the socially acceptable 
standards with respect to work intensity, working time and health and safety. 
Minimum wages were introduced to set minimum levels of “acceptable” labour 
compensations (the minimum value the society gives to a person’s hour of work) and 
unemployment benefits were introduced to provide incomes for those temporarily out 
of employment. In the same way, employment security, insurance contributions and 
redundancy payments were introduced to maximise the inter-temporal security of the 
workforce which, as opposed to employers, is committed to one job and cannot 
diversify its “human capital portfolio” in order to minimise risk. Overall, labour 
market regulations were largely introduced to organise the operation of the labour 
markets in a systematic way, to achieve continuity and establish commonly accepted 
“rules of the game”. This, of course, should benefit both employees and employers.  
Following these considerations, labour market regulation is the set of binding 
arrangements imposed by a government on labour relations in order to achieve a 
number of economic and non-economic outcomes, not necessarily related to the 
labour market itself. Such regulations, however, can adversely affect the operation of 
labour markets and produce greater inefficiencies than those they are supposed to 
prevent. Because of that danger -and under the specific conditions that were created 
after the slowdown of economic growth in the 1970s- labour market deregulation 
became an issue with many advocates and few opponents. Labour market 
deregulation therefore refers to the removal of the technically imposed institutional 
obstacles in the free operation of a labour market, obstacles that are imposed and 
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controlled by governments. It is under this perspective that such issues as Active 
Labour Market Policies (ALMPs: vocational and subsidised on-the-job training, job-
brokering, etc; see Calmfors, 1994), the flexibilisation of the housing and financial 
markets and the reduction of barriers to geographical mobility relate directly to labour 
market deregulation. More importantly, of course, labour market deregulation refers 
to the relaxation of policies that keep minimum wages, hiring and firing costs, costs 
related to overtime and non-wage compensations (maternity leave, paid holidays, sick 
leave, etc) and unemployment benefits at high levels. The objective of labour market 
deregulation is not, however, the complete removal of any form of regulation from 
the labour market and should not be considered as merely a quantitative reduction in 
“rigidities”. As was discussed in the previous chapter, labour market deregulation 
constitutes effectively a re-regulation of labour markets under more flexible and 
(mainly) cost-effective rules. It is thus conceptually different from labour market 
flexibility and not at all symmetrically opposite to labour market regulation.  
 
2.1.3. Regulation, deregulation, flexibility and flexibilisation 
Labour market deregulation is however often confused with what could be 
called “labour market flexibilisation”.16 Nevertheless, the case here is again not 
symmetric. As will be further discussed in the following chapters (and explicitly 
shown in chapter five), labour market deregulation is neither a sufficient nor a 
necessary condition for flexibilisation to occur. First, flexibility in a labour market 
can increase without a change in regulation if other labour market rigidities are 
removed. For example, a reduction in the degree of segmentation (either vertical or 
                                                 
16
 Although we recognise that the term “flexibilisation” is a neologism that is not aesthetically 
appealing, we use it extensively to describe “increases in labour market flexibility”.  
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horizontal) in labour markets would increase sectoral, occupational and (possibly) 
geographic mobility. The result would be a flexibilisation of the labour market. 
Second, labour market deregulation can occur without a subsequent 
flexibilisation of the labour market (Brosnan and Walsh, 1996; Ozaki, 1999). Imagine 
for example that, despite regulations, the extent of part-time employment in a labour 
market is (close to) optimal. Further, imagine that some restrictions are withdrawn so 
that the part-time employment becomes easier to achieve. Naturally, the effect of 
deregulation on employment arrangements and labour market relations in such a 
(hypothetical) case would be negligible.  
A different and perhaps more plausible example is the following. Imagine that 
certain rules regulating fringe benefits were withdrawn (deregulation). Firms would 
have the option to reduce their fringe benefits in order to reduce their (labour) costs. 
If, however, such a reduction led to lower labour supply and a probable reduction in 
workers’ effort, it is possible that this would effectively increase wages and reduce 
output. So, it is possible to assume that a profit-maximising firm would find it more 
profitable to keep the fringe benefits it offers at their pre-deregulation levels, rather 
than reduce them.17 This rationale can probably explain the finding of Addison and 
Hirsch (1997) that the introduction of mandatory advance notices (regulation) in the 
USA in 1989 did not raise the proportion of redundant workers receiving a dismissal 
notice of over than a month in advance (inflexibility). As their estimates suggest, 
8.6% of dismissed workers received a one-month-or-more notice in the six-year 
period prior to regulation, while in the next three years following regulation this 
                                                 
17
 Such an outcome can be formally derived from an insider-outsider or an efficiency wage model. We 
derive a condition for such an outcome under a perfect competition framework in the model we 
develop in chapter five.  
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percentage even dropped slightly to 8.2%. This example points to the fact that 
deregulation proxies flexibility only to the extent that it is used by firms.  
 
Figure 2.1: Labour market regulation, deregulation, flexibility and flexibilisation  
Labour Market
Deregulation
Labour Market Regulation Labour Market Conditions
Labour Market Flexibility
The Labour Market
Labour Market Flexibilisation
 
 
Finally, labour market deregulation can result in the removal of some 
“rigidities” that actually cancel other important inflexibilities. Although this refers 
more to labour market outcomes than to labour market flexibility as such, imagine a 
case where the decentralisation of wage bargaining leads to its restructuring in such a 
way so that an increased number of parties become involved. Prolonged periods of 
bargaining and a potential increase in wage-stickiness can result, especially if the 
centralised bargaining system was characterised by high co-ordination (Calmfors and 
Driffil, 1988; Nickell, 1997a; Traxler and Kittel, 1997).  
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Indeed, for the last two cases one can argue that flexibilisation has in fact 
occurred with the withdrawal of the restrictive regulations, and that flexibility is 
higher, although not directly observed. Such a perspective would, however, create 
further problems for the definition and measurement of labour market flexibility. We 
prefer to think of flexibility more as an outcome, rather than a potentiality, in order to 
simplify the analysis, both theoretically and empirically. This is the perspective we 
employ in the theoretical discussions and empirical investigations that follow.  
To better illustrate this perspective, we summarise our discussion so far, in 
Figure 2.1. Labour market regulation interacts with economic conditions and, 
although both are reshaped by each other, determines the degree of flexibility that 
prevails in the labour market. Labour market conditions can of course trigger changes 
in labour market regulation (deregulation). The labour market response to 
deregulation (flexibilisation) will generate some minor feedback effects to 
deregulation (dotted line) and affect directly the overall degree of flexibility. 
Flexibility, deregulation and flexibilisation will reshape labour market conditions, so 
that a new “equilibrium” of labour market regulation, labour market outcomes and 
labour market flexibility will emerge. 
Before closing this section, it is important to note that such a perspective 
suggests that labour market flexibility is endogenous to labour market conditions. In 
other words, it is not the potentiality of flexible employment arrangements to occur 
that is important, but rather the extent to which such flexible arrangements are 
identifiable in a labour market. The latter will depend on the degree of regulation and 
the specific economic conditions prevailing in the labour market and will affect the 
extent to which regulations are used.  
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2.2. An analytical decomposition of labour market flexibility 
 Having rather extensively discussed the issues of labour market regulation, 
deregulation and flexibility, we now turn to the forms and types of flexibility, to 
reproduce the typologies existing in the literature and discuss the particular elements 
of flexibility. Our examination of the ingredients of flexibility is conducted on three 
levels: first, at a functional level, which provides an investigation of the different 
types of flexibility; second, at a technical level, which facilitates the analysis of the 
various forms of flexibility; and, third, at a practical level, which facilitates the 
discussion of the ways in which flexibility manifests itself in the labour market. A 
detailed table with all the decompositions discussed here is presented in the Appendix 
(Table A.2.1).  
 
2.2.1. Functional decomposition 
From a functional perspective labour market flexibility can be classified as 
numerical and functional, with each of these types further divided into internal and 
external.18 The term “numerical flexibility” refers to a condition where firms can 
easily find the necessary quantities and qualities of labour to adjust to any business 
cycle shifts. “Internal numerical” flexibility refers to the workforce already employed 
by the firm and to the adjustability of their working hours (short shifts, overtime) 
working time (weekly hours, variable shifts), leaves and holidays. “External 
numerical” flexibility refers to the ease with which a firm can adjust its labour input, 
presumably by temporarily employing additional workers. Conversely, “internal 
                                                 
18
 This classification resembles the distinctions produced by the Institute of Manpower Studies 
(Atkinson (1984; Meager, 1985; Atkinson and Meager, 1986). In their model, however, functional 
flexibility was mostly identified as internal, while numerical flexibility was considered external. A 
third type of financial flexibility, which here we consider external to the labour market and do not 
discuss, was also identified.  
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functional” flexibility refers to the “ability of companies to improve their operating 
efficiency by reorganising the methods of production and labour content 
(multiskilling, decreases in job demarcations, increased employee involvement) in 
order to keep pace with changing [demand conditions or] technological needs” 
(Koshiro, 1992, p.14). “External functional” flexibility refers to the ability of firms to 
externalise some parts of their production (vertical disintegration) and possibly 
diversify their production, mainly through sub-contracting.   
 
2.2.2. Technical decomposition 
 While such a classification of the various functional types of flexibility is 
useful, further analysis is needed to obtain a clearer picture of what labour market 
flexibility actually refers to. Such an analysis is facilitated by the technical 
decomposition of labour market flexibility. From a technical (or “economic-theory”) 
perspective, labour market flexibility can be understood as the extent to which market 
forces are allowed to operate freely in three broad domains. These domains can be 
labelled as “production function flexibility”, “labour costs flexibility” and “supply-
side flexibility”. Alternatively, one can regard these three domains as “institutional 
flexibility”, “wage flexibility” and “individual flexibility”, respectively (Dawes, 
1993). Each of these domains consists of smaller sub-domains, as illustrated in Figure 
2.2.  
Production-function flexibility can be divided into “flexibility in the labour 
input” (adjustability of labour input to changing economic conditions) and “flexibility 
in the work content”.19 Labour-costs flexibility can be divided into “flexibility in non-
                                                 
19
 Note that these two categories closely resemble the distinction between numerical and functional 
flexibility, respectively. However, this is a different classification. For example, although sub-
contracting would be classified as (external) functional flexibility from a functional perspective, from a 
technical perspective it would fall into the “labour input” category.   
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wage costs” and “pay flexibility”. The latter can be further decomposed into 
“flexibility in the determination of the reservation wage” and “(average) wage 
flexibility”.  Finally, supply-side flexibility can be split into “labour mobility” and 
“flexibility in skills acquisition”.  
 
Figure 2.2: Technical decomposition of labour market flexibility 
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We will return to these categories after a practical account of the different 
elements constituting labour market flexibility has been made. At present, three 
points are noteworthy. First, these seven “bottom-line” categories identified in 
technical terms include elements that are not exclusively attached to any particular 
category. For example, deregulation in hiring-and-firing legislation can increase both 
flexibility in non-wage costs and flexibility in the labour input, by reducing (non-
wage) labour costs and increasing labour turnover, respectively. Second, categories 
identified from a technical perspective do not exactly correspond to a specific 
category from the functional decomposition. Some elements of supply-side flexibility 
can thus be better viewed as functional (e.g., occupational mobility), while others 
refer to numerical flexibility (e.g., sectoral mobility). Third, this technical 
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decomposition allows us to scrutinise the specific targets that each category of labour 
market flexibility is supposed to reach. Some of the categories presented in Figure 2.2 
refer mainly to pure labour market flexibility (defined as the degree of adjustability to 
changing economic conditions). Such categories would be what we defined above as 
pay and supply-side flexibility as well as most elements of production-function 
flexibility. Most of the latter would also be relevant in a productivity-enhancement 
context, as would be (a few) elements of flexibility in non-wage costs, although these 
fit almost entirely to a third target, that of cost-reduction. These three targets of 
labour market flexibility will be further discussed later, together with our practical 
decomposition of flexibility and re illustrated in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Elements of flexibility, by target and technical category 
                 Flexibility 
                      targets 
Technical    
Categories 
 
“Pure” flexibility 
 
 
Enhancement of 
labour productivity 
 
Reduction of 
labour costs 
Labour input Irregular hours, Shift 
work, Working time, 
Weekends, Temping, 
Dismissal protection 
(Negative effects) Alternative, Part-time 
and Home-work, 
Irregular hours, Temps, 
Dismissal protection 
Work content Multi-tasking, Within-
job occ/tional mobility, 
Job demarcations 
Multi-tasking, Within-
job occupational 
mobility 
Multi-tasking, Job 
demarcations 
Reservation wage Duration of benefits, 
Minimum wages, 
Replacement rate 
(Duration of benefits, 
Replacement rate) 
 
Minimum wages, 
Replacement rate 
 
Wage flexibility Co-ordination (unions-
firms), Structure of wage 
bargaining, Union 
(coverage, density, 
power), Wage flexibility 
Union power Co-ordination (unions-
firms), Structure of 
wage bargaining 
Non-wage costs Dismissal and empl. 
protection, Employees 
representation rights,  
Labour standards 
Employment 
protection, Labour 
standards 
Dismissal and empl. 
protection, Labour 
standards 
 
Labour mobility Housing flexibility, Job 
mobility / Tenure, 
Occupational, Regional 
and Sectoral mobility 
Regional and Sectoral 
mobility 
Job mobility / Tenure, 
Occupational mobility 
Skills acquisition ALMPs, Educational 
attainment, Training 
ALMPs, Educational 
attainment, Training 
Training 
 
Note: In parenthesis are listed elements that are not straightforwardly expected to be related to a 
target, but for which there is debate in the literature about their potential connection.  
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Before turning to the specific elements that constitute labour market 
flexibility, we must mention the distinction among the various sources of flexibility. 
Labour market flexibility can be the outcome of government legislation (labour 
market regulation and deregulation), collective bargaining (trade unions), changes in 
firm behaviour, or changes in the behaviour of the workforce (Ozaki, 1999). While 
the second source of flexibility is rather common in some countries (Denmark and 
Holland, usually with the consultation of -and sometimes the pressure from- 
government), the most common sources of flexibility are labour market deregulation 
and unilateral changes in firms behaviour. Changes in the behaviour of the workforce 
(for example, workers investing in multi-skilling and becoming more mobile) are 
more of a theoretical possibility than an identifiable reality, at least outside the area of 
self-employment. The fact that flexibility and flexibilisation are dominated almost 
entirely by the acts of the firms and the state, together with the fact that much of what 
is perceived as flexibilisation is in effect productivity-enhancing and cost-reduction 
strategies, has led to the identification of the search for flexibility with “the idea of 
labour being flexible in the interests of capital” (Atkinson, 1987, p.98). As one strong 
critic of labour market flexibility puts it, “[t]he notion of flexibility, then, becomes 
something of an ideological fetish” (Hyman, 1991, p.281). We will talk about these 
issues in detail in the next section. We now turn to a detailed presentation of the list 
of elements that constitute labour market flexibility.  
   
2.2.3. Practical decomposition 
From a practical perspective, there are many elements that fit into the notion 
of labour market flexibility. The discussion of this sub-section cannot be exhaustive, 
as a full account of all possible elements of labour market flexibility would require 
Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Economic Performance 
 
51
much more space than we can actually devote to it here. However, we will cover most 
areas at least briefly.  
Our technical decomposition illustrated the main elements that labour market 
flexibility is conventionally thought to include. We present a fairly extensive list of 
these elements in Table A.2.1, with reference to the targets that such elements are 
primarily meant to meet. One group of elements includes non-standard employment 
arrangements that allow a firm to employ workers while simultaneously avoiding a 
permanent commitment and the non-wage costs that such a commitment might entail. 
Elements included in this category of “flexible employment” are part-time work,20 
temporary placements (fixed-term contracts or contracts over a fixed task), seasonal 
work, sub-contracting and casual employment (irregular or occasional work).  
These non-standard employment arrangements also connect to elements 
related to the “casualisation of employment”, with the deregulation of dismissal 
protection (job security). Such elements make the permanency of a job less secure 
and dismissals less costly. Consequently, the labour input becomes cheaper (lower 
non-wage costs) and therefore more responsive to demand and general economic 
conditions.  
Another group includes what we could attach to the labour-input and internal 
numerical flexibility categories. This group, characterised by the ILO as “working-
time flexibility” (Osaki, 1999), includes flexibility in overtime, working hours and 
working time, shift-work and work on weekends. Such elements of flexibility 
represent the ability of firms to adjust their labour inputs upwards or downwards 
without any additional costs.  
                                                 
20
 To the extent that part-time work is contracted on an open-ended (permanent) basis, it could be 
included in the next group as well.  
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Hence, relaxation of the regulations covering (paid) overtimes, maximum 
working hours per week and per day, maximum days per week, the continuity of the 
working day (shift-work) and of the working week (weekend-working) allow firms to 
adjust internally their labour inputs and distribute them more evenly, so as to achieve 
continuity of production and respond immediately to demand changes. An example of 
such an arrangement would be the annualisation of working time, with which 
overtime is no longer calculated on a weekly basis and weekly hours can vary 
substantially, sometimes including a week’s holiday per month in return for weekend 
work or longer workdays.  
Multi-tasking, which often includes team-working and within-job 
occupational mobility, is also a means of internally adjusting labour inputs, although 
it mainly refers to the content of work. As an example, imagine a firm with a number 
of secretaries, which needs occasional book-keeping services. The firm could either 
sub-contract this service, hire an occasional, temporary or part-time employee, or re-
train one of its secretarial employees to occasionally provide this service (overcoming 
occupational demarcations through skill enhancement). The last option would 
additionally reduce costs (and increase productivity), especially if the secretarial staff 
was not fully utilised (labour hoarding). Additional elements of flexibility that could 
also facilitate multi-skilling and occupational mobility are increased training 
provision (on-the-job and government-provided job-related training) and higher 
educational attainment. This group of “supply-side” flexibility elements allows firms 
to use more fully (the skills of) their workforce and probably more flexibly organise 
their production process. But to the extent that changing demand conditions do not 
require that, this only serves a cost-reduction purpose. A special category within this 
group is Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs). Such policies can increase the 
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employability of the unemployed (especially the long-term unemployed), increase 
job-matching (hence, productivity) and help firms overcome skill-shortages that can 
increase labour costs (wages) and hinder production efficiency. 
Related to the above is a group of elements that fall under the general title of 
labour mobility. This list includes occupational, sectoral, regional and job mobility, as 
well as flexibility in the housing market. All these are pretty much supply-side 
elements, although both firms and governments can offer incentives to enhance 
labour mobility. These elements mainly guarantee the unrestricted operation of 
“market forces” that compel the labour market into an equilibrium any time a 
deviation occurs. Flexibility in the housing market (and, hence, housing market 
deregulation) is included here as it removes barriers to mobility (in space and, 
consequently, across jobs) for the workforce. Flexibility in labour standards includes 
a wide range of elements, of which employee representation rights, working 
conditions, health and safety regulations, the right to organise (unionism), regulated 
breaks, paid leave (sickness or maternity) and holidays, are the most significant. All 
these elements largely represent extra production costs. They also include, however, 
aspects related to the adjustability of the labour input (breaks, working hours) and of 
labour costs (working conditions, holidays) and their deregulation, therefore, is a 
source of flexibility. As we shall see in the model we develop in chapter five, labour 
standards (non-wage costs) can be adjusted depending on market conditions, despite 
the degree of regulation (which, however, provides a lower floor).  
For theory, however, the most important elements of flexibility are those 
related to the determination of (minimum and average) wages. First among them is 
wage flexibility, or the elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment. This is a 
much less institutional element, as it depends on a plethora of factors that affect the 
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operation of the (labour) market. It is related, however, to the reservation wage and 
the system of wage determination. Wage determination involves at least three 
elements: decentralisation (or individualisation) of wage bargaining, reduced trade 
union power (as well as densities and coverage rates), and co-ordination among 
unions and among employers in the bargaining process. Trade unions apply upward 
wage pressures (with potential negative employment effects) and make wages 
stickier, thus reducing their (downward) adjustability with respect to unemployment. 
Co-ordination in wage bargaining can unify the otherwise sectorally and regionally 
segmented labour markets and help regional and sectoral specificities be accounted 
for in the wage bargaining process, especially when the latter is decentralised. 
Decentralised wage bargaining recognises the existing differences in profitability and 
final demand for different sectors and firms and allows the equal growth of all sectors 
in the economy by producing sector-specific wage equilibria.  
Flexibility in the determination of reservation wages is directly related to a 
lowering of minimum wages and the levels and duration of unemployment benefits. 
Hence, this group of flexibility elements is effectively a (labour) cost-reduction 
policy, although it also helps reduce reservation wages, increase labour supply and, 
more importantly, increase the unemployment elasticity of wages. A final cost-related 
element of flexibility is (reductions in) payroll taxes. This is sometimes a large 
component of the so-called “wedge” (the difference between production and 
consumption wages).21 Reducing the wedge can increase labour demand and supply, 
thus stimulating economic activity and impelling labour market outcomes (wages and 
employment) to be increasingly responsive to (and more reflective of) general 
economic conditions.  
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With this discussion of the various constituent elements of labour market 
flexibility we conclude this section on the decomposition of flexibility into its 
discrete parts. In the next section we attempt an organic synthesis by placing the 
relevant elements into a more structural framework.  
 
2.3. The “flexible firm”? the relationship between the different 
elements of flexibility 
 In the previous section we saw what constitutes labour market flexibility. We 
decomposed flexibility into its descriptive elements and provided further aggregations 
based on functional, technical and other classifications (i.e., targets and sources). 
Here we explore how and whether all these elements can be integrated into a model 
of labour market behaviour and managerial strategies. The literature does not offer 
many insights on the issue, as this is too complicated to be convincingly described by 
one single model. Thus, our present inquiry is more exploratory than conclusive.  
In general, one can identify three theoretical perspectives in which to fit the 
stylised facts of the patterns and forms of flexibility discussed so far.22 The most 
thorough and analytical attempt dates from the mid-1980s, to the work of the -then- 
Institute of Manpower Studies (now Institute for Employment Studies). In a series of 
studies (Atkinson, 1984 and 1985; Meager, 1985; Atkinson and Meager, 1986) a 
model of a “flexible firm” was developed and relevant evidence was provided to 
explain the changing patterns of labour use and labour market flexibility. A divergent 
second perspective considers such changing patterns as the outcomes of fundamental 
socio-economic changes: a number of causal factors, not necessarily organically 
integrated, rather than the implementation of specific strategies by “flexible firms” 
                                                                                                                                           
21
 There are enormous differences in the payroll tax rate among countries, varying for example (for the 
1989-1994 period) from 0.6% in Denmark to 40.2% in Italy.  
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are what drive these changes. Such a perspective is compatible with the view of firms 
as having “a distinctively non-strategic approach to labour use” (Hunter et al, 1993, 
p.401).  
A third approach considers such changes (labour market flexibilisation) as a 
wider “strategy” outside the firm. This category could include non-economic 
approaches (political theory and sociology) as well as non-orthodox economic 
approaches (flexible specialisation, regulationist, marxist, neo-institutional). 
According to such approaches, a specific strategy exists for changing patterns of 
labour exploitation, organisation of production and regulation of socio-economic 
relations. This strategy, however, is beyond the scope of the firm. In other words, 
these changes occur at the level of the firm but are inspired at and instigated from the 
wider social and economic arena. We present and briefly discuss each of these 
approaches below.  
 
2.3.1. The “flexible firm” 
 The model of the “flexible firm” (Atkinson, 1985; Atkinson and Meager, 
1986) suggests that firms consciously move from traditional labour use strategies to 
more flexible ones. Under the pressure of increasing economic uncertainty, higher 
competition and technological change, firms tend to favour a division between a 
“core” of permanent employees who enjoy (relative) job security and probably higher 
wages and a “periphery” of temporary employees with low labour standards (and 
wages). Firms deploy such a strategy in order to enhance their ability to adjust their 
labour use, responding quickly and with little costs to changes in demand or in the 
organisation of production. This strategy generates a dichotomy between an internal 
                                                                                                                                           
22
 Pollert (1991) offers a similar classification (of three theoretical perspectives) to ours.  
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labour market of core workers and an external labour market of peripheral workers. 
Firm strategies go further to apply new measures of functional flexibility to the core 
workforce, while using the external labour market to satisfy their need for numerical 
flexibility.  
 
Figure 2.3: The Flexible Firm Model 
 
As Figure 2.2 shows, outside the core group there are three peripheral 
categories.23 The first includes all workers employed on a part-time basis or under 
job-sharing arrangements. This part of semi-core workers normally works irregular 
hours in order for the firm to meet its numerical flexibility goals. The second group 
includes workers on fixed-term and task-related contracts and constitutes the typical 
external workforce, which has no options for promotion or any further involvement 
within the firm. In the periphery of these two groups is a third group consisting of 
sub-contractors, agency temps, trainees and the self-employed. This group is an 
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external labour market, which is not specific to the firm and to which the firm has no 
commitment other than that deriving from the specific production arrangement 
(contracted task). 
To summarise, the flexible firm model predicts a structural trend of firms 
consciously developing a strategy where various forms of flexibility are technically 
constructed. Internal functional flexibility is achieved by the technical construction of 
the core workforce; (semi-)internal numerical flexibility is offered by the first 
peripheral group (part-timers); external numerical flexibility is offered by the second 
peripheral group (temporary employees); and external functional flexibility is 
achieved by the utilisation of the external peripheral group (sub-contractors). Further, 
with this segmentation of the workforce, the flexible firm can also achieve pay-
flexibility and non-wage costs flexibility, simply by altering the shares of each of the 
groups of workers in its total workforce. Union representation and power will also 
decline, sometimes by more than the extent to which the core workforce is reduced.24 
 
2.3.2. The “non-strategic” approach 
It is no exaggeration to say that the main critiques of the flexible firm model 
are data-oriented. A number of empirical studies have indeed found that the pay and 
labour standard conditions within the different groups of peripheral workers are not 
so homogenous as to support a core-periphery model (Hunter et al, 1993; Gallie et al., 
1998; Pollert, 1988). Survey evidence also strongly suggests that the increased use of 
temporary and contingent forms of employment is unrelated to any shifts from 
                                                                                                                                           
23
 The model actually presented here is based on Errington and Gasson (1996) and is a modified 
version of Atkinson’s (1985) original model, in that it explicitly takes into account the heterogeneity of 
the various forms of peripheral employment.  
24
 This is expected, as it is assumed that only core workers can in the long run be union members. As 
their numbers decline, so will union density. As union power increases geometrically with union 
density, the decline in unionisation rates will lead to a stronger decline in union power.  
Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Economic Performance 
 
59
traditional firm strategies to newer, flexible ones (Hunter et al., 1993; Wood and 
Smith, 1989; Casey, 1988 and 1991; Walsh, 1991). A pragmatic, random and non-
strategic approach is what seems to drive firm behaviour.  
If there is no firm-specific strategy to explain the increasing labour market 
flexibility, then one might have to look at the various economic and non-economic 
forces for a coherent explanation (Hakim, 1987).25 From this perspective, firms 
respond to changing economic and technological conditions and to increased 
uncertainty by changing what can be called their “aggregate flexibility” (Gallie et al., 
1998). Simultaneously, the same forces that lead firms to enhance their aggregate 
flexibility also create the conditions for specific forms of flexibility to emerge. This 
would include “institutional” flexibility (labour market deregulation) and “supply-
side” flexibility. As an example of the latter, a high probability of someone 
experiencing long-term unemployment would make her more willing to accept a part-
time or temporary job. Firms exploit that opportunity in order to increase their 
aggregate flexibility, but flexibility at the individual level is not altered. For the 
individual part-timer, stability rather than flexibility is the norm.  
Gallie et al. (1998), using information from the Employment in Britain 
Survey, provide the most recent evidence revealing that workers normally perceived 
as the “peripheral workforce” do not experience severely different levels of job-
insecurity, pay, task, or even working-time flexibility. This, despite the fact that pay 
(especially non-wage compensations) is on average lower for this group of workers. 
 
                                                 
25
 We do not discuss here this part of the literature extensively, as it does not help us perform the 
“organic synthesis of the various forms and types of labour market flexibility”, which is in fact the 
purpose of this section. A very good presentation of the market and institutional forces that necessitate 
and hinder the flexibilisation of the labour markets from a (new) political economy perspective, can be 
found in Saint-Paul (1996).   
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 Such an analysis therefore suggests that firms deploy strategies merely to 
reduce their (labour) costs (the “cost-reduction target” that we discussed earlier) and 
increase their production flexibility on aggregate. However, the implementation of 
these strategies does not imply the existence of a strategic approach to labour use 
methods or to production organisation.  
The same results were obtained by Hunter et al (1993) in their analysis of the 
Employers’ Labour Use Strategies and Workplace Industrial Relations surveys. 
Moreover, their analysis suggested that, rather than complying with a “horizontal 
segmentation” (within-firms) scenario as dictated by the flexible firm model, to the 
extent that firms had a strategic approach to their labour use, this was more of a 
vertical segmentation (between firms). This in turn supports the argument about the 
aggregate-versus-individual flexibility made above. Firms might be making 
increasing use of “flexible” forms of employment (and this might be enhancing their 
internal, external, numerical, functional and pay flexibility on aggregate), but this is 
not occurring under a specific and organised managerial strategy. Rather, it seems as 
an opportunistic response to changes in competitiveness, technology and even 
ideology. Hence, the conclusion based on this approach suggests that the existence of 
a clear trend -not to mention strategy- of within-firm “flexibilisation of labour use” 
cannot be sustained.  
 
2.3.3. Structuralist approaches 
 Although equally critical of the flexible firm model, the third approach 
examined here does not support the view of a pragmatic but non-strategic firm 
behaviour. As noted earlier, this approach is less homogenous and includes 
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perspectives as diverse as the marxist “labour exploitation” and the (post-modernist) 
“flexible specialisation” theses.  
 For the latter and largely for the post-Fordist regulation approaches,26 
flexibility is conceptualised as the outcome of the decline of the “Fordist” firms and 
spatial production systems (large industrial cities), or the erosion of Fordism as a 
mode of accumulation and method of regulation (Scott, 1988b; Scott and Cook, 1988; 
Storper and Scott, 1990; Vazquez-Barquero, 1992; Granados-Cabezas, 1992; Amin, 
1994). With this decline and erosion, alternative production systems begin to 
gradually dominate. Such systems are flexibly specialised and spatially unique. 
Storper and Scott (1990) identify six new complementary organisational structures of 
production, which facilitate various forms of flexibility: labour-intensive flexible 
specialisation; technology-intensive flexible specialisation; semi-continuous serial 
production; systems house manufacturing; de-skilled service production; and 
professional and managerial team-work. To avoid grappling with unnecessary details, 
the main argument states that (previously dominant) large trans-national corporations 
(TNCs) encounter the limits of Fordism and react by reducing their (internal) 
employment and externalising their production. Depending on “local responsiveness”, 
small businesses will grow, thus creating a network of self-employment, sub-
contracting, part-timing, temping and home-working. A new production system (of a 
small “core” workforce and a larger more dynamic “peripheral” flexible workforce) 
will emerge, leading us to observe on aggregate a flexibilisation of the labour market.  
 
                                                 
26
 There are important differences between these two approaches. We overlook them, however, quite 
arbitrarily for ease of presentation. Observable differences exist also within each of these perspectives. 
Although the examination of these differences is interesting, we avoid considering them here and 
restrict ourselves to the relevant discussions of chapter one. Interested readers can refer to the editorial 
of Amin (1994) and the critical discussion of Brenner and Glick (1991).  
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With the decline in core employment, “new forms of work and of conditions 
of employment” prevail, manifesting themselves as multi-skilling (reduced job-
demarcations), work-intensification (overtime), decentralised wage bargaining and 
union de-recognition (Hudson, 1989, p.8). Hence, the global-local interplay gives 
birth to a new dualism: core workers in TNCs and peripheral workers in “local” 
enterprises, with a consequent erosion of unionism and labour standards.27 In the 
words of one of the flexible specialisation analysts, “productive adjustment would 
appear through new forms of capital accumulation that make the production processes 
and the functioning of the labour markets more flexible” (Vazquez-Barquero, 1992, 
p.33). We do not want to further expand on the global-local and flexible 
specialisation debates here. Here, we merely want to point out the relevance of certain 
aspects of these debates to the organic understanding of (the various elements of) 
labour market flexibility.   
 Turning to the marxist approaches to labour market flexibility -and avoiding 
other perspectives, such as the German analysis of “new production concepts” (see 
Hyman, 1991)- the main question addressed is the degree of novelty and indeed the 
analytical validity of the notion of flexibility. For such approaches, labour market 
flexibility was always present (for a non-marxist elaboration on that, see Peck, 1992). 
Prior to keynesianism, the almost complete lack of regulation in labour relations had 
allowed maximum degrees of “flexibility”. Such flexibility, of course, is for marxists 
nothing more than pure labour exploitation for the creation of surplus value. In the 
keynesian period, this exploitation took the form of a vast utilisation of cheap 
immigrant labour and native female and agricultural labour, assisted by the pre-
conditions for growth that emerged after the Second World War (Mandel, 1972). 
                                                 
27
 This is also consistent with the “between” segmentation thesis discussed earlier.  
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These factors allowed for the stabilisation (and often expansion) of the rate of profit 
and simultaneously of employment, work arrangements and labour standards.  
With the new crises of the 1970s, the increased uncertainty of the 1980s and 
the consequent decline in the rates of profit, capital sought new ways of increasing 
labour exploitation.28 In this respect, all the forms and types of flexibility reviewed 
above are alternatives in a continuous search for increased labour exploitation. The 
re-emergence of labour market flexibility simply “represents the re-imposition of old 
‘hire and fire’ strategies as the position of labour in the market becomes seriously 
weakened” (Hudson, 1989, p.15). This shift has been largely assisted by the re-
emergence of neo-liberal ideology and the changing role of the state, from a mediator 
and advocate of worker rights, to a facilitator of the interests of capital (Hyman, 
1998). The emerging “new” forms of flexibility, then, are random outcomes of a 
“strategic” and organised attempt to increase labour exploitation. They are random 
because there is not an underlying managerial model of labour use or a governmental 
plan of the configuration of social relations behind them. And they are strategic 
because these changes are endogenous (historically-specific) to the present phase of 
capitalist development.   
 
2.4. Labour market (de)regulation in the UK and the OECD 
 In this section we proceed to a synoptic overview of the main labour market 
reforms and evolutions in the OECD and the UK in particular. We do not intend to 
make a full account of the changing conditions in the labour markets of these 
                                                 
28
 From such a perspective, the contemporary anti-immigration policies (both proactive and reactive), 
especially in the USA and the EU, can be viewed as a reaction to the re-emergence of a once 
welcomed socio-economic phenomenon, which has now reached its limits (played its historical role). 
To sustain peace and balance in contemporary advanced societies, while simultaneously ensuring its 
own sustainability and reproducibility, capitalism requires new forms of labour exploitation to replace 
older ones. Such forms of exploitation can be found in the “flexibilisation of the labour markets”.  
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countries. Rather, the purpose is to present a number of general trends and specific 
country experiences relating to the issues discussed in this chapter. Despite the 
distinctions drawn in the previous sections, in what follows we use the terms 
flexibility and deregulation somewhat arbitrarily. Furthermore, and in complete 
analogy, the term regulation will be occasionally used to represent both regulation as 
such and inflexibility. This is done only to simplify our discussion here. The basic 
distinctions between the terms should however be born in mind at all times. In 
complement with the discussion here, in the third section of chapter four we review 
the OECD labour market experiences. Furthermore, in chapter seven we provide a 
rather detailed list of labour market reforms (deregulation) in the UK and analytically 
present the evolution of labour market flexibility in the UK regions, based on the 
flexibility indexes we constructed. 
 Consistent with its wider political tradition, the UK has never had a vast set of 
rules and regulations governing its labour market, at least not in the forms of hiring-
and-firing, working-time, employment-contracts or wage-bargaining regulations 
(Nickell, 1997b). This is unlike the experience of other OECD countries (for 
example, the Scandinavian countries, Spain, France and the Netherlands), where 
labour relations were traditionally much more under the control of the state. Most of 
these countries have introduced in the last two decades various measures in their 
labour markets to achieve enhanced flexibility. However, the UK -together with the 
USA and, to a minor extent, Canada, Australia and New Zealand- is thought to have 
introduced the most severe deregulation measures and to have one of the more 
flexible labour markets. Deterioration in the treatment of the unemployed, with 
reductions in the levels and duration of unemployment benefits, is clearly identifiable 
(although to different extents and with additional qualitative differences) for all 
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OECD countries. In many countries, a concurrent increase in spending on Active 
Labour Market Policies (training, job-brokering, etc.) has accompanied the reduced 
spending on traditional (passive) labour market policies (OECD, 1994; Jackman, 
1995; Martin, 1998).  
The UK does indeed stand among the more flexible labour markets, together 
with the USA, New Zealand, Canada and Denmark (OECD, 1994 and 1997). These 
countries have the most flexible arrangements concerning temporary employment 
(broadly defined), parental leave, labour standards and employment protection 
legislation (Nickell and Layard, 1998). Conversely, Finland, Norway, France, Italy, 
Germany and Belgium have rather strict laws regarding both labour standards and 
employment arrangements (OECD, 2000). There are small differences in these 
classifications regarding the treatment of unemployed, minimum wages and union 
recognition and power. But if we look at rates of change in labour market flexibility 
(flexibilisation), a quite different picture is revealed. The Netherlands, Italy, Belgium 
and Spain have introduced a number of measures to reduce the real level of minimum 
wages and facilitate alternative forms of employment (OECD, 1998). In contrast, the 
UK -while embarking in a strong deregulation path during the 1980s- has recently 
(re)introduced a minimum wage and restrictions on working hours.29 In 1994 the 
government expanded employment protection to cover part-time employees (Saint-
Paul, 1996). Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands are gradually moving 
towards more flexible and decentralised wage-bargaining systems and –although with 
major differences in the way changes occur- so do the USA, the UK, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand (OECD, 1997). Only a few European countries remain 
relatively rigid in this respect (Spain, Italy). 
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  Of course, looking at changes in regulation is not as informative as 
examining actual changes in the patterns of labour commitment and employment 
relations, as was indicated by our previous discussion of the conceptual and practical 
differences between flexibilisation and deregulation. Changes in labour relations are, 
however, much more difficult to identify and measure than institutional changes, 
despite the latter’s qualitative nature. Information about functional flexibility, in 
particular (and especially its internal flexibility aspects), is difficult to obtain even 
with the most detailed survey data. Some evidence indicates that job-demarcations 
have declined and multi-tasking and multi-skilling have increased, although in many 
cases these trends are industry-specific. Ozaki (1999) suggests that these trends have 
been slower in the Anglo-Saxon countries, where occupational segmentation is 
traditionally stronger. New Zealand managed to successfully overcome its rigidities 
and has seen in the 1990s a substantial reduction in job-demarcations and an 
equivalent increase in multi-skilling (NZIER, 1996). Multi-skilling has also advanced 
relatively fast in France, Germany and Norway. For the UK, Evans (1999) found that 
occupational upgrading and downgrading does not follow a clear time-trend, but 
depends on the business cycle. Finally, a clear trend of increasing work intensification 
is reported by Burchell et al (1999), for the case of the UK in the 1990s.  
A clear increasing trend can also be identified for part-time employment, sub-
contracting and self-employment (these are mainly indicators of numerical flexibility, 
with self-employment also potentially proxying for external functional flexibility), 
both in the UK and the OECD in general (Casey, 1988; Boli, 1997; OECD, 2000). 
Using data from the OECD and the European Commission, Ozaki (1999) has shown 
                                                                                                                                           
29
 The UK had up to 1992 a form of sector-specific minimum wages based on the Wage Councils (see 
Dickens et al., 1995).   
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that -with the exception of the USA, Sweden, Spain and Norway- the incidence of 
part-time employment increased in all OECD countries between 1985 and 1995.30 
The incidence of temporary employment, contrary to widely held notions, was fairly 
constant in many OECD countries (Belgium, Germany, Japan, Sweden), at least until 
the early 1990s. In the UK the share of temporary employment to total employment 
was around six percentage points throughout the 1980s (Casey 1991). But in the 
1990s temporary employment exhibited an increasing trend (Watson, 1994; Gallie et 
al. 1998). Hunter et al (1993) suggest a small increase in temporary employment 
(around 0.6% per year). In Australia and New Zealand broadly defined non-standard 
forms of employment have increased sharply, accounting by 1995 for around 30% of 
total employment, while temporary employment in particular also increased in 
France, Spain and the Netherlands (Ozaki, 1999).  
Although data on changes in flexible work practices are especially difficult to 
obtain, evidence suggests that countries with high levels of shift-work and weekend-
work (UK, USA, Spain) tend to also have the faster expansion of these arrangements 
(Grubb and Wells, 1993). Generally, however, the growth of non-standard working 
times is rather slow. The incidence of working irregular hours (as measured by the 
extent of annualised hours contracts, weekend working and the like) increased sharply 
in the 1990s in the Oceania countries, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Regarding 
wage flexibility, as measured by the unemployment elasticity of (log) wages, the 
evidence is limited. Some evidence for the UK suggests that the responsiveness of 
wages with respect to unemployment has increased during the 1980s (Jackman and 
Savouri, 1991; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994a; Armstrong and Blackaby, 1998). 
                                                 
30
 Some authors attribute this increase to the rising labour force participation of married women. 
However, even to the extent that this is true, it is difficult to establish which of the two trends is 
endogenous, that is, whether the increase in part-timing is supply- or demand-driven.  
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An increasing responsiveness of wages to unemployment also seemed to describe 
Germany in the 1990s, although German wages in the 1980s were rather rigid. 
Compared to other EU countries the unemployment elasticity of wages is in general 
higher in France, Italy and probably the Netherlands (Layard et al., 1991). 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) have also found (statistically) significant 
unemployment elasticities of wages for the USA, Canada, Switzerland, Australia and 
Norway. Performance-related pay, another form of wage flexibility, is increasingly 
common across firms in Italy, France, New Zealand, the USA and the UK, but is less 
important in Norway, Canada and the Netherlands.  
In retrospect, there has been a relatively clear trend of labour market 
deregulation across all OECD countries during the last two decades and especially 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Anglo-Saxon countries have in general 
more flexible labour markets than continental European countries, although 
significant differences do exist among different countries in their experiences with 
respect to specific elements of flexibility. The same is true for the trends towards 
labour market flexibilisation. Flexibility has increased in many respects in all OECD 
countries, especially flexibility referring to the internal and external adjustment of 
firms’ labour inputs. Conclusions regarding the trends in functional flexibility are 
more difficult to draw as are conclusions regarding pay flexibility. The reduction, 
however, in employment security, minimum wages and unemployment benefits can 
actually be identified as a common OECD trend.  
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2.5. Concluding remarks 
 This chapter has explored in detail the nature, forms, types and patterns of 
labour market regulation, deregulation, flexibility and flexibilisation. Despite the fact 
that a large literature encompassing these issues exists today, a detailed and coherent 
analysis from a perspective as wide as that which is employed here is hardly found in 
any of the relevant works. As noted in the introduction, the structure of this chapter 
was developed around four questions: what is labour market flexibility; which are its 
constituent elements; how are they organised and integrated into a wider paradigm of 
socio-economic behaviour; and how do the facts relate to the theoretical 
considerations. We now summarise our discussion thus far and draw some general 
conclusions. 
 Because of the numerous and rather diverse elements that are naturally 
thought to constitute the concepts of (de)regulation and flexibility, it is difficult to 
give a widely accepted definition of these terms. A very broad definition of flexibility 
is that flexibility refers to a high degree of responsiveness by the economy to 
exogenous economic and technological factors. Accordingly, deregulation can be 
defined as the withdrawal of institutional and political arrangements from the 
determination of economic outcomes. As we have seen, however, many of the aspects 
of flexibility are related to increased labour market intervention by the state, in that 
new institutional arrangements are introduced and enforced in the organisation of 
employment and production. In this respect, labour market deregulation is nothing 
more than a change in regulation and effectively a re-regulation of the labour markets 
(Streeck, 1989). Accordingly, labour market flexibility and flexibilisation are chiefly 
a new set of arrangements prevailing in the labour markets and governing labour 
relations, which help reduce labour costs and intensify labour use.  
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 The classification of the various elements of labour market flexibility is no 
less problematic, because one can organise a classification of these elements from 
many perspectives. Classifications can often conflict one another. For example, it is 
widely believed that increased flexibility is connected to a higher incidence of 
temporary employment and sub-contracting. But it is also often argued that many of 
these forms of non-standard employment have been present for many decades and are 
not at all “new” forms of employment arrangements. The appealing functionalist 
categorisation of flexibility becomes quite problematic when attempting to attach 
specific elements of flexibility (e.g., temping and part-timing) to specific theoretical 
categories (e.g., internal and external functional and numerical flexibility).  
Furthermore, conflicts also exist between different elements of flexibility as 
such. For example, internal functional flexibility is related to higher job-tenure (lower 
labour mobility), training on job-specific skills and the construction of an internal 
labour market. So, flexibility can occur with a concurrent standardisation of 
employment relationships, which stands in contrast to the view that flexibility is 
related to the casualisation of the employment relationship (Hunter et al., 1993). In 
other words, labour market flexibilisation can include both an increase in non-
standard employment and an increase in job-tenure.  
Moreover, conceptual complications also arise at the level of theory and the 
attempt to identify the structural characteristics of the hypothesised “new paradigm” 
of flexible labour relations, as it is less evident that a new paradigm actually exists. 
Our discussion of the various theoretical approaches to the issue of flexibility, 
presented in section 2.3 illustrated this situation. There is little empirical evidence to 
support the thesis of a “flexible firm”, even though this model can explain the 
simultaneous increase of job-tenure and firm-specific skills acquisition on the one 
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hand, and non-standard forms of employment on the other. The concept of the 
flexible firm is rather vulnerable to theoretical critiques and the flexible firm model 
has attracted such critiques from a wide range of approaches.  
Yet, it is far from clear which are the exact conditions leading to specific 
changes in the organisation of labour markets, and ultimately manifesting themselves 
as “labour market flexibility”. Although an almost absolute consent exists about the 
trends of labour market flexibility over the last two decades being triggered by 
changes in the international economy,31 approaches to the specific processes and 
mechanisms that are actually activated differ substantially. Among others, the 
humanitarian approach of a pragmatic and reactive behaviour model of the firm and 
the structuralist approaches of flexible accumulation and specialisation and of labour 
exploitation are the most popular and were discussed in this chapter.  
When the stylised facts of changes in labour market regulation and the 
experience of flexibility across OECD countries are reviewed, even more 
complications arise. Countries exhibit a substantial diversity in the degree, quality 
and mix of the specific arrangements they have introduced to (or, withdrawn from) 
their labour markets. Over-simplifying generalisations regarding the ideological 
background and the evolutionary patterns of labour market deregulation and 
flexibility are not sufficient in explaining this diversity and can possibly be 
misleading. The understanding of the causes of discrete country experiences is helpful 
in order to distinguish among three different approaches to labour market flexibility.  
One approach attempts to facilitate the re-organisation of production by 
allowing the functional flexibilisation of the labour market. This approach can be 
                                                 
31
 Such changes include the significant sectoral shift towards services, the increased importance of 
information and communications, the higher uncertainty in product and financial markets, the higher 
volatility and differentiation of product demand and the ever-accelerating technological progress. 
Ch.2: Labour market deregulation and flexibility 
 
72
attributed to the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Germany. A second approach 
focuses more on numerical flexibility, aiming primarily at the amelioration of labour 
market outcomes. Representatives of this approach are Italy, Spain and the UK. A 
third approach attempts a balanced use of both forms of flexibilisation as part of a 
wider reconstruction of the social and economic relations of production. The USA, 
Australia and New Zealand belong to this group. Irrespective, however, of which 
approach is employed, a general conclusion is that in all countries measures of 
deregulation and flexibility are selectively introduced as a means to improve labour 
market and wider economic performance. Nevertheless, countries differ also in their 
means of introducing these measures (legislation enforcement, co-ordination between 
economic agents, or unilateral enhancement of employers’ power). 
To summarise, there are many approaches to flexibility and flexibilisation as 
well as many different approaches to the implementation of measures related to these 
approaches. The discussion in this chapter has attempted to highlight the diversity and 
complexity of labour market flexibility, both in terms of its conceptualisation and its 
implementation. Despite the differences, the common denominator of all approaches 
is that flexibility is introduced as a means to improve economic outcomes. The 
remainder of the chapters in this study discuss and investigate the existence and 
significance of such a relationship between flexibility and economic outcomes. 
Chapter three reviews the empirical and theoretical literature. The remaining chapters 
are devoted to the empirical investigation and theoretical modelling of this 
relationship, at the international, national and regional levels.  
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APPENDIX A.2: Labour market flexibility decompositions 
 
Table A.2.1: Analytical decomposition of labour market flexibility 
Listing Practical Technical Functional Target Source 
Homework Homework LI, NW EN F, C F, S 
Part-time Part-time LI, NW IN, IF F, C F, W, S 
Casual Temping LI, NW EN F, C F, S, U 
Fixed-term Temping LI, NW EN F, C F, S 
Seasonal Temping LI, NW EN F, C, P F, S 
Sub-contracting Temping LI, NW EN, EF F, C, P F, S 
Task-contracting Temping LI, NW EN, EF F, C, P F, S, U 
Job-sharing/overtime Working-time JC, LI IN F, C F, W 
Irregular hours Working-time JC, LI IN F, C F, S, W 
Weekend-work Working-time JC, LI IN F, C F, W, S 
Working week Working-time JC, LI IN F, C S, F, U 
Shift-work Working-time JC, LI IN, IF F, C F, W, S 
Health/safety rules Labour standards NW IF F, C, P S, F, U 
Holidays Labour standards NW, LI IN F, C F, U 
Lunch breaks Labour standards NW, LI IF, IN F, C F, W 
Paid leaves Labour standards NW, LI IN, IF F, C F, W 
Representation rights Labour standards NW IF F F, S 
Right to organise Labour standards NW IF F S, F 
Working conditions Labour standards NW IF F, C F 
In-job occ. mobility In-job occ. mobility JC IF, IN, EN F, P F, U 
Job demarcations In-job occ. mobility JC IF, IN, EN F, C F, U 
Multi-tasking In-job occ. mobility JC, LI IF, EN F, C, P F, W, U 
Dismissal protection Job security LI, NW IN F, C F, S 
Empl. protection Job security NW IN F, C, P F, S 
ALMPs Training SA EN, IF F, P S, W 
Educational levels Training SA EN, IF F, P W, S 
Job-related training Training SA EN, IF F, P, C S, F, W 
Housing flexibility Labour mobility LM EN F W, S 
Job mobility Labour mobility LM EN F, C W, S 
Occupational mobility Labour mobility LM EN F, C W, S, F 
Regional mobility Labour mobility LM EN F, P W, S 
Sectoral mobility Labour mobility LM EN F, P W, S, F 
Benefits duration Unemployment RW EN F, P S, U 
Replacement ratio Unemployment RW EN F, P, C S, U 
Minimum wages Minimum wages RW EN F, C S 
Coordination Wage determination AW EN F, C F, U, S 
Decentralisation Wage determination AW EN F, C S, F, U 
Payroll taxes Wage determination AW EN C, F S 
Wage elasticity Wage determination AW EN F, C F, U, S 
Union coverage Unionism AW EN F F, S 
Union density Unionism AW EN F W 
Union power Unionism AW EN, IF F, P, C S, F, W 
Notes: The following abbreviations are used. Technical: LI – labour input; JC – job content; RW – 
reservation wage; AW – average wage; NW – nonwage costs; LM – labour mobility; SA – skills 
acquisition. Functional: IN – internal numerical; EN - external numerical; IF - internal functional; EF - 
external functional. Targets: F – pure flexibility; P – productivity enhancement; C – costs reduction. 
Sources: F – firms; S – state; U – unions; W – workers. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT 
OF LABOUR MARKET REGULATION 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 In the previous chapters we sketched a picture of high economic uncertainty in a 
changing economic environment, which brought about -among other things- new 
developments in the organisation of labour relations. In chapter one (especially section 
1.3) we conducted a preliminary discussion about the different views on the desirability, 
effectiveness, necessity, but also the sustainability of the new forms of labour regulation 
(labour market flexibility). This discussion continues here with a more detailed critical 
presentation of the relevant schools of thought and theoretical and empirical studies, with 
direct reference to the economic role of the new regulatory frameworks. 
 We discuss the different theoretical approaches while analysing their predictions 
about the impact that labour market regulation (and deregulation) has on certain 
indicators of labour market and macroeconomic performance (e.g.: unemployment and 
wage inequality or output and productivity growth, respectively). We focus in the next 
section on the “labour market performance” effects of labour market (de)regulation and 
flexibility, and draw on empirical as well as theoretical contributions. Likewise, section 
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3.3 discusses the impact of labour market regulation on -more broadly defined- overall 
economic performance. This analysis is conducted mainly at the national level, since the 
vast majority of the relevant literature is concerned with the effects of deregulation on 
national economic performance. Some connection to the relevance of the analyses for 
regional or local levels of economic activity will, however, also be made. But a more 
thorough discussion of the regional dimension of those issues will be presented in chapter 
six.  
 The views summarised in this chapter range from approaches advocating the idea 
of a regulation-free labour market, where “market forces” are free to determine economic 
outcomes, to approaches that regard labour market regulation (“rigidities”) as potentially 
beneficial. We label the latter group of approaches as post-Keynesian or neo-
institutionalist, although they include a variety of (often, complementary) theoretical 
perspectives (from efficiency wages to neo-Ricardian and Regulation32 theories). 
Incorporated in the discussion of the economic impact of deregulation is a discussion of 
the alternative explanations of recent trends in wage dispersions (section 3.4). In the 
concluding section we synthesise the various approaches and make some considerations 
to enhance our understanding of the social and economic role(s) of labour market 
regulation and flexibility.    
 
 
 
                    
32
 The term “Regulation” here refers to the French “School of Regulation” (e.g., Aglietta, 1979, 1982; 
Lipietz, 1979, 1984). It should, therefore, not be connected directly or confused with the debate about the 
(de)regulation of labour -and other- markets. 
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3.2. Labour market regulation and labour market performance 
 The literature on the impact of labour market flexibility and (de)regulation on 
employment, unemployment and wage rates is large and constantly growing. Moreover, it 
encompasses a wide range of economic sub-disciplines, including industrial relations, 
labour economics, international (trade) economics, growth theory and development 
economics. There are numerous empirical studies that try to quantify the impact of labour 
market conditions (and especially institutions) on labour market outcomes. Yet, the 
results cannot be safely regarded as conclusive. As in all social sciences, the empirical 
findings -not to mention their interpretations- depend to a noteworthy degree on the 
theoretical perspective and the assumptions of the individual researcher.  
 
3.2.1. The neoclassical framework 
 Using the “text-book” theoretical analysis as a starting point,33 we can identify 
how the main indicators of labour market performance are determined in a Walrasian 
world. Under the assumptions of perfect competition, rational behaviour and perfect 
information, wages are equal to the marginal revenue product of labour: to the market 
value of the product that the least productive worker makes. Employment and 
unemployment are determined by the demand and supply of labour, both of which 
depend on the (real) wage rate. Hence, in equilibrium, unemployment can only be due to 
the mobility of workers between jobs (frictional unemployment). Apart from this “natural 
rate of unemployment”, there will be no involuntary unemployment in the long-run. And, 
with perfect capital and labour mobility and a homogenous labour force in terms of skills, 
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there is no reason for any wage differentials to emerge.34 Productivity increases lead to 
higher wages and boost employment either via increases in profits, investment and labour 
demand, or via increases in workers’ demand for goods.  
 Of course, in the real world things are different. As we discussed earlier, 
unemployment rates in many countries are far from being close to a “natural” level, while 
the incidence of long-run unemployment (people unemployed for more than 12 months) 
is strikingly high. Wages are much more rigid than the simplistic outcome of neoclassical 
theory sketched above assumes and substantial wage differentials exist within countries, 
as well as within regions and between regions. Labour mobility (both occupational and 
geographical) is constrained by a great number of factors.35 The relatively poor labour 
market performance, internationally, for much of the last twenty years has led to the 
emergence of a strong critique of the regulatory regime of the labour markets. Although 
numerous factors have been proposed to explain the deterioration of labour market 
outcomes and especially the pattern of increasing wage inequality, the analysis of labour 
market institutions is at the centre of the debate.  
 There is common agreement concerning earnings dispersion that institutional 
factors (such as unions, employment legislation, minimum wages, etc.) tend to lower 
wage inequality. However, this is effect is not always regarded as positive. Blau and 
Kahn (1996, p.832) conclude in their empirical study that “to the extent that institutions 
are important in [reducing] wage inequality, [they have an] adverse impact on 
                                                        
33
 See for example Smith (1994) or Ehrenberg and Smith (1997), or any labour economics textbook. 
34
 In the case of heterogenous labour, wage differentials will reflect differences in skills or preferences.  
35
 Social and personal characteristics are the main non-economic factors of labour immobility. Another 
important barrier is home-ownership and housing market rigidities (see for example Ermisch, 1990, or 
Henley, 1998). Uncertainty and job search-related costs are among the main economic factors.  
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employment and productivity due to resource allocation effects”. Hence, from a 
neoclassical perspective, as far as wage differentials reflect the impact of market forces 
(like the ones discussed in the section 3.4: shifts in labour demand, technological change, 
international trade, etc.), an institutional setting which tries to reduce these differentials 
will notice distorting and negative employment effects. More institutionalist-oriented 
approaches, however, see labour market institutions as a means of ensuring justice and 
security for the labour force. Security and justice are regarded as productivity-enhancing, 
either due to increased worker effort, or due to increased provision of training by firms.   
 
3.2.2. Adverse regulation effects 
 Let us now consider more deeply the mainstream neoclassical views concerning 
the effects of labour market regulation and institutions on wages, wage dispersions and 
unemployment. One of the most thoroughly studied institutions is trade unions and their 
impacts through wage bargaining. Unions can lower wage inequality by narrowing the 
distribution of wages for the unionised workers, but they can also increase inequality by 
increasing the distance between the wages of unionised and non-unionised workers 
(Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). The positive effect is easier to rationalise in the case of 
professional clubs. Trade unions acting individualistically (maximising the utility of their 
members) tend to increase unemployment by the upward pressures they apply on wages 
in the bargaining process. Unemployment will not appear in the -protected- unionised 
sector, but it will spill over into the non-unionised workers (Oswald, 1982a; Lindbeck 
and Snower, 1988; Ehrenberg and Smith, 1997). The resultant downward pressure of 
wages in the non-unionised sector, which could effectively eliminate the increased 
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unemployment, may be cancelled out if employers in this sector offer higher wages to 
their workforce to prevent them from getting unionised (Rosen, 1969). To the extent that 
unions raise wages, employment growth will be lower in unionised firms (Blanchflower 
and Oswald, 1994b).  
Although higher wages could lead to higher productivity,36 other trade union 
policies (pressures for better working conditions, restrictions on work content, etc.) will 
tend to reduce labour productivity and raise labour costs. To the extent that labour costs 
increase more than labour productivity due to union policies, the profitability of 
unionised firms will be lower. A number of empirical studies seem to support this view 
(e.g., Machin and Steward, 1990; see also Millward, 1993). 
Of course, the trade union is not the only institution that is seen as imposing 
labour market rigidities and affecting labour market outcomes. Even though trade unions 
are -together with minimum wages- the institutions appearing more often in the relevant 
empirical literature,37 the importance of other institutions has not gone unnoticed. Other 
institutions include legislation on hiring and firing (employment legislation and dismissal 
protection), legislation on fixed-term contracts (temporary employment), legislations 
regulating per-week working hours and per-year working weeks, regulations on the level 
at which wage-bargaining takes place (from the national level -centralised wage 
bargaining- to the firm or individual level -decentralised wage bargaining), and 
regulations concerning “overtime” payment, conditions of work (health and safety 
                    
36
 This can be for a number of reasons. Increased worker participation, increased capital to labour ratio due 
to less employment (higher capital intensiveness), or reduced quit rates. Lower quit rates mean higher job-
tenure, more job-specific experience, but also more incentives for firms to enhance their workers’ skills (via 
training).  
37
 This, of course, happens mainly for data-related reasons.  
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standards) and worker representation rights. They also include what is often called 
“passive” labour market policies, specifically the duration and level of unemployment 
benefits (replacement ratio) and other social (income) support.  
 All of these regulations are considered in neoclassical analysis as factors that -in 
one way or another- increase labour costs. Centralised wage bargaining processes fail to 
account for the specificities of each industry, sector, region or firm (in terms of costs, 
profitability, etc.). In that sense, they may even be catastrophic for some firms or even 
some (low-productivity) sectors of the economy. When employment and dismissal 
protections are stricter, firms will tend to hire fewer workers than otherwise during 
periods of expansion in order to fire fewer workers in downturn periods (Blanchard et al., 
1986; OECD, 1996). This leads to lower levels of output and employment (higher 
unemployment) in the long-run, despite the “mechanical” positive effect it has on labour 
productivity (by raising the capital-labour and output-labour ratios).  
Millard (1995, as surveyed in OECD, 1996) has presented empirical evidence 
supporting the view that looser employment protection legislation (lower turnover costs) 
is related to both higher incidence and lower duration of unemployment, thus leading to 
an overall decline in unemployment rates. In the same manner, other regulations limiting 
the ability of firms to adjust the size of their workforce to changes in product demand 
(such as legislation on fixed-term contracts, overtime pay and weekly working hours) 
have the same negative impact on employment and output. High unemployment benefits 
make workers more selective, increasing “reservation wages”.38 Hence, unemployment 
                    
38
 Reservation wage is the minimum wage a worker (or the typical worker) would be willing to work for. 
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benefits apply upward pressures on wages, especially in low-paid jobs, lowering in this 
way the demand for labour and increasing unemployment (Siebert, 1997). A study 
utilising a more macroeconomic perspective (Koedijk and Kremers, 1996) has also found 
a negative relationship between labour market regulation (“rigidities”) and labour market 
outcomes. The study employs a cross-country analysis and concludes that, overall, 
regulation has a negative impact on employment and productivity growth.  
 Recent studies in the field of labour economics develop a somewhat more 
sophisticated approach, decomposing the different characteristics of labour market 
deregulation/flexibility and empirically testing which of the characteristics have positive 
and which have negative (employment) effects. For example, Nickell (1997a) has tested 
the impact of different labour market conditions and institutions on unemployment. His 
results indicate that it is the incentives for the unemployed to seek a job (e.g., duration of 
unemployment benefits, employment creation schemes, job-brokering assistance) and not 
the level of unemployment benefits that are responsible for the relatively high European 
levels of unemployment. In the same way, it is the degree of co-ordination between 
unions and employers that matters and not the degree of unionisation or the protection of 
employment and labour standards.  
 Although neoclassical analysis attributes a negative role to labour market 
regulation, this should not lead to the conclusion that any kind of labour market 
intervention is dismissed out of hand. As discussed earlier, a number of so-called Active 
Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) are considered important in that they can promote 
employment growth, productivity, wages and output, while reducing wage dispersions. 
The provision of vocational training and the acquisition of advanced technology-related 
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skills make workers more “attractive”, thus increasing their employment opportunities 
and their potential wages. Job-brokering helps both firms and the unemployed, by 
increasing the “matching” between job-seekers and vacancies. And when firms can easily 
fill their vacancies with qualified workers, they will tend to create more new jobs 
(especially if firing costs are kept low). Accordingly, the implementation of such policies 
is expected to lead to higher production efficiency and productivity, and lower turnover 
and unemployment rates.  
 
3.2.3. Beneficial regulation effects 
 Although mainstream economic analysis attributes a negative role to labour 
market regulation, there are numerous studies within the neoclassical approach that 
provide evidence in favour of a positive relationship between labour market institutions 
and labour market outcomes. Machin and Manning (1992) and Machin et al. (2000) offer 
some empirical evidence (for the case of the UK) for the argument that the overall impact 
of minimum wages on employment is negligible if not positive. The same conclusion was 
reached by Card and Kruger (1995) and earlier by Bertola (1990), while theoretical 
studies also support such findings (e.g., Boadway and Cuff, 2001). Bertola has shown for 
the case of Europe that job security legislation does not seem to reduce employment 
when wages are rigid, nor is it connected with higher wages. He concludes that “job 
security provisions alone cannot be blamed for the high unemployment in European 
countries” (p.851). Fraja (1996) offers a theoretical framework for explaining this 
“paradox”. In his model, minimum wages lead to increased investment in physical and 
human capital (training), with a positive effect on aggregate (production and) 
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employment. Regarding wage rigidities (caused by trade union power and the imposition 
of minimum wages), Card et al. (1996) found evidence that they do not seem to affect the 
patterns of employment growth in their sample of countries.39 A similar result was 
reached by Nickell and Bell (1995) for a cross-section of OECD countries.  
 The common wisdom about the adverse impact of unionism on labour market 
performance has most analytically been questioned by the much earlier work of Freeman 
and Medoff (1984). The authors discriminate between the “undesirable” wage-increasing 
function of unions and their “desirable” collective voice-enhancing function. They 
conclude (for the USA economy) that the collective-voice effect (unions improving 
workplace conditions and altering the social relations of production) dominates, thus 
increasing economic efficiency and employment. In the same line of argument, but 
explicitly using a formal model, Booth and Chatterji (1998) show that under realistic 
assumptions unionism leads to lower quit rates and increased job-stability (when wage 
bargaining occurs at the firm level). Moreover, they show that this is sufficient to make 
firms increase their human capital investment (on-the-job training), thus moving closer to 
the social optimum level of training and “leading to an improvement in social welfare” 
(p.329). As they mention, the predictions of their model are consistent with the stylised 
facts of the existing empirical literature (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Booth, 1991; Miller 
and Mulvey, 1993; Green et al., 1996). Relevant evidence for the case of a developing 
country has been offered by Standing (1991), who found that while unions have modest 
wage effects and reduce employment growth, they also reduce turnover rates and are 
                    
39
 France, Canada and the USA. The authors also find that negative demand shocks lead to either lower 
wages or to higher unemployment, depending on the institutional setting regarding wage determination.  
Ch.3: Regulation and economic performance 
 
84
associated with more training, increased fringe benefits and higher productivity.40  
 An interesting and controversial finding is offered by Freeman (1988). Using a 
cross-country analysis he concludes that “both highly centralised and highly decentralised 
labour market arrangements [(as measured by union density and inter-industry wage 
dispersion)] outperform intermediate cases” (p.75). The well-known study of Bruno and 
Sachs (1985) also found that regulated and relatively deregulated economies performed 
about the same in terms of employment growth. Calmfors and Driffil (1988) reach the 
same conclusions and offer supportive evidence to the work of Fields (Fields, 1990; 
Fields and Wan, 1989; OECD, 1995) who, by employing an “international economics 
labour standards” perspective, argues that a loose labour market regulation is inferior to a 
strict policy (either strong regulation or no regulation) in terms of both labour market and 
general economic outcomes (increased market efficiency, employment, output and 
growth).41  
 This last result is in sharp contrast with the views advocated by more 
institutionalist-oriented researchers (Piore, 1990; Sengenberger and Campbell, 1994), 
who suggest that an intermediate level of regulation is the most efficient policy. We have 
already mentioned that the “economics of labour standards” employs a more 
macroeconomic and dynamic analysis and focuses mainly on the wider economic effects 
of labour market regulation. In addition, this strand of literature lacks the variety and vast 
number of empirical studies that the neoclassical approach enjoys. As a result, it is 
                    
40
 The study of Standing (1991) for the role of trade unions in Malaysia is reviewed in Freeman (1993). 
41
 As we shall see later, this stands in absolute contrast with the neo-institutionalist approach, which 
advocates that some regulation is better than no regulation, even though a very tight regulation can be 
harmful. Then again, the two approaches are set in a different context and try to explain different patterns, 
so they define “tight”, “average” and “loose” regulation differently. 
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difficult to present the labour market performance effects of labour market regulation as 
predicted by this strand of literature, without discussing the wider economic relations and 
effects. For this reason we leave the detailed presentation of this and related approaches 
for the next section. For the moment, we shall only comment on the relevance of the 
efficiency wage hypothesis to the issues discussed here.  
 In terms of the effects of labour market regulation on labour market performance, 
it is the utilisation of the efficiency wage hypothesis that probably serves as the most 
appropriate means of questioning the analyses reviewed above. Efficiency wage theories 
were originally proposed to explain the existence of unemployment rates above the 
“natural” rate of (frictional) unemployment (e.g., Yellen, 1984) and later to explain inter-
industry wage differentials (e.g., Dickens and Katz, 1987; Blackaby and Murphy, 1991). 
Nevertheless, it is easy to transfer the focus of the analysis to the impact of labour market 
regulation using the same framework. In the efficiency wage literature, output is a 
function of workers’ effort, which in turn depends on the wage they receive.42 It is not 
unreasonable to assume that the effort workers put into the production process is also a 
function of a number of labour market conditions, which depend on a number of labour 
market institutions. Hence, if health and safety standards, job and employment security 
(legislation on dismissal protection and temporary employment), and minimum wages are 
guaranteed by legislation, workers would be more willing to work harder for their firm.43 
A formal presentation of a similar assumption is made in chapter five.   
                    
42
 In this literature, efficiency wages are sources of higher unemployment and wage dispersion, but also of 
higher labour productivity and output. 
43
  This, nevertheless, holds only if the “outside opportunities” that the workers face -that is, their 
alternative options in case they get fired- are sufficiently poor to suppress their incentive to shirk. 
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3.3. Labour market regulation and economic performance 
 In the previous section we presented a short selective review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the effects of labour market conditions and institutions on 
indicators of labour market performance. In this section we broaden the discussion to 
include the analysis of the impact of labour market regulation on wider indicators of 
economic performance. Although such a discussion would ideally include all possible 
channels through which economic outcomes can be influenced, we focus strictly on the 
standard short- and long-run effects, not paying much attention to more dynamic effects. 
An example of such dynamic effects based on Kaufman (1997) is nevertheless worth 
mentioning. Imagine that regulations on maternity leaves are relaxed, leading to a 
reduction in both the duration and the incidence of maternity leaves. In the short-run, this 
is going to reduce labour costs and possibly increase profits. In the long-run it will affect 
female labour force participation (with a possible small impact on wages). In the longer-
run, however, such a policy might lead to slower population growth, affect the gender 
and household relationships and result in lower-quality (and quantity of) pre-school 
education (human capital formation) and probably to lower levels of educational 
attainment for the new generation(s). In this respect, the effects of labour market 
deregulation are particularly difficult to conceptualise and measure.     
 
3.3.1. Orthodox analysis 
 As alternative -to the orthodox- approaches to labour market regulation do not 
focus much on the labour market performance effects, in the same way, mainstream 
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analyses related to the wider economic effects of the regulation of labour markets are 
limited. This is mainly a side-effect of the focus of mainstream economic analysis on 
microeconomic relations (the micro-foundations of macroeconomics). Hence, traditional 
(neoclassical) theory concentrates mainly on the employment effects of labour market 
deregulation. Nevertheless, one can speculate on some expected income and wider 
economic effects. As already stated, a simple neoclassical model would predict that 
labour market rigidities increase unit labour costs and harm employment. Consequently, 
profits should be expected to shrink, with a negative impact on investment (both in 
physical and human capital). With less investment, productivity growth will be slower as 
will economic (output) growth.  
 There have been comparatively few studies of these anticipated effects and, of 
those, Koerdijk and Kremers (1996) is one of the even fewer empirical studies to 
straightforwardly investigate the impact of labour market regulation on macroeconomic 
outcomes. The results (consistent with the neoclassical orientation of the authors but 
subject to problems related to sample size, sample selection and model specification) 
indicate that countries with more regulated (rigid) labour markets perform worse in terms 
of output growth. The more in-depth investigation of Nickell and Layard (1998) reaches 
the conclusion that output and employment growth are negatively related to unionism and 
unemployment benefits specifically, but not to other regulation factors, like employment 
protection and minimum wages. In a micro-originated approach, Bertola (1994) examines 
the effects of labour mobility costs that prevail under tight job-security provisions. He 
concludes that “constraints on employment flexibility reduce production efficiency and 
the value of firms, with adverse effects on private incentives to invest and, in 
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equilibrium, on the level and rate of growth of product demand... ...[T]he welfare of the 
economy’s consumer-investors and workers is harmed ... by lower profitability of 
existing capital, reduced capital accumulation and slower growth of productivity and 
wages” (p.217).  
 Further supportive evidence to these conclusions (in the context of developing 
countries) is offered by Rama (1995). He finds a robust negative relationship between 
economic growth and unionism or public sector employment for the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. Nevertheless, his study also reveals an insignificant relationship 
between minimum wages or unemployment benefits and economic growth for his sample 
countries (see also MacIsaac and Rama, 1997). Marshall (1993), in a study of Latin 
America countries, also has found no relation between job-security and (manufacturing) 
productivity. It must be stressed, however, that the results of such studies are of 
questionable relevance to advanced economies, since the labour market institutions and 
general social and economic conditions in developing countries are often very different 
from those of the developed world.  
 
3.3.2. Non-orthodox approaches 
 A normative model in variance with the negative relationship between job-
security and economic outcomes has been offered by Parkin (1996). Under the realistic 
assumption of asymmetric information (monitoring costs), he shows that the free-market 
level of job-security is below the Pareto optimal and that lower job-security leads to 
lower labour effort. Hence, (legislative) increases in job-security (protection against 
dismissals) will have the effect of increasing labour effort, profits and workers’ utility. 
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Although Parkin’s (1996) work lacks any empirical verification, some support for his 
model is provided by the empirical findings of other studies (e.g., Hall, 1982; Carter, 
1988; Levin and Parkin, 1994). A much less technical study of LDCs and NICs concludes 
that it is impossible to generalise about the relation between institutional structures and 
growth patterns from the experience of such countries. “Rather than trying to force all 
experiences into a simple competitive (or other) model, we ought perhaps to explore the 
domains in which different institutional arrangements produce better results” (Freeman, 
1993, p.408).  
 This last quotation effectively calls for an institutional analysis of labour market 
regulation and its impact on economic performance. Such a perspective can be found in 
the neo-institutionalist or post-keynesian “economics of labour standards” (Piore, 1990; 
Herzenberg et al., 1990; Sengenberger and Campbell, 1994; Boyer, 1994; Rodgers, 
1994), the neo-Ricardian school (Aspromourgos, 1987), and the post-Fordism debate 
(Michon, 1987; Hudson, 1989; Storper and Scott, 1990). For these approaches, labour 
standards (job security, employment security, minimum wages, etc.) are seen as assets for 
the economy, which enhance the human capital available for production and raise the 
efficient operation of the product-market, promoting quality-based competition (against 
price-based competition) and technological innovations (progress). Higher and secured 
wages are seen as a productivity-enhancing factor (and, hence, as a factor promoting 
growth) due to reduced shirking, improved worker morale and lower turnover rates. 
Moreover, any reduction in labour standards leads to productivity slow-downs (the “low 
pay – low productivity” hypothesis), gives incentives for the adoption of cost-saving 
technologies and price-based competition (with detrimental effects on technological 
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progress and economic growth) and results in the de-skilling of the labour force.  
This argument is central to the discussion of the positive impact of labour market 
regulation. In the absence of labour market regulation (wage and employment protection) 
firms lose their incentive to participate in quality-based competition and instead compete 
on the basis of excising monopoly power over labour, lowering wages and labour 
standards (see for example, Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1988; Piore, 1990; Deakin and 
Wilkinson, 1991; Sengenberger and Campbell, 1994 and the references given there). 
This, in effect, harms overall economic efficiency because it allows inefficient producers 
and obsolete technologies to survive.44 Streeck (1989) rather convincingly argues through 
an extensive and multi-disciplinary theoretical discussion that the problem of under-
investment in skills is not a question of efficient allocation of costs and resources, but 
rather “market failure in skill formation is endemic and inevitable” (p.92), as the short-
sighted opportunism of firms cannot provide the “functional” and “extra-functional” 
skills that are required in contemporary capitalist production (and which are of a 
collective, public-good nature). The conclusion, then, is that “just as skill formation for 
individuals requires education, skill formation in firms requires regulation. Deregulation, 
if driven too far, breeds inefficiency” (p.100). An empirical example of the role of higher 
labour standards in diverting firms towards higher product innovation is given by 
Koshiro (1992). He presents the experience of a number of Japanese firms that increased 
their production diversification (towards faster expanding markets) in the face of binding 
                    
44
 Note that this reasoning has been criticised by advocates of the neoclassical approach. The argument is 
that labour market regulation (while it may shift employers to more “productive” strategies) “diverts the 
employees’ creative energy towards non-productive strategies for securing jobs or economic benefits” 
(Herzenberg et al., 1990, p.7).   
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labour standards. 
 So, in such a view, not only does labour market deregulation increase wage 
inequality, but it also reduces aggregate output (and income) and leads in the long-run to 
higher unemployment. Consequently, what is most important in contemporary capitalist 
production and economic development is the quality of the labour force and the co-
operation among all actors taking part in the production process (Sengenberger, 1994a). 
Both of these factors suggest additional importance for labour. When workers are 
dissatisfied in terms of income, job and employment security, it is not reasonable to 
expect such factors as labour effort and co-operation in the production to be enacted. The 
whole production process can fall into what is called a “low pay – low productivity trap”, 
where increases in pay require increases in workers’ effort and co-ordination, but the 
latter also require an amelioration in labour standards. In this respect, it is only the 
creative activity by firms (quality-based competition and enhanced workforce 
productivity) that can help escape this trap of relatively poor outcomes (Wilkinson, 1994) 
and lead to a “high road” of competitiveness (Ozaki, 1999, p.142). 
 The empirical literature offers some evidence in support of the views presented 
here. An ILO study (ILO, 1997) gives many empirical examples where unions have in 
fact played a beneficial role in work re-organisation and increased efficiency. The ILO 
reports cases where the absence of unions (or union consent) acted as an obstacle to the 
introduction of new elements in the technology and organisation of production. Based on 
evidence from survey data, many authors have suggested that non-standard employment 
(temporary work, sub-contracting, etc) and job-insecurity (higher labour turnover) are 
related more often than not to lower productivity (Casey, 1988; Kuhl, 1990, Ozaki, 
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1999), and to efficiency losses in the longer-run, due to a lack of (firm-specific) skills and 
experience or commitment to the firm (Brosnan, 1996; Burkins, 1996; Ozaki, 1999). The 
last issue is more directly related to the long-run view of the economic effects of flexible 
labour arrangements, which introduces the wider issue of dynamic efficiency.    
 
3.3.3. Dynamic efficiency issues 
 In an interesting discussion of the economic, social and political factors in the 
operation of the labour market, Craig et al.(1985) note that the segmentation of labour 
markets (which they attribute to increased labour market flexibility and wage inequality) 
makes wages unrelated to skills or productivity. This constitutes “a shift in the direction 
of protective regulation and its more narrow concentration upon an elite of [primary 
sector] workers” (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1991, p.138). This duality and inequality is one 
source of dynamic inefficiency, since a specific segment of the labour force (which need 
not lack any skills or productive ability) is excluded from the skills-oriented, high 
productivity segment of the economy. A less recognised source of production 
inefficiency, which is due to the suppression of labour standards, is cited in Standing 
(1995). In his World Health Organisation study he suggests that “there has been a 
substantial increase in work-related accidents ... as a result of flexiblisation of labour 
contracts” (p.169). Rodgers (1994) argues that not only can labour market institutions 
increase on-the-job training and production efficiency, but they are also important in 
sustaining and enhancing consumption. 
 Employing a more “regulationist” framework of analysis, which attributes the 
move towards deregulation to changes in the organisation of production, Kuhl (1990) 
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argues that lower employment protection has not generated higher employment (in W. 
Germany). He goes on to say that “the efficiency of CLF-jobs45 may be questioned 
because of poor productivity performances in the medium term … and because of high 
costs of manpower transactions and labour turnover. The slow-down of productivity 
growth in some EC-countries may be a consequence of CLF-expansion” (p.251).  
The point about the impact of (changing) production organisation on the 
organisation of labour markets is frequently made by economic geographers. For 
example, Hudson (1989) argues that the changing locational patterns of production 
enforce the adoption of more flexible work practices and employment relations, putting 
the relationship between re-organisation of production and labour market flexibility into 
a spatial perspective. The analysis of work organisation and local labour markets by 
Storper and Scott (1990), developed in a similar context, offers a thorough explanation of 
the economic-organisational factors that lead to the deterioration of labour standards 
(labour market flexibility). They conclude that “the uncertainties endemic in flexible 
labour markets diminish the incentive, both for firms and workers, to invest in on-the-job 
training and the acquisition of new skills” (p.590). As we claimed in chapter one, this is 
the main contradiction of the forces behind labour market deregulation which inevitably 
raises serious questions about the reproducibility of the system of flexible production 
with flexible labour markets (Peck, 1992).   
 A different theoretical perspective, which criticises labour market flexibility 
based on dynamic efficiency considerations, originates from the neo-Ricardian school of 
                    
45
 The term “CLF-jobs” describes three categories of marginalised workers: contingent (temporary work), 
life-of-project (related to employment-creation schemes) and “fake self-employment” (on subcontracting). 
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thought.46 For neo-Ricardians, full employment is not attainable in a capitalist economy, 
because of the very functioning of the capitalist system. Hence, for the advocates of this 
approach, a labour market deregulation policy aiming at increasing aggregate 
employment by reducing labour costs cannot be successful. This is true (in a classical 
analytical framework) because a shift to more labour intensive methods of production 
(fall in the capital-labour ratio) cannot be activated through increases in the rate of profit 
and falls in real wages (which are the by-products of labour market deregulation) 
(Garegnani, 1970). Two other ways of promoting employment growth, namely increases 
in investment and product demand, are also unobtainable. Higher investment cannot be 
sustained without an increase in the purchasing power of workers. And since labour 
market flexibility implies a suppression of labour incomes, workers’ consumption 
abilities are reduced. For the same reason, a demand-driven increase in employment is 
very unlikely to occur.  
This analysis, although it belongs to a completely different framework, is very 
similar to the predictions of the advocates of higher labour standards. Indeed, the words 
of a neo-Ricardian, about the importance of labour market deregulation, could be easily 
attributed -terminology apart- to the institutionalist approach: “the supply-and-demand 
theory of wages, conditions and employment should be rejected. Once the marginal 
theory is rejected, the social norms which govern work, and the institutions which 
support them emerge, not as “artifices” imposed upon the “natural” forces of supply and 
                    
46
 The neo-Ricardian approach originates from the work of the classical economists and was first 
introduced by Sraffa (1960). We find it particularly interesting to present such an approach here, as this 
shows the universality of the issue of labour market flexibility and offers some additional insights and 
considerations not made by other approaches.   
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demand, but as themselves part of the normal organisation of employment in capitalist 
societies. [U]nemployment is a normal feature of the operation of a competitive capitalist 
economy, there existing no mechanism which would automatically push the system 
towards full-employment. [W]age flexibility cannot succeed in fulfilling the role of such 
a mechanism” (Aspromourgos, 1987, p.141).     
 Empirical evidence for the beneficial economic effects of higher labour standards 
has been offered from a recent research project of the International Institute for Labour 
Studies (IILS). Under this project, work for the case of India (Papola and Rodgers, 1992) 
questioned the commonly held opinion about the detrimental effects of minimum wages 
and labour protection. Complementing this, is the work for a number of OECD countries 
(Boyer, 1994) which found that job regulations hinder labour mobility and increase 
unemployment, but also increase real wages and productivity. Sengenberger (1994b, 
p.115) concludes from his empirical study that “countries with protection from the 
termination of employment and personnel stabilisation policies enjoy higher productivity 
growth than countries without such provisions”. Similar findings were reported by 
Brunetta and Dell’Aringa (1990) and Buechtemann (1993). In terms of the dynamic 
efficiency potential of labour market institutions, Table 3.1 adapted from Boyer (1994, 
p.56) and slightly amended, is very illustrative.  
 Table 3.1 summarises the plethora of short- and long-run effects that some main 
labour market institutions have been claimed to have. Both positive and negative effects 
exist at both the static and dynamic levels. For example, in a static framework 
unemployment benefits, unionism and minimum wages tend to reduce inequalities but 
increase unemployment. In the long-run though, the last two tend to ameliorate the skill-
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composition of the workforce and increase productivity, while unemployment benefits 
are a significant ingredient for social peace. Employment protection can stimulate 
technological change and stabilise product demand, but it also leads to reductions in 
profits and employment. In principle, the short-run effects are more likely to be negative, 
while the opposite holds for the long-run effects. This observation is very interesting in 
that it helps us to understand the complexity of the issue and possibly build a bridge 
between the opposing theoretical approaches. 
 
Table 3.1: Static versus dynamic efficiency 
 
Impact  
Type of regulation 
Employment 
protection 
Labour 
Standards 
Minimum 
wages 
Welfare 
system 
 
Training 
 
Unionism 
Short-run 
 
static 
efficiency 
-Lagged 
employment 
adjustment 
-Reduction 
in profits 
-Stabilisation 
of wages and 
consumption 
-Increased 
unit labour 
costs / lower 
profits 
-Possible un- 
employment 
-Reduced 
productivity 
-Reduced 
inequalities 
-Exclusion of 
workers of 
low 
productivity  
-Possible un-
employment 
-Reduced 
inequalities 
-Increased 
unit labour 
costs 
-Possible un-
employment 
-Extra costs 
for firms 
-Possible 
shifts of 
labour 
demand 
-Reduced 
inequalities 
-Less wage 
flexibility 
-Harmful to 
“outsiders” 
-Possible un-
employment 
Long-run 
 
dynamic 
efficiency 
-Incentive to 
internal 
flexibility 
-Reduced 
employment 
-Stimulation 
of technical 
change 
-Higher job-
satisfaction / 
fewer 
accidents 
-Increased 
efficiency 
-Increased 
productivity 
-Work 
intensification 
-Labour 
saving tech. 
change 
-Upgrading of 
skills and 
product 
quality 
-Increased 
labour 
mobility 
-Ingredient 
for social 
peace 
-Higher 
wage 
incomes 
-More 
occupational 
mobility 
-Skill driven 
tech. change 
-Increased 
productivity  
-Possible 
elimination 
of the  
impact of 
wages upon 
employment 
  
As we discuss further in the concluding section, because of the simultaneous 
existence of both positive and negative effects of regulation and flexibility, it may be 
more correct to focus on the appropriate mix and quality of regulation, rather than to try 
to support (or dismiss) all kinds of regulation, altogether.   
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3.4 Alternative explanations for recent trends in wage inequalities 
 The existence of substantial wage differentials and their increasing trend during 
the 1980s and -for some countries, at least- the 1990s (OECD, 1993, 1996) has led to the 
development of a wide variety of theoretical formulations, consistent with orthodox 
theory, that try to explain these trends.47  
 
3.4.1. Microeconomic explanations 
On the one hand, standard competitive (neoclassical) labour market models, such 
as Human Capital Theory and the Theory of Compensating Differentials, attribute wage 
differentials to differences in the quality of labour or to unobserved differences in skill 
levels and job characteristics. Thus, changes in wage inequality can be attributed to 
changes in the distribution of such characteristics across people. On the other hand, 
Efficiency Wage models suggest that wage premia are paid to workers in industries 
where monitoring is more difficult (e.g., large establishments, Oi, 1983), where the 
labour market is tighter, or where work experience (and job-tenure) is more important 
(e.g., high-skill firms), so that workers lose their incentive to shirk or quit. Similarly, 
Insider-Outsider models attribute such wage premia (and involuntary unemployment) to 
the market power of the incumbent workforce (insiders). Changes in these conditions 
could induce changes in wage inequality. Dual and Segmented Labour Market theories 
attribute the existence of wage differentials to the segmentation of the labour market, 
                    
47
 Since the objective of this study is not the explanation of wage dispersion and the evaluation of the 
relevant theories, but rather the investigation of the impact of labour market (de)regulation on wage 
dispersion, we do not find it necessary to provide a detailed presentation of those theories. The interested 
reader can refer to the brief surveys by Dickens and Katz (1987) and Blackaby and Murphy (1991), or to 
the more detailed works of Borjas (1988) and Akerlof and Yellen (1986).  
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where forces connected to the organisation of production divide the economy into a well-
paid, secure primary sector and an insecure secondary segment of low-paid jobs, with 
limited mobility between the two segments. Finally, threat models of Collective Action 
and Bargaining models emphasise the role of union power in raising wages in the 
unionised sectors of the economy. Each of those theories stresses the importance of one 
or two factors having an impact on the dispersion of wages, but fails to give a full 
explanation as to why those disparities exist, when it comes to their empirical 
verification. 
 Departing from the more theoretical explanations, in general the main 
explanations for the increased earnings dispersion include the following factors: specific 
personal (age, education, job-tenure, etc.), occupational, industry (plant-size, profitability, 
etc.) and regional (e.g., local amenities) characteristics, an increasingly skill-biased 
labour demand due to technological change, variations in the (shadow) price of the 
workers’ skills (human capital), increasing female labour force participation, and 
international trade and “globalisation” that -due to international competition- put 
different pressures to different sectors of the economy.48  
 As mentioned above, the empirical investigation of the determinants of wage 
inequality has shown that wage differentials persist even after controlling for a wide 
variety of factors of a microeconomic nature. For example, Dickens and Katz (1987, 
p.30) found that the identified wage differentials in the UK persist “even after controlling 
for a wider range of personal characteristics and geographic location ... for both union 
                    
48
 An analytical presentation of alternative explanations on rising wage inequalities with specific reference 
to the United States can be found in Danziger and Gottschalk (1993). 
Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Economic Performance 
 
99
and non-union workers”. They attribute the remaining (unexplained) variation of wages 
on wage premia, in accordance with the efficiency wage hypothesis. Using the same 
methodological approach, Blackaby and Murphy (1991) conclude that -again for the case 
of the UK- regional and industry characteristics explain much of the earnings dispersion 
which is left unexplained after controlling for a large number of human capital 
characteristics. Gosling and Machin (1993) found a statistically significant difference in 
the earnings dispersion between unionised and non-unionised workers (especially for 
semi-skilled ones), even after taking into account differences in personal, occupational, 
industry and firm-specific characteristics. They conclude that unions tend to compress the 
distribution of earnings and mainly help the less-skilled workers. Similar findings have 
been obtained in the works of other researchers, conducted for other countries. For 
example, Freeman (1991) and Card (1991) found a flatter distribution of wages in 
unionised USA firms. Fortin and Lemieux (1997) have also estimated a negative 
relationship between unionism and wage dispersions for the US (although this 
relationship is weaker for women; see also Gosling and Machin, 1993 and Freeman, 
1994) as well as a stronger negative relationship between minimum wages and the latter.  
 Hemmings (1991), following Shah and Walker (1983) and Blackaby and 
Manning (1987), concludes that intra- and inter-regional variations in wages can be 
explained by the regional variation of individual, occupational and industry-specific 
characteristics.49 Some of the regional variation of wages has also been attributed to 
inter-regional differences in local amenities (climate, environment, infrastructure, crime 
                    
49
 Duranton and Monastiriotis (2000) further stress the role of changes in the returns to personal 
characteristics for the UK. Similar results have been obtained for the case of Indonesia (Manning, 1997), 
where regional variables are found to affect wage differentials (together with other controls variables).  
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rates, population growth, etc.), as well as on the (shadow) value of these amenities 
(Roback, 1982, 1988; Furtado, 1998). Support for the efficiency wage hypothesis is 
offered in the empirical work of Wadhwani and Wall (1988) for the UK, Kruger and 
Summers (1988) for the USA, Gera and Grenier (1994) for Canada, Lucifora (1993) for 
Italy and Arai (1994) for Sweden (among other studies).  
 If a general conclusion can be drawn from these studies, it would be that there is a 
long list of microeconomic factors that generate wage dispersions and, despite this long 
list, there is always a significant part of these dispersions that remains unexplained. The 
implication here is that macroeconomic or institutional factors are also important.  
 
3.4.2. Macroeconomic explanations 
 The belief that wage differentials, persisting even after controlling for the factors 
identified in the microeconomic literature, are systematic (rather than random) is 
reflected in the macroeconomic literature of wage inequalities. At the macro-level, one of 
the most cited explanations for the identified trend of increasing wage inequality is the 
increased importance of international trade (globalisation). Borjas and Ramey (1994) 
showed that wage inequality in the United States shares the same long-run trend with the 
share of the durable-goods trade deficit to GDP and argued that the latter has helped 
increase wage inequality in the USA. Similar findings are reached by Borjas et al. (1997). 
On the other hand, Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) attribute only a minor role to 
international trade patterns in affecting wage inequality and they find the effects to be 
concentrated in a limited number of low-productivity industries (see also Bound and 
Johnson, 1992, and Baldwin, 1995). Some studies have found the impact of international 
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trade and globalisation to be insignificant (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1991; see also Wes, 
1996 and Krugman, 1996). In his regional-level analysis for the USA, Topel (1994) 
attributes most of the dispersion of wages to supply factors rather than trade, namely to 
the changing skill ratios in the labour force and to increased female labour force 
participation.  
 Other authors have also found evidence for the impact of changing labour demand 
conditions on wage inequality. Specifically, Berman et al (1994) and Machin (1995) 
stress the importance of skill-biased technological change, which increases wage premia 
for better-educated and high-skill workers. Similar evidence is provided by Monastiriotis 
(2000). Finally, a rather different strand of literature stresses the role of changes in the 
organisation of production (post-Fordism) (Storper and Scott, 1990; Peck, 1992) in 
increasing wage dispersions. 
 In their influential study, Blau and Kahn (1996) found that countries with more 
“rigid” labour markets perform better in terms of wage inequality -at least for the bottom 
of the wage distribution. Also, that differences in measured workforce characteristics 
among countries are only partly responsible for wage inequality and that price differences 
for these characteristics have a stronger impact (see also Duranton and Monastiriotis, 
2000). Since labour market institutions (minimum wages, trade unions and the wage-
bargaining system) co-determine these prices, countries with weaker trade unions and 
more decentralised wage bargaining “show less wage compression at the bottom” (Blau 
and Kahn, 1996, p.831).  
 The diversity of the findings in the macroeconomic literature of wage inequalities 
suggests that, as was the case with the microeconomic explanations, no single factor can 
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satisfactorily explain the marked differences in labour incomes that exist among 
seemingly similar individuals. Instead, it seems that there is a variety of micro- and 
macro-economic factors that impact on the distribution of wages. Together with such 
factors, labour market institutions also play a role. The importance of such institutions for 
wage inequality cannot be undermined, even if one assumes that wage inequality is 
significantly influenced by other microeconomic (industry wage premia, human capital 
characteristics) and macroeconomic factors (international trade or technological change). 
This is because, even under this assumption, labour market regulation will still affect the 
impact that these factors have on wage inequality. That is not to say that labour market 
regulation can affect -say- technological change,50 but that the effect of technological 
change on wage inequality will be conditioned on the specific regulatory regime of the 
labour markets.  
A number of empirical studies can support this argument. For example, Cortes 
and Marshall (1991) claim that the regulation of the Argentine labour market cannot be 
studied outside its inter-relation with the long-run growth model of the country. In their 
studies of the labour markets of Equador and Bolivia, Rama (1995) and MacIsaac and 
Rama (1997) conclude that the pattern of economic growth followed by these countries 
was largely determined by the specific forms of regulation in their labour markets. A 
detailed study of six industrialised countries for ILO (Ozaki et al., 1992) shows that 
technological change is conditioned on the existing labour relations, but it also reshapes 
                    
50
 This, nevertheless, is not impossible. The forms of regulation existing in a labour market can influence 
the patterns of R&D and technology diffusion, the levels of FDI (inward investment), the degree of female 
labour-force participation, or the competitive advantage and, hence, the volumes of trade of a specific 
economy.  
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them. All these studies can be interpreted as evidence that labour market regulation can 
affect wage inequality even when the effects of other micro- and macro-economic factors 
are present. 
 
3.5. The theory of labour market regulation: concluding remarks 
 The discussion throughout this chapter on the impact of labour market conditions, 
institutions and their regulation, has served as a means for the presentation of the 
arguments in support of and in opposition to labour market deregulation. The approaches 
range from technical microeconomic analyses, to political arguments on the role of 
labour market regulation for capitalism. For neoclassical analysis, raising labour 
standards creates economic distortions that harm job and income creation. For neo-
institutionalist analysis, labour standards are seen as “tools that may influence the social 
process of development in positive or negative ways, depending on how policy-makers 
apply them” (Herzenberg et al., 1990, p.4). The implied differences of the various 
approaches, in both methodology and the perspective employed, create a potential 
obstacle to the formulation of coherent empirical hypotheses with which to test the 
validity of the alternative views. For example, as straightforwardly dismissible as it may 
seem at first glance, it is not necessarily incompatible for labour market deregulation to 
have a negative impact on productivity (in a static, firm-level analysis), while affecting 
positively productivity growth (in a dynamic, macroeconomic specification).  
This condition can exist mainly because the impact of labour market deregulation 
is realised on two levels (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1991). A first level concerns the direct 
effects on factors like wages, employment, wage inequalities, the productivity of labour, 
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labour costs, monitoring costs, profitability, labour standards and the organisation of 
production relations at the firm-level. The second level, of indirect effects, concerns 
human capital formation, consumption, investment, the labour intensiveness of 
production (capital-labour ratio), the nature of product market competition (quality- or 
price-based competition), output growth, and the organisation of production at the 
economy-wide level.  
Another difficulty in dealing with the effects of labour market regulation is 
because it can be utilised in the service of two largely unrelated objectives. First, labour 
market regulation is a means of protecting the most vulnerable class of agents in the 
production process (the workers) from the market-power of large employers. In that 
sense, this first objective is more socially oriented than economic. It ensures a minimum 
of working (health and safety) conditions and determines the rules under which capital 
and labour can compete for a higher share of the output. Finally, it guarantees a minimum 
level of security enjoyed by the workers.51 In fact, this is the ultimate reason why labour 
market regulations exist in the first place (Sengenberger, 1994a).  
The second objective (which is more about deregulation than regulation) concerns 
the efficient operation of the production process and the achievement of better economic 
outcomes. From this viewpoint, labour market regulation (or deregulation) is a means of 
increasing economic efficiency and achieving more optimal levels of factors’ utilisation, 
investment (in both human and physical capital) and output. Therefore, when evaluating 
the importance and impact of specific labour market regulation policies (or, more 
                    
51
 In many respects: labour market security, employment and job security, work and income security, labour 
reproduction security and labour representation security (Standing, 1995).  
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broadly, labour organisation regimes), one must remember the different and often 
divergent forms and objectives of labour market (de)regulation.  
 On the basis of these considerations, one can take a second look at the role of 
different labour market institutions. Indeed, some labour market performance indicators 
are adversely affected by certain labour market regulation instruments and policies. For 
example, unionisation without co-ordination between employers and workers appears to 
create unemployment and notable downward wage rigidities (Nickell, 1997a), with 
detrimental effects on growth. But unions, on the other hand, if they function in a 
“corporatist” (i.e., decentralised wage bargaining) environment, can also improve 
economic performance by increasing, for example, on-the-job training (Booth and 
Chatterji, 1998). Most of labour market “rigidities” also help reduce wage inequalities. 
The importance of a more even distribution of incomes and wages for economic growth 
is an open debate in the literature (e.g.: World Bank, 1991; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; 
Benabou, 1996), but its social importance is unquestionable.  
 Another labour market “rigidity”, which has both positive and negative effects, is 
employment security (“hiring and firing” legislation). Increased employment security and 
job-tenure can lead to higher work commitment and increased on-the-job training and 
firm-specific acquisition of skills, with beneficial effects on productivity and, ultimately, 
on growth. Conversely, increased employment security can provide incentives for 
shirking and a potential obstacle to labour mobility. This has a potentially negative 
impact on productivity, the diffusion of technology (knowledge spill-overs) and on the 
adjustability of the size of the workforce to demand shifts. Such effects are expected to 
hinder economic growth.  
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 There is no reason here to continue drawing examples of labour market 
regulations which have possible contradicting effects. The existence of regulatory aspects 
that lead to opposing outcomes, as well as of contradicting effects within single 
regulations, is not at odds with economic intuition. Therefore, the question about the 
regulation of labour markets should not be judged as a black-or-white dilemma that can 
then lead to complete approval or total rejection of deregulation. This issue is rather, as 
Campbell (1994, p.151) suggests, “a systemic matter, i.e., ‘which standards?’, ‘how 
structured?’ and ‘how implemented?’”. In other words, the challenge is to find the 
appropriate level and type of regulation to facilitate an economically dynamic and 
socially acceptable operation of labour markets, after taking into account the local 
specificities that can make some labour market arrangements work and others to fail. 
An interesting point should be made here. For both neo-institutionalists and 
regulationists, the existence of regulation norms in the operation of labour markets is not 
necessarily related to government. As Streeck (1989) reminds us, there can be no social 
interaction (the labour process included) without the presence of certain norms 
(institutionalised, or not) governing this interaction. In this respect, the neo-liberal search 
for deregulation is in fact a search for a new regulation regime. Neoclassical analysis, 
with its static orientation, often fails to observe this reality. This is probably the main 
reason why it is difficult to direct empirical and theoretical research towards exploring 
the appropriate levels and types of labour market regulation that can produce the best 
possible economic outcomes. This realisation creates a potential for the integration of 
neoclassical and non-orthodox perspectives into a less fragmented theoretical 
understanding of the economic role of labour market regulation and flexibility.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY IN THE OCED 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters we have extensively discussed the context in which 
labour market deregulation and flexibility have become issues of increased 
importance, the nature of labour market regulation and flexibility and the various 
forms that they can take, as well as their relationship to economic performance at a 
theoretical level, with reference to the predictions of alternative economic 
approaches. Following these discussions, a number of alternative and conflicting 
possibilities for the role of labour market regulation on economic performance were 
identified. In this chapter we want to provide some empirical evidence for the 
relationship between economic conditions and labour market regulation, at the 
national level, using a cross-country analysis. With this exercise we can gain some 
useful information that can help us understand better what the relationship between 
these labour market regulation indicators and economic performance is in practice. 
Although the main purpose of the present study is an analysis of the regional 
dimension of this relationship, drawing on international empirical evidence, which is 
based on official cross-country data, is an exercise of essential importance, before we 
conclude our theoretical discussion of the issue and focus on the regional dimension.  
Hence, in this chapter we investigate empirically the relationship between 
labour market regulation conditions in the OECD countries and their economic 
performance. We pay particular attention to the relationship between regulation and 
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wage inequalities, separating the latter from the empirical analysis relating to the 
other measures of economic performance. This is mainly for three reasons. First, 
there is a conceptual difference between wage inequality and aggregates like 
productivity, employment growth and unemployment. Although the latter are pure 
economic variables (with unquestionable social relevance, however), wage inequality 
is probably mainly a social issue.52 Second, there is a practicality issue, as the 
literature on the determinants of (wage) inequalities is very different from that on the 
economic effects of labour market flexibility and regulation. Finally, there is also a 
technical issue, as the questions that are asked regarding the relation between wage 
inequalities and labour market regulation differ from those regarding the relation 
between the latter and economic performance. This, of course, will be made clearer in 
the following sections of this chapter. Before that, in the next section we discuss the 
problems related to undertaking an empirical investigation on the issue at a 
macroeconomic level, mainly problems related to data availability and data quality. 
Then, we draw on the experience of the OECD countries regarding their economic 
performance, the regulation and flexibility of their labour markets and their 
performance in terms of within-country wage dispersion. Section 4.4 presents the 
empirical analysis of the relationship between wage inequality and labour market 
regulation, while section 4.5 presents the same analysis, but between the latter and a 
number of indicators of economic performance. The last section relates the evidence 
of the empirical analysis to the theoretical discussions of the preceding chapters. 
 
                                                 
52
 This is not to neglect the extended literature that exists on the issue of (wage and income) 
inequalities and economic growth (for example, Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Glomm and Ravikumar, 
1994; Benabou, 1996; and from a different perspective, Dunford, 1995). Despite the potential 
significance, however, of inequalities for growth, the former remain effectively a socio-economic 
issue.  
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4.2. Aggregate data and macroeconomic studies 
4.2.1. Aggregate data  
Despite the centrality of the issue of labour market flexibility and deregulation 
and their economic effects, little empirical research has been conducted at an 
aggregate macroeconomic level. This is mainly because of the limited quantitative 
information that is available at both the national and international levels. Cross-
country comparisons and evaluations of the national regulatory frameworks of the 
labour market are difficult to make and of questionable reliability, as there are 
significant differences in the definitions of the various labour market intervention 
measures but, more importantly, as the cross-country differences are mainly 
qualitative rather than quantitative. Constructing data on a time-series dimension is 
also very problematic, especially when these data refer to labour market regulation 
rather than to labour market flexibility.53 This is presumably the reason why, although 
such information is quite easy to obtain, there has been little effort in the literature to 
construct time-series measures of labour market regulation either for one single 
country or for a selection of countries. Additionally, national statistical bodies do not 
produce measures to labour market flexibility either in absolute terms or in a 
comparative time-series fashion.54  
 
                                                 
53
 As it has already been discussed, not only are there conceptual and theoretical differences between 
the two concepts, but there are also differences in their variability over time. For the moment, it is 
sufficient to say that while regulation is a policy variable which changes in discrete points in time, 
flexibility is a response to policy and, hence, is a much more continuous variable.   
54
 The UK has a short-lived index of labour market flexibility derived from data obtained by the 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). This index is based on the number of people self-reporting a 
flexible employment relationship (calculated as a share to total employment) and naturally excludes 
many of the factors that would normally be considered as elements of the regulatory framework of a 
labour market. Similarly, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in the United States produces some 
measures of contingent and alternative employment, based on data derived from the Current 
Population Survey. Other countries have data of much poorer quality, if any.   
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Naturally, then, it is effectively impossible to undertake a macro-econometric 
time-series analysis for a single country. Alternative methods of empirical 
investigation, including testing for a trend-break in relevant time-series data after the 
implementation of deregulation policies, or cross-country comparisons of the trend 
behaviour of economic aggregates for countries with similar economic bases but 
different labour market regulation settings (Gorter and Poot, 1998), could be 
implemented but the inferences that can be made from them are limited. Hence, the 
main method of investigation of the issue at a macroeconomic level is cross-country 
econometric analysis.   
The only source of official quantitative and comparable information regarding 
the degree of labour market regulation across a set of countries is the OECD (OECD, 
1994, 1996, 1997 and 1999; OECD database on Benefit Entitlements and Gross 
Replacement Rates; OECD database on Permanent-Temporary Employment; OECD 
database on Labour Market Structures). The ILO also maintains a database on Key 
Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM), but this is only vaguely related to issues of 
labour market regulation and flexibility.55 Some other indicators of the degree of 
flexibility in a labour market have been produced by a number of studies, based on 
individual survey data. Hunter et al. (1993) have used the ELUS survey to produce a 
number of measures related to flexible forms of employment (contingent 
employment) in Britain, in an attempt to test empirically the so-called “flexible-firm 
model”, developed by Atkinson (1984).56  
 
                                                 
55
 One of these indicators (KILM12: the time-related underemployment rate), however, is a good proxy 
for internal numerical flexibility.  
56
 Employers’ Labour Use Strategies survey, 1987. This survey was carried out by the Social Science 
Branch of the Department of Employment (see Wood and Smith, 1989, for further details about the 
survey).  
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Gorter and Poot (1998) have used national published data to compare the 
effects of labour market deregulation in New Zealand and the Netherlands. Metcalf 
(1986) has assessed the employment effects of labour market flexibility in the UK 
and other OECD countries using quantitative information produced by the study of 
Coe and Gagliardi (1985) for the OECD. Another source of information for 
quantitative assessments of the relation between labour market flexibility and 
economic performance is the study of Emerson (1988), for a number of OECD 
economies. A cross-country analysis based on survey data (Survey on the Work 
Environment in Europe, Eurostat, 1991) has been used by Smulders et al. (1996) to 
assess and compare the working conditions in 12 EU countries. Finally, the 1992 
Employment in Britain Survey (see Gallie et al., 1998 for a survey description and 
relevant analysis) is another useful source of relevant information for the UK.  
At the microeconomic level, of course, numerous studies have used survey 
data to measure different elements of labour market flexibility in a country (mostly 
minimum wages and trade unionism) and assess their impact on some economic 
indicators (usually employment and wage dispersions). However, the nature and the 
sources of these measures do not allow for such information to be used in cross-
country comparisons or in international macroeconomic studies. Data comparability 
is apparently the main problem.  
 
4.2.2. Macroeconomic studies 
Because of this lack of appropriate available information, at least in 
quantitative terms, most of the few empirical macroeconomic studies in the literature 
have used the OECD indexes (e.g.: Nickell, 1997a; Grubb and Wells, 1993; Nickell 
and Layard, 1998), sometimes amending them with some additional country-specific 
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information (e.g.: Keodijk and Kremers, 1996). The main advantages of using the 
OECD information are the reliability of their source, their comparability across a 
relatively large number of countries and their availability at different points in time. 
There are, however, disadvantages related to the OECD indexes. First, not all data are 
organised in a comparable fashion. For example, data on minimum wages are 
available even at an annual basis (but data on minimum wage legislation are available 
as a three-categories index), while data on temporary employment and employment 
protection legislation are only available for approximate time periods (early 1980s, 
late 1980s, early 1990s). Second, not all data are available for the same selection of 
countries. Third, as a consequence, there is only a small selection of countries for a 
limited number of observations in time that can be used in an empirical 
macroeconomic analysis. The main problem, however, relates to the nature of the 
indexes produced by the OECD. Almost all of these indexes are country rankings, 
based on cross-country comparisons. It follows, then, that these indexes do not 
measure the degree of regulation or flexibility in a country in absolute terms, but only 
relatively to a group of other countries. Hence, the inclusion or exclusion of some 
countries from the estimating sample severely affects the distance between the sample 
countries. Moreover, by being rank variables, the OECD indexes give no indication 
of the distances between the regulatory frameworks among countries. This will have 
an impact on the results of any statistical analysis except in the special case where the 
distance between countries in terms of labour market regulation experiences is 
constant for all countries. In any other case the true cross-country differences in 
labour market regulation and flexibility will be inconsistently distorted (as there is 
sometimes a positive and sometimes a negative bias).  
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Another problem with the OECD data is that they are not updated regularly. 
At present, the most recent publicly available OECD information covers the period up 
to the mid-1990s. Since then, significant changes have occurred in many OECD 
countries, especially in terms of their economic performance. Undoubtedly, the lack 
of more recent information regarding labour market regulation limits the power of the 
empirical investigation.  
Having made these points, the OECD indexes are still the best-quality data 
available on labour market regulation at an international level. Hence, it is these data 
that we use in the empirical investigation that follows. As already mentioned, before 
actually presenting the empirical analysis, we first review the economic performance 
and labour market regulation experience of the OECD countries of our sample. 
 
4.3. OECD economic performance and regulation experience57  
Labour market deregulation, as a means of achieving higher labour market 
flexibility, has been increasingly advancing in most of the industrialised countries, 
with the USA, Canada and the UK in the forefront. Other countries, like the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Australia and New Zealand have followed,  implementing 
new measures in their labour markets, in terms of lower real minimum wages, freer 
hiring-and-firing legislation, decentralisation (or individualisation) of the wage 
bargaining process or reductions in the levels and duration of unemployment 
benefits. However, the experience of labour market regulation differs substantially 
across OECD countries, especially in a qualitative sense. As with regulation, changes 
have also occurred in the distribution of wages within countries. Wage dispersions 
                                                 
57
 This section is only intended to make a brief presentation of labour market regulation and economic 
performance in the OECD. For more detailed reviews see the OECD Jobs Study (1994) and also Saint-
Paul (1996), Siebert (1997) and Nickell and Layard (1998). 
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started widening in some countries from the mid-1970s58 and this process accelerated 
during the 1980s in most of the OECD economies, although the pattern of increasing 
wage inequalities was not uniform across them (OECD, 1993). The tendency of 
increasing (or, not decreasing) wage dispersions also continued at least into the first 
half of the 1990s (OECD, 1996).  
 
4.3.1. Wage dispersions 
According to OECD data (OECD, 1993, Table 5.1), wage dispersion rose in 
the 1980s in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA. In the UK and the US, 
the increase in wage inequality was much more remarkable and persistent (OECD, 
1996). Increasing wage inequalities continued to characterise countries like Italy, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Austria, France and Sweden into the 1990s, especially for the 
upper half of the distribution of wages. On the other hand, wage inequalities started 
subsiding in Canada, Belgium, Japan and Finland (OECD, 1996). Table 4.1 shows 
three measures of wage inequality for three time-periods for 18 OECD countries.59 
The construction and content of these measures is explained in section 4.4.1 and is 
thus not discussed here.  
As noted above, this evidence should be treated with caution, since cross-
country comparisons depend partly on the definition and measurement of the 
inequality indexes on which they are based. Nevertheless, what is clear for most of 
the OECD economies is that earnings dispersions are considerable and show no 
                                                 
58
 Raj and Slottje (1994) have shown for the case of the US the existence of a structural break in the 
trend behaviour of income inequality in the late 60s and early 70s, which is a robust across different 
inequality measures.  
59
 It was impossible to collect comparable wage inequality data for Spain, the nineteenth country of our 
sample. For this reason, although Spain is included in the economic performance analysis, it is 
excluded from the analysis regarding wage inequalities.   
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strong signs of a long-run declining tendency. In some countries the increase in wage 
dispersion is not only the outcome of higher wage increases for the highly-paid 
workers, but of an absolute decrease in the real earnings of the low-paid.  
 
Table 4.1: Three measures of wage inequality for a selection of OECD countries 
 9th-to-5th decile 5th-to-1st decile 9th-to-1st decile 
Country '84-'88 '89-94 '84-'94 '84-'88 '89-94 '84-'94 '84-'88 '89-94 '84-'94 
Australia 1.72 1.77 1.74 1.68 1.66 1.67 2.89 2.94 2.91 
Austria 1.67 1.65 1.66 1.65 1.67 1.66 2.76 2.76 2.76 
Belgium 1.76 1.57 1.66 1.39 1.38 1.38 2.45 2.17 2.31 
Canada 1.71 1.73 1.72 2.23 2.18 2.20 3.81 3.77 3.79 
Denmark 1.55 1.57 1.56 1.40 1.38 1.39 2.17 2.17 2.17 
Finland 1.69 1.73 1.71 1.51 1.46 1.48 2.55 2.53 2.54 
France 2.12 2.13 2.12 1.62 1.61 1.61 3.43 3.43 3.43 
Germany 1.65 1.64 1.64 1.42 1.37 1.39 2.34 2.25 2.29 
Holland 1.66 1.66 1.66 1.56 1.56 1.56 2.59 2.59 2.59 
Italy 1.56 1.65 1.60 1.45 1.60 1.52 2.26 2.64 2.45 
Japan 1.70 1.73 1.71 1.64 1.60 1.62 2.79 2.77 2.78 
N.Zealand 1.64 1.79 1.71 1.74 1.77 1.75 2.85 3.17 3.01 
Norway 1.49 1.50 1.49 1.45 1.32 1.38 2.16 1.98 2.07 
Portugal 2.13 2.40 2.26 1.61 1.72 1.66 3.43 4.13 3.78 
Sweden 1.57 1.62 1.59 1.34 1.36 1.35 2.10 2.20 2.15 
Switzland na 1.64 na na 1.49 na na 2.44 na 
UK 1.78 1.86 1.82 1.70 1.74 1.72 3.03 3.24 3.13 
USA 1.99 2.01 2.00 2.05 2.13 2.09 4.08 4.28 4.18 
All* 1.73 1.76 1.75 1.61 1.62 1.61 2.81 2.88 2.85 
*: This is an unweighted average. Does not include Switzerland.   
 
To complete the picture, a tendency that has been named the “disappearing 
middle” has been apparent. The numbers of people receiving either higher than 
average or lower than average wages has increased remarkably since the early 80s, 
especially in countries like the US, the UK and Canada. Definitionally, of course, 
since these data show earnings, they reveal nothing about incomes of the non-
employed and so are incomplete as indicators of overall (income) inequality.  
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4.3.2. Regulation and economic performance 
A categorisation of different country experiences in terms of their labour 
market regulation is a difficult task as is a categorisation of them in terms of their 
economic performance, as some countries may perform better in one field but worse 
in others. Nevertheless, a short discussion of the labour market experience across 
countries is necessary as this facilitates the understanding of the differences and 
similarities of different forms of labour market regulation. For reasons of simplicity, 
but with the risk of misrepresentation, we can divide our sample countries into five 
groups. The first group consists of the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway and 
Finland), Austria and -to a lesser extent- Germany. These countries had in the 15-
year period of our study highly regulated labour markets, with high minimum wages 
and relatively high employment protection and labour standards. With the exception 
of Finland, their labour market performance (growth in real wages, unemployment 
and wage inequality) was very strong for most of the period under study (but many 
experienced a deterioration of labour market performance in the second half of the 
1990s). Their output and productivity growth rates were also above average. On the 
other hand, employment growth in these countries has been rather slow. Attempts to 
introduce greater labour market flexibility started in these countries more recently 
but, for most of the period of this study (1980-1994), this was not the case.  
Another group of countries where labour markets were highly regulated is 
constituted by Belgium, Italy and Spain. In these countries, though, the labour market 
performance was much bleaker. Substantially high unemployment rates and slow 
employment growth were the main characteristics of this group of countries for the 
whole of the study period. Importantly, these countries experienced above average 
and even high rates of economic and productivity growth. France, Portugal, Denmark 
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and the Netherlands make up the third group of countries with intermediate overall 
labour market regulation scores. These countries had generous compensation for the 
unemployed (apart from France), high labour standards and strong trade unions (only 
France and Denmark), but employment protection (not in Portugal) and minimum 
wages (not in France) were set at more moderate levels. Their overall economic 
performance has been close to the OECD average, with relatively slow employment 
growth but good productivity records (apart from the Netherlands). Portugal had high 
rates of output growth but was also the poorest country in terms of per capita GDP.  
 
Table 4.2: Indexes of labour market flexibility (1980-1994) 
Country Repl. 
Rate 
Labour 
standrds 
Empl. 
Protect 
Union 
cover. 
Centra-
lisation  
Union 
density 
Coordi-
nation  
Min. 
wage 
Flexibility 
index 
Australia 17 13 16 8 8 10 11 3 75.4 
Austria  14.5 7.5 5 1 2.5 6 18 2 39.8 
Belgium 10.5 10.5 4 5 2.5 5 9 2 39.3 
Canada 12 15.5 17 17 18 12 1.5 3 90.5 
Denmark 1 15.5 15 13 6.5 3 15 3 58.8 
Finland 8.5 7.5 10 2 1 2 13 1 29.9 
France 13 4.5 7 4 11 19 6.5 1 47.9 
Germany 8.5 4.5 6 3 11 13 18 2 45.0 
Italy 19 2 1 7 14 8 5 1 42.2 
Japan 10.5 17 12 18 18 16 18 3 87.2 
Holland 4 7.5 11 9.5 11 15 9 2 54.5 
N. Zealand 18 13 18 16 16 7 3 2 82.0 
Norway 6.5 7.5 9 11.5 5 4 16 1 35.5 
Portugal 6.5 10.5 3 11.5 11 10 6.5 2 48.3 
Spain 4 2 2 9.5 6.5 18 9 1 31.3 
Sweden 2 2 8 6 4 1 13 1 20.9 
Switzerlnd 4 13 14 15 11 14 13 2 64.9 
UK 16 18.5 13 14 15 10 4 3 87.2 
USA 14.5 18.5 19 19 18 17 1.5 3 100.0 
Notes: Countries are ranked (1-19) according to their degree of flexibility. For minimum wages 
countries are categorised in three groups where a high value stands for a low minimum wage. The 
replacement ratio is the ratio of the average unemployment benefit over the average wage. Labour 
standards is a composite index reflecting regulation on working time, fixed-term contracts, minimum 
wages and workers’ representation rights. Employment protection reflects the strictness of national 
hiring-and-firing legislation. Union coverage is the share of employees covered by union agreements 
on wage bargaining. Union density is the share of union members to total civilian employment. 
Centralisation is an index reflecting the level at which wage bargaining takes place (firm, industry, 
region, country). Co-ordination is simply an evaluation of the degree of co-ordination between 
workers and between employers in the wage bargaining process. For more information on these 
indexes, see the Appendix.  
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Table 4.3: Measures of economic and labour market performance (avg., 1980-1994) 
Country GDP per 
capitaa 
GDP 
growthb 
Empl. 
growthb 
Unempl 
rateb 
Producti-
vitya 
Productivi-
ty growthb 
Empl/Pop 
ratio 
Performance 
index 
Australia 15,529 3.1 2 8.5 37.70 1.3 0.412 65.9 
Austria  18,736 2.6 0.8 4.9 44.46 0.9 0.421 68.1 
Belgium 18,050 2.1 0.4 11.2 49.25 1.6 0.367 54.9 
Canada 18,325 2.4 1.5 9.7 42.66 1.1 0.430 57.1 
Denmark 24,230 1.9 0 9.9 48.43 1.6 0.500 54.9 
Finland 23,870 1.2 -1.7 8.1 51.40 3.0 0.464 67.6 
France 19,453 2.1 0.2 10.2 51.20 1.7 0.380 59.9 
Germany 19,166 2.8 0.6 7.7 51.42 -0.2 0.373 70.9 
Italy 18,038 2 -0.2 9.6 48.52 2.2 0.372 53.8 
Japan 21,849 3.3 1.1 2.5 44.78 2.3 0.488 97.3 
Holland 17,450 2.7 1.7 7.4 45.05 0.2 0.387 65.9 
N. Zealand 12,244 1.4 0.4 6.8 29.52 0.0 0.415 33.5 
Norway 26,266 2.8 0.3 4.2 56.05 2.6 0.469 100.0 
Portugal 6,271 3.3 0.3 6.3 14.20 2.2 0.441 60.4 
Spain 11,573 2.9 0.7 19.8 37.80 2.4 0.306 58.2 
Sweden 24,679 1.2 -0.8 3.6 50.81 2.1 0.486 70.9 
Switzerland 30,192 1.7 1.4 1.6 59.80 0.4 0.505 87.9 
UK 15,648 2.3 0.5 9 35.96 1.6 0.435 47.3 
USA 20,100 2.5 1.6 6.5 45.39 1.2 0.443 78.0 
Notes: [a]Thousands of US dollars, in 1990 prices and exchange rates; [b]Percentage points. 
 
The rest of the 19 OECD countries of our study had rather flexible labour 
markets. Nevertheless, their performance in terms of economic outcomes was not 
always satisfactory. Canada, the UK, New Zealand and Switzerland had moderate to 
poor performance in terms of economic outcomes and the first three also had rather 
poor labour market performance. Switzerland, despite its low rates of growth and the 
fact that it had the most regulated labour market in this group, had an exceptional 
labour market performance. The last group consists of Australia, Japan and the USA. 
This group is characterised by very high labour market flexibility, minimal levels of 
employment protection and job security, low minimum wages and low levels of 
compensation for the unemployed. The labour market and overall economic 
performance of these countries was above average, with low rates of unemployment 
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and high rates of employment growth,60 at least in relative terms, although wage 
inequalities grew sharply (especially for the USA).    
This categorisation of countries is useful for the conceptualisation of the 
different labour market experiences in the OECD, but is to a significant extent 
subjective and might hide interesting information. In our empirical analysis we use a 
number of more detailed measures of labour market flexibility rather than an 
aggregate index. Table 4.2 presents the ranking scores on these more detailed indexes 
for 19 OECD countries. Table 4.3 shows how these countries have performed in 
terms of some main economic and labour market indicators.  
The last column in each table presents a composite index based on the 
combined scores each country receives when ranked according to its performance on 
the detailed labour market flexibility and economic performance indexes. These two 
indexes take the value of 100 for the best performing country and all other countries’ 
performances are expressed as percentages of the best score. Reading the last column 
in Table 4.2, one can see that the USA, Canada, the UK, Japan, New Zealand and 
Australia have been the economies with the most flexible labour markets. A group of 
intermediate countries consists of Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and France. In the rest of the countries, the regulation of their labour markets is 
relatively high, so they can be viewed as having relatively rigid labour markets. 
Turning to the last column of Table 4.3 we see that Norway, Japan, Switzerland, the 
USA, Sweden and Germany had a very good overall economic performance while 
                                                 
60
 One must be very careful with what employment growth really stands for and how it is measured, as 
in most of the cases the biggest portion of the new jobs created were part-time jobs and the results 
seem to depend on the business cycle. For example, employment grew in New Zealand at an annual 
rate of 3.2% between 1991 and 1996, but only at 1% p.a. between 1986-1997. Moreover, as the growth 
of part-time jobs was 3.9% p.a., the full-time equivalent employment growth was only 0.4% p.a. 
(Gorter and Poot, 1998).  
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New Zealand and the UK had the poorest performance among the 19 OECD 
countries of our study. 
 
4.4. Labour market flexibility and wage inequality 
In chapter three we reviewed in some detail the expected effects of labour 
market regulation on economic performance and wage inequality. In brief, unions are 
expected to reduce wage inequality, although some widening of the union-nonunion 
wage gap is also possible. Deregulation of minimum wages and decentralisation 
should lead to a widening of wage inequality. On the other hand, the expected impact 
of deregulation in hiring-and-firing, working time arrangements, unemployment 
benefits and the mobility of labour is much more ambiguous. In this section we 
provide empirical evidence to help evaluate the impact that such elements of labour 
market regulation have had on wage inequality in the OECD during the 1980s and 
early 1990s.  
 
4.4.1. Considerations for the empirical analysis 
 Our empirical investigation uses a macro-analytical approach to examine how 
different characteristics of national labour markets affect wage inequality. In such a 
context, theory does not suggest any specific relation determining wage inequalities. 
As mentioned earlier, occupational, individual, locational and industry-specific 
characteristics are important at the micro-level, but they still leave a significant part 
of the variance of the distribution of wages unexplained. The impact of factors like 
international trade and female labour force participation has been shown to be 
significant in some studies but insignificant in others. Hence, for the purpose of our 
study, the specification of the model referred more to the choice of its functional 
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form, than to the choice of the explanatory variables. Nevertheless, we did 
experiment with some measures of the structure of the production system ("openness 
to trade" and share of manufacturing, services and industry in total employment),61 as 
well as with different labour market variables (unemployment rate, employment-
population ratio and growth rate of the labour force), trying to control for exogenous 
macroeconomic conditions. None of these variables proved to be of any significance 
in explaining cross-country differences in wage inequality. Table 4.4 presents the 
correlation coefficients between the three measures of inequality presented earlier and 
the aforementioned candidate control variables. 
 
Table 4.4: Correlation between inequality and the structure of the economy 
Inequality 
measures 
Share of 
agriculture 
Share of 
industry 
Share of 
services 
Share of 
man/ture 
Openness 
to trade 
U-rate Empl/pop 
ratio 
L-force 
growth 
WDIS95 0.191 
(0.46) 
-0.036 
(0.89) 
-0.046 
(0.86) 
0.264 
(0.31) 
-0.188 
(0.47) 
0.232 
(0.36) 
-0.141 
(0.58) 
-0.041 
(0.87) 
WDIS51 0.013 
(0.96) 
-0.203 
(0.43) 
0.206 
(0.43) 
-0.189 
(0.47) 
-0.446 
(0.07) 
0.236 
(0.35) 
-0.024 
(0.93) 
0.330 
(0.18) 
WDIS91 0.097 
(0.71) 
-0.160 
(0.54) 
0.124 
(0.64) 
0.004 
(0.99) 
-0.420 
(0.09) 
0.266 
(0.29) 
-0.074 
(0.77) 
0.192 
(0.45) 
Notes: significance levels in parentheses. 
 
As none of the correlation coefficients is statistically significant (with the 
exception of the openness variable for the lower-tail inequality measure and 
marginally at the 10% level), we decided to exclude these variables from our analysis. 
Hence, our sample consists of 18 OECD countries, for two time-periods (1984-1988 
and 1989-1994). Wage inequality data were collected from the OECD Employment 
Outlook (1993, 1996) and they refer to the last year of each time-observation.62 Three 
measures of wage inequality have been used. The ratio of the fifth to the bottom 
(first) decile of the distribution of wages, the ratio of the ninth to the fifth deciles and 
                                                 
61
 Data on “openness” were taken from the Penn World Tables (version 5.6), while data for 
employment shares were collected from various issues of the OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
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the ratio of the ninth to the first deciles. According to the OECD, these indexes are in 
general considered to be preferable to the standard deviation of the distribution of 
wages, or other inequality measures, like the Gini coefficient or the Theil index, 
especially for cross-country studies (OECD 1993, Annex 5.A). They also enable us to 
take a look inside the wage distribution and see how even are the effects of labour 
market flexibility (if any) across the distribution of wages. The results support this 
methodological approach, showing that, in general the impact of differences 
(changes) in labour market regulation and flexibility is greater for the lower-paid 
workers.  
As our explanatory variables, rather than using one aggregate measure of 
labour market flexibility, we used seven different indexes of labour market 
characteristics, which all proxy for different aspects of labour market regulation.63 
Nickell (1997a) has shown that different elements of labour market flexibility have 
very different effects on the unemployment rate. Our earlier theoretical considerations 
suggest that the same will hold for its wage inequality effects. It is more plausible that 
“the effect of a single institutional arrangement can only be understood in its 
interaction with other institutional rules” (Siebert, 1997, p.39). Additionally, we also 
included some squared terms of these indexes in our estimated equations, as the 
existence of non-linearities is suggested in the literature even by different economic 
approaches (e.g.: Piore, 1990; Herzenberg et al., 1990; Sengenberger and Campbell, 
1994; Fields, 1990; OECD, 1995). We originally considered estimating our equations 
using the Random Effects GLS method (Baltagi, 1995), since for cross-sectional 
panel data, the two observations corresponding to the two sample periods for each 
                                                                                                                                           
62
 Hence, we actually test how the regulatory environment of labour markets in the last five years has 
affected the dispersion of wages. The reason for this is that we assume that the impact of labour market 
regulation takes some time to be realised in terms of wage inequality. 
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country cannot be treated as independent (Greene, 1993). After experimenting with 
different estimation methods, however, we ended up using OLS as our estimation 
technique. This was supported by all the specification tests, as reported in Table 4.5 
(Panel B). Since the specification of the model cannot be derived a priori, the 
decision as to which variables should enter the estimated equations in both levels and 
squares was based on a backward stepwise selection procedure. In general, only 
employment protection, occupational mobility and spending on ALMPs did not 
require the inclusion of a squared term. 
 
4.4.2. Empirical results 
The last two rows of panel B present the results from the Breush-Pagan chi-
square test for random effects and an F-test test for omitted time-specific effects, 
respectively. The results indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis that there are no 
significant time-specific or country-specific (random) effects, suggesting that OLS is 
the most appropriate estimation method.64 For all three equations, the goodness of fit 
as measured by the adjusted R2 (first row of Panel B) is high, ranging from 83% to 
92%, and the Durbin-Watson statistic is satisfactorily close to 2 (second row). They 
all pass the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality (third row) and the Ramsey RESET test 
for omitted variables (fourth row), which is a further indication of the good 
specification of the equations. Finally, with the exception of the case of the upper-tail 
inequality, which is the weakest relationship, the estimated residuals are 
                                                                                                                                           
63
 For details about the indices see Appendix A.4. 
64
 The possibility of country fixed-effects was not tested, for two reasons. First, because the country-
specific effects (if any) could not be fixed, as in terms of their labour market experience our sample 
countries cannot be considered as forming one group (Siebert, 1997). Second, because the use of a 
fixed-effects specification would create problems of collinearity between the fixed effects and the 
constant-across-time regressors, as some of our explanatory variables show no within-group (between 
time-periods) variation. 
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homoskedastic according to the Cook-Weisberg chi-square test that we applied (fifth 
row).   
 
Table 4.5: The impact of labour market regulation on wage inequality 
 Variables 
 
Overall Inequality 
(9th-to-1st decile) 
Upper-tail Inequality 
(9th-to-5th decile) 
Lower-tail Inequality 
(5th-to-1st decile) 
PA
N
EL
 
A
 
Constant 3.657 (7.140)*** 
1.020 
(6.505)*** 
2.681 
(11.711)*** 
Spending on ALMPs -0.00093 (-0.215) 
-0.00176 
(-0.858) 
0.001709 
(0.874) 
Labour standards 0.345515 (3.118)*** 
-0.01905 
(-1.592) 
0.155597 
(3.305)*** 
Square of Labour 
standards 
-0.04001 
(-3.290)*** 
- -0.01575 
(-3.014)*** 
Co-ordination in     
wage bargaining 
-1.03004 
(-4.532)*** 
0.009218 
(0.465) 
-0.61025 
(-5.793)*** 
Square Co-ordination 
in wage bargaining  
0.111695 
(4.404)*** 
- 0.06773 
(5.647)*** 
Employment protection 0.083424 (7.843)*** 
0.046351 
(9.287)*** 
0.001225 
(0.254) 
Job mobility 0.057275 (7.025)*** 
0.028443 
(8.347)*** 
0.008073 
(2.105)** 
Treatment of 
unemployed 
-0.00128 
(-3.120)*** 
0.001433 
(1.995)* 
-0.00215 
(-3.018)*** 
Square of Treatment of 
unemployed 
- -5.20E-06 
(-2.176)** 
5.28E-06 
(2.232)** 
Unionism -0.02046 (-7.213)*** 
-0.00751 
(-6.378)*** 
-0.0019 
(-4.679)*** 
Square of Unionism 5.95E-05 (5.250)*** 
2.41E-05 
(4.907)*** 
- 
Statistics 
PA
N
EL
 
B 
R2-bar 0.92 0.83 0.87 
DW 2.49 1.94 1.89 
Normality test 
(Shapiro-Wilk) 
z=-0.550 
(0.709) 
z=-1.339 
(0.910) 
z=0.546 
(0.292) 
RESET test (Ramsey) F(3,20)=1.50 (0.246) 
F(3,21)=3.63 
(0.030) 
F(3,20)=2.03 
(0.141) 
Heteroskedasticity test 
(Cook-Weisberg) 
Chi2(1)=0.53 
(0.466) 
Chi2(1)=7.61 
(0.006) 
Chi2(1)=0.38 
(0.536) 
Test for random effects 
(Breush-Pagan) 
Chi2(1)=1.97 
(0.160) 
Chi2(1)=0.95 
(0.329) 
Chi2(1)=0.50 
(0.481) 
F-test for omitted      
time effects 
F(10,23)=0.176 
(0.679) 
F(11,24)=0.181 
(0.674) 
F(10,23)=0.005 
(0.942) 
Notes: t-statistics (panel A) and probabilities (panel B) in parentheses. *, ** and *** show statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. For definition of variables see Appendix.  
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 The first part of Table 4.5 (panel A) presents the empirical findings. The first 
column refers to the total measure of inequality (9th to 1st decile), while the second 
and third columns present the results for the upper-tail (9th to 5th) and lower-tail (5th to 
1st) inequality, respectively. As can be seen in the table, spending on ALMPs is the 
only policy variable that does not seem to significantly affect wage inequality. All 
other variables have a statistically significant impact on overall wage inequality, in 
consistence with the priors set out in chapter three. Nevertheless, high labour 
standards seem to result in higher wage inequalities, at least among the low-paid. An 
explanation for this seemingly counter-intuitive finding could be that -controlling for 
other labour market characteristics- labour standards compensate for an uneven wage 
distribution. Tempting though it may be to conclude that, the analysis employed in 
this study is not sufficiently disaggregated really to support such conclusions. Firm-
level studies would be needed to investigate in more detail such an hypothesis. Here it 
can be no more than a plausible conjecture. As with labour standards, co-ordination 
(among employers and among workers) in wage bargaining does not affect the upper-
tail inequality. Nevertheless, as expected, this variable has a negative impact on 
overall wage inequality. Labour markets with wage setting environments that 
promote co-ordination exhibit less inequality, especially at the bottom-half of the 
wage distribution.   
 Employment protection seems to be a significant determinant of wage 
inequality for the top-half of the wage distribution (increasing disparities). For high-
wage earners, this result is not counter-intuitive. Higher employment protection 
means higher employment stability with the result that wage determination (and, 
hence, inequalities) will depend more on the hierarchical structures of the internal 
labour market, increasing inequalities. For low-wage earners, employment protection 
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is insignificant. This result seems superficially to invalidate the original hypothesis 
that employment protection increases workers’ power to bargain for a more equal pay 
(or higher wages). Nevertheless, employment protection has a positive sign only after 
controlling for other factors, including job mobility. The coefficient for the latter is 
positive and significant in all equations, indicating that more flexible labour markets 
exhibit higher wage inequality. Hence, controlling for other elements of regulation, 
job stability contributes to a narrower distribution of wages.  
 The last two rows of Panel A present the estimated coefficients for two of the 
more intensively studied labour market "rigidities", namely unionism and the way the 
unemployed are treated. Unionism has a clear negative impact on wage inequality 
(significant at the 1% level for all inequality measures). This result indicates that 
countries with higher unionisation rates or higher rates of union coverage have a 
narrower distribution of wages. The effect of unionism is the strongest and most 
robust result obtained, and it is also very robust across the different inequality 
measures. Hence, it offers further support for the results obtained by other researchers 
using different methodological approaches (e.g.: Gosling and Machin, 1993; Fortin 
and Lemieux, 1997) about the role of trade unions in achieving a narrower wage 
distribution. In contrast, the “treatment of the unemployed” variable has a very 
differentiated impact between upper-tail and lower-tail inequality. Higher 
unemployment benefits (in level and duration) have a negative impact on overall 
wage inequality, and they mainly reduce the dispersion of wages in the bottom half of 
the wage distribution. This is as expected, as a generous treatment of the unemployed 
would increase the reservation wage (and, hence, the minimal market wage), 
compressing the distribution of wages at the bottom. For upper-tail inequality, there is 
no reason to expect any negative effect of unemployment benefits. Despite this, our 
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findings indicate that, for this category of wage-earners, unemployment benefits 
increase wage inequalities! One potential explanation for this apparently paradoxical 
finding can be that higher unemployment benefits are correlated with lower (median) 
wages.65 If wages at the top of the distribution are not affected, then upper-tail 
inequality would increase, and this would appear to be related to the more preferential 
treatment of the unemployed.  
 Two points are worth making in conclusion. The first relates to the difference 
between the effects of the various labour market institutional characteristics in 
relation to the two “disaggregated” measures of wage inequality. For inequality in the 
upper half of the wage distribution, it is only unionism, firing-and-hiring legislation 
(employment protection) and unemployment benefits that matter. For inequality at the 
lower half of the distribution, co-ordination in wage bargaining and labour standards 
are also important, while employment protection is not. The second point is about the 
role of employment protection and labour standards. According to our estimates, 
these two elements of labour market regulation do not seem to reduce wage inequality 
for the low-paid. (The negative correlation between inequality and labour standards is 
reversed when we control for other labour market regulation characteristics). This is 
in sharp contrast with the predictions of the opponents of labour market deregulation, 
who expect these two elements to be among the major factors that help narrow wage 
inequalities.    
 
                                                 
65
 A simultaneity scenario would have to be employed to justify this. If one assumes that countries with 
high unemployment rates are forced to treat the unemployed better, and if unemployment increases the 
incidence of low-pay (OECD, 1996) and, hence, lowers the median wage, then high unemployment 
benefits will be correlated with lower median wages.   
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4.5. Labour market flexibility and economic performance 
In this section we investigate the role of labour market flexibility on 
economic performance, for the same sample of OECD countries. There are only a 
few studies that try to assess the impact of overall labour market flexibility on 
indicators of economic and labour market performance at an aggregate level. Koedijk 
and Kremers’ (1996) cross-country analysis for the relationship between regulation 
on the one hand and output, productivity and employment growth on the other, has 
provided some evidence of a negative relationship between labour market regulation 
and output growth, but no impact on employment or productivity growth was 
revealed. Nickell and Layard (1998) have found trade unions and unemployment 
benefits to hinder employment and output growth but they suggest that employment 
protection and minimum wages are neutral in relation to these variables. Esping-
Andersen (1998), examining the impact of overall labour market regulation on 
unemployment, concludes that unemployment is not affected by the regulation of 
labour markets. Finally, Nickell (1997a) has shown that different elements of labour 
market regulation have different effects on unemployment and that probably it is a 
very tight and careless regulation rather than any regulation that reduces 
employment.    
 
4.5.1. Considerations for the empirical analysis 
In the present empirical analysis we use -as before- the OECD indexes. 
However, we aggregate these indexes into three broader ones, measuring regulation 
on the determination of (i)the minimum levels of wage costs (unemployment benefits 
and minimum wages), (ii)average wage costs (bargaining systems and union power), 
and (iii)average non-wage costs and labour input adjustability (labour standards and 
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employment protection).66 With these aggregations we categorise flexibility into 
three groups that measure the extent to which market forces are allowed to operate 
freely in three broad domains, facilitating a direct reference of our dependent 
variables to the theoretical considerations. In the case of the previous section we used 
as many regulation indexes as possible, in order to locate as precisely as possible the 
sources of increased wage inequalities. In the present case we want to locate effects 
which are relevant to theory. This justifies the aggregations used in the present 
empirical work. 
We again use 6-year averages for two periods (1983-88 and 1989-94) to 
avoid time-inconsistency and business-cycle related problems.67 Seven indicators 
measure economic performance, namely output per capita, output growth, 
productivity, productivity growth, employment growth, the employment-population 
ratio and unemployment. This is in order to get a more general picture of the effects 
of labour market flexibility on the economies under investigation and to enable a 
discussion on the probable mechanisms that are behind any identified relationships. 
For example, labour market flexibility can have an impact on per capita output either 
by affecting the productivity of labour or by changing the employment-to-population 
ratio. Moreover, the effects on the two last variables may be such that they cancel 
each other out. Examining merely the output effects of regulation can potentially hide 
crucial information.   
In accordance with the methodologies employed in other studies (Koedijk and 
Kremers, 1996; Nickell, 1997a; OECD, 1997; Nickell and Layard, 1998), the 
                                                 
66
 Additionally, the first two categories are each sometimes split into two components: treatment of the 
unemployed and minimum wages, for the first, and the bargaining system and union power, for the 
second. For definitions of the data used see the Appendix. 
67
 Such problems arise from cross-country differences in the “timing” of implementation of labour 
market reforms, but also in order to avoid any business cycle effects affecting the dependent variables, 
the economic performance indicators. 
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estimating regressions do not include any economic variables as controls. The main 
reason for that is that we want to estimate “total-impact” effects. The labour market 
regulation indicators are strongly exogenous variables in the estimating relationships, 
expected to affect each and every one of our dependent variables.68 In this respect, 
regressions specified without controls can be thought of as reduced-form equations, 
derived from some underlying structural relationships. The estimated coefficients are 
then total-impact effects. We illustrate this in the following example. Assume that 
productivity growth is a function of investment, employment growth and some 
labour market institutions. Further, assume that investment depends on the same 
labour market institutions (or some others, closely related to them) and on 
productivity, which is again a function of labour demand, wages, and unemployment. 
Naturally, we assume that the last three variables will also be determined by some 
labour market institutions and by some business cycle effects. The same can be said 
for employment growth as well. As all of our variables are constructed as 6-year 
averages so that business cycle effects are minimised, a reduced-form productivity 
growth equation will only contain the labour market regulation variables on the right 
hand side. The estimating coefficients, though, will capture the universal effect of 
regulation on productivity growth so that they will certainly not represent a direct 
effect. However, the direct effects are not what we are interested on, either in this 
study or from a policy perspective.    
Studies focusing on the direct effects of a single regulation indicator on a 
single economic performance measure often indicate that these effects are non-linear 
(see Dorwick, 1993 for empirical evidence and Fields, 1990 or Sengenberger, 1994a 
                                                 
68
 As claimed elsewhere, although in many instances labour market flexibility can be seen as an 
endogenous variable, this is not the case for labour market regulation, which is the measure that we use 
here.   
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for theoretical discussions). This is undoubtedly an interesting possibility. To test it, 
we include squared terms of the explanatory variables in the estimating regressions. 
With this we can see whether it is possible that too much (or too little) regulation is 
better (or worse) than intermediate levels. For estimating the regressions the Random 
Effects Generalised Least Squares procedure was used and, where appropriate, 
simple OLS. Alternative panel data estimation techniques (mean group and pooled 
mean group estimation; see Pesaran et al., 1999) cannot be utilised due to the small 
time dimension of the sample.    
  
4.5.2. Empirical results 
Reflecting the foregoing discussion, a number of regressions were run using 
three main explanatory variables: the nature of the system determining minimum 
wage levels (RESERV), the nature of the wage determination system (BARGAIN), 
and the nature of regulation-determined non-wage costs and labour input 
adjustability (RIGID).69 Table 4.6 presents the results from the best performing 
regressions in three panels. The first two panels correspond to cross-sections for the 
two sample periods, while the last panel presents the results from the pooled 
regressions. The estimated coefficients are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion 
of right hand side variables, supporting the robustness of the results obtained. Despite 
the fact that the cross-sectional regressions do not return many significant 
coefficients, the fit of the regressions is in most of the cases satisfactory and the 
general impression is that labour market institutions have a significant role in the 
                                                 
69
 In an earlier draft (Monastiriotis, 1999a), a cross-sectional empirical investigation was presented for 
the same countries but with more detailed flexibility indexes. Despite some minor econometric 
problems, the results obtained were very similar to those reported here. 
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determination of economic performance.70 Overall, the growth and unemployment 
regressions perform better than the regressions in levels. The same is true for the 
regressions on the 1980s sample, compared to the 1990s sample. This should not be 
surprising. Differences in labour market regulation across OECD countries were 
wider in the 1980s and for this reason the rank indexes of labour market regulation 
that we use should perform better in this period. Additionally, it is reasonable to 
expect that labour market regulation has a stronger impact on the rate of change of 
economic outcomes than on their levels.  
In the case of per capita GDP, none of the indexes is statistically significant 
(with the exception of the negative coefficient for the wage bargaining system in the 
pooled regression) and the fit of the regressions is remarkably poor. The 
decomposition of this relationship in the next two columns offers further support for 
this conclusion.71 The only significant relationship is the negative impact of 
bargaining on the employment-population ratio in the pooled regression, which 
seems to suggest that countries with rigid wage bargaining structures tend to have 
lower labour force participation rates. The effects on output are largely activated 
through this relationship. In none of the cases is the productivity of labour found to 
have any connection to the regulatory framework in the labour market. This is a 
counter-intuitive finding, as we would expect that much of the economic effects of 
labour market regulation would function through labour productivity. 
 
 
 
                                                 
70
 The reported R2 in the pooled regressions understates the goodness of fit of these regressions, as it 
does not take into account the contribution of the country-effects.  
71
 Per capital GDP equals productivity times the employment-to-population ratio.  
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Table 4.6: Labour market regulation and economic performance, basic analysis 
Variables GDP per 
capita 
Product-
ivity 
Empl- 
to-pop 
GDP 
growth 
Pr/vity 
growth 
Empl. 
Growth 
Unempl 
rate 
1983-1988 
RESERVE 1.99 
(4.10) 
1.94 
(4.14) 
1.11 
(0.86) 
-0.16** 
(0.06) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
RESERVE 
SQUARE 
-1.11 
(3.12) 
-0.90 
(3.06) 
-0.88 
(0.66) 
0.11** 
(0.04) 
- 0.07 
(0.05) 
- 
RIGID -0.26 
(0.41) 
-0.66 
(1.66) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.01* 
(0.006) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.40* 
(0.19) 
RIGID 
SQUARE 
- 0.59 
(1.46) 
- - - - 0.37** 
(0.16) 
BARGAIN -1.05 
(1.08) 
-5.90 
(7.96) 
-0.12 
(0.23) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
-0.41** 
(0.19) 
0.47*** 
(0.15) 
0.16 
(0.10) 
BARGAIN 
SQUARE 
- 4.05 
(6.15) 
- - 0.35** 
(0.15) 
-0.38*** 
(0.11) 
- 
R^2 0.11 0.14 0.29 0.53 0.42 0.68 0.36 
DW 2.15 2.19 2.09 2.51 2.12 1.33 2.21 
White 1.11 2.00 2.04 0.38 0.87 0.58 0.99 
1989-1994 
RESERVE 12.36 
(13.92) 
8.85 
(11.57) 
1.63 
(1.13) 
-0.10 
(0.10) 
-0.24** 
(0.11) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.16* 
(0.07) 
RESERVE 
SQUARE 
-9.10 
(10.63) 
-6.15 
(8.84) 
-1.39 
(0.90) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.17* 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.14) 
- 
RIGID -1.01 
(2.45) 
-1.21 
(2.04) 
-0.10 
(0.08) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.42** 
(0.15) 
RIGID 
SQUARE 
1.02 
(2.39) 
1.29 
(1.99) 
- - - - 0.38** 
(0.13) 
BARGAIN -17.79 
(15.73) 
-15.25 
(13.07) 
-0.11 
(0.21) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.14 
(0.25) 
0.13 
(0.09) 
BARGAIN 
SQUARE 
13.01 
(11.67) 
11.39 
(9.71) 
- - - -0.14 
(0.19) 
- 
R^2 0.13 0.15 0.38 0.15 0.51 0.43 0.49 
DW 2.55 2.54 2.01 1.83 2.28 1.48 2.10 
White 0.43 0.71 1.51 1.81 0.79 0.50 1.16 
1983-1994 
RESERVE 0.88 
(0.62) 
0.74 
(0.64) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.16*** 
(0.05) 
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
-0.12* 
(0.07) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
RESERVE 
SQUARE 
-0.79* 
(0.42) 
-0.61 
(0.45) 
- 0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
RIGID 1.10 
(1.47) 
0.54 
(1.26) 
0.39 
(0.30) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.005) 
-0.30** 
(0.15) 
RIGID 
SQUARE 
-1.05 
(1.34) 
-0.35 
(1.14) 
-0.46* 
(0.27) 
- - - 0.30** 
(0.14) 
BARGAIN -1.10*** 
(0.31) 
-2.52 
(3.52) 
-0.25*** 
(0.08) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
0.39*** 
(0.12) 
0.15*** 
(0.06) 
BARGAIN 
SQUARE 
- 1.49 
(2.70) 
- - - -0.33*** 
(0.09) 
- 
R^2 0.05 0.01 0.27 0.36 0.36 0.52 0.32 
DW - - - 1.94 - 1.40 - 
White - - - 1.07 - 0.59 - 
Breusch-
Pagan 
19.28*** 
(RE-GLS) 
18.42*** 
(RE-GLS) 
16.68*** 
(RE-GLS) 
2.22 
(OLS) 
4.86** 
(RE-GLS) 
0.49 
(OLS) 
14.73*** 
(RE-GLS) 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** show significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. The cross-sectional regressions (first two panels) have been estimated with OLS, while 
the pooled regressions as indicated in the last row. The Breusch-Pagan test is a test for random effects, 
a significant value showing significance of the random effects. White is an F-test for 
heteroskedasticity with a significant value indicating mis-specification problems. DW is the Durbin-
Watson statistic.   
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The next three columns present the estimated effects of regulation on growth. 
As noted already, the relationships seem to have been stronger in the mid-1980s than 
in more recent years. The pooled regressions have a satisfactory fit and -with the 
exception of the productivity growth equation- country specific (random) effects are 
insignificant. Regulations related to unemployment benefits and minimum wages 
seem to have a negative but convex effect on growth. For our sample this suggests 
that intermediate countries have experienced lower growth rates than both weakly 
and strongly regulated countries. For the case of employment growth, the in-sample 
forecasting suggests that tight regulation results in faster rates of employment 
growth, ceteris paribus. Rigidities related to the determination of non-wage costs and 
the easiness of adjustment of labour inputs have a linear negative effect on output 
and employment growth. However, the negative output growth effect must be 
activated merely through the employment growth effect, as our results indicate that 
productivity growth is not affected. The findings regarding the growth effects of the 
wage bargaining system are again quite surprising. The latter has a linear positive 
impact on both output and productivity growth rates. The estimated coefficients for 
the employment growth equation suggest that employment growth is faster in very 
flexible bargaining structures compared to very rigid ones, but intermediate levels of 
regulation are superior.      
The last column presents the estimated results for the unemployment 
equation. The evidence from the cross-sectional regressions is again mixed, so we 
focus on the results from the pooled regression. Regulation on unemployment 
benefits and minimum wages does not seem to impact on unemployment rates, 
suggesting that at an aggregate level the expected negative relationship between 
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unemployment and the determination of reservation wages is, if anything, not 
particularly strong. Moreover, rigidities relating to employment protection and labour 
standards seem to lead to lower levels of unemployment. However, tight wage 
bargaining systems are found to increase unemployment.   
 
Table 4.7: Labour market regulation and economic performance, five indexes 
Variables GDP per 
capita 
Productivity Emp/pop GDP 
growth 
Prod/vity 
growth 
Empl. 
growth 
Unempl 
rate 
TREAT -0.19* 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
(0.10) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.02) 
MWAGE 0.05 
(0.05) 
0.042 
(0.047) 
0.008 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
RIGID -0.20 
(0.33) 
-0.004 
(0.29) 
-0.15** 
(0.06) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.01) 
-0.016** 
(0.008) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
UNION -0.48** 
(0.23) 
-0.112** 
(0.055) 
-0.13** 
(0.06) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
BRGN -0.56 
(0.38) 
-0.075 
(0.34) 
-0.30*** 
(0.08) 
0.011 
(0.01) 
0.027* 
(0.016) 
-0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.196*** 
(0.05) 
UNION 
SQUARE 
0.143 
(0.10) 
- 0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
- -0.007** 
(0.003) 
- 
R^2 0.09 0.003 0.67 0.23 0.29 0.46 0.52 
DW - - - 2.00 - 1.54 - 
White - - - 0.90 - 0.66 - 
Breusch-
Pagan 
18.02*** 
(RE-
GLS) 
18.22*** 
(RE-GLS) 
15.12*** 
(RE-
GLS) 
0.62 
(OLS) 
6.46** 
(RE-
GLS) 
0.25 
(OLS) 
16.32*** 
(RE-
GLS) 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** show significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. The Breusch-Pagan test is a test for random effects, a significant value showing 
significance of the random effects. White is an F-test for heteroskedasticity with a significant value 
indicating mis-specification problems. DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic.   
 
It is interesting to investigate further the relationships estimated in Table 4.6, 
as it is possible that the results obtained are dependent on the aggregations of the 
data. For this reason, the pooled regressions presented above, are replicated using 
more detailed regulation indexes. Specifically, RESERVE and BARGAIN are 
decomposed into four new variables: treatment of the unemployed (TREAT), 
minimum wages (MWAGE), union power (UNION) and centralisation/coordination 
of wage bargaining (BRGN). The results from the new regressions are reported in 
Table 4.7. In general, the results are similar to the ones reported in Table 4.6. This 
Ch.4: Flexibility in the OECD 
 
 
136
can be reasonably viewed as an indication of the robustness of our findings. The fit 
of the GDP per capita and productivity regressions is again very poor. The estimated 
negative effect of BARGAIN is largely due to union power and less to the BRGN 
variable. Union power has a significant negative effect on employment, productivity 
and output. This is in accordance with much of the empirical literature and economic 
intuition. The view of unions as potential efficiency- and productivity-enhancing 
devices (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) is not supported by the data.  
On the other hand, productivity and output growth are hardly affected by any 
measure of regulation. This may come as a surprise, as the regressions of the more 
aggregate indexes had a better fit. Plausibly, then, this suggests that no single 
institution is by itself a determinant of growth, but the whole context their interplay 
creates has adverse effects on the growth rates of the economy. The employment 
equation has a much better fit now, largely because the effects of the two components 
of BARGAIN are not of equal size (although they have the same sign). The same is 
true for the unemployment equation. The effect of RIGID is on average zero (when a 
squared term is not included) and the impact of BARGAIN is merely due to the 
centralisation of wage bargaining (BRGN). In the employment growth equation 
unions are found to have a (marginally insignificant) positive effect, but 
centralisation in wage bargaining has a strong negative impact. Consequently, union 
power does not seem to affect unemployment when wage bargaining is coordinated 
and decentralised. This finding is at odds with much of the economic orthodoxy. We 
interpret it, though, as evidence suggesting that unions do not have damaging effects, 
provided that the institutions that they create do not.     
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4.6. Putting the evidence together - Conclusions 
 The empirical evidence presented in the previous sections revealed a wide 
range of information regarding the impact of labour market regulation on wage 
inequalities and economic performance. Despite the fact that the same or very similar 
data have been used in other research (e.g.: Grubb and Wells, 1993; Nickell, 1997a; 
Nickell and Layard, 1998), the advantage of the present analysis is that the results we 
obtained seem more organised and related to the predictions of economic insight.  
Concerning the effects on wage inequality, the empirical evidence showed 
that while labour market deregulation in general tends to increase wage inequality, 
especially for the low-paid, not every aspect of labour market deregulation is 
detrimental to equality in wages. Trade unions, unemployment benefits and co-
ordination in wage bargaining help narrow the distribution of wages. On the other 
hand, high labour standards and employment protection, especially for high-wage 
earners, are connected with wider wage dispersions, but only when we control for job 
mobility and union power. These findings shed light on the trade-offs and choices 
that are involved in labour market deregulation, but they also show specifically where 
policy measures should be aiming, so as to contribute towards more flexible labour 
markets while avoiding potential socially unpleasant side-effects. 
As with the wage inequality effects, our empirical analysis of the role of 
labour market regulation on economic performance suggested that there is a variety 
of mechanisms in place, generating effects with different impacts. Specifically, our 
results suggest that there is no “one truth” but rather multiple and, often, diverse 
mechanisms and effects. Labour market flexibility seems to be in many cases almost 
as detrimental to economic performance as labour market regulation. Unemployment 
benefits and minimum wages do not seem to be responsible for the bad economic 
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performance of highly regulated labour markets. Rigid wage bargaining systems are 
an impediment to productivity, employment and growth, but unions -although they 
reduce productivity and labour supply- are not responsible for unemployment and 
can even boost employment and productivity growth. Employment protection and 
high labour standards seem to reduce employment and employment growth, but these 
effects do not translate into a reduction of the levels or growth rates of output or 
productivity.  
The results obtained so far can be summarised as follows. Labour market 
regulation seems to have a minimal impact on output and productivity. Any effects 
are activated merely through labour supply, where rigid wage bargaining systems 
seem to have a negative effect. The latter, however, have a significant positive effect 
on the growth rates of employment, productivity and output. They also tend to 
produce more equal wage distributions. Adverse growth effects of regulation are 
found for the cases of unemployment benefits and minimum wages and less so for 
employment protection and labour standards. The last two elements of labour market 
regulation in effect seem to reduce unemployment and possibly to increase wage 
inequalities. Overall, labour market regulation is found to have some significant 
effects on wage inequalities, limited effects on unemployment, labour supply and 
employment growth, and negligible effects on output, productivity and their growth 
rates. 
Keeping the efficiency-versus-equality trade-off in mind, some tentative 
implications can be drawn. Our empirical findings suggest that it is possible to 
achieve a combination of labour market regulations that will improve economic 
performance while also reducing wage inequality. Rigid wage bargaining systems 
can be beneficial to both, provided that complementary measures are taken to 
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increase labour mobility and effort and reduce unemployment. Minimum wages and 
unemployment benefits can be successfully integrated into such a wage bargaining 
system, so as to further reduce wage inequality, but then additional attention should 
be drawn on alleviating their possible adverse effects on growth. Employment 
protection and labour standards, on the other hand, seem to be harmful to both 
equality and growth and should thus be probably left at relatively low levels.  
Although the results obtained in this chapter are not conclusive enough to 
dismiss any particular theoretical approach, in many respects they question the 
orthodoxy of the advocates of (any kind of) labour market deregulation. The evidence 
presented here is sufficient to suggest that the issue of labour market regulation and 
deregulation is a matter related more to the appropriate combinations and qualities of 
labour market institutions that can generate better economic outcomes, than to the 
“optimal” degree of flexibility as such. In the absence of conclusive empirical results, 
however, the possibility remains that labour market flexibility can be the source of at 
least as many problems as it can solve. 
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APPENDIX A.4: Description of the labour market regulation variables. 
1. Data sources: The original source of all data used is the OECD. Economic data 
were derived from the OECD Statistical Compendium, obtained by the British 
Library of Political and Economic Science (LSE). Data on wage inequality were 
obtained from OECD (1993 and 1996). Most of the data on labour market regulation 
indexes were taken from Prof. S. Nickell, who kindly made available to us his 
dataset. Some data, however, were directly obtained from the OECD, being made 
available to us in electronic format by D. Grubb, J. Martin and P. Swain, to whom I 
am grateful.  
2. Construction of variables and indexes: For the empirical investigation 6-year 
averages were computed and then used in the regressions, as explained in the text. 
The indexes of labour market regulation are composite indexes derived from more 
detailed data. The indexes used, were: TREAT, duration and replacement rate of 
unemployment benefits; MWAGE, minimum wages; RIGID, employment protection 
and labour standards; UNION, union density and union coverage; BRGN, 
centralisation of and coordination in wage bargaining; RESERVE, aggregation of 
TREAT and MWAGE; and BARGAIN, aggregation of UNION and BRGN. To make 
the aggregations, the following formula was used: 
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where k=A,B,…,N is the number of elements constituting the composite INDEX, the 
subscripts i and t index countries and time, respectively, and max{X}t is the 
maximum value of the index X at period t. Hence, each index expresses the degree of 
regulation in a specific area as a percentage of the maximum value, the latter being 
the value for a country which is most regulated in all respects. With this formula 
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equal weights are given to all elements and the aggregate index is independent from 
the measurement units of each element. The definitions of the seven more detailed 
labour market regulation indexes used in the empirical analysis are provided below.  
ALMP: Measures expenditure on Active Labour Market Policies. Constructed as 
“spending on ALMPs per unemployed, as a percentage of GDP per worker”.   
Labour standards: Constructed as the average of the relative position of each labour 
market (country) in terms of regulation on working time, fixed-term contracts, 
minimum wages and employees’ representation rights. 
Employment protection: Constructed as a ranking of countries according to the 
strictness of legislation concerning hiring and firing procedures.  
Job mobility: It measures the share of people employed in their current job for less 
than two years, as a percentage of total employment. Hence, it is a measure of 
labour market flexibility (job mobility) rather then deregulation. 
Co-ordination in wage bargaining: It is the sum of the scores each country received 
in terms of co-ordination between employers and co-ordination between trade 
unions in the wage bargaining process. 
Treatment of the unemployed: Constructed as the product of two indexes, the duration 
of unemployment benefits (measured in years) and the replacement ratio 
(average unemployment benefit as a percentage of the average wage).  
Unionism: It is the product of two more detailed indexes, union density (share of 
unionised workers to total employment) and an index of union coverage. The 
latter is a classification of countries into three categories on the basis of how 
widely are the negotiated union wages applied in the economy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DEREGULATION AND LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 In this chapter we depart from the general discussion about flexibility and 
engage in a theoretical investigation, examining how the standard neoclassical model 
of the labour market is altered when a specific form of labour market rigidities 
(labour standards) is introduced in the analysis. Specifically, we employ a framework 
of perfect competition and analyse the labour market equilibrium when labour 
standards are allowed to enter the labour demand and supply functions. The definition 
we give for labour standards is a broad one, including both working conditions and 
general employment conditions. In other words, the term “labour standards” includes 
two clusters of elements. On the one hand, it includes factors like health and safety, 
lighting and ventilation, organisation of production, child-care facilities, lunch-breaks 
and sick-leave. On the other hand, it also includes some non-tangible aspects, like 
job- and work-security, internal promotion opportunities, workers’ involvement in the 
decision-making and the right to unionise. We provide a detailed discussion of what 
constitutes labour standards and of how labour standards affect production in the next 
section.  
 The analysis presented in this chapter is not meant to cover the full range of 
complex dynamics that operate in a labour market in the presence of institutional 
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rigidities. Rather, the aim is to develop a simple framework within which to analyse 
the impact that a fraction of policy-imposed rigidities can have on the determination 
of labour market outcomes. Naturally, a number of labour market rigidities (among 
them, the most intensively studied, like unemployment benefits, minimum wages and 
unionism) are not considered in the development of the formal model, to keep the 
presentation of the current analysis and the exposition of the theoretical findings 
simple. Thus, we examine the implications of incorporating unionism, minimum 
wages and unemployment insurance into the model, separately. The model developed 
here makes labour supply and demand functions of labour standards, by introducing 
the latter into the profit and utility maximising decisions of the economic agents. This 
allows (in)flexibility to affect the slope and position of the labour demand and supply 
curves, rather than affecting the labour market equilibrium exogenously.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The next section provides the 
definition that we will use for labour standards and considers their nature as a 
production cost and as an element affecting workers’ utility. The model is presented 
in Section 5.3. We derive the demand and supply functions and investigate their 
behaviour in the wage-employment space, examining how the labour market 
described by our model responds to changes in regulation and in economic 
conditions, in comparison to the standard neoclassical model. In section 5.4 we 
discuss a number of extensions for our model, allowing for further rigidities in the 
labour market, related to unionism, minimum wages and unemployment insurance. 
This allows also an examination of labour market duality. The chapter concludes with 
a summary of the theoretical findings.  
 
 
Ch.5: Deregulation and labour market outcomes 
 
144
5.2. Labour standards and the labour market 
 As mentioned already, the term “labour standards” describes two broad 
groups, namely conditions of work and conditions of employment. We make the 
distinction between these two groups in order to discuss in more depth their 
constituent elements and their characteristics. The first group includes well-defined, 
often material aspects. It refers to the conditions of work, including health and safety 
standards, the intensity and organisation of the production process, and the 
availability of child-care facilities, lunch-breaks, leave and holidays, and other 
arrangements that are of benefit to the workforce (e.g., lighting, space, access to a 
telephone or a coffee machine).  
 The second group that we consider refers to more abstract elements that are 
not always directly observable. Such elements could be related to general worker 
representation rights, participation in the decision-making and the right to organise. 
They could also include the existence of internal promotion structures, commitment 
to employment protection (job-stability) from the side of the management, as well as 
agreements on maximum lengths for the working day and working week.  
 From the way that these two groups are defined it is obvious that they exhibit 
a considerable degree of diversity, both within and between them. However, as we 
discuss below, they share a significant number of similarities, in many levels. This 
allows one to consider them -at some level of abstraction- as a homogenous entity 
and justifies their treatment as a single variable in the analysis that follows. To 
illustrate this, we turn at the examination of how these elements are integrated in and 
affect the production process. There are three levels at which the importance of labour 
standards can be considered. First is the fact that they constitute significant 
production costs. Second, they are also production amenities that affect the efficiency 
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of production and thus total factor productivity. Finally, they affect the (dis)utility 
that is associated with participating in production.  
 
5.2.1. Labour standards in the utility function 
Let us first look at their impact on worker utility. Naturally, although one 
cannot rule out the possibility that basic facilities like ventilation or a coffee machine 
give direct utility to a worker, the main underlying mechanism in operation is that 
they make work less repelling. Thus, with better working and employment 
conditions, workers must have a less strong preference on leisure compared to the 
time spent working. At an extreme, if production takes place in an ideal environment 
where all workers’ needs are catered for, it is reasonable to expect that the disutility 
of work and, thus, the utility derived from not working will be diminished. Being able 
to enjoy a lunch-break at work, with catering provision, in a safe and healthy 
environment, is undoubtedly going to increase the attractiveness of work and thus 
reduce the disutility associated with it. The same holds for the availability of child-
care, sick leave and short holidays (at short notices). In the same way, the ability to 
work at a “reasonable” pace undertaking non-monotonous tasks that allow for worker 
involvement and team-working, also tends to make work more enjoyable. Among the 
more abstract elements, the feeling of work security and stability, the right to unionise 
and the guarantee of a maximum amount of overtime (even if this is never reached), 
are all factors that reduce the disutility of work. It is not necessary to compare a 19th 
century sweatshop or a Fordist assembly-line factory with a modern production unit 
to illustrate the role of labour standards in making work more enjoyable. The 
literature on worker satisfaction suggests a direct link between the two, which is very 
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robust empirically and not refuted theoretically (Freeman, 1978; Gordon and Denisi, 
1995; Brown and McIntosh, 1998; Appelbaum et al., 2000).  
 The implication of the above considerations for the analysis that follows is 
that labour standards are an important component in workers’ utility function. 
Although the constituent elements considered above are very diverse, they are very 
homogenous in terms of their role as utility-enhancing factors. They can thus be 
treated as a single entity, or a single composite variable in the same way that 
consumption or leisure are treated. We accept the that view labour standards can have 
a direct positive effect on utility. However, much more central is our observation, 
consistent with the above discussion, that labour standards affect the elasticity of 
substitution between working time and leisure. The simplest way to model this 
relationship is to assume that workers discount leisure by the value of labour 
standards, so that an increase in the latter would reduce the value in utility terms of 
the former. This effectively implies that improvements in labour standards reduce the 
demand for leisure and thus increase the supply of labour-hours. We examine this 
relationship more formally in the next section.  
 
5.2.2. Labour standards in the production function 
 We now turn at the side of the firm and examine the role of labour standards 
in production. Although one can arguably view labour standards as a factor affecting 
labour effort and labour productivity, in line with the efficiency wages literature and 
probably in the fashion of the Akerlof (1982) gift-exchange model, the line of 
reasoning we pursue here is different. With perfect information and under the 
assumption of homogenous labour, it is more comprehensive to view labour standards 
as a factor that impacts on the way in which production takes place. This must be true 
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for both working conditions and the conditions of employment. Thus, we view the 
arrangements that determine the conditions of work and employment as something 
that affects the efficiency of production and thus total factor productivity (for a 
similar specification in the context of unionism, see Clark, 1980).  
 For example, the availability of child-care facilities or lunch-breaks must 
allow for production to be organised in longer shifts. High health and safety standards 
must allow for a more intensive production process with less frequent disruptions 
(e.g., due to accidents or sickness). The organisation of production (assembly-line, 
multi-tasking, team-working, etc) has a self-evident impact on total factor 
productivity and the way and pace at which production meets product demand. 
Specific conditions of employment affect the accumulation and stock of job-specific 
skills and allow for production innovations that would normally be expected to 
increase production for fixed quantities of capital and labour. In practice, labour 
standards tend to enhance product quality and assist product and process innovations, 
thus allowing firms to engage in dynamic strategies of quality-based competition 
(Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1988; Sengenberger and Campbell, 1994).  
 On the other hand, there is also an issue of balance that has to be taken into 
account. Although labour standards should always improve the efficiency of 
production, it is a rather oversimplifying approach to assume that this relationship is 
constant for different levels of labour or capital productivity. In the same way that 
more productive assets have higher insurance premiums, similarly where the marginal 
product of labour is higher, labour standards should also be higher.72 This implies that 
the efficiency of labour standards depends on the wage rate and, hence, that the 
                                                 
72
 Real-life experience is full of examples that support this view. The working space of a CEO is not 
more comfortable than that of a secretary only because the former is more skilled or has greater 
monopoly power than the latter. If such a pattern is consistently observed throughout the economy, 
then it must be that a comfortable working space increases the productivity of a CEO by more than it 
does for the productivity of the secretary.  
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optimal -from a firm’s perspective- level of labour standards offered, would change 
accordingly to changes in equilibrium wages. Although this might seem to lead to a 
very complex model of determination of production and profit maximisation, in the 
next section we will derive a model consistent with the present discussion that has a 
very straightforward structure. Before that, however, we need to consider the third 
dimension of labour standards, that is, their role as production costs.  
 
5.2.3. Labour standards in the cost function 
 The discussion conducted thus far has illuminated the role that labour 
standards take as a production cost. The provision of facilities and equipment that 
enhance efficiency and reduce the disutility of work cannot come without a cost. 
This, of course, does not refer only to tangible elements, like a coffee machine, a 
computer-monitor filter, a canteen or a nursery. Although it is much easier to 
conceptualise how tangible elements affect production costs, it is true that the most 
significant production costs are related to the more abstract elements within the 
“conditions of employment” group.  
 Thus, engaging workers in the decision-making or in the design of the 
production process involves costs associated with both direct expenses (e.g., 
questionnaires, ballots, notice-boards) and foregone opportunity costs due to time lost 
(e.g., meetings, negotiations). Allowing for a union can reduce some of these costs by 
making the interaction between the management and workers more efficient 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984). However, this would raise other costs, related to the 
recognition of a union (provision of an office and other facilities, or increased risk of 
strikes). Of equal importance are aspects related to the organisation of production. An 
assembly-line production structure involves fewer costs in terms of monitoring, 
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supervising or training. Production based on team-working and multi-tasking requires 
a complex structure of monitoring and evaluation which, although might enhance 
production efficiency, undoubtedly adds to the costs of production.  
 It is important to stress the nature of the costs that are associated to the 
provision of labour standards. As it should be evident form the above discussion, 
much of labour standards are fixed costs, which are independent of the number of 
workers and, more importantly, of the number of hours they work. For example, the 
fixed costs of operating a canteen or a nursery are much greater than the variable 
costs of serving less or more people. The provision of good ventilation and of coffee 
machines in the workplace is independent of the number of employees, as is the 
existence of worker involvement mechanisms or the commitment to job protection. It 
has to be said, of course, that if a firm doubles its workforce its costs for labour 
standards will naturally rise. However, within reasonable ranges of employment 
variation such costs should remain constant.  
 This effectively implies that labour standards are of a public-good nature, so 
that increasing the amount consumed by one worker does not affect the amount 
consumed by others. An alternative way to think about labour standards is to consider 
them as part of the non-human capital that is engaged in production, but for which 
workers have clear preferences. Capital is fixed in the short-run and not directly 
related to the size of employment. However, if a firm doubled its workforce it would 
obviously have to also increase its capital stock. The difference between physical 
capital and labour standards is that the latter affect output indirectly, by their impact 
on production efficiency and worker utility. Again, these considerations will be dealt 
with formally in the next section.  
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5.2.4. Labour standards and labour market regulation 
 We conclude this section by stressing the relationship between labour 
standards as defined here and the issue of labour market flexibility and regulation, 
which is the focus of this thesis. Here we have defined labour standards as a labour-
related fixed production cost, whose optimal level is determined by the profit and 
utility maximising behaviour of firms and workers. However, for most of the 
elements considered, policy regulations exist that determine minimum levels and 
qualitative issues of implementation. This clearly applies to the elements within the 
“conditions of employment” group, i.e., to elements like worker representation rights, 
union recognition, promotion and redundancy regulations, as well as regulations on 
overtime and shift-work. Nevertheless, it also applies to elements related to working 
conditions. The more obvious cases in this group are regulations on health and safety, 
on leave and holidays, and on other benefits (for example, the right for workers to 
purchase products or services they produce at a favourable price). 
 Less clear is how policy can directly affect the provision of such labour 
standards like the availability of a nursery or of a canteen. Even for such elements, 
however, policy has the discretion to impose specific regulations, for example by 
enforcing large employers to provide catering for the workers. More importantly, in 
some cases it is possible that the existence of specific regulations will dictate changes 
in the labour standards offered, even in seemingly unregulated areas. For example, if 
regulations force firms to recognise and consult unions, maybe employers will find it 
inevitable (and more cost-effective) to directly engage workers in the decision-
making, even if this is not an obligation dictated by regulation.  
 Following these considerations, the relationship between labour market 
regulation and the provision of labour standards is based on the fact that policy can 
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affect the levels of the latter and, thus, alter the equilibrium that would otherwise 
obtain in the labour market. It is effectively for this reason that it is important to 
investigate how equilibrium is determined in a perfectly competitive labour market 
when labour standards are taken into account. As it will be shown in the next section, 
this investigation leads to the derivation of a labour demand equation that is perfectly 
consistent with what is often referred to as the third of the Marshall-Hicks “laws of 
derived demand”, which suggests that the slope of labour demand depends on the 
share of non-wage production costs to the total costs of production. In the model 
presented next, variations in labour standards affect the slope and position of the 
labour demand curve, thus altering the equilibrium levels of wages and employment.  
 
5.3. A labour market model with labour standards 
 In this section we formally model a competitive labour market, incorporating 
the notion of labour standards as was discussed in the previous section. Workers are 
assumed to be homogenous in terms of preferences and skills. Firms are price takers 
in the labour market and determine their levels of employment by solving their profit 
maximisation problem. Production takes place with the interaction of capital and 
labour hours, under some working conditions (labour standards).  
 
5.3.1. Labour demand 
 Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production technology, the production function 
can be written as: 
21 aa KeHY =       (1) 
where Y is real output, H is employment measured in hours, K is capital (in real 
terms) and e is a term capturing technological efficiency. Production exhibits 
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decreasing returns to scale for each individual factor of production, i.e., YL, YK >0 and 
YLL, YKK <0.  
 We consider technological efficiency to be a function of working and 
employment conditions, in other words, to depend on the level of labour standards. 
Following our discussion in section 5.2.2, the impact of labour standards on 
technological efficiency is itself a function of the wage rate, due to the fact that more 
productive workers make more out of a given amount of labour standards. Thus, 
technological efficiency can be described with the following relation: 
wbbSBe 210
+
=       (2) 
where B0 > 1 (so that its natural logarithm, b0 > 0) is a technology parameter, w is the 
natural logarithm of the wage rate (in real terms), S is the real cost of labour 
standards, b1 < 0 and b2 > 0. Following the discussion of the previous section, 
technological efficiency must be increasing in both labour standards and the wage 
rate, but for both at a diminishing rate or, in other words, eS, eW > 0 and eSS, eWW < 0. 
As will be shown later, this is a necessary assumption in order for labour demand to 
be downward sloping. The restrictions that satisfy this assumption can be easily 
calculated as  
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 Labour standards are a fixed production cost (independent of employment) 
but production also incorporates the costs of employing labour and capital. Thus: 
SrKWHC ++=      (3) 
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where C is total production costs, r is the interest rate (price of capital) and all 
variables are in real terms.  
 Given the form of the production and cost functions, real profits (Π) will be 
given by: 
SrKWHKHSB aawbb −−−=Π + 21210     (4) 
By solving the profit maximisation problem of the firm, we can derive an 
expression for the firm’s demand for labour (measured in hours). The first-order 
conditions for the maximisation problem are: 
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 Using (5a), taking logs and solving for the natural logarithm of labour-hours 
we obtain: 
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or, for simplicity of notation and assuming that capital is fixed in the short-run,   
wsmsmwmmh 3210 +++=      (6’) 
where h, k, w and s are the natural logarithms of labour-hours, capital, the wage rate 
and labour standards, respectively, and m0, m3 > 0 and m1, m2 < 0 (because b1 < 0 and 
a1 < 1). 
We can now determine how labour demand will respond to changes in labour 
standards. The slope of labour demand in the wage-employment space will depend on 
the values of s, m1 and m3. Specifically, 
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Hence, when labour standards increase, the elasticity of labour-hours with 
respect to the wage rate will become less negative and thus the demand curve in the 
wage-employment space will become steeper. It follows that labour markets with 
worse working conditions (lower values for s) will have flatter labour demand curves.  
 There is more to be said, however, about the position and slope of the labour 
demand curve, in relation to changes in labour standards. To show how exactly the 
demand curve moves after deregulation (or, more precisely, when labour standards 
fall), we can calculate its position at two distinct points: first, when wages are zero 
(demand crosses the employment line) and, second, when employment is zero 
(demand crosses the wage line). To examine the first case, we solve (6) for w=0. 
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where b1<0 and thus higher labour standards will be associated with lower levels of 
employment (ceteris paribus). Hence, with deregulation the demand curve moves 
outwards and crosses the employment line (horizontal axis) further to the right. 
 Turning at the second case, we now solve (6) for h=0. 
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We can now compare the “maximum” wage for different values of “s”, say 
high (H) and low (L): 
⇒
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where sH-sL>0 (by definition) and 1-b2s>0 (from (2’’)). Thus, we have wH-wL>0, or 
wH>wL, which implies that the intersection point between the wage-axis and the 
demand curve will be higher the higher the level of labour standards. Hence, 
deregulation will force labour demand to become flatter, as Figure 5.1 illustrates. The 
point at which all the labour demand curves cross is the point at which the two 
inequalities (2’) and (2’’) seize to hold and become equations. Thus, in what follows 
we restrict our analysis to the area of acceptable wage rates, that is, above the 
horizontal line where w = -(b1/b2).   
 
Figure 5.1.: Labour demand for different levels of labour standards 
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 What is more important to note here is that, according to the model developed 
so far, economies with lower levels of labour standards will have (ceteris paribus) 
more elastic labour demand curves. Interestingly, this is also consistent with the 
Marshall-Hicks law of derived demand which states that the demand for labour is 
more inelastic the higher the share of non-wage labour costs (in our case, labour 
standards) to total production costs.  
 Another significant property can also be derived from the solution of the 
profit maximisation problem of the firm. Using (5c) we can obtain an expression 
which makes labour standards a positive function of output and the wage rate:  
YwbbS
S
Y
wbbc )(1)()5( 2121 +=⇒=+⇒          (12) 
We can take the total derivative of (12) with respect to the wage rate (W), in 
order to establish a relationship between labour standards and wages:  
 =++=
∂
∂
++
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
W
Y
wsbb
W
Yb
W
Y
sbb
W
Y
wb
W
Yb
W
Yb
W
S
22221221
1
          
)](1[)1( 212212 wbbsW
Ybwsbsb
W
Yb ++=++=        (13) 
which is positive since 1+sb1>0 and w≥ 0. It follows that (in the absence of 
regulation) more advanced economies will have higher equilibrium levels of labour 
standards, compared to more backward ones. The implication of this is that labour 
market rigidities related to high labour standards will be more harmful to backward 
economies. The policy prescription that follows is that labour market deregulation 
should be a more urgent priority in backward economies, as deregulation can increase 
efficiency in these economies faster than it can do in advanced economies. 
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5.3.2. Labour supply 
To generate equilibrium in the labour market described by our model, we also 
need to examine the behaviour of workers and derive a relationship for labour supply. 
We specify the utility function of the representative worker assuming that she derives 
utility from the consumption of goods and leisure. Consistent with our discussion in 
section 5.2.1, we also assume that the utility derived from leisure depends on the 
value of the labour standards the worker enjoys when working. Specifically, we 
assume that the individual discounts the amount of leisure that she “consumes” by the 
labour standards that she would enjoy if working. Thus, we can write: 
))(,( ZfXuU =      (14) 
with 
S
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+
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1
)(       (15) 
where X is total consumption (of goods), Z is leisure and UX > 0, UZ > 0 so that 
0<
∂
∂
=
Z
XX Z . Workers maximise their utility subject to a budget constraint  
WHX ≤     (16) 
and a binding time constraint 
HZT +=     (17) 
where T is a fixed amount of time (e.g., the 24-hour day). Thus, the maximisation 
problem can be written as: 
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which yields the following first-order conditions: 
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where λ is the constraint coefficient of L, the Lagrangian function for (18). Using the 
first-order conditions and the budget constraint (i.e., using (19), (20) and (16)) and 
solving for Z we can derive the demand for leisure of the representative worker: 
),( SWzZ =      (21) 
with ZW, ZS < 0. Using (17) we can then derive an expression for labour supply: 
),(),( SWhHSWzHT =⇒=−     (22) 
with HW, HS > 0. Thus, the supply of labour hours derived from the utility 
maximisation behaviour of the representative worker will be a positive function of the 
wage rate and the level of labour standards offered in the labour market. Assuming 
for simplicity a log-linear labour supply function, we have: 
snwnnh 210 ++=       (23) 
with n0 < 0 and n1, n2 > 0, so that labour-hours supply will be upward sloping in both 
the wage-employment and the labour standards-employment spaces. In contrast with 
labour demand, the slope of the labour supply curve (in the wage-employment space) 
does not depend on the level of labour standards, but its position does. Thus, an 
increase in labour standards will cause an outward shift to the labour supply curve, 
but will not affect its slope. It follows that labour markets with lower levels of labour 
standards will have more restricted (higher) labour supply curves. 
 
5.3.3. Labour market equilibrium and labour market regulation 
 We can now turn to the graphical demonstration of the determination of the 
equilibrium levels of employment and wages. Equilibrium will be determined by the 
interaction of the demand and supply curves. Figure 5.2 presents this graphically, 
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plotting labour demand and supply in the wage-employment space. Equilibrium is at 
point E, with a wage-rate equal to w and employment equal to h. 
As noted earlier, the present model allows an analysis of the labour market 
effects of labour market intervention. Assume (contrary to the stylised facts but for 
ease of analysis) that for some exogenous reason policy wants to impose higher 
labour standards, either in the form of improved working conditions, or in the form of 
higher job security (or both). Firms and workers cannot cancel the policy, but they 
will react to the new regulations by altering their labour market behaviour. Thus, the 
labour market equilibrium will be altered.  
 
Figure 5.2: Labour market equilibrium and the effects of (de)regulation 
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The process is as follows. Higher labour standards will increase the utility 
from working and will thus increase labour supply. In terms of Figure 5.2, this shows 
as a downward shift of the labour supply curve from N to N’. Firms will now face 
higher production costs, but they will also experience higher total factor productivity 
in their production. The result of that, according to (6) and our discussion in 5.3.1, 
will be an outward shift and an increase in the steepness of the labour demand curve. 
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The new equilibrium will be at E’, where employment is higher (h’ < h). Wage rates 
(w’) might fall or increase (Figure 5.2 shows a reduction in the wage rate), depending 
on the impact that the change in labour standards (regulation) had on the position of 
the supply curve and the slope of the demand curve. Thus, the model presented here 
predicts that enhancing labour market flexibility (i.e., introducing labour market 
deregulation) will have adverse effects on employment, although it can have positive 
wage effects.  
However, withdrawing the policy-imposed regulations on the level of labour 
standards will not necessarily increase profits or economic efficiency. In chapter two 
we argued that deregulation is not synonymous to flexibility. Rather, deregulation is a 
condition for flexibilisation, but it is neither sufficient, nor necessary. The model we 
have developed here allows us to illustrate this by examining the optimal level of 
labour standards in an un-regulated labour market and the condition under which, in a 
regulated labour market, deregulation will successfully lead to enhanced flexibility. 
If a labour market is relatively rigid, deregulation will only lead to enhanced 
flexibility if adjusting to the lower levels of labour standards (that are now feasible 
due to deregulation) is profitable for firms. Thus, the condition for success in 
deregulation is that profits and labour standards are inversely related. In algebraic 
terms, 0<∂
Π∂
S . Solving this inequality, we obtain the following condition: 
⇒+>
⇒<−+⇒<
∂
Π∂
−−
−+
2121
2121
021
1
1
021
)(
01)(0
aawbb
aawbb
KHBwbbS
KHSBwbb
S    
 
( ) )(1 1021 2121)( wbbaa KHBwbbS +−+>               (24) 
Thus, irrespective of whether policy allows labour standards to fall or not, the 
optimal level of labour standards will depend on the structure of the economy.  
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 5.3.4. Labour market adjustment 
It is interesting, of course, to examine the predictions of the model developed 
here, regarding the ways in which different labour markets (flexible or rigid) respond 
and adjust to a similar economic shock. To perform our analysis, we assume that a 
negative employment (demand) shock hits the two economies. As was illustrated in 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2, a regulated labour market (high labour standards) will have a 
steeper labour demand curve, compared to a flexible one. Thus, the negative demand 
shock will generate a greater decline in employment and wages in a flexible labour 
market compared to a regulated one, as long as labour supply is relatively elastic (as 
shown in Figure 5.3, where h1Rh0R < h1Fh0F).  
 
Figure 5.3.: Labour market adjustment and labour standards flexibility 
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However, while in the regulated labour market the shock will hit with its full 
impact (i.e., no further adjustment after the decline in employment and wages), a 
flexible labour market will slowly adjust to the shock. The decline in the wage rate 
will lead to a reduction in labour standards (because 0>∂∂ WS ), forcing the labour 
demand curve to shift its slope further to the left and shifting the labour supply curve 
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upwards. These movements will help wages recover, but it will reduce employment 
further. The slopes of the demand and supply curves and the sensitivity of labour 
demand and supply to labour standards and the wage rate will determine where the 
new equilibrium will be (possibly even above the initial wage rate, but at lower 
employment levels). 
It needs to be noted that the adjustment process related to changes in labour 
standards will not be instantaneous. Lower wage rates will generate declines in labour 
standards, resulting in changes in the positions of the labour demand and supply 
curves. As is shown in Figure 5.3, this will bring wage rates up, thus triggering the 
same adjustment process, only this time in the opposite direction. However, since 
wage rates do not return to their initial levels, this time the impact of this adjustment 
mechanism will be smaller. This process will be repeated, until a new stable 
equilibrium is obtained (shown as (h2F, w2F) in Figure 5.3). Thus, rather than 
adjusting instantaneously, the flexible labour market described by our model will 
experience a process of oscillatory convergence towards the new equilibrium, until it 
reaches an optimal combination of labour standards and wage rates.  
Apparently, the impact of the shock on wages in the flexible labour market 
will be smaller than in the case of the rigid labour market (especially after the 
secondary response in the former, where wages can actually increase as a result of the 
negative demand shock), although the employment loss will normally be greater. 
However, the most important observation here is that after the shock hits any of the 
two economies, if policy allows further flexibilisation (further reductions in labour 
standards), this will help labour market adjustment and transmit the impact of the 
shock towards employment loss, as opposed to wage changes. In terms of the right-
hand panel of Figure 5.3, with completely unregulated labour standards, the impact of 
Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Economic Performance 
 
163
the shock will be (h2F - h0F, w2F - w0) compared to (h1F - h0F, w1F - w0) if the level of 
labour standards was fixed. We will return to this observation later, in our analysis of 
regional labour market adjustments.   
 
5.4. Extensions 
 The model developed in the previous section has a number of important 
features. By introducing labour standards in the labour demand and supply functions 
it was possible to show how regulation of labour standards can affect labour market 
outcomes and the way in which labour markets adjust to economic shocks. Further, 
we were able to come to some conclusions about the characteristics of the labour 
demand and supply curves in different economies. Thus, other things equal, more 
regulated labour markets have steeper labour demand curves, with the implication 
that in flexible labour markets the impact of an economic shock is concentrated more 
on employment (as opposed to wages). Additionally, more advanced economies have 
higher equilibrium levels of labour standards and, hence, labour market deregulation 
is more important for backward economies.  
 This analysis assumed that the only type of rigidities in the labour market 
were the policy-imposed high levels of labour standards. In this section we focus on 
some possible extensions of this model, which we believe to be of particular interest. 
We introduce in the analysis some additional labour market institutions, namely 
unionism, minimum wages and unemployment insurance. We examine the impact 
that such institutions have on labour market equilibrium under both a rigid and a 
flexible setting and investigate the adjustments that are triggered from the 
introduction of such rigidities into the model. First, we allow unions to set wages 
above the equilibrium levels throughout the economy (full coverage) and examine 
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how different labour markets react to such a distortion. Following that, we relax the 
assumption of full coverage and examine how labour market duality (in the form of 
inequalities in labour standards) can arise in the presence of unionism. Finally, we 
turn at the impact of a policy-imposed increase in the value of either the minimum 
wage rate or the replacement ratio of unemployment benefits (or, of course, both). 
Our analysis compares a rigid with a flexible labour market, which are assumed to 
start with identical wage rates but different levels of employment, and examines the 
difference in their response to institutional distortions.73  
 
5.4.1. The impact of unionism in the case of full coverage  
 As discussed in chapter three, the literature provides ample theoretical and 
empirical evidence suggesting that unions tend to be associated with higher wages, 
other things equal. The main reason for that is that unions have significant bargaining 
power and a powerful device of threat (strikes). Here we do not want to consider the 
process under which unions can impact on wages. Rather, we take the wage-
increasing function of unions for granted and simply proceed to examine the impact 
of a union-imposed wage increase in our model. In this sub-section we make the 
assumption that unions are powerful enough so that the union-imposed wage increase 
can cover the whole economy (full coverage).  
We describe a rigid and a flexible labour market in the two panels of Figure 
5.4. The initial equilibrium is at a wage rate w0, with employment (measured in 
hours) h0R and h0F in the rigid and the flexible labour market, respectively. Assume 
that unions impose an identical increase in the wage rate in both economies, bringing 
                                                 
73
 The two labour markets are put together only for presentational reasons. Thus, there is no migration 
or other adjustment between them, since they simply represent two distinct cases, rather than two 
labour markets within the same economy. 
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the new wage rate to wU. In the rigid labour market this will reduce employment to 
h1R, generating unemployment equal to h1RhR, which is greater than the employment 
loss since workers are willing to supply more working hours for the new wage rate.  
 
Figure 5.4.: The impact of a union-imposed wage increase 
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 In the first instance the same mechanism operates in the flexible labour 
market. With the wage rate at wU, employment drops to h1F and unemployment 
(measured in hours) is h1FhF. Note that the employment loss in the flexible labour 
market (and also unemployment) is greater due to the fact that the labour demand 
curve there is flatter (assuming that labour supply is relatively elastic). However, in 
the absence of regulation firms can adjust freely their levels of labour standards, so as 
to achieve a more profitable (dis)equilibrium.74 With higher wage rates, labour 
standards will increase, thus generating an outward shift in the labour demand curve 
(from D0F to D1F) and the labour supply curve (from N0F to N1F). The result of these 
movements will be a reduction in the original employment loss and probably in 
                                                 
74
 It is difficult to sustain that regulation can impose maximum levels of labour standards. In this sense, 
the same mechanism can operate in the rigid labour market following the union-imposed wage 
increase. However, in the presence of rigid regulations, firms might be reluctant to increase their levels 
of labour standards fearing that they will be unable to reduce them to their original levels should they 
require to. The argument is in the same line with that suggesting that high firing costs limit 
employment expansion during economic upturns, in fear of extensive labour hoarding when economic 
circumstances deteriorate.   
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unemployment. Although employment can actually increase beyond the pre-union 
equilibrium (Figure 5.4 shows exactly that, with h2F>h0F), the magnitude of 
unemployment (h2FhF’) will effectively depend on how large is the response of labour 
supply to the change in labour standards. The finding that a union-imposed wage 
increase can increase employment is a very significant property of our model, since it 
can provide a theoretical justification for a number of empirical findings in the 
literature of the economics of unions (Booth, 1995).  
 Thus, in a flexible labour market, the impact of a union-imposed wage 
increase will be less severe. Moreover, the action of unions will result in increases in 
both wages and labour standards, something that is consistent with the stylised facts. 
The adjustment mechanism related to changes in the levels of labour standards will 
help diminish the initial response to the union-imposed wage increase, thus helping 
the economy recover. This finding has an obvious but extremely significant 
implication. If one type of rigidity is present in a labour market (e.g., unionism), then 
the existence of unregulated areas elsewhere (e.g., in labour standards) can 
compensate for the existing “rigidity” and improve economic outcomes. This is fully 
consistent with the view that intermediate levels of regulation (in terms of extent; not 
of intensity) are preferable to corner solutions. In a sense, this further suggests that 
the balance between regulation and flexibility, in other words, of “how much 
regulation is appropriate”, can be found across the various flexibility elements, rather 
than within each of them, as luck of regulation in one can possibly substitute for a 
strict regulation in another.  
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5.4.2. The impact of unionism in the case of partial coverage (two sectors) 
 The analysis of the role of unionism of the previous sub-section assumed that 
unions have full coverage, so that the wage increase they achieve is applied 
throughout the economy. More realistic is the assumption that the economy is split 
into two sectors, one where all employees are union members and a second where no 
union members are employed. Introducing this assumption in our model generates 
labour market duality in the form of inequalities in (wages and) labour standards. We 
show this graphically, after first reviewing briefly a few key references in the 
literature of dual labour markets.  
 
5.4.2.1. The literature of dual labour markets 
The theory of Dual Labour Markets originates from the institutionalist 
literature on discrimination (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Within this, dualism exists 
because firms are reluctant to offer high-quality jobs to specific segments of the 
labour force, specifically to women and ethnic minorities. Working conditions, 
employment protection, labour standards and wages are lower in the secondary 
sector. The primary sector is characterised by job rationing (barriers to entry), higher 
wages and internal promotion structures, but also by unemployment.  
 In a series of papers, Oswald (1982a, 1982b, 1984, 1985) has provided a more 
rigorous framework to show how unionism in the presence of duality can increase 
wages in the primary (unionised) sector above the competitive equilibrium and 
reduce secondary-sector wages below it. Apart from the implied wage differentials, 
Oswald has shown that in the presence of unemployment benefits  (or high minimum 
wages) involuntary unemployment will emerge in the secondary sector. The idea that 
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unionism generates duality in the labour market has recently been incorporated in 
formal mathematical models (e.g., Roberts, Staehr and Tranaes, 2000). 
In a very different context, the ideas developed in the efficiency wage 
literature about an equilibrium wage, which is above the market clearing level, so 
that involuntary unemployment may persist in equilibrium, have been very useful in 
the empirical and theoretical investigation of the dual labour markets thesis. 
Extending the work of Stiglitz (1984), Yellen (1984) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), 
Bulow and Summers (1986) have produced “a theory of dual labour markets” that in 
fact explains why and when duality will prevail. The basic assumptions of this model 
are that workers (although homogenous) can employ one of two possible effort 
regimes (high and low) and that the cost of monitoring workers’ effort differs across 
firms or industries. By implication, the model shows that industries with high 
monitoring costs must offer higher wages in order to induce their workers not to 
cheat by shirking. As a result, involuntary unemployment, high wages and job 
security co-exist in the primary (difficult-to-monitor) sector, while market clearance 
characterises the (easy to monitor) secondary sector. A number of papers develop 
similar models of incentives-based (or effort-regulation) dual labour markets 
(Rebitzer and Taylor, 1991a and 1991b; Rebitzer and Robinson, 1991).  
A general drawback common to all these models is that they often neglect to 
offer an explicit economic mechanism for the emergence of duality. Some models 
simply presume duality and attempt to investigate its implications. Models based on 
the existence of union power are technically appealing but they lose much of their 
explanatory power if the assumption is made that unionised segments of the economy 
are related to low-skill and low-productivity sectors.75 The pure effort-based models 
                                                 
75
 The same is true for the standard Insider-Outsider model with unions (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). 
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of dual labour markets (Bulow and Summers, 1986) effectively predict duality 
merely on the basis of the existence of variable monitoring costs between sectors 
categorised ad hoc as primary and secondary. If this assumption is relaxed, as some 
empirical literature seems to recommend (Rebitzer and Robinson, 1991), then there is 
no reason for firms to offer higher wages and job security to primary employees. 
Some variations of the effort-based models overcome this drawback. For example, 
Rebitzer and Taylor (1991b) develop a model where uncertainty in product demand 
is combined with the dichotomy between low and high effort to produce labour 
market duality. Again, however, the existence of duality is fully dependent on the 
assumption that secondary sector workers exhibit low levels of effort, which is hard 
to justify considering that in the same model these workers are perfectly (and 
costlessly) monitored and receive their marginal product.  
 
5.4.2.2. Unionism and labour market duality 
The model developed here allows labour market duality to emerge 
endogenously, merely by the wage-increasing actions of a non-full-coverage union. 
Moreover, the form of duality observed is not related solely to wage inequalities (as, 
for example, in Oswald, 1982a), but mainly to differences in the levels of working 
and employment conditions enjoyed by workers. Thus, the union sector becomes a 
sector of high labour standards, good working conditions and increased job-security 
(as well as higher wage rates), while the non-unionised sector becomes a sector of 
relatively unprotected, casual jobs with low labour standards.  
Assume that the economy is split into two sectors, with identical equilibrium 
wage rates, as presented in the two panels of Figure 5.5. Further assume that a union 
is formed in one of the sectors (left panel) and, as was the case before, that it imposes 
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a wage increase bringing the wage rate from w0 (the initial equilibrium) to wU in the 
unionised sector (by assumption this wage increase will not roll-over to the non-
union sector) and thus initially reducing employment to h1U and generating 
unemployment equal to h1UhU. Facing higher wage rates, firms in the union sector 
will respond by increasing their levels of labour standards, thus altering their labour 
demand schedule (from D0U to D1U). Correspondingly, higher labour standards will 
induce increases in labour supply, shifting the labour supply curve outwards (from 
N0U to N1U).76 At the new (dis)equilibrium, wages in the union sector are wU, 
employment (in hours) is h2U and unemployment is h2UhU’.  
  
Figure 5.5.: Partial union coverage and labour market duality 
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The displaced workers (more precisely, the lost hours of work) will move to 
the non-union sector, thus increasing labour supply there from N0N to N1N and 
reducing labour supply in the union sector (to N2U) to bring it into equilibrium (wU, 
h2U). In the non-union sector these movements will bring wage rates down and trigger 
reductions in labour standards as a response from the non-union firms. Thus, the 
labour demand curve will move from its original position (D0N) to D1N. Lower labour 
                                                 
76
 We ignore the impact that higher wage rates and labour standards in the union sector will have on 
labour supply in the non-union sector, since any impact will be temporary, due to the high 
unemployment observed in the union sector.  
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standards will discourage some workers from supplying labour-hours, thus re-
adjusting the position of the labour supply curve (from N1N to N2N) until a stable 
equilibrium is reached (shown as (w2N, h2N) in Figure 5.5).  
At this level, labour standards are higher in the union sector compared to the 
initial equilibrium (since D1U is steeper than D0U), while in the non-union sector they 
are lower (since D1N is flatter than D0N). Wage rates are also higher in the union 
sector (wU>w0), while in the non-union sector they are lower (w2N<w0), so that union 
wage rates are strictly higher than non-union wage rates (wU>w2N). The employment 
effects in both sectors are ambiguous, but it is possible that both sectors will 
experience employment expansion (Figure 5.5 shows a reduction in employment in 
the non-union sector).  
Thus, the union-imposed wage increase in the case of partial union coverage 
has generated duality in the labour market, with unionised workers obtaining a 
“primary employee” status (higher wage rates and improved working and 
employment conditions), while non-unionised workers are losing-off, experiencing a 
deterioration in their labour standards (entering secondary or casual employment) and 
their wages.  
 
5.4.3. Unemployment insurance and minimum wages 
 Let us now turn to the case of a policy-imposed increase in the replacement 
ratio (value of the unemployment benefit relative to the wage rate) or in the minimum 
wage rate, assuming no unions in the economy. Higher unemployment benefits and 
minimum wages tend to increase the workers’ reservation wage and thus reduce 
labour supply for any given level of wage rates. As Figure 5.6 shows, this will be 
translated in an upward shift of the labour supply curves in both economies (from N0R 
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to N1R and from N0F to N1F). This will initially reduce employment and increase 
wages everywhere. Due to the fact that the flexible labour market has a flatter labour 
demand curve and assuming that labour supply is relatively elastic, employment 
contraction will be greater in the flexible labour market while the increase in the wage 
rate will be smaller. Hence, the new equilibrium will be (w1F, h1F) and (w1R, h1R) in 
the flexible and rigid labour markets, respectively, with w1F<w1R.  
 
Figure 5.6.: The impact of unemployment insurance and minimum wages 
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 Although the new equilibrium in the rigid labour market will be stable, the 
flexible labour market will experience further adjustment. With higher wage rates 
labour standards will also rise, making labour less elastic (moving from D0F to D1F in 
Figure 5.6), but helping labour supply recover (moving from N1F to N2F).  
The new equilibrium is indeterminate, in the sense that the new wage rate 
(w2F) can be anywhere above w0 and the new employment level (h2F) can in fact be 
either to the right or to the left of h0F (Figure 5.6 shows an expansion of both wage 
rates and employment). Clearly, the adjustment of labour standards will refrain the 
wage increase that followed the decline in labour supply and normally will not be 
enough to offset the negative employment effect. Possibly, both the new wage rate 
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and the new equilibrium labour hours will be between their initial value and the value 
obtained immediately after the increase in unemployment benefits.  
However, other outcomes are also possible. Among them, the two most 
interesting are probably the observations that the new wage rate can be even below 
w0F (which would suggest that the increase in the reservation wage effectively 
generated a reduction in the equilibrium wage rate and would only happen if the 
responsiveness of labour supply to changes in labour standards is much greater than 
its responsiveness to changes in minimum wages or unemployment benefits) and that 
the final employment effect can be positive (so that h2F>h0F). Since such cases are 
possible, the model presented here can provide a theoretical justification for such 
controversial empirical findings like the observation that increases in minimum 
wages generate ambiguous and sometimes positive employment effects (as found, for 
example, in Card, 1992, and Card and Krueger, 1995).77  
It needs to be noted that the adjustment mechanism described here reduces the 
negative employment effect that would prevail in a rigid (in terms of labour 
standards) labour market (as in the left panel of Figure 5.6). Thus, a flexible labour 
market will be affected less severely by the increase in the reservation wage 
compared to the rigid labour market. In such a case, as was the case with the union-
imposed wage increase, the tentative conclusion can be drawn that in the presence of 
one type of rigidity (here, unemployment insurance), policy can generate better 
economic outcomes by relaxing regulations in other areas (labour standards).  
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 In their book, Card and Krueger effectively suggest that the observed “empirical anomalies” cast 
doubt on the traditional minimum wage model, implicitly stressing the need for alternative theoretical 
formulations on the issue.  
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5.5. Conclusions 
 In this chapter we developed a model of perfect competition in the labour 
market, based on the notion of labour standards, which were allowed to impact on 
output, utility and production costs. We initially developed a technical understanding 
of the role that labour standards play in the determination of the equilibrium in a 
simple competitive labour market with homogenous labour. Then we introduced 
trade unions into the analysis to show how the equilibrium would change when an 
institutional factor is allowed to have an impact in the labour market. We examined 
two different cases and showed how the wage-increasing role of a non-full-coverage 
union can generate duality in the labour market. Further, we examined the impact of 
other institutional factors, like unemployment benefits and minimum wages, 
providing a theoretical justification for some controversial empirical findings 
identified in the literature.  
In concluding this chapter, it is important to discuss the relevance of the 
model(s) developed here to our discussion of the previous chapters. Specifically, we 
want to discuss how the insights developed in this chapter, into the way that labour 
markets operate after explicitly accounting for the role of labour standards, can help 
us understand better the economic role of labour market flexibility and 
(de)regulation.  
 In chapter two we argued that deregulation and flexibilisation are not 
identical, as the former is a change in labour market policy while the latter is a 
response to such a change. Hence changes in flexibility will occur only to the extent 
that economic conditions and considerations make such a response profitable. We 
illustrated this formally here, in the analysis of the labour demand and supply 
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schedules under deregulation. We showed in section 5.3.3 that the effectiveness of 
deregulation should depend on the slopes and positions of the labour demand and 
supply curves and, of course, on the extent of deregulation.  
 In chapter three we reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature to discuss 
the potential labour market and other economic effects of labour market deregulation 
and flexibility. Although the model developed here is static, its relevance to the 
preceding discussion is clear. Labour market deregulation, if successful, can increase 
profitability, thus generating resources for investment and possibly raising labour 
productivity.  
The wage effects of a successful labour market deregulation policy, as 
predicted by the model presented here, are ambiguous. This may seem at first to be a 
controversial finding. However, at the level of empirical enquiry, as we saw in 
chapter three, studies have often found the effects of labour market flexibilisation to 
be negligible or even negative. The model developed here offers some theoretical 
justification for such findings.  
Another controversial prediction of the model is the robust negative 
employment effect of deregulation. However, it must be noted that this effect is 
specific solely to deregulation of labour standards and not of other elements that are 
considered to raise wages above their equilibrium levels (e.g., minimum wages, 
unemployment benefits and union power).  
The model has also a clear implication regarding inequalities. In the presence 
of unions, a weak regulation of labour standards (i.e., flexibility) creates the potential 
for inequality in the labour standards offered (duality), as well as in wages, even with 
homogenous labour. However, the model developed here is not appropriate for 
Ch.5: Deregulation and labour market outcomes 
 
176
making any inferences about the long-run output effects, although it is intuitively 
reasonable to infer that with increases in profitability, output will also increase. 
The discussion has had little reference thus far to the regional dimension of 
the issue under investigation. But this was unavoidable for three inter-related reasons. 
First, the issue of labour market deregulation and flexibility refers largely to the 
economic behaviour of national political entities (governments) and relates to 
international economic developments. For this reason, it would be inappropriate to 
examine the regional interactions instigated by deregulation without looking first at 
the national economic picture. Second and as a consequence, to maintain a reference 
with the relevant literature, which is developed mainly at the scale of national 
economic analysis, our discussion had to start from using the same spatial scale. We 
did so at an empirical level in the previous chapter and at a theoretical level in this 
chapter. Last but not least, and again as a consequence of the previous point, the a-
spatial analysis developed thus far was necessary because of the relative scarcity of 
theoretical models in the literature to analyse and explain the economic role of labour 
standards and their changes (deregulation). Given this absence of formal theoretical 
support, it became essential to first develop an understanding of how labour market 
outcomes are determined in the presence of labour market rigidities, initially ignoring 
the notion of space.  
Having accomplished that, we can now proceed with the regional analysis. 
Chapters seven and eight encompass the empirical analysis of the relationship 
between labour market flexibility and economic performance at the regional level (for 
the UK). Chapter six builds on the previous ones and develops a framework for the 
empirical analysis. We discuss the relevance of the issue for regional economies and 
how our theoretical considerations are transformed by the particular characteristics of 
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a regional approach. Moreover, we develop further insights into the relationships that 
emerge at the regional level, in order to provide a foundation for the empirical 
analysis that follows.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
A REGIONAL APPROACH 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 Throughout the previous chapters we have argued that the trend towards 
greater labour market flexibility and the relevant policy measures (labour market 
deregulation) are the outcomes of forces and developments occurring at an 
international (social, economic, technological and ideological) level and being 
manifested at the national level. In chapter one we argued that increased economic 
uncertainty and volatility in the international economic system in an era of 
globalisation have created conditions that seem to necessitate greater flexibility in the 
product and labour markets. As the organisation of production moves towards less 
rigid systems of flexible specialisation (and, together with the decline in 
manufacturing and industrial production, away from the traditional mass production 
model), newer -and more flexible- forms of configuration of labour relations are 
required. Technological developments help (automation and computerisation of 
production and the increased importance of knowledge and its diffusion), as do the 
developments in politics and ideology (the global dominance of capitalism and neo-
liberal ideology). In chapter two we discussed how the applications of these new 
forms of labour relations in practice may be driven by a strategic or pragmatic (non-
strategic) approach by firms, or even by a systemic nation-wide economic 
restructuring. In all cases, the implication was that changes in labour market 
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regulation and flexibility are universal and fairly exogenous to the local or regional 
arenas of economic organisation.  
 There are at least three arguments that can challenge such a view. First, labour 
relations like all social relations are organised at a much smaller scale than that 
defined by national boundaries. Second, labour market conditions (again, like all 
economic conditions) differ between places within a country –sometimes 
substantially. Third, even if the previous two points can be ignored at some level of 
abstraction, it is possible that the re-organisation of labour relations (deregulation) 
and the change in economic conditions that it can generate have a spatially uneven 
impact on labour market equilibria. From such a perspective, labour market 
deregulation and the resultant flexibilisation of the labour market can upset the 
balance between regional economies such that the aggregate performance of their 
national economy will be affected.  
 In general, one can think of the following schema of regional interactions 
related to the issue of labour market flexibility and deregulation. Local labour 
markets have their own specific mixes of labour relations and wider cultural and 
socio-economic traditions and conditions (historical unemployment rates, production 
structures, export orientation of production, etc), which generate their own local-
specific degree (and quality) of labour market regulation and flexibility. Hence, even 
if a universal force is applied to all localities, the specific local responses will vary, 
reflecting the variety of initial conditions existing across local economies in labour 
relations and labour market conditions. Ultimately, the need for flexibilisation and 
deregulation will be felt differently in different localities and the responses to these 
different needs will themselves exhibit a large degree of variation. The variety of 
local responses will generate a re-configuration of the national economic system and 
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change the distribution of economic conditions and opportunities among the localities 
of the state.  
 Moreover, changes in and spatial variations of labour relations will have a 
significant influence on how local labour markets adjust to regional and national 
economic shocks. The extent of labour market flexibility can affect the adjustability 
to shocks of factors like migration, labour force participation, firm relocation and 
wage movements, as we will extensively discuss later in this chapter. Further, it can 
affect their importance as regional adjustment mechanisms, as such. Plausibly, high 
levels of flexibility can increase the responsiveness of wages (wage flexibility), at the 
same time altering the importance of migration for regional adjustment. Or, in the 
case of a sector-specific shock, higher flexibility in the form of sectoral labour 
mobility will reduce wage pressures in the sector hit by the shock, thus reducing wage 
flexibility.  
 Additionally, regional variations in labour market flexibility can alter the 
relative attractiveness of each and every region. Thus, regional adjustments towards 
the equalisation of economic opportunities might be hindered. In this case, regional 
differences in flexibility can be viewed as differences in productive amenities, with 
higher levels of flexibility being connected to lower utility levels for the working 
population (as dictated in the previous chapter), but also to a stronger growth 
potential. If flexibility acts as a productive amenity, regional variation in its levels 
will produce and sustain regional disparities in economic outcomes. If such a scenario 
is plausible, then it is interesting for academic research -and necessary for policy- to 
employ a regional perspective in the examination of the impact of labour market 
flexibility and regulation.  
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 A few more considerations need to be made at this point, regarding the 
importance of regional as opposed to more aggregate analyses. The first is about 
scale. If the impact of flexibility on economic performance differs in intensity with 
either the level of flexibility or the specific mix of labour market regulation (or of 
course, both), if in other words the economic effects of labour market flexibility are 
not linear, then we should expect that an aggregate national-level analysis will lead to 
conclusions that do not necessarily reflect the relationships existing in reality.78 
Therefore, if the appropriate unit of analysis -that is, the field where most social and 
economic interactions take place- is the region, a national-level analysis will produce 
distorted results.79  
The second consideration relates labour market flexibility to the design of 
regional economic policy. As it has been suggested in the literature, the general 
policy towards labour market flexibility has a specific regional policy context. 
Regional policies -at least in the UK- have shifted from assisting backward regions by 
directing public and private investment “where most needed”, to trying to increase 
labour market flexibility throughout the country (Armstrong and Blackaby, 1998; van 
der Laan and Ruesga, 1998). In the UK, where the political climate was towards 
relaxed economic intervention, expenditure on regional assistance fell by more than 
half in the period 1983-1990 (Martin and Tyler, 1992).80 Such a re-design of regional 
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related to an economic outcome, y, and the actual economic interactions occur at the regional rather 
than the national level, then even if all regions are totally homogenous (which is itself a questionable 
assumption) the aggregation of the analysis at the national level will bias the results.     
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 This observation, of course, necessitates a coherent definition of the region, or the spatial scale at 
which the socio-economic phenomena under investigation can be more accurately examined. A 
discussion of this issue and of the reasons that led us to select the Standard Statistical Region as our 
unit of analysis in the empirical investigation of chapters seven and eight will be presented in the next 
section.  
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 On the other hand, expenditure on urban programmes more than doubled in the same period (Martin, 1993b). 
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policy, to the extent that it actually occurred, reflects the belief of policy-makers that 
poor economic performance in backward regions is at least partly due to the presence 
of significant labour market rigidities between and within regions. Furthermore, it 
reflects the belief that removing such rigidities is a necessary -if not sufficient- 
condition for improving economic performance in these backward regions and 
achieving real regional convergence. Deregulation was thus expected to increase local 
and cross-local responsiveness to differing regional economic conditions. In the 
words of Armstrong and Blackaby (1998, p.81), “[i]ndeed, there is a sense in which 
the reform of labour market institutions became one of the main government 
responses to the existence of spatial economic disparities in the UK”.  
 It is particularly interesting from this perspective to examine the issue of 
labour market deregulation or flexibility and economic performance beyond the 
aggregate national level, and instead focus on the regional and local levels. That is 
precisely the theoretical investigation we pursue in the remaining sections of this 
chapter. In chapter seven we will look at the regional economic performance of the 
UK over the last two decades and discuss a number of measures of labour market 
flexibility that we constructed at the level of the UK Standard Statistical Regions 
(SSRs). In chapter eight we conduct an econometric analysis of the economic impact 
of labour market flexibility and of the hypotheses related to the regional dynamics of 
labour market flexibility.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 6.2 we 
discuss the issue of the appropriate spatial scale and the reasons for selecting the SSR 
as our spatial unit of analysis. Section 6.3 outlines the specificities of regional (as 
opposed to national) economies and economic research and discusses the processes of 
regional adjustment and equilibrium. Section 6.4 looks at labour market flexibility 
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and investigates the ways in which changes in and spatial variations of flexibility 
impact on the responsiveness and significance of the mechanisms of regional 
adjustment. In section 6.5 we look closely at the issue of labour standards and 
investigate theoretically the regional dynamics that are triggered with their 
deregulation, following the model presented in chapter five.  
 
6.2. Selection of the spatial scale 
 As noted earlier, the selection of the spatial scale at which the analysis of the 
economic effects of labour market flexibility occurs is crucial for the accurate 
measurement of these effects. Analysis at the national scale can mask lower-level 
dynamics and interactions and hide information necessary for our understanding of 
the issue. This is not to undermine the importance of country-level empirical studies 
and non-spatial theoretical models. Depending on the level of abstraction at which 
one approaches the issue, non-spatial analysis can offer -and indeed has offered- 
valuable insights into the question about the economic impact of labour market 
flexibility and regulation. But the non-spatial analysis does have clear limitations, 
related to its inability to take into account and explain spatial interactions and the 
dynamics they create.  
 Although analysis at any scale lower than the national can be assumed to 
circumvent such problems, this is not always the case. The aggregation and 
heterogeneity problems identified in the previous section can plausibly bias the 
inferences drawn from an empirical analysis that fails to address the issues at the 
appropriate spatial scale, even if spatial interactions are explicitly taken into account.  
 In trying to identify the appropriate spatial scale for the investigation of the 
economic impact of labour market flexibility and regulation, certain criteria must be 
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put forward. First, the spatial units of the empirical analysis must exhibit an 
acceptable degree of homogeneity in their main socio-economic and labour market 
characteristics. The spatial units must be sufficiently homogenous regarding the 
institutions and regulations that govern their labour markets, not only to produce 
reliable estimates of the relationships under investigation, but also for a correct 
measurement of the degree of labour market flexibility itself.  
Second, the spatial units must be relatively self-contained. This is crucial for 
the correct estimation of the investigated effects. The spatial units must correspond to 
the actual mini-economies on the basis of which national economic activity is 
organised. This implies that the selected spatial units must maximise the internal 
flows and minimise the external flows of labour, capital, intermediate and final 
products. This relates to but is not identical to the homogeneity criterion.  
Third, spatial units must correspond to established conceptual divisions of 
space and be large enough for a theoretically relevant and policy-informing 
investigation to be undertaken. An empirical analysis based on spatial units smaller 
than a critical size might produce a number of complexities that can possibly render 
impossible the explanation of the phenomena under investigation. As an example, 
imagine that the neighbourhood was selected as the spatial unit of analysis. Even if 
significant relationships were revealed, these would be of questionable validity, as it 
is indeed questionable whether the social and economic dynamics related to labour 
market flexibility and deregulation are organised (and manifested) at such a small 
scale.  
The last criterion is strictly technical. The spatial units selected for the 
analysis must be such so that good-quality data can be obtained or constructed. There 
is no reason to increase the accuracy of the empirical investigation by selecting a 
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more theoretically appropriate spatial scale, if this is to be at the expense of accuracy 
in terms of data quality and availability.  
 Putting these criteria aside, four candidate spatial units were considered for 
the empirical analysis. These are the administrative region (NUTS1, SSR, or 
Government Office Region -GOR), the county (NUTS3), the travel-to-work area 
(TTWA) and the functional urban region (FUR). The first two of these spatial units 
are based on technical definitions while the last two are derived from more functional 
classifications.81 Each of these spatial units has some advantages and disadvantages in 
relation to the criteria set out above. Administrative regions tend to be relatively large 
and self-contained. However, they are quite heterogeneous, as they include a diversity 
of areas (urban and rural areas, high and low unemployment areas, and so forth). On 
the other hand, in terms of data quality and availability, this is the most complete 
statistical unit. The county is very similar to the administrative region in relation to its 
advantages and disadvantages. Counties are smaller and more homogenous. 
Nevertheless, data quality and availability is a larger problem at this scale, especially 
for the 1980s. More importantly, the technical definition of the county makes it 
unlikely that this spatial unit will meet the second of the identified criteria (self-
containment).  
 The main drawback of our third candidate spatial unit, the travel-to-work area, 
is related to data availability. Apart from the definitional change of TTWAs between 
1981 and 1991, statistical information for these units is not collected directly. Rather, 
it is derived from aggregations based on ward-level data. It follows that most of the 
relevant data are only available for census years, if at all. On the other hand, TTWAs 
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 We do not present here the exact definitions and technical and functional characteristics of these 
spatial units, as this information is widely available from national and international statistical bodies. 
For more details see the regional statistical publications of the ONS (e.g., Regional Trends), the 
Eurostat (e.g., Regio database) and, for FURs, Hall and Hay (1980) and Cheshire and Hay (1989).   
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are self-contained and sufficiently homogenous areas that correspond better than any 
other candidate spatial unit to the concept of a local labour market.82 Putting aside 
data-related problems, this is probably the most appropriate unit of analysis. It is 
probably preferable even to the functional urban region (FUR), the last candidate 
spatial unit. The FUR suffers from effectively the same problems of data quality, data 
availability and consistency over time. More than any other spatial unit, however, it 
resembles the concept of a relatively self-contained mini-economy, although it is not 
necessarily as homogenous as the TTWA.  
 Overall, from a theoretical perspective, the TTWA is the most useful spatial 
unit. The relationships under investigation -the determination, organisation and 
economic impact of labour market flexibility- are organised at the level of the labour 
market, which the TTWA represents. Following our definition of labour market 
flexibility as “the local response to labour market regulation under local-specific 
socio-economic conditions”, it is clear that the majority of the flexibility effects (apart 
from any spatial dependence effects) will be concentrated inside a labour market area. 
This effectively guarantees that, with the use of TTWAs as the spatial unit of 
analysis, the criterion of self-containment is met (due to the very definition of the 
TTWA), while relative homogeneity is simultaneously achieved. An alternative to the 
use of TTWAs is the use of FURs, since they both share many advantages. However, 
both spatial units impose severe limitations onto the empirical research, since data of 
the type that our empirical analysis requires are not available for such areas on a time-
series basis.  
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 However, see in this respect the interesting discussion about the issue of defining and 
conceptualising a local labour market area in Martin (2001).   
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 This brief discussion of our candidate spatial units reveals that, despite setting 
out specific selection criteria, we were not presented with a real choice. Data 
availability and quality (last criterion) indicate that the only spatial unit we could use 
in a regional-level historical study (time-series and cross-sectional analysis) is the 
administrative region. Although this choice is not ideal, it may be noted that the 
above discussion has uncovered additional merits of using the administrative region 
as the spatial unit of analysis. Administrative regions are sufficiently self-contained 
(second criterion) and large enough (third criterion) to make the empirical results 
meaningful. Despite having in many cases more than one centre (e.g., Scotland, 
Northwest or Southwest) and a clear urban-rural dichotomy, (heterogeneity; for 
example, Scotland or Wales), administrative regions are clearly related to conceptual 
divisions of space (especially for Scotland and Wales) and can thus be seen overall as 
mini-economies.  
 Possible biases in our analysis due to the selection of such a spatial unit 
mainly refer to two cases. First, to cases where part of an administrative region is 
economically connected more to a neighbouring region than to its own region. 
Second, to cases where an administrative region has two distinct labour markets with 
significant differences in their institutional settings and economic outcomes. For the 
UK, the second case seems not to be a particular problem. Institutional settings and 
labour market performance seem to be largely homogenous within UK regions, as in 
many respects the economic geography of the UK more closely resembles a North-
South divide (Blackaby and Manning, 1990; Blackaby and Murphy, 1995) than a 
rural-urban or other dichotomy. If within-regions heterogeneity is a serious problem, 
however, this is most likely to describe regions such as Scotland, Wales and probably 
the Southwest.  
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Conversely, the case of cross-regional linkages is a much more likely 
problem. Cross-regional linkages characterise to a large extent Wales (with south 
Wales being economically connected to parts of the Southwest and north Wales 
having strong economic links with the Northwest) and probably Scotland and the 
North region. For the Midlands and East Anglia they seem to be less of a problem. 
The openness of Wales is problematic with respect to our selection of the spatial unit 
of analysis, but it can only have a limited impact (bias) on the obtained results. This is 
especially true for our panel-data (time-series and cross-sectional) analysis, as this 
openness will only have an impact if it is not constant over time.  
Another potential problem related to the cross-regional linkages issue 
concerns the case of Southeast and Greater London. There is a large degree of 
homogeneity between these two regions in many respects.83 However, our empirical 
analysis controls for spatial dependence and thus for the case where economic 
outcomes in one region contemporaneously affect economic outcomes in other 
regions. For this reason, it is quite unlikely that our results will be biased because of 
such spatial linkage effects.  
 To conclude, the selection of the administrative region (in particular, the 
Standard Statistical Region, as this is the primary spatial unit for which data are 
reported for most of the study period) as the spatial unit of analysis in the empirical 
work, although dictated by data availability, is clearly the best decision. Other spatial 
units might be theoretically more relevant, but this should not discourage the use of 
the administrative region as the spatial unit of analysis (especially since our controls 
for spatial dependence should safeguard our results from the most obvious source of 
bias suggested by our theoretical criteria). Further research at a smaller spatial scale, 
                                                 
83
 Note that almost the entire Southeast region belongs to the Functional Urban Region of London. 
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probably the TTWA, would complement rather than replace the analysis conducted 
here.  
 
6.3. Regional specificity, regional adjustment and equilibrium 
 It is standard practice to contrast regional with national economies on the 
basis of their openness (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993). Regional economies are much 
more open to other regional economies than national economies are with respect to 
each other. Flows of goods, people and resources are much more intensive between 
regions than across states and the typical barriers hindering mobility on a cross-
national scale (language, religion, culture, currency, institutional or legal restrictions, 
purchasing power, etc) are much less significant in a cross-regional context. This is 
also true within the context of member countries of supra-national institutions, such 
as the European Union (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993). Therefore, the analytical 
perspective often applied in economic analyses of national economies (basically, the 
assumption of a closed economy) is potentially misleading and often inappropriate for 
regional analysis.  
More important is the difference between how national and regional 
economies react to specific economic developments. For example, at a national level 
inflation can be tackled (at least in the short-run) with the use of monetary 
instruments such as money supply and the exchange rate. These instruments are not 
available to the designers of regional policies. On the other hand, regional economies 
have available a number of adjustment mechanisms that are less operative in national 
economies. Capital and labour mobility are two such mechanisms. A high 
unemployment region will experience (net) out-migration, as people will, in the 
longer-run, move to more prosperous regions in search of better employment 
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opportunities. Labour supply will decline in the less prosperous region, even with 
sticky wages, thus reducing unemployment in the region and resulting in cross-
regional convergence in unemployment rates.84 Because international migration is 
much smaller than inter-regional migration, at a national level this adjustment 
mechanism is of minor importance, with the implication that a decline in the national 
unemployment rate can only come from either a decline in the real wage or from real 
productivity growth.  
 Despite the absence of tools available to national policy, the mechanisms of 
regional economic adjustment can guarantee a stable cross-regional equilibrium in 
well-functioning labour markets, in the sense that any economic shocks (national, 
regional or sectoral) will be quickly reduced and eventually eliminated. In other 
words, regional disparities in wages or unemployment rates cannot persist for long 
periods of time if the adjustment mechanisms are allowed to operate without failures. 
The main mechanisms for regional economic adjustment are worker 
migration, changes in economic activity rates (labour force participation), firm 
relocation, job creation and destruction, and wage movements.85 Among these 
mechanisms, the most important and best studied is migration. As stated above, when 
unemployment differentials arise (say, due to a demand or a technology shock), 
worker movements will tend to reduce these differentials. Much debate exists in the 
literature as to which are the main determinants of migration (see for example Harris 
and Todaro, 1970 and Greenwood, 1997). Standard migration theory, based on 
gravity models, assumes that workers respond to regional differences in economic 
opportunities, moving from high-unemployment regions to low-unemployment ones 
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 This, of course, is a rather simplistic view of the operation of regional labour markets, as it does not 
account for any dynamic agglomeration or any other cumulative causation effects.  
85
 Wage movements is both a (qualitative) mechanism of adjustment itself and a mediating factor that 
triggers changes in other (quantitative) mechanisms, like migration.  
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(Oliver, 1964). Wage differentials can also generate migration, with higher wages in a 
region attracting more workers from outside the region. Other labour market 
incentives to migrate include regional differentials in employment growth and labour 
force participation rates (Weeden, 1973). In any case, people will move from 
backward  areas  to  more  dynamic  ones.  This will reduce labour supply in the high- 
unemployment (and/or low-wage) regions, thus reducing unemployment (and/or 
increasing wages), until a cross-regional equilibrium is achieved. More dynamic 
regions will experience labour supply pressures and, thus, increases in employment 
and declines in wages.  
 A similar mechanism operates in the case of firm relocation and job creation. 
High unemployment (low wages) will create an incentive for businesses (controlling 
for productivity differences) to increase labour demand, thus increasing both wages 
and employment. Again, the mediating factor is wage movements. If wages in a high 
unemployment region are sticky, the incentive for firms to increase their demand for 
labour in the region will vanish. This leaves worker migration (due to the 
unemployment differentials) as the only viable mechanism of adjustment. Reductions 
in labour force participation will also occur (as well as out-migration), but this is a 
much less desirable response to a negative economic shock and it is thus in the 
interest of policy to restrain it.  
 Unfortunately, the empirics of regional labour market adjustment offer a much 
bleaker picture than the one implied by the above theoretical discussion. In practice, 
substantial unemployment differentials exist and they are remarkably persistent 
(Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Decressin and Fatas, 1995; Jimeno and Bentolila, 1998; 
Baddeley et al., 1998; OECD, 2000). Empirical evidence for the USA suggests that 
the impact of a region-specific negative employment shock will take as much as five 
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years to diffuse (Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Bertola and Ichino, 1996). The 
immediate response to such a shock is a small decline in labour force participation 
and a larger increase in unemployment. However, migration responds rapidly to such 
a shock and is by far the most important mechanism of adjustment. In Europe -and in 
the UK in particular- migration responses are much smaller and much slower. 
Unemployment differentials have a much longer persistence, even beyond the first 
decade (Alogoskoufis and Manning, 1988; Baddeley et al., 1998 and 2000; Mare and 
Choy, 2001). Migration rates in Europe are a fraction of those in the USA and so is 
the responsiveness of migration to changes in regional employment (Pissarides and 
McMaster, 1990; Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Thomas, 1994; Decressin and Fatas, 
1995; McCormick, 1997; Baddeley et al., 1998; Mauro et al., 1999; OECD, 2000b). 
 A variety of factors can account for the persistence of regional disparities and 
the inefficient operation of the adjustment mechanisms, especially in Europe. Among 
those factors that are outside the influence of labour market policy, the most 
important is housing market arrangements (Cameron and Muellbauer, 1998; Oswald, 
1999). Other factors include capital market imperfections, uncertainty, the existence 
of substantial fixed costs related to migration and firm relocation, the demographic 
composition of the population and other non-market (cultural or psychological) 
factors. However, empirical evidence suggests that by far the most significant 
impediments to labour market adjustments are related to labour market policies and 
institutions, most of which reduce the responsiveness of wages to differentiated 
employment outcomes, although direct effects (not via wages) can also be identified 
(Edin et al., 1991; Antolin and Bover, 1997; Mauro and Spilimbergo, 1998). The 
most pronounced impediment to regional adjustment is the presence of a number of 
wage-setting institutions, mainly related to the structure of the wage bargaining 
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system (centralisation, co-ordination), the presence of unions (union power and 
coverage), minimum wage legislation and the replacement ratio and duration of 
unemployment benefits (via its impact on reservation wages). A large literature exists 
that attributes the existence of high and persistent unemployment in Europe (in 
comparison to the USA) exactly to these factors (Layard et al. 1991; Bean, 1994; 
Nickell and Bell, 1996; Saint-Paul, 1996; Nickell, 1997a; Siebert, 1997).  
We will discuss in detail the specific process under which these factors act as 
an impediment to regional adjustments in the next section. However, it needs to be 
stressed here that regional inequalities might be also caused by factors other than the 
persistence of imbalances that are due to economic shocks and inflexible labour 
market arrangements. Despite the equilibrating mechanisms that operate across 
regions, regional economies exhibit a significant degree of heterogeneity.86 For 
example, regions can differ in terms of economic outcomes, like unemployment and 
inflation rates or employment and output growth. They may also be dissimilar in 
terms of general socio-economic conditions, like employment-to-population ratios, 
female labour force participation, skill composition and average education levels, 
production structures, average firm sizes and industrial composition of output.  
Furthermore, their socio-demographic indicators, such as average family 
sizes, urban density and migration may be different as well. Regional differences may 
also be present in social and economic attitudes and traditions, such as attitudes 
towards work (or specific patterns of work, for example, part-timing and temping), 
production effort, labour supply, managerial strategies and entrepreneurship. Such 
differences may further be reflected in aspects like labour demand and supply 
                                                 
86
 Regional heterogeneity is the outcome of spatial segmentation, spatial (distance) frictions, variation 
in spatial dynamics and the uneven spatial distribution of economic shocks (Fischer and Nijkamp, 
1987). 
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elasticities, investment in human and physical capital, etc. One final significant 
source of regional heterogeneity is differences in socio-economic and particularly 
labour market institutions (Peck, 1992; Storper, 1993; van der Laan and Ruesga, 
1998). The traditional and rather persistent cross-regional differences in unionisation 
rates in the UK (Martin et al., 1996) is one such example of regional heterogeneity in 
labour market institutions.  
It needs to be noted that the aforementioned regional differences may not 
always be the outcome of market failures and externalities that prevent adjustment 
mechanisms from generating equilibrium. Perhaps it is more appropriate to think of 
such differences as systemic and stable. From this perspective, the interaction (co-
existence) of regional inequalities in a set of social or economic indicators with 
another set of regional inequalities may result in a stable inter-regional equilibrium 
(see Adams, 1985 and Baddeley et al., 2000, for simple models illustrating this view 
and Martin, 2001, for a wider discussion of the issue). For example, low relative 
wages in a region might be sustained (and not eliminated through migration) if this 
region offers better amenities that compensate for the low wages.87 Regional 
inequalities in unemployment rates may be stable if high unemployment regions have 
denser social networks to assist the unemployed, or more Keynesian labour market 
institutions to compensate the labour force for its higher -relative to more prosperous 
regions- probability of falling out of employment. Regional differences in female 
labour force participation rates may be stable when co-existing with regional 
differences in female labour productivity, in production structures (industrial 
composition), or in urban densities. In technical economic terms, this might be 
                                                 
87
 Such amenities can be of various forms: locational (proximity to ports or other countries), 
environmental (cleaner air and less congestion), institutional (job security or higher labour standards), 
or cultural (entertainment attractions). 
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regarded as typical of the existence of convergence clubs at a regional level (Quah, 
1996). 
Our knowledge of how important such factors are empirically for the 
persistence of regional disparities is not yet fully developed. However, it seems clear 
that, at least to some extent, regional economic disparities can be self-sustainable 
even in the most efficient labour markets and that, in such a case, not much can be 
done to remove them. To be clear about it, if a region experiences higher 
unemployment due to the existence of relatively denser social networks and family 
support traditions, it would be socially undesirable for policy to destroy such a social 
infrastructure in order to increase the responsiveness of migration to unemployment 
(and thus eliminate the regional unemployment differentials).  
Before closing this section, a brief discussion of some other impediments to 
regional adjustment must be added. Numerous studies have shown (e.g., Gordon, 
1995; Mauro and Spilimbergo, 1998; Bailey and Turok, 2000) that the probability of 
migrating, as well as the elasticity of migration to changes in employment, are not 
constant across different sub-groups of the labour force. Skilled and more educated 
workers are more likely to migrate and so do male, single and relatively young 
workers.88 If average human capital declines with out-migration, then the decline in 
labour supply in a high unemployment region will not help improve economic 
conditions there. The decline in the quality of the workforce will reduce productivity 
and thus increase unit labour costs, making the area less attractive to new firms. This 
will keep wages low and unemployment at relatively high levels. In such a process, 
the high-unemployment region will experience a further decline in economic activity, 
while more prosperous regions will expand faster. This will create a cumulative-
                                                 
88
 Evidence also suggests that these workers tend also to migrate faster and further.  
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causation effect and cause further regional divergence. The presence of institutional 
or other impediments to regional adjustment, in that case, can act in favour of 
achieving a stable cross-regional equilibrium (see Booth and Chatterji, 1998 and 
Faini, 1999, for technical discussions of such processes).  
 
6.4. The regional dimension of labour market flexibility 
 We saw in the previous section that a number of elements related to labour 
market flexibility (e.g., unions or unemployment benefits) can act as impediments to 
the mechanisms of regional adjustment. In this section we will discuss the mechanics 
of this process and examine under which specific assumptions flexibility can 
accelerate or hinder regional convergence. Before doing so, it is important to examine 
first how the levels of labour market flexibility can vary in space, given uniform 
(national) regulations in the labour market.  
 
6.4.1. Regional variations in labour market flexibility 
 We argued in the introduction of this chapter that although labour market 
(de)regulation is a national policy, it can also be used (as it seems to have been the 
case in the UK) as an instrument for regional economic policy. This perspective is 
under the assumption that the effects of a uniform deregulation policy will exhibit 
regional variation and, more importantly, will trigger cross-regional dynamics that 
will activate the mechanisms of regional adjustment. However, the regional 
importance of labour market regulation is not limited to the regionality of its effects. 
Despite the national character of labour market regulation, the application of such 
regulations exhibits considerable regional variability, which is related to the existing 
patterns of cross-regional heterogeneity. In other words, the particular ways in which 
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these policies are applied and the actual levels of flexibility that obtain in each region 
depend on and reflect the specific characteristics (initial conditions) of each region. 
 In practice, most of the labour market policies related to factors that we 
identify as elements of labour market flexibility are constant across space (in nominal 
terms). Minimum wages, the levels and duration of unemployment benefits, 
regulations regarding working conditions and work arrangements, fire-and-hire 
legislation, regulations on worker representation rights and on trade unionism, are all 
decided at a national level and are applied evenly throughout the country. Only a few 
elements show regional variation at this level, including housing regulations and 
factors related to skills-acquisition (active labour market policies, training 
programmes and vocational education). 
On the other hand, the local responses to uniform labour market policies (i.e., 
the observed levels of flexibility) are variable. Table A.6.1 (see Appendix) presents 
the full list of labour market flexibility elements presented in chapter two, looking 
this time at their regional variability and providing a description of the main causes 
for this variability (last column). Work arrangements (temping, part-timing, sub-
contracting, multi-tasking, etc) depend on the sectoral and labour force composition 
of each regional economy, on specific demand pressures and profit margins, as well 
as on family structures and other socio-demographic conditions. Labour standards 
(representation, holidays, etc) depend on factors such as union power, the degree of 
co-ordination between the management and the workforce, the share of the services 
sector on total regional employment, and the particular economic conditions in the 
region (e.g., demand pressures). Unionism, too, varies with sectoral and occupational 
composition (for example, manual labour-intensive occupations are traditionally more 
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unionised), but it is mainly dependent on the social attitudes and history of each 
region.  
Regional, sectoral and occupational mobility, as well as mobility between jobs 
(job tenure) will mainly depend (for given economic conditions) on the skill 
composition of the labour force and the diversity of the production structure of each 
regional economy. The wage elasticity of unemployment will in general reflect the 
heterogeneity of regional economies. The existence of sources of incomes alternative 
to the wage (i.e., capital rents), strong social networks and high reservation wages in 
some regions will tend to reduce the flexibility of wages in their economies. The 
duration of unemployment benefits is probably the only element that is universally 
applied, although regional variations in long-term unemployment rates might create 
regional variations in the importance of benefit duration. The levels of unemployment 
benefits (replacement ratio), however, will depend on the average wage of each 
region, as well as on the regional family structures, since replacement rates are 
decided nationally and vary with family size. Most importantly, of course, they will 
depend on regional price levels and, more precisely, on cross-regional differences in 
price levels. Finally, the real minimum wage will be regionally variable, as minimum 
wages are -most of the times- set at a national level, while average wages and price 
levels vary among regions (or even among places within regions). 
Regional variations in labour market flexibility, of course, will in turn produce 
regionally variable economic outcomes. The combination of variable labour market 
flexibility landscapes and regionally uneven labour market regulation effects can 
constitute a fairly complex picture of regional labour market interactions and 
dynamics. Modelling all of these interactions would require a full model of regional 
and cross-regional social and economic behaviour, something that is beyond the 
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scope of our study. At a technical level, such complications will be considered and 
dealt with in chapter eight, where the empirical analysis of labour market flexibility 
and regional economic performance is presented. In the remainder of this section we 
discuss the implications of labour market regulation and flexibility on regional 
economic performance and regional disparities, looking at the impact that (in)flexible 
labour market arrangements have on the mechanisms of regional adjustment. In the 
next section we expand this discussion, examining the regional effects of a negative 
demand shock in a rigid and in a flexible labour market, as predicted by the model 
developed in chapter five. Inevitably, this discussion is limited to the effects of 
flexibility in labour standards, as this is the focus of our model. Many of the 
inferences made, however, are also applicable to other elements of labour market 
flexibility, the effects of which are discussed -in less technical terms- next.  
 
6.4.2. The impact of flexibility on regional adjustment 
 There are two broad cases that it is interesting to examine. The first follows 
the discussion of the previous sub-section and looks at the impact that regional 
variations in the levels of flexibility will have on regional disparities. The second 
assumes that the levels of flexibility are constant across space and examines regional 
adjustment to a region-specific negative demand shock, when labour market rigidities 
are present. Other scenarios (e.g., the effects of a negative shock in a relatively 
flexible and in a relatively rigid region, or of a national shock) follow directly from 
these two cases and are thus not examined here. For each of the two cases, we discuss 
separately the role of flexibility in the determination of wages and of labour-input 
flexibility (see chapter two for definitions of these terms), because of the differences 
in the mechanisms that are of relevance for each category.  
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6.4.2.1. Regional dynamics when flexibility differs across regions 
To examine this scenario, assume that the two regions are in equilibrium and 
that tight regulation guarantees the equalisation of the regional levels of flexibility. 
Assume now that deregulation occurs, so that the levels of flexibility rise in both 
regions. With regional differences in socio-cultural characteristics (e.g., family sizes, 
attitudes towards flexi-working) and economic structures (e.g., firm sizes and sectoral 
compositions), it is expected that the actual levels of flexibility that will obtain after 
deregulation will differ between the two regions. However, the slopes and positions 
of the labour demand and supply curves in each regional labour market will not 
change, as far as the assumption that labour demand and supply are both functions of 
labour market flexibility (as was shown in the model developed in chapter five) is 
relaxed.  
Under these assumptions, following deregulation, wages and unemployment 
rates will be the same in the two regions, but one region (say, A) will have a more 
flexible labour market compared to the other (say, region B). Let us first consider the 
case of flexibility in wage determination. With higher flexibility in its labour market, 
region A will become more attractive to potential employers (firms) but less attractive 
for workers. To the extent that attractiveness generates cross-regional flows of factors 
of production, it should be expected that firms will tend to relocate to region A, while 
workers will tend to migrate to region B. Thus, labour demand will increase in A and 
decline in B.  
In contrast, labour supply will increase in B and decline in A. This will lead to 
a wage increase in A and a fall in wages in region B, the less flexible region. The 
employment effects in the two regions are ambiguous, since they depend on the 
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slopes of the demand and supply curves, as well as on the relative sizes of worker 
migration and firm relocation. (i.e., the shifts of the two curves). This process will 
generate regional wage differentials, with higher wages in the more flexible regions. 
These differentials will be stable, since they will reflect regional differences in 
productive amenities.89  
Now assume that deregulation leads to regional disparities in the area of 
labour-input flexibility, again with region A exhibiting the higher levels of flexibility. 
As was the case with flexibility in wage determination, labour-input flexibility can 
only be seen as a productive amenity, since we have assumed that it does not affect 
the shape of the labour demand and supply curves. In this case, again, firms will be 
attracted by the more flexible labour market (region A), thus increasing their labour 
demand there. However, this time region A will be more attractive also for workers, 
since higher levels of labour-input flexibility imply higher employment opportunities 
(increased “employability”).90 Thus, under our assumptions, region A will also 
experience an increase in labour supply. This process will result to a decline in 
economic activity in region B and in an expansion of employment in region A.91 This 
time the wage effects will be ambiguous, as they will depend on the slopes of the 
labour demand and supply curves and on the relative sizes of firm relocation and 
worker migration. As was the case before, whatever regional differentials obtain, they 
will be stable, since they will reflect regional differences in productive amenities, 
rather than represent a temporary imbalance.  
                                                 
89
 Also, these will be compensating differentials and will not reflect differences in labour productivity 
between the regions. It is interesting to keep this in mind during the empirical investigation. A negative 
correlation between wages and flexibility at the regional level might simply reflect the amenity-
character of flexibility (and, thus, the existence of compensating differentials) and should not be taken 
without doubt to imply lower labour productivity in rigid labour markets.  
90
 If one assumes that labour-input flexibility is unattractive for workers (e.g., due to lower 
employment security), then the final effect will be as in the previous case. 
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It is necessary to note at this point that the exact responses of firms and 
workers to regional differentials in the levels of flexibility will in reality depend on 
the reasons that made these differentials possible. For example, if these differentials 
are mainly due to regional differences in firm sizes and sectoral shares, one should 
expect responses from the side of the firms (relocation) to be minimal. Conversely, if 
they are due mainly to regional differences in workers’ preferences (and factors like 
family size and structure, or occupational shares), one should expect that the workers’ 
response (migration) would be less important. However, the general patterns 
identified in the discussion above will still hold. Thus, the main conclusion to be 
drawn from this analysis is that, under the assumptions made, labour market 
deregulation can lead to stable (permanent) regional economic disparities.  
 
6.4.2.2. Regional imbalances with homogenous levels of flexibility 
As we discussed in section 6.3 (and technically illustrate in section 6.5), when 
a region is hit by a negative economic shock, in the absence of any labour market or 
other rigidities, a number of mechanisms are activated (mainly migration) that help 
bring the regional economies into a new equilibrium. The presence of inflexibilities in 
the determination of wages (i.e., high and long-term unemployment benefits, 
minimum wages protection, high unionisation rates and centralised wage bargaining 
structures) makes such adjustment mechanisms less operative. 
Imagine a region that is hit by a region-specific economic shock, which results 
in higher unemployment. The newly unemployed will now have to choose 
(considering for simplicity but without loss of generality a two-period situation) 
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 Note here that, following our analysis, wage-determination flexibility tends to create regional wage 
differentials, while labour-input flexibility tends to create regional differences in employment rates.  
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between (i) staying in their region of residence, receiving an unemployment benefit b 
and having a probability 1-uH of returning to work in the next period, and (ii) 
migrating to a lower unemployment region, where they will receive a wage w>b with 
probability 1-uL and an unemployment benefit b with probability uL (where uL<uH), 
bearing at the same time a migration (adjustment) cost c. Obviously, with rigid wage-
setting institutions, wage adjustments -if any- will be slow. Firms will face higher-
than-expected wages and so employment will decline by more than what was due to 
the initial shock. Given this, some firms might choose to relocate to another region, 
further reducing labour demand in the troubled region. Clearly, to generate regional 
adjustment, more out-migration is now necessary, than what would be originally 
required, should wages were more responsive to the shock. However, with generous 
unemployment benefits, the incentive for workers to migrate is diminished.92 Even if 
wages do actually fall, unemployment benefits will still restrain out-migration, 
especially so since the wage decline will increase the importance of the 
unemployment benefit (i.e., the replacement ratio –see Table A.6.1).  
In any case, irrespective of whether wages in the high unemployment region 
fall or not, or of the assumption regarding perfect knowledge about the conditions in 
the two regions, the probability of migrating will be inversely related to the level of 
the unemployment benefit. At an extreme case, with highly generous unemployment 
benefits such that w=b, the newly unemployed will not migrate even if unemployment 
in another region is zero! Even if they are actually offered a job, their net returns from 
migrating will be lower than those from staying (on the dole!): b>w-c. Hence, at low 
                                                 
92
 For direct empirical evidence on this, see Antolin and Bover (1997).  
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levels of flexibility, unemployment will be sustained in the region and regional 
unemployment differentials will emerge.93  
A policy designed to reduce regional inequalities can try and direct investment 
towards the high unemployment regions or provide re-training to the unemployed to 
improve their probability of finding a job in their own region. An alternative (and 
more cost-effective) measure would be to lower the value and duration of 
unemployment benefits (at a national scale), so that the barriers to migration can be 
lifted. In fact, this is what has happened in the UK since the early 1980s. Under this 
perspective, labour market deregulation, although a national policy, can have a 
regional impact by improving regional economic adjustment processes and fostering 
regional convergence.94  
In contrast with flexibility in the determination of wages, labour-input 
flexibility allows adjustments from within the region. With high levels of flexibility, a 
negative economic shock will result in comparatively greater job losses, but the laid-
off workers will be more likely to get a (flexible) job somewhere else in the regional 
economy. Thus, one can think of labour-input flexibility as a device that helps reduce 
                                                 
93
 Interestingly, the same effect can be triggered by the implementation of active labour market policies 
(ALMPs), which substitute for traditional passive policies. A number of studies have shown that 
ALMPs have significant lock-in effects, similarly to passive labour market policies, by decreasing the 
unattractiveness of unemployment and thus reducing the incentive to migrate (Edin et al., 1991; Butner 
and Prey, 1998; for contradicting empirical evidence see Fredriksson, 1999).  
94
 Of course, such an analysis assumes that migration rates are constant across different groups of 
workers. Relaxing this assumption, it can be shown that out-migration from the high unemployment 
region (or, equalisation of unemployment rates) does not guarantee the amelioration of economic 
performance in this region (see Faini, 1999). As the probability of migration increases with skills 
(Mauro and Spilimbergo, 1998), it is possible that a low unemployment benefit might drive the most 
skilled out of the backward region, lowering labour productivity there and hindering its prospects for 
economic recovery (assuming that the unemployment benefit-to-wage ratio is constant across skill 
levels). Furthermore, the prospect of migration can make the unemployed reluctant to invest in training 
and acquire new skills, while a well-administered unemployment benefits system (which could include 
compulsory re-training and job-brokering) might help increase human capital and employability for the 
temporarily unemployed. In such a way, unemployment benefits may act as a temporary measure to 
retain the most skilful inside the high unemployment region and turn a plight (unemployment) into an 
opportunity (skill-acquisition). 
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the impact of a shock, rather than as something that accelerates the adjustment to it, 
as was the case with flexibility in the determination of wages.  
To examine the process under which labour-input rigidities affect regional 
adjustment, imagine now that a region is hit by a negative demand shock, while the 
(national) labour market is inflexible in terms of labour-input adjustability 
(regulations on temping, firing costs, etc). If firms, following the negative demand 
shock, cannot adjust their levels of employment easily, adjustment can only occur in 
the form of job destruction (firms going out of business) and reductions in wages.95 
Job destruction will not be followed by firm relocation (to another region) and thus it 
will cause an absolute fall in welfare. In contrast, the downward wage adjustment (if 
possible) will create an incentive for workers to out-migrate. If, however, the existing 
labour-input inflexibilities include (the lack of) sectoral, occupational and 
geographical mobility, adjustment will only be partial. Inward investment (firm 
immigration) will also be insufficient, since labour-input flexibility is assumed to be 
low in all regions. In such a case, the region of focus will experience an absolute 
decline in economic activity, with lower wages and higher unemployment. This result 
will not be cumulative, but it will be permanent. Again, the conclusion is that 
flexibility assists regional adjustments and, thus, regional convergence.   
 
6.5. Deregulation in labour standards and regional dynamics 
 Our discussion in the previous section assumed that the elasticity of labour 
demand and supply was not affected by changes or regional differences in the levels 
of flexibility. Rather, labour market rigidities were an external factor that affected the 
decision to migrate to or to invest in another region. In other words, the analysis was 
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conducted within the framework of a standard perfect competition model (with two 
regions). In this section we want to see how flexibility is predicted to affect regional 
adjustments and equilibria when one employs the framework developed in chapter 
five.  We want to investigate what happens to regional disparities when labour supply 
 and demand are assumed to be functions of labour standards. For simplicity, we will 
assume throughout this section that our two regions are homogenous (in both socio-
economic conditions and levels of flexibility) and that the only labour market 
rigidities present are those related to labour standards. Our analysis will examine the 
effects of a region-specific negative demand shock, using the simple model developed 
in section 5.3, in order to avoid the complexities that arise from introducing 
unionisation (as in section 5.4.1), labour market duality (as in section 5.4.2), or 
unemployment benefits and minimum wages (as in section 5.4.3).  
 Assume initially that labour market regulation is very strict, so that all firms in 
all regions have identical levels of labour standards (set at a high value). With no 
further frictions and rigidities, the regional labour markets will be in equilibrium, as 
migration will guarantee the equalisation of the marginal product of labour and 
unemployment rates throughout the country. We describe the cross-regional 
equilibrium in Figure 6.1. Regions A and B are in equilibrium, with identical wage 
rates (wA=wB) and employment hA and hB, respectively. Assume that a negative 
demand shock hits region B, causing labour demand to move to the left (from DB to 
DB’). With clearing markets, wage rates in B will fall to wB’, triggering worker 
migration towards A.96  
                                                                                                                                           
95
 This observation shows how important other forms of flexibility (in this case, financial 
liberalisation) are for regional adjustments, at least in the presence of labour market rigidities.   
96
 Because the present analysis is in terms of labour-hours, it is more precise to think of the adjustment 
process in terms of commuting rather than migration. However, this makes no difference in terms of 
the results obtained.  
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Thus, labour supply in B will decline (from NB to NB’), while it will increase 
in region A (from NA to NA’). Out-migration from B will continue until a new 
equilibrium is reached (at wA’=wB’’). The new equilibrium will be stable and the 
initial shock will be absorbed by a general decline in employment and wages 
(wA=wB>wA’=wB’’) and a redistribution of employment from B to A.97 Thus, with 
fixed and constant-across-space levels of flexibility, and labour market rigidities not 
affecting the decision to migrate, the regional adjustment process is identical to that in 
the case of perfectly flexible labour markets (as was described in section 6.3), 
although the welfare loss will be greater due to the steepness of the demand curves 
and the fact that firms cannot adjust their labour standards to optimal levels. 
 
Figure 6.1.: The impact of a negative shock in a rigid labour market 
 wage-rate wage-rate 
labour-hours labour-hours 
NA’ 
DB DB’ DA 
NB 
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wB 
wB’’ 
wB’
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wA’ 
wA 
Region A Region B 
 
 
 Assume now that regulations regarding labour standards are removed, 
allowing firms to set labour standards at their own profit maximising levels. As was 
shown in chapter five (see Figure 5.2), this will result in an inward shift of the labour 
supply curves in both regions, while the labour demand curves will become flatter. 
                                                 
97
 However, it must be noted that the overall employment loss will be greater the more inelastic the 
labour demand or, in other words, the higher the level of labour standards.  
Ch.6: A Regional Approach 
 
208
Again, we assume that region B is hit by a negative demand shock, so that it 
experiences a decline in labour demand and, hence, in wage rates. However, this time 
migration is not the only mechanism activated. As well as out-migration, lower wage 
rates trigger changes in the optimal level of labour standards (as shown in eq.(13) in 
chapter five). This will in turn affect the slope of the demand curve (consistent with 
eq.(6) in chapter five) and the position of the labour supply curve (consistent with 
eq.(23) in chapter five). Thus, changes in the level of labour standards are in this case 
(in a flexible labour market when labour standards affect labour demand and supply) 
an additional mechanism of adjustment to economic shocks. Although it is 
conceptually plausible that any of the two adjustment mechanisms (migration and 
changes in labour standards) can respond faster, thus making the other unnecessary, 
first we take the view that migration movements exhibit some hysterisis (say, because 
of uncertainty or convex adjustment costs). This will also allow the clearer exposition 
of the process under which changes in the levels of labour standards act as an 
adjustment mechanism. Relaxing this assumption and allowing for both mechanisms 
to adjust partially and simultaneously, does not change the quality of the results we 
obtain. 
As can be seen from Figure 6.2, the negative demand shock will be expressed 
as a shift of labour demand in region B to the left (from D0B to D1B). This will bring 
the wage rate in this region to w1B<w0B, creating regional wage differentials. 
However, while workers will take some time to start migrating towards region A in 
search for higher wages, lower wage rates in region B will force firms to reduce the 
level of labour standards they offer, so that s1B<s0B=s0A. Thus, the new labour demand 
curve in region B will become flatter (like D2B). Lower levels of labour standards, 
though, will also lead to a decline in labour supply (from N0B to N1B) and thus in a 
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relative recovery of wage rates in region B (w2B>w1B). The latter will make the two 
curves move back towards their original positions. The whole process will continue 
as an oscillating convergence process as was described in section 5.3.3, until a new 
equilibrium is reached. In this new equilibrium, both wage rates and employment will 
be below their initial levels (i.e., w3B and h3B such that w0B>w3B>w1B>w2B and h0B> 
h3B>h2B). Note that since the migration adjustment is slower, the equilibrium in 
region A will not yet be altered (thus, w0A> w3B). 
 
 Figure 6.2.: Partial adjustment in a flexible labour market (region B) 
 
N0B 
N1B 
D1B 
D0B 
w0B 
w1B 
h0B h1B 
Wage-rate 
Labour-hours 
w2B 
w3B 
h2B 
N2B 
D2B 
D3B 
h3B 
   
Key: equilibrium: ●, initial; ■, immediate response; ▲, secondary response; ♦, final. 
 
 At the new equilibrium both wages and labour standards will be higher in A 
and thus utility will also be higher there (UA>UB, because wA> w3B and sA>s3B). Thus, 
workers will eventually move from region B to A, driving wage rates up in B and 
down in A (as N0A moves to N1A and N3B moves to N4B ; not shown). The new wage 
changes will start bringing the two regions to an equilibrium, but will also cause new 
changes to the levels of labour standards offered and thus to the slopes of the two 
labour demand curves. This time, however, labour standards will move in the 
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opposite directions in the two regions, moving above s3B in region B (DB* is steeper 
than D3B) and below s0A in region A (DA* is flatter than D0A). The partial adjustments 
will continue, again with an oscillating convergence process, until a stable 
equilibrium is reached, with wage rates and labour standards becoming equal in the 
two regions (wA*=wB* and sA*=sB*).  
 
Figure 6.3.: Cross-regional adjustment in a flexible labour market 
 
N0B 
D3B 
D0B 
N0A 
D0A 
N3B 
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hB* h0B h3B h0A hA* 
w* 
w0 
w3B 
Region B Region A 
 
       Key: equilibrium: ●, initial; ♦, after the shock / before migration; ⋆ , final cross-regional. 
 
Figure 6.3 presents the cross-regional adjustment to the new equilibrium. At 
this new equilibrium both regions have lost employment. Moreover, wage rates are 
lower compared to the situation before the shock occurred, but are higher compared 
to a case where labour standards were not allowed to vary or before migration took 
place (wA,B>wA,B*> w3B>w1B). Thus, again the impact of the region-specific shock is 
diffused in the national economy through migration, as was the case in the rigid 
labour market (see Figure 6.1). However, this time, with flexibility in the 
determination of labour standards, the impact of a shock is larger, as it is magnified 
by changes in the levels of labour standards.  
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 Now let us assume that migration can occur simultaneously with changes in 
the levels of labour standards. As was the case before, the shock will reduce wage 
rates in region B, leading to a further reduction in labour standards. This time, 
however, while labour standards in B decline, out-migration will also occur, limiting 
the decline in the wage rates. It follows that the decline in labour standards will also 
be less dramatic. The limited fall in the levels of labour standards will nevertheless 
reinforce out-migration, making regional adjustment through migration even faster.  
Before closing this section we need to note that the stable cross-regional 
equilibrium is only reached under a number of restrictive assumptions: (i) that there 
are no rigidities in the two labour markets, apart from the original regulation in labour 
standards (which is removed)98; (ii) that the two regions are homogenous in terms of 
socio-economic conditions and characteristics and, following that, in terms of the 
optimal levels of labour standards99; (iii) that workers are homogenous in terms of 
skills and in terms of the utility they derive from a given level of labour standards; 
and (iv) that migration is the major of the traditional adjustment mechanisms (e.g., as 
opposed to changes in labour force participation). Relaxing these assumptions will 
affect the nature of the equilibrium reached. For example, if we allow for regional 
heterogeneity, as discussed in section 6.3, a stable equilibrium can be reached with 
one region offering higher wages and another offering higher levels of labour 
standards. However, even in such a case, the process of adjustment through changes 
in the levels of labour standards described above, with changes in the slope of the 
                                                 
98
 If we assume, as in sections 5.4 and 6.4, that there are other inflexibilities in the two labour markets 
that hinder migration (e.g., unemployment benefits), then the result will be persistent regional 
differentials in both wages and labour standards.  
99
 For example, dropping this assumption, one could examine how the cross-regional equilibrium is 
altered if new regulations in labour standards are imposed (starting from an initial condition of no-
regulation) and regions are allowed to respond differently to the new regulations (say, with one setting 
labour standards at the regulation levels and a second setting them above that level).   
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labour demand curve and in the position of the labour supply curve generating 
oscillatory convergence (within each region this time, due to the cross-regional 
heterogeneity), will still operate.  
To remove regional disparities, policy-makers will have to choose between 
two options for regional policy.  One option will be to induce a socio-economic 
restructuring in both regions so that heterogeneity is removed and both regions 
become equally flexible (in terms of labour standards offered). This will also equalise 
wages, but cannot be achieved through deregulation, since labour standards have 
already been set at profit-maximising levels. The alternative option would be to 
introduce new regulations in the labour market, so that labour standards are equalised 
in the two regions (by moving upwards). This will help wages converge, but it will 
destroy some employment in the more flexible region. In any case, however, although 
policy intervention can achieve a more equal distribution of economic opportunities 
across regions, it does not guarantee an overall increase in economic efficiency or 
welfare. 
 
6.6. Concluding remarks 
 The purpose of this chapter was to examine labour market flexibility and 
deregulation from a regional perspective. Such a perspective is rarely found in the 
relevant literature. If, as we noted in chapter five, a holistic analysis (a general theory) 
of the economic effects of labour market flexibility is undeveloped, the regional 
economic analysis of the issue is missing entirely. Only a few attempts to model the 
regional dynamics of specific labour market institutions exist in the literature (see for 
example, Faini, 1999), while many studies undertaking cross-regional analyses treat 
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regions as simply a different unit of analysis rather than as a system within a national 
economy (for example, Adsera and Boix, 2000).  
 However, the analysis employed here is not meant to substitute for the paucity 
of regional economic research on labour market regulation issues. Rather, our 
intention was to provide a framework under which the impact of labour market 
rigidities (or of their absence) on regional adjustment and on economic outcomes can 
be understood and investigated. After reviewing the specificities of regional 
economies and the mechanisms of regional adjustment in the absence of labour 
market rigidities, we proceeded to highlight an array of dynamics that can emerge at a 
regional scale when various forms of labour market rigidities are present. In this 
context, we extended the predictions of the model developed in the previous chapter, 
to examine the impact of a region-specific negative economic shock when labour 
standards are fixed by regulation and when they are allowed to vary (flexibility).  
 The most interesting question requiring an answer in this type of analysis is 
the role of labour market flexibility and deregulation for regional economic 
performance and regional convergence. As we noticed, there is an implicit 
assumption, evident in the implementation of labour market deregulation policies, 
that flexibility in the labour markets fosters regional convergence. This assumes that 
market forces can restore any regional disequilibria and that labour market rigidities 
are the only externalities in the economy. The issue of spatial heterogeneity, 
discussed in section 6.3, is apparently not accounted for in such a perspective, as this 
rules out the possibility for regional disparities to be stable and systemic. We 
mentioned earlier that such an equilibrium is compatible with the notions of 
conditional convergence and convergence clubs, which have gained a place in 
economic orthodoxy over the last decade.  
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 Our discussion in this chapter revealed that increasing labour market 
flexibility allows the mechanisms of regional adjustment to operate faster (e.g., 
labour-input flexibility) and more efficiently (e.g., wage-determination flexibility), 
thus fostering regional economic convergence. Further, that labour market flexibility 
itself constitutes an additional adjustment mechanism that can reduce the impact of 
economic shocks and, thus, make the adjustment of more traditional mechanisms less 
dramatic. However, once spatial heterogeneity and the existence of a number of 
frictions in the labour market are assumed, labour market deregulation and flexibility 
can be shown to have adverse regional economic effects. In other words, if the 
operation of regional adjustment mechanisms generate cumulative-causation-type of 
effects, leading to regional divergence (due to the presence of market imperfections, 
regional heterogeneity, or agglomeration economies), then labour market flexibility 
will only reinforce this process. Such a perspective suggests that, perhaps, in the 
presence of externalities and market failures, labour market institutions act to assist 
backward regions and prevent regional disparities from exaggerating further. The 
argument about labour market regulation being a second-best policy, given the 
imperfections of the markets, has been explicitly made in some of the neo-
institutionalist literature on labour standards (see Sengenberger and Campbell, 1994) 
and was sufficiently discussed in chapter three. Interestingly, the observation that 
labour market flexibility can, under some specific (but plausible) conditions, lead to 
regional disparities in incomes and unemployment rates resembles the observation 
that labour market flexibility exacerbates cross-personal wage inequalities. The latter 
is a rather well established empirical finding, which is also supported by our 
empirical investigation of chapter four.  
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 With these considerations, we proceed in the next two chapters with the 
empirical investigation of the relationship between labour market flexibility and 
economic performance at the regional level in the UK. In chapter eight we turn at the 
econometric investigation of the regional economic effects of labour market 
flexibility, controlling for the cross-regional dynamics that were identified in this 
chapter. For example, we explicitly test the assumption that higher levels of flexibility 
in a region generate wage increases in the same region but reduce wages in 
neighbouring regions (as discussed in sub-section 6.4.2.1).100  
The main investigation, however, undertaken in chapter eight is about the 
direct effects of labour market flexibility on regional economic performance. For the 
purposes of this investigation, we split labour market flexibility into its constituent 
elements (as discussed in chapter three) and investigate the individual impacts that 
each of these elements has on productivity, wages, employment and output growth, 
wage inequalities and investment. Special focus is given on the relationship between 
productivity, migration and unemployment insurance, as discussed in 6.4.2.2. 
Before that, in chapter seven we measure the various elements of labour 
market flexibility in the UK regions and examine the variation over time and across 
space of the levels of flexibility. Revealing the extent of regional heterogeneity in 
labour market flexibility and its path over time (whether it is declining or not) can 
inform us about the efficiency of the mechanisms discussed here. Also, it can inform 
us about the presence of other impediments that prevent enhanced flexibility from 
triggering regional adjustment and reducing regional disparities.  
                                                 
100
 We examine such spatial interactions by modelling spatial autocorrelation explicitly, through 
various distance decay functions, but also by allowing for more general forms of spatial 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. We provide a discussion of the economic interpretation of the 
spatial lags (spatial autocorrelation) and their distribution in chapter eight.   
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APPENDIX A.6.: Regional variation of labour market flexibility 
 
Table A.6.1: The regional variation of the elements of labour market flexibility 
Elements of 
flexibility 
Regional variation  Sources of regional variation 
policies outcomes 
Holidays No Yes Union power, co-ordination, 
socio-economic conditions, 
sectoral composition 
Lunch breaks No Yes 
Paid leaves No Yes 
Representation rights No Yes Union power, co-ordination 
and social traditions Right to organise No Yes 
In-job occ. mobility No Yes  
Union power, co-ordination and economic 
conditions 
Job demarcations No Yes 
Multi-tasking No Yes 
Working conditions No Yes  
 
Union power and co-ordination with 
management 
Dismissal protection No Yes 
Empl. protection No Yes 
Co-ordination No Yes 
Decentralisation No Yes 
ALMPs Yes -  
Spending decided at the sub-regional level Educational levels Yes - 
Job-related training Yes - 
Union coverage No Yes Social attitudes, 
sectoral composition Union density No Yes 
Union power No Yes Social attitudes 
Job mobility No Yes  
Sectoral, occupational and other regional 
differences, skills composition, economic 
conditions 
Occ/nal mobility No Yes 
Regional mobility No Yes 
Sectoral mobility No Yes 
Homework No Yes  
Sectoral composition, socio-economic conditions Part-time No Yes 
Casual No Yes 
Job-sharing No Yes Sectoral composition, social conditions 
Seasonal No Yes Sectoral composition, regional peculiarities 
Fixed-term No Yes  
Sectoral composition, 
economic conditions 
Sub-contracting No Yes 
Task-contracting No Yes 
Overtime No Yes 
Irregular hours No Yes  
 
Sectoral composition 
Weekend-work No Yes 
Working week No Yes 
Shift-work No Yes 
Health/safety rules No Yes 
Wage elasticity No Yes Regional heterogeneity 
Replacement ratio No Yes Variation in average wages and family sizes 
Minimum wage No Yes Regional variation in average wages 
Benefits duration No No Variation in long-term unemployment rates 
Housing flexibility Yes - Housing regulations at the sub-regional level 
Notes: The two levels of regional variation (columns two and three) are (1) regionally varying 
policies; and (2) regionally varying application of the regulations or regionally varying degrees of 
flexibility. Empty cells illustrate that a non-uniform (region-specific) policy cannot have a uniform 
(nation-wide) application.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
FLEXIBILITY IN THE UK REGIONS 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 It is a widely accepted that labour market flexibility has advanced over the last 
two decades in many OECD and other economies. Indeed, as has been discussed in 
detail in previous chapters, the 1980s experienced a global shift of economic policy 
(as well as political ideology) towards the relaxation of the rigidities imposed in the 
labour and product markets over the period of Keynesian regulation and Fordist 
development. The perception of policy intervention as a necessary condition for 
controlling economic outcomes was replaced by a more liberal view (neo-liberalism), 
the perception of policy intervention as detrimental to economic development and 
prosperity. This underlined the belief that market forces, when left free to operate, can 
lead to optimal economic (but also social) outcomes and that policy intervention can 
only distort the market clearing equilibria by generating unemployment and lowering 
the rates of economic growth.  
Under such considerations, labour market deregulation became a major policy 
priority. A number of measures were introduced (or relaxed) in many countries to 
facilitate the flexibilisation of their labour markets. The UK in particular experienced 
a significant shift away from the government protectionism regime of the 1970s, for 
political as well as economic reasons. During the 1980s Thatcherism provided the 
political and ideological platforms for the deregulation of labour relations and the 
flexibilisation of the UK labour markets. The trend towards labour market 
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deregulation continued (and in some cases, intensified) in the following Conservative 
governments and, more importantly, in the new Labour government. 
Although in more recent years legislation has been introduced attempting to 
re-regulate some aspects of labour relations (e.g., the re-introduction of a national 
minimum wage and restrictions introduced over the length of the working day and 
week), labour market policies still aim at the flexibilisation of labour markets (in 
some respects, increasingly so). Table A.7.1 (see Appendix A.7.1) reviews the main 
labour laws introduced in the UK since 1979, with a special emphasis on their effects 
on trade union power. As can be seen, these laws constituted a direct attack on labour 
rights and have increasingly facilitated the removal of what have been perceived as 
the main labour market rigidities. 
From the beginning of the 1980s, the 1980 Employment Act imposed 
restrictions on the rights to strike and to organise in a trade union and removed some 
of the benefits related to unfair dismissal and maternity rights. At the end of the 
decade, the 1989 Employment Act further restricted such rights and imposed clauses 
that reduced job and employment security (dismissal protection and redundancy 
payments). Although the 1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act re-
defined or re-introduced some of the employment rights related to maternity leave 
and dismissal protection, the same act completely abolished the Wage Councils 
responsible for the determination of minimum levels of pay (although only for 
overtime and hourly wage rates and for only a few occupations, since the 1986 Wage 
Act). More recent Employment Acts (e.g., 1996, 1999) have re-introduced some of 
the previously removed employment rights. Nevertheless, labour market flexibility is 
still a priority for the Labour government. 
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The advance of labour market deregulation over the last two decades is not 
necessarily a proof of increased labour market flexibility. Indeed, as our earlier 
discussions illustrate (especially the model developed in chapter five), labour market 
deregulation is often a necessary but rarely a sufficient condition for the 
flexibilisation of labour markets. With respect to the situation in the UK, however, on 
aggregate, it seems that labour market deregulation triggered substantial increases in 
labour market flexibility. Trade union density in the UK declined from a global 
maximum of 54.8% in 1978 to a 60-year low of 31.7% in 1997 (Asteriou and 
Monastiriotis, 2000). Some authors have argued that “the vast bulk of the observed 
1980s decline in union density in the UK is due to the changed legal environment for 
industrial relations” (Freeman and Pelletier, 1990, p.156), rather than business cycle 
factors (Disney, 1990), or changes in social attitudes. The replacement ratio fell by 
more than 35% in the period between the late 1970s and the early 1990s (Barrell et 
al., 1994). According to the findings of Minford and Riley (1994), the responsiveness 
of the unemployment rate to the level of unemployment benefits more than doubled 
over the same period. With respect to within-job mobility and task (functional) 
flexibility there is evidence (for the 1980s) to suggest that they have been rising 
(Daniel, 1987; Elger, 1991), although not as fast as might have been expected. 
Flexibility in labour standards (understood as a withdrawal of labour rights such as 
maternity leave, paid leave and holidays, dismissal protection and employment 
security) has also increased, but thus far there are limited (if any) empirical attempts 
to associate labour market deregulation to this decline in employment rights. 
However, it is clear that labour market flexibility -in the form of lower labour 
standards, increased casualisation of work (part-timers, temping, home-working and 
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sub-contracting), reduced job security and the like- has on aggregate increased in the 
UK over the period of labour market deregulation.101  
Together with the shift of labour market policy towards higher labour market 
flexibility, as stated in chapter six, regional economic policy shifted towards the same 
goals. From the early 1980s, the conduct of regional policy reflected the belief that 
regional inequalities and poor regional economic performance can be alleviated by 
the natural adjustment mechanisms of the labour market. To improve their efficacy, 
these mechanisms require the removal of labour market rigidities. As suggested by 
the 1983 White Paper on regional industrial policy, “wage flexibility […] would 
increase the attractiveness to industry of areas with high unemployment” (DTI, 1983, 
p.3). The attempt to increase labour market flexibility, even to the extent that this was 
viewed as an indirect regional economic policy, never did obtain a clear regional 
dimension. As Table A.6.1 illustrated, the application of labour market policies is 
clearly constant through space, with the exception of policies related specifically to 
training, education and the housing market. Even in 1999, with the introduction of the 
new minimum wage, labour market policy did not assume a regional dimension, 
despite the recognition of at least some academics that this might be necessary 
(Sunley and Martin, 1999) and the known differences in incomes and average wages 
among some UK regions (especially the South East and the rest of the country) 
(Gregg and Machin, 1994). Of course, this probably reflects the belief that nation-
wide labour market policies can have regionally uneven effects (as our discussion in 
chapter six suggested), rather than a neglect of the regional economic problems of the  
                                                 
101
 Casey (1988, 1991) provides detailed evidence regarding the increase in self-employment, part-
timing and temping in the UK during the 1980s. We avoid a detailed presentation of national labour 
market flexibility indicators here, since this would overlap with the presentation of the evolution of the 
regional flexibility indexes, conducted in section 7.3.  
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country. It is from this viewpoint, after all, that increasing labour market flexibility 
can be interpreted as an indirect regional economic policy (Armstrong and Blackaby, 
1998).  
In sections 7.3 and 7.4 we grapple with how labour market deregulation as a 
national policy has created different levels of flexibility in the regional labour 
markets of the UK. To accomplish this, in section 7.2 we examine the evolution of a 
number of regional labour market flexibility indicators that we constructed using 
survey data from various sources (see Table 7.1). In section 7.5 we will look at the 
regional economic performance of the UK over the last two decades, in order to 
obtain a picture of the economic developments, which the empirical analysis of 
chapter eight will attempt to explain.  
 
7.2. The construction of the flexibility indexes: data and method 
7.2.1. Theoretical considerations and data sources102 
 The analytical discussion of labour market flexibility and deregulation in 
chapter two revealed a wide array of elements that can reasonably be regarded as the 
constituents of labour market flexibility. These elements were identified and 
classified in a number of ways, according to various decompositions, based on 
alternative perspectives (e.g., functional, technical, etc). In the empirical analysis of 
the UK and its regions that follows in the next sections of this chapter and in chapter 
eight, we have utilised these decompositions and classifications and produced a 
detailed list of elements of labour market flexibility, which we went on to quantify 
and measure as a cross-regional time-series.  
                                                 
102
 In this section we focus only on the data sources related to the construction of the regional 
flexibility indexes. A detailed account of the sources for the data used in the empirical analysis is 
presented in chapter eight.  
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Earlier discussions (e.g., chapter three) suggest that the term labour market 
flexibility is neither uniform nor homogeneous and that, instead, both the elements of 
flexibility and their effects can in fact move in opposing directions. For this reason, it 
was necessary to extensively decompose the labour market flexibility indicators. We 
identified thirty-one (31) labour market flexibility indicators, trying to balance 
parsimony with full coverage. The thirty-one components are listed in Table 7.1. As 
the table shows, we further grouped these components into eight technically 
homogenous groups, for the following reasons: first, because econometric 
investigation requires a manageable number of variables, especially if non-linearities 
and cross-interactions are to be taken into account; second, because the indicators 
should be aggregate enough to minimise measurement error and business-cycle 
effects; last but not least, in order for our indexes to be consistent with the theoretical 
discussion of the previous chapters and especially of chapter two.  
We must note, however, that despite the consistency issue, the technical 
components identified for the empirical investigation (second column of Table 7.1) 
do not precisely correspond to those identified in chapter two (first column). This is 
mainly because the latter categories were to some extent overlapping. However, other 
problems discussed below (data availability, weighting problems, etc) also played a 
role. Nevertheless, although the deviation of the empirical categorisation from the 
theoretical one was unavoidable, major similarities remain. The seven measures of 
flexibility in labour input, work content, reservation and average wages, non-wage 
costs, labour mobility and skills acquisition, have here been replaced by eight 
measures of unionism, labour mobility, skills input, and internal numerical, internal 
functional, external numerical, wage and unemployment flexibility.  
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Table 7.1: Indexes of labour market flexibility 
Flexibility Indicators Data Sources 
Category Group Index LFS/ 
QLFS 
 
WIRS 
FES/ 
GHS 
OECD 
/ONS 
 
 
Labour 
input 
 
and 
 
Non-wage 
costs 
 
 
Internal 
numerical 
 
Work time • •   
Irregular hours •    
Shift work •    
Weekends •    
 
 
External 
numerical 
Home-working * *   
Alternative workers 
 *   
Part-time workers •    
Temporary employment •    
Dismissal protection * *   
Employment protection 
 *   
 
Work 
content 
 
Internal 
functional 
Within-job occ. mobility •    
Empl. representation rights 
 *   
Labour standards 
 *   
Multi-tasking 
 *   
Reser- 
vation 
wages 
Unemploy
-ment. 
flexibility 
Replacement rate    • 
Minimum wages *   * 
Duration of benefits 
   * 
 
 
 
Average 
wages 
 
Wage 
flexibility 
Structure of wage bargaining 
 *   
Co-ordination (unions-firms) 
 *   
Wage flexibility   •  
 
Unionism 
Union density • *   
Union coverage 
 *   
Union power 
 *   
 
 
Labour 
mobility 
 
 
Mobility 
Regional mobility •  • • 
Sectoral mobility •    
Occupational mobility •    
Job mobility / Tenure •    
Housing flexibility   •  
 
Skills 
acquisition 
 
Skills 
input 
Training 
   * 
ALMPs 
   * 
Educational attainment 
   * 
Notes: Dots (•) show a valid data source that was actually used in the construction of the 
corresponding indicator. Stars (*) correspond to potential data sources that, for various reasons (sample 
size, accuracy, change in definitions over time, regional detail, etc), we were unable to use. LFS/QLFS 
is the series of the biannual, annual and quarterly Labour Force Surveys. WIRS is the series of the 
Workplace Industrial Relations and Workplace Employment Relations Surveys. FES/GHS is the 
Family Expenditure and General Household Survey series. Finally, OECD/ONS refers to data obtained 
from OECD databases or the UK Office for National Statistics.   
 
 Some of the listed indexes are composite. For example, the seventh index 
(part-time employment) includes two measures: the share of part-timers in total 
employment and the share of involuntary part-timers in total part-time employment. 
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Conversely, some indexes are more aggregate than the theoretical analysis of chapter 
two would seem to recommend. For example, the eighth index lumps together all the 
categories of temporary employment (seasonal, fixed-term, fixed-task, casual, etc), 
despite their differences (see section 2.2).  
In the last four columns of Table 7.1 we also present the data sources. The 
primary data source was the Labour Force Survey series (LFS and QLFS). This is a 
national quarterly (biannual for 1973-1983, annual for 1984-1991) household survey 
under the responsibility of the Office for National Statistics (ONS), using a sample of 
more than 40,000 households. Additional sources were the Family Expenditure 
Survey (FES) and the General Household Survey (GHS) series, as well as the various 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS 1980, 1984, 1990; New Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey, 1990; Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 1998).103 
Finally, some published data were also used, mainly derived from the ONS Regional 
Trends database, the OECD Database on Social Expenditures and the OECD 
Employment Outlook series.  
 
7.2.2. Further considerations and data construction 
 The nature of the data sources, mainly being surveys with frequent changes in 
the content of the questions asked, made it particularly difficult to obtain consistent 
time-series for all the indicators presented in Table 7.1. For this reason, in certain 
cases some data had to be estimated by interpolation. When this was necessary, the 
                                                 
103
 The FES is a continuous random sample survey of around 10,000 private households, with 
information about incomes as well as detailed information on expenditure. The GHS is an annual 
national (excluding Northern Ireland) multi-purpose survey, based on an achieved sample of about 
9,000 households, providing information on aspects of housing, employment, education, health and 
social services, transport, population and social security. Both surveys are under the responsibility of 
the ONS. The WIRS/WERS series are occasional one-time studies of around 2,000 working 
establishments of more than 25 employees (whole population), based on face-to-face interviews with 
managers and trade unions officials (for Great Britain only). It is conducted under the responsibility of 
the Employment Department and the Department of Trade and Industry.   
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typical procedure was to estimate group averages for the data from years where the 
relevant information was available, and then calculate the values for the year of 
interest, assuming that the distribution of characteristics across the groups had 
remained (relatively) constant.  
For example, data on household relocation for job-related reasons at a 
regional level were not available for the years 1980-1983 and 1985. The values for 
these years were calculated as follows. First, for the years for which all information 
was available (e.g., 1979, 1984) we calculated average relocation rates for each 
region by sector and occupation. Then, using national information on relocation rates 
from the FES and data on regional sectoral and occupational employment 
composition, we interpolated the household relocation shares for the missing years. 
This implied the assumption that the share of people moving house for job-related 
reasons in a region relative to the national share, given differences in the sectoral and 
occupational composition of employment, remained constant between two years (say, 
1979 and 1980). Such an assumption, although restrictive, is not implausible.  
Out-of-sample projections were also used when a change in definitions (for 
the survey data) made the derived indicators non-comparable through time. For 
example, the figures for sectoral mobility derived from the Quarterly Labour Force 
surveys were not directly comparable to those derived from the annual Labour Force 
surveys, because the definition of job mobility (the control variable) changed between 
the two surveys. Hence, to adjust the two series we assumed that, controlling for 
unemployment, job mobility followed the same trend before and after 1992. 
When inter- and extra-polation was not possible (or did not seem reliable), we 
had to accept a reduction in the sample size for the specific indicator. This was the 
case with a few indicators for values before 1982 (for example, information on 
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irregular hours, weekend-work and shift-work) and for household relocation for job-
related reasons for values after 1991. Additionally, the well-documented problem 
with the regional union density data (see Martin et al., 1996; Monastiriotis, 1999b) 
meant that this indicator was only available from 1989.104  
One of the first and primary considerations relating to the construction of the 
data was whether they should be weighted (and how). This issue is very important, as 
it not only relates to the requirements of empirical research, but also to the theoretical 
perspective of the analysis. Specifically, apart from the technical issue of whether 
some indicators (for example, shift-work) vary across industries or occupations, a 
more important question is whether, given such variability, one should try and control 
for it when constructing regional measures of labour market flexibility. In other 
words, the more important issue is whether or not one should consider such 
variability (to the extent that it is present) as endogenous to the regulation of the 
labour market. For example, is temporary employment more common in the service 
sector because of some inherent characteristics of this sector (for example, high 
female employment rates), or is it the regulation of labour relations (e.g., fire-and-hire 
legislations) that allows this sector to make a more intensive use of temporary 
employment? 
Further, when assessing the degree of flexibility in a labour market, should 
one be interested in how things are (and thus use the raw, unadjusted figures), or 
should one account for the reasons as to why things are as they are (controlling for 
sectoral composition and the business cycle)? Although in our empirical investigation 
                                                 
104
 Despite that, using published national data on union density, data on union recognition from 
WIRS80 and WIRS84 and data on union membership from WIRS84, WIRS90, LFS89-91 and 
QLFS92-98, we constructed an extrapolated series of union density for the period 1979-1998, which 
we use in the empirical analysis.  
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we are, in fact, more interested in how things actually are, rather than how they would 
have been if all regions were homogenous, we decided to control most of our 
indicators for industrial composition (of employment). However, we did not control 
for occupational composition, because we thought that this was much less exogenous 
than industrial composition to the extent of labour market flexibility. We also made 
some adjustments based on the regional unemployment rates (deviations from the 
regional means) for some indicators for which there was evidence to suggest that they 
depend on the business cycle (for example, household relocation and within-jobs 
occupational mobility –see Evans, 1999).  
Another important issue we had to consider was our method to integrate the 
original information into the thirty-one detailed indicators and the eight broader 
categories. For example, as a measure of (flexibility in) temporary employment, we 
had two indicators available: share of temps to total employment and share of 
involuntary temping to total temporary employment. Is one indicator more important 
than the other? Should both be given the same weight? We decided that, given the 
lack of prior knowledge regarding the appropriate weights, using un-weighted 
averages was the best method. Hence we expressed all observations for all variables 
as percentages of their maximum values and then aggregated some indicators to 
obtain as many of the thirty-one indicators listed in Table 7.1 as possible. The 
indicators used are as follows. Work-time is a simple indicator, measuring the share of 
employees who are happy with their weekly hours of work and would not prefer to 
work much more or much less than their actual hours (for the going wage rate). 
Irregular hours is a composite indicator, being the un-weighted average of (i) the 
share of employees working variable hours, (ii) the share of average weekly overtime 
hours to the average weekly hours of normal work, and (iii) the share of unpaid 
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overtime to total overtime. Shift-work is simply the percentage of employees doing 
shifts. Correspondingly, weekends is the percentage of employees working during 
weekends. 
As stated earlier, part-time is the un-weighted average of (i) the share of part-
time to total employment and (ii) the share of part-timers stating that they would 
accept a full-time job if one was available (involuntary part-timing). In the same way, 
temping is the un-weighted average of (i) the share of temps to total employment and 
(ii) the share of involuntary temps to total temporary employment.  
The four remaining indicators corresponding to the “external numerical” 
category (dismissal and employment protection, home-working and alternative 
workers) were impossible to quantify in a meaningful way, because the only relevant 
source of information was the WIRS/WERS series. This meant that any time-series 
would have only four real observations (1980, 1984, 1990, 1998). So we decided not 
to use these indicators in the empirical analysis. The same problem arose with respect 
to the elements of internal functional flexibility. The only data constructed for this 
category is within-job mobility, measured as the number of employees who changed 
occupation over the last year while remaining with the same employer, as a share of 
all the employees who changed occupation in the same period. This variable has been 
adjusted for the business cycle, using the regional unemployment rate. 
In contrast, it was finally possible (against initial expectations) to obtain a 
reasonable panel of data for the replacement ratio (of the unemployment benefits). 
This was based on OECD data on national replacement ratios and on FES data on the 
characteristics of the average unemployed person and regional average wages. As 
with internal functional flexibility, most of the elements of flexibility in wage 
determination (wage bargaining and union power) were impossible to obtain for a 
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reasonably large panel, since the only source of information was again the 
WIRS/WERS series. However, we constructed an indicator of wage flexibility (wage 
elasticity of unemployment –see Appendix A.7.2 for details) and we obtained a 
measure of union density for the whole of our time-sample (1979-1998 –original data 
available for 1989-1998).  
Finally, data on mobility were in general much easier to obtain. Regional 
mobility is the share of gross migration flows to regional population, adjusted for the 
five-year average unemployment rate (to control for business cycle effects). Sectoral 
(occupational) mobility is the number of employees who changed industry 
(occupation) over the last year as a share of the total number of employees who 
changed job during the same period. Job mobility is an indicator measuring the 
average employment length in the region (in 8 intervals), adjusted for regional 
unemployment. Housing flexibility, finally, is the share of employees who changed 
address for a job-related reason to total employment, again, adjusted for regional 
unemployment.  
Two things must be mentioned here. First, the individual measures of labour 
market flexibility are not totally independent from one another. For example, wage 
flexibility should be higher -other things equal- in labour markets with low 
unionisation rates. Although this might lead to an overstatement of the degree of 
flexibility in more flexible labour markets, this should not be interpreted as a 
problem. The reason for this is effectively that the degree of correlation between 
different elements of flexibility is itself a measure of labour market flexibility. The 
second point refers to the measurement of the mobility indicators. Specifically, it is 
unavoidable that some double-counting will occur when we measure such aspects as 
regional and occupational mobility. Again, however, this is not a major problem for 
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the following reason. Even with double-counting, the obtained mobility measures will 
reflect the actual degree of flexibility in the movements of the labour force. If the 
empirical investigation referred to individuals, then measurement would be an 
important issue. But at the current level of aggregation, labour movements between 
regions and among occupations are neither substitutes nor complements. The method 
used in constructing the more aggregate indicators of flexibility (averaging) also 
further minimises any such measurement problems.  
Other difficulties were encountered with respect to the construction of the 
more aggregate indexes. As mentioned above, the aggregations should have the 
benefit of smoothing-away any errors in the data that are due to wrong (unnecessary) 
weighting or small sample size (in the calculation of the relevant regional shares). 
Since no prior knowledge was available regarding the significance of each element 
for the broader category to which it belonged, we did not weight the indicators when 
aggregating them. This should not be much of a problem. A potential source of 
serious bias, however, was in cases where some data were not available for all years. 
This was the case, for example, with external numerical flexibility. For the period 
1979-1982, the indicator is exclusively determined by the share of part-timing, due to 
data (un)availability. However, the trends of part-timing (across time and space) are 
rather different from those of temping. How could we calculate an unbiased measure 
of external numerical flexibility with missing values for temping if -for example- 
temping and part-timing were not highly correlated? The solution we reached was 
clearly a second-best one. Since a correct calculation would require data unavailable 
to us (and since ignoring the trends of temping would be as bad as miscounting 
them), we used a non-standard procedure that nevertheless has some intellectual 
merits. The procedure is based on weighting the available series with those 
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constructed with out-of-sample forecasting and is described in detail in Appendix 
A.7.3. We ended up with seven operational aggregate labour market flexibility 
indicators for a panel of 240 (12 x 20) observations. These indicators are: internal 
numerical flexibility, external numerical flexibility, internal functional flexibility, 
unemployment flexibility, wage flexibility, flexibility in wage bargaining and labour 
mobility. In the following section we present the cross-regional and over time 
variation of these indicators.  
 
7.3. The regional picture of labour market flexibility 
 As explained in the previous section, two sets of indicators of regional labour 
market flexibility have been produced. The first set includes the more detailed 
indexes, while the second attempts to measure more aggregate (and more 
theoretically based) indexes. We first present the detailed set of indexes, focusing on 
their evolution over time and across space and making some comparisons with 
published data available from other sources. A note has to be made, however, 
regarding such comparisons. Our indexes are adjusted for sectoral composition and 
(sometimes) the business cycle (i.e., unemployment) and do not correspond exactly to 
published figures.  
  
7.3.1. Some detailed indicators 
One of the indicators for which published data is most widely available is 
part-time employment. According to ONS figures, the share of part-timers to total 
employment in 1979 was around 18%. It grew quite steadily to 24.5% in 1997. In 
general, regional differences in part-time employment shares have remained stable 
since the early 1980s, but the ranking of regions according to this index has been 
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quite volatile over the last two decades. The same volatility is confirmed by our part-
time shares figures, which are adjusted for sectoral composition and show 
additionally a trend of (slow) regional convergence in the use of part-timers. Finally, 
our conditional part-time employment shares suggest that over the period 1979-1998 
part-time employment increased from 12.3% to 16% (unweighted cross-regional 
averages). Figure 7.1 presents the evolution of the adjusted part-time employment 
shares for three regional groupings: Northern Ireland, the South (East Anglia and 
South East including Greater London) and the rest of Britain.105 The evolution seems 
quite stable, with N. Ireland having a consistently higher use of full time 
employment.  
 The use of temporary employees (fixed-term contracts and seasonal 
employment) is again lower in N. Ireland than in the rest of the country (Figure 7.2). 
Temporary employment (adjusted for sectoral composition but not for the business 
cycle) was higher in periods of economic expansion in Britain (excluding N. Ireland), 
but the rest of the country shows some hysterisis in adjusting to the business cycle 
compared to the South.106  
 
                                                 
105
 Throughout the chapter, figures for these regional groupings are presented instead of the detailed 
data for the twelve UK regions. This was necessary for presentational reasons, as it would be 
impossible to present all of our figures for each single region (this would involve plotting around 200 
series). The regional groupings unavoidably hide some of the actual regional variation, but have been 
constructed in such a way so as to minimise this bias. The actual regional data for our final aggregate 
flexibility indexes are presented, for selected years, in Appendix A.7.4.  
106
 There is a strong case for not adjusting temporary employment shares with the unemployment rate. 
Because temporary employment contracts are often a form of hidden unemployment or 
underemployment (Boeri, 1999), these two measures must move in opposite directions. Hence 
adjustment would only eliminate the variation over time, rather than report more accurately the extent 
of flexibility in non-standard employment contracts.    
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Figure 7.1: Part-time employment shares  
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Figure 7.2: Temporary employment shares  
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Such hysterisis, however, should not be interpreted as a sign of labour market 
rigidities. Instead, it should be viewed as evidence of higher flexibility, as in the 
downturns the rest of the country seems to have lost more equal amounts of 
temporary and standard employment than the South, where a higher share of the 
employment loss came from the temporary sector. The ONS and ILO data of a 
(national) share of around 7% at the beginning and end of our sample period and of 
around 5% in the middle years compares well with our average adjusted figures of 
6.5% and 4.6% for the two periods, respectively. 
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Figure 7.3: Share of employees doing shifts 
10%
13%
16%
19%
22%
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
Rest South NI
 
 
The differences between our three regional groupings are clearer in the case of 
two elements of internal numerical flexibility, namely shift-work and weekend work. 
Northern Ireland and the South have much lower values compared to the rest of the 
country, especially for shift-work (Figure 7.3). According to our adjusted figures, 
11% (14%) of the employees were involved in shift-work in the mid-1980s (late 
1990s) in the South, compared to a 16% (20%) in the rest of the country.107 
Interesting the South and the rest of the country show no signs of convergence in their 
shares of shift-work. Rather, the two regional groups move in parallel, with the South 
having started from a much lower point. A more detailed look at each individual 
region reveals more information. In general, shift-work is more widespread in the 
northern regions of England and in Scotland and Wales. However, the sharpest 
increase over the period was experienced by East Anglia (from 11% to 18%).  
 
                                                 
107
 Remember that these figures are adjusted for sectoral composition and thus should be independent 
of the regional industrial structures.  
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Figure 7.4: Share of employees working on weekends 
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Figure 7.5: Sectoral and occupational mobility 
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The differences are less significant in the case of weekend work, with the 
corresponding values in the mid-1980s (late 1990s) being 40% (60%) in the South 
and 44% (66%) in the other regions (Figure 7.4). What is important to note there, 
though, is the sharp increase of weekend work throughout the country during the late 
1980s and early 1990s and the relative stabilisation thereafter.  
Unlike shift-work, the increase in weekend work was pretty much the same in 
all regions. This might seem to suggest that deregulation in this area (allowing 
Sunday trading) has been more successful, in the sense that flexibilisation was more 
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widespread and spatially even. This, of course, could be due to the specific demand 
and supply conditions in the labour markets rather than because of a more careful 
deregulation legislation (in accordance with our theoretical analysis of chapter five). 
But in the absence of an objective measure against which one could evaluate the 
effectiveness of policy measures, both possibilities could be equally plausible.   
Before we turn to the aggregate indicators, it is interesting to examine the 
evolution of sectoral and occupational mobility. As Figure 7.5 shows, occupational 
mobility (measured on the left vertical axis) has increased over time in all regions, 
despite relative stability during the period 1985-1992. In contrast, sectoral mobility 
(measured on the right vertical axis) seems to have declined sharply in the early 
1990s, although it rose again with the economic recovery of the mid-1990s. Both 
measures of labour mobility have been very similar in the South and the rest of the 
country throughout the years. The same inferences are made for occupational 
mobility (and slightly less so for sectoral mobility) when we look at the individual 
regions. However, since these figures may be highly affected by changes in 
unemployment (and the business cycle in general), it is not clear whether the 
identified trends, given their relative cyclicality, reflect changes over time (and 
differences across space) of economic opportunities or the impact of labour market 
deregulation.108  
 
  
                                                 
108
 We have not adjusted these figures for unemployment, as it was not clear whether this was 
necessary or even appropriate or just how the adjustment should be made. Specifically, according to 
some theoretical approaches (matching models of unemployment), labour mobility should increase 
when unemployment falls, as the probability of falling (and staying) into unemployment is lower and 
workers have a relatively higher expected payoff from searching for a different job. Alternative 
approaches, however, suggest that mobility might increase with the unemployment rate, as workers 
facing the threat of becoming (or remaining) unemployed are more willing to accept a job in a sector or 
occupation other than that of their expertise.  
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7.3.2. Aggregate indexes of regional labour market flexibility 
 Based on the regional labour market information we have collected, we 
created seven aggregate indexes. These are: internal numerical flexibility, external 
numerical flexibility, internal functional flexibility, wage flexibility, unemployment 
flexibility, wage bargaining flexibility and labour mobility. We also constructed an 
index of overall labour market flexibility based on these seven categories. Overall, 
eight aggregate indexes were thus created for the empirical analysis and are presented 
here. All the indexes are calculated as percentages of the highest value observed in 
the country (for a year- and region- specific observation).  
  
 Figure 7.6: Internal numerical flexibility 
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As already noted, internal numerical flexibility has been calculated on the 
basis of information about shift-work, work on weekends, overtime and workers’ 
preferences over their hours of work. Figure 7.6 presents the plots for our three broad 
regional groupings, for the period 1979-1998 (individual regional data are presented 
in Appendix A.7.4). According to our data, this element of flexibility has -as 
expected- increased over the last two decades. This increase is more remarkable in the 
South (by 50% in 20 years) and is mostly attributable to East Anglia, which had the 
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most rigid labour market in terms of internal numerical flexibility in 1979. In the late 
1990s, Greater London exhibited the highest rigidities in this respect, while the most 
flexible regional labour markets were those of Scotland and the North. Although 
flexibility was rather high in the early 1980s in N. Ireland, Figure 7.6 suggests that 
this region has diverged from the rest of the country. In contrast, disparities in 
internal numerical flexibility between the South and the other regions have been 
declining at least until the mid 1990s. The same trend is observed when examining 
the individual regions of Britain (see Appendix A.7.4). 
 A rather similar picture is observed for the case of external numerical 
flexibility (part-timing and temping). The South seems to converge with the rest of 
Britain, while flexibility in N. Ireland seems to remain lower throughout the period. 
In the 1990s, the South is effectively identical to the other regions. Unlike the case of 
internal numerical flexibility, though, in this case convergence seems to have been 
facilitated not only by a faster increase in the South but also by the relative stability 
throughout the rest of the country (Figure 7.7).  
 
 Figure 7.7: External numerical flexibility 
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 Figure 7.8: Numerical flexibility (overall) 
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Figure 7.8 presents the evolution for overall numerical flexibility. There is a 
clear trend of the South converging towards the rest of the country in the 1990s. 
Specifically, while in the 1980s numerical flexibility in the South was practically in 
line with that of N. Ireland, in the 1990s the South moved much closer to the other 
British regions, while N. Ireland experienced minor increases in numerical flexibility. 
On the other hand, N. Ireland has experienced a dramatic increase in internal 
functional flexibility during the 1990s (Figure 7.9). This element of flexibility in N. 
Ireland doubled between 1979 and 1992, but increased by five times in the period 
1992-1998. On the contrary, internal functional flexibility in Britain, while increasing 
during the 1980s, followed a declining path during the 1990s. Regional differences 
(in Britain) in internal functional flexibility do not seem to be significant.  
The evolution of internal functional flexibility in the UK results in a picture of 
overall internal flexibility that is quite different from what we saw with respect to 
overall numerical flexibility (Figure 7.10). Internal flexibility increased evenly across 
space in the UK during the 1980s. In the 1990s, however, it remained stable (if not 
declined) in Britain, while it increased dramatically in N. Ireland. Unfortunately we 
could not collect data on external functional flexibility to see whether the sharp 
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increase of the internal element in N. Ireland during the 1990s has been 
complemented by a possible decline in external functional flexibility. This 
relationship of substitutability seems possible, especially given the relative 
substitutability between internal and external numerical flexibility (compare N. 
Ireland in Figures 7.6 - 7.8). Without information on elements of external functional 
flexibility, it is not possible to infer on the evolution of flexibility in the labour input, 
on aggregate. However, it seems safe to conclude that during the last two decades 
flexibility in the labour input has increased in the UK, although this increase is mostly 
attributable to the increase in numerical flexibility in the South and functional 
flexibility in N. Ireland. 
The next three indicators (flexibility in wages, unemployment benefits and 
wage bargaining) refer to the determination of labour costs. Wage flexibility (with 
respect to unemployment) has been relatively stable across regions and over time, 
with an average value for the UK as a whole of –0.20 (t-statistic in the pooled 
regression -3.005). According to our first measure of regional wage flexibility (see 
Appendix A.7.2), wage flexibility has been highest in the South and lowest in N. 
Ireland. According to our second measure, cross-regional variations were much less 
clear. Both measures, however, show evidence of further convergence in the 1990s. 
Figure 7.11 presents the mean value of the two measures of wage flexibility. 
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 Figure 7.9: Internal functional flexibility 
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 Figure 7.10: Internal flexibility (overall) 
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 As with wage flexibility, unemployment flexibility (effectively, the inverse of 
the real replacement ratio of unemployment benefits) has been highest in the South 
and lowest in N. Ireland throughout the period (Figure 7.12). Despite the difference in 
their levels, however, the movement of unemployment flexibility in the three broad 
regions is almost perfectly identical. Given the way that this variable was constructed, 
it is evident that this homogeneity is due to the fact that there is significantly little 
variation in the characteristics of the average unemployed person across regions over 
time. But it is important to note here the implications of what is presented in Figure 
Ch.7: Flexibility in the UK regions  
 
242
7.12. If unemployment flexibility is consistently lower outside the South and if 
policy-makers believe that unemployment flexibility is essential for lowering 
unemployment, then it is clear that a regionally-differentiated rather than a flat 
national replacement ratio (with lower unemployment benefits in low-wage regions) 
is the optimal policy measure.   
 
 Figure 7.11: Wage flexibility (overall) 
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 Figure 7.12: Unemployment flexibility 
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 Figure 7.13: Wage bargaining flexibility 
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 Figure 7.14: Flexibility in wage determination 
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 The last measure of flexibility in wage determination is flexibility in the wage 
bargaining processes. As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, it was impossible to 
construct a consistent time-series of regional data for union power and the 
centralisation of wage bargaining. Hence the measure of wage bargaining flexibility 
presented in Figure 7.13 is effectively the inverse of the constructed series for union 
density. As with the other measures of this category, flexibility in wage bargaining 
has been consistently higher in the South (and lower in N. Ireland), despite our 
controls for sectoral composition. Like unemployment flexibility, it has increased 
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over time in all regions. The increase has been faster outside the South and so real 
convergence has occurred. Comparing the trends across the 12 regions, the coefficient 
of variation for this index has more than halved in the 20 years of our sample, while 
the rank correlation between the regional figures of wage bargaining flexibility for 
1979-1981 and 1996-1998 is 0.98.  
 The aggregate picture of overall flexibility in the determination of wages 
shows a clear increasing trend over time (Figure 7.14). Additionally, it offers strong 
evidence of convergence among all the UK regions. The South, however, has 
consistently higher levels of this element of flexibility. This finding is in contrast to 
what we observed for the case of flexibility in the labour input and, more specifically, 
for numerical flexibility. The extent to which this reflects a wider pattern that can be 
explained by other factors (e.g., labour shortages in the South or regional differences 
in the technology of production) is not known.  
 
 Figure 7.15: Labour mobility 
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 The last aggregate measure we have identified is labour mobility, which 
consists of sectoral, occupational and regional mobility and length of job tenure. 
Figure 7.15 presents this measure, again for the three broad regions. The picture we 
Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Economic Performance 
 
245
obtain most resembles that for the evolution of flexibility in the labour input, as 
shown in Figures 7.6 - 7.10. The South seems to converge slowly with the rest of 
Britain, while N. Ireland seems to follow a different trend. However, there is also a 
similarity with the behaviour of flexibility in labour costs (wage determination): the 
South has been more flexible throughout the period of study. Overall, one cannot 
identify any major changes in labour mobility over the last two decades. For most of 
the regions labour mobility was higher in the late 1980s and 1990s, but the cyclicality 
identified in Figure 7.5 with respect to sectoral and occupational mobility remains 
here for the overall measure.  
 
7.3.3. Overall labour market flexibility in the UK regions 
 In retrospect, labour market flexibility in the UK regions seems to have 
followed a consistent upward path across all regions. Regional differences exist, but 
in most of the cases we observe at least some convergence (although in many respects 
N. Ireland is an outlier). The main source of difference in flexibility is between its 
different elements, rather than across regions.    
At first it might seem difficult to combine all the information reviewed above 
into one index. It might seem likely that -exactly because of the variation in the 
evolution of the more detailed indexes- a comprehensive index of labour market 
flexibility would eliminate most of the information our indexes offer. However, the 
evolution of the aggregate index of labour market flexibility (Figure 7.16) reflects in 
a surprisingly clear way what one would have expected.  
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Figure 7.16: Flexibility in the regional labour markets (UK, 1979-1998) 
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 Following labour market deregulation in the early 1980s, labour market 
flexibility increased throughout the period. The increase was faster the lower the 
initial levels of flexibility in a region. Hence, overall labour market flexibility 
increased less in the South (by around 10% between 1980 and 1998) than in the rest 
of Britain (around 12.5% in the same period) and much faster in N. Ireland (around 
32.5%). This has resulted in a substantial decline in the regional variation of labour 
market flexibility. The UK regional labour markets seem to have a much more 
uniform set of institutions and labour relations by the late 1990s compared to the 
situation twenty years earlier. We further investigate this question, in a more formal 
way, in the next section.  
 
7.4. The evolution of flexibility in time and space 
 The previous section offered a detailed presentation of labour market 
flexibility and its evolution over time and across space for the UK and its regions. In 
some cases, inferences were made about the evolution of regional disparities in 
specific elements of labour market flexibility. We extend this discussion in the next 
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section, by performing a more formal analysis of convergence. Furthermore, we relate 
this analysis to the discussion of chapter six, where specific assumptions were made 
about the evolution of labour market flexibility.  
 
7.4.1. The research hypotheses 
 As discussed stringently in chapter six, labour market deregulation was 
considered especially in the 1980s as a complementary policy tool for regional 
economic convergence (DTI, 1983). Economic orthodoxy supports this view, as it 
suggests that the removal of wage rigidities and binding employment contracts allows 
wages and labour costs to fall to their market clearing levels. In backward regions 
with high rates of unemployment and low productivity, this translates into a larger 
decline in labour costs and hence faster economic growth. Apparently, the more 
intensive the deregulation of labour relations, the faster (and more likely) the 
convergence of regional economies. To test the empirical validity of these views, we 
consider here the spatial distribution of labour market flexibility and its evolution 
over time, relating labour market flexibility to the level of regional disparities in per 
capita output. We first examine the extent to which changes in labour market 
flexibility over the period 1979-1998 have been spatially uneven. We then relate this 
evolution to three theoretical assumptions: that, following a spatially uniform (nation-
wide) deregulation programme, flexibility (i) increased more “where most needed”, 
that is, in the most backward regions; (ii) increased more “where most likely”, that is, 
in the regions with the least flexible labour relations at the beginning of the period; 
(iii) increased randomly, that is, without a systematic spatial pattern.  
Understandably, these three assumptions have very different implications for 
the role of labour market deregulation and flexibility on regional convergence and, 
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thus, regional and national economic performance. Take the example of deregulation 
in employment contracts. According to the first assumption, firms in backward 
regions will make more extensive use of casual employment to compensate for their 
low profitability. This will generate faster employment growth in these regions 
(relative to the more prosperous ones –other things equal) and foster regional 
convergence. According to the second assumption, however, whether firms in a 
region will make more use of casual employment will not depend on the region’s 
economic position, but rather on the initial level of flexibility in its labour market. 
The argument is that, with deregulation, flexibility increases faster in the more rigid 
labour markets, with the implication that deregulation generates regional convergence 
in the levels of flexibility. To the extent that labour market flexibility ameliorates 
economic performance, this will further lead to convergence in economic outcomes. 
Finally, the third assumption states that changes in labour market flexibility need not 
have any (systematic) spatial variation and, hence, that the regional equilibria will not 
be altered by changes in the regulation of labour relations or the flexibility of labour 
markets.  
 
7.4.2. Convergence and divergence in flexibility and incomes 
 In this sub-section we undertake a formal investigation of the relationship 
between labour market flexibility and the growth of flexibility and incomes at the 
regional level, in accordance with the three hypotheses presented above. The first of 
these hypotheses suggested that flexibility growth is faster in backward regions. The 
second related flexibility growth to the initial levels of flexibility. We first look at the 
second hypothesis, examining whether the UK regions have converged in terms of 
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labour market flexibility over the two decades of our analysis and of labour market 
deregulation.  
One way of looking into this question is by using the concept of sigma-
convergence. Figures 7.17-7.19 plot the evolution of the standard deviation of three 
measures of flexibility over the two decades of our analysis. Figure 7.17 clearly 
shows that regional dispersions in labour-input flexibility have followed an upward 
trend, despite being rather cyclical. This trend was mainly determined by the 
behaviour of internal flexibility, as dispersions in external numerical flexibility have 
been rather constant.109 Figure 7.18 presents the evolution of regional dispersions in 
the flexibility of wage determination. This time the plot shows clear sigma-
convergence, with the implication that, following deregulation, the UK regions made 
a more even use of flexible patterns of wage determination. Overall, regional labour 
market flexibility dispersions have declined, especially after the mid-1980s (Figure 
7.19).  
 
Figure 7.17: Regional dispersions in labour-input flexibility 
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109
 Flexibility in the labour input has been calculated as the average of numerical (internal plus 
external) and internal functional flexibility.  
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Figure 7.18: Regional dispersions in flexibility in wage determination 
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Figure 7.19: Regional dispersions in overall labour market flexibility 
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An alternative way to look at these issues is by examining beta-convergence 
(Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995). Table 7.2 presents the results obtained from some 
unconditional convergence regressions on our main labour market flexibility 
indicators. Three regressions are presented for each measure of flexibility. The first 
regression from each triplet tests the unconditional beta-convergence hypothesis, 
which corresponds to our second research hypothesis.   
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Table 7.2: Regional convergence and divergence in labour market flexibility 
Dependent variable (growth) Constant Initial level of flexibility Initial GDP pc R-squared 
 Internal Numerical Flexibility 
 
0.063 (3.47) -0.071 (-2.57) - 0.40 
0.066 (2.51) -0.071 (-2.44) -3.6e-07 (-0.18) 0.40 
0.014 (0.74) - 3.2e-07 (0.14) 0.002 
 External Numerical Flexibility 
 
0.060 (5.61) -0.082 (-4.92) - 0.71 
0.009 (0.41) -0.074 (-5.50) 5.9e-06 (2.73) 0.84 
-0.060 (-1.82) - 8.6e-07 (2.08) 0.30 
 Total Numerical Flexibility 
 
0.055 (4.44) -0.061 (-3.46) - 0.54 
0.029 (1.39) -0.055 (-3.21) 2.8e-06 (1.54) 0.64 
-0.020 (-1.06) - 4.2e-06 (1.72) 0.23 
 Internal Functional Flexibility 
 
0.246 (5.11) -1.844 (-4.78) - 0.70 
0.417 (5.56) -1.441 (-4.23) -0.00003 (-2.65) 0.83 
0.400 (3.24) - -0.00005 (-3.09) 0.49 
 Total Internal Flexibility 
 
0.112 (2.49) -0.211 (-2.08) - 0.30 
0.186 (5.60) -0.195 (-3.09) -0.00001 (-4.12) 0.76 
0.104 (3.85) - -0.00001 (-3.17) 0.50 
 Wage Flexibility 
 
0.021 (6.03) -0.023 (-6.03) - 0.78 
0.022 (5.93) -0.030 (-3.80) 5.9e-07 (1.00) 0.81 
0.011 (3.12) - -1.4e-06 (-3.12) 0.49 
 Labour Mobility 
 
-0.046 (-3.10) 0.061 (3.25) - 0.51 
-0.046 (-2.78) 0.060 (2.16) 1.5e-08 (0.01) 0.51 
-0.030 (-1.75) - 4.1e-06 (1.88) 0.26 
 Unemployment Flexibility 
 
0.022 (3.82) -0.019 (-2.80) - 0.44 
0.028 (3.84) -0.030 (-2.82) 3.8e-07 (1.33) 0.53 
0.008 (4.40) - -2.6e-07 (-1.15) 0.12 
 Wage-Bargaining Flexibility 
 
0.051 (22.16) -0.051 (-13.31) - 0.95 
0.041 (7.88) -0.056 (-13.10) 1.6e-06 (1.96) 0.96 
0.060 (2.79) - -4.9e-06 (-1.82) 0.25 
 Overall Flexibility 
 
0.043 (4.26) -0.043 (-3.36) - 0.53 
0.041 (3.58) -0.036 (-1.66) -4.5e-07 (-0.39) 0.54 
0.024 (4.07) - -1.9e-06 (-2.57) 0.40 
Note: All regressions have been estimated with OLS. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Clearly, for all measures of flexibility except labour mobility, there is strong 
evidence of unconditional beta-convergence.110 The fit of the regressions is 
sufficiently high and all coefficients are significant at any conventional level of 
significance. The results are robust to the inclusion of the initial level of real output 
                                                 
110
 This does not contradict the finding of sigma-divergence in labour-input flexibility of Figure 7.17. 
The inconsistency between the two findings suggests that the previously more rigid regional labour 
markets have now become the more flexible ones. This is in line with our discussion of Figures 7.6-
7.10. When we rerun these regressions excluding Northern Ireland, the results were largely the same. 
However, there was no evidence of convergence in unemployment flexibility and labour mobility 
across the British regions. This further resulted in a weakening of the significance of the convergence 
effect for the un-weighted measure of overall flexibility.  
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per capita output, which can serve as a control for conditional convergence (second 
regression in each triplet). Despite the fact that the inclusion of this variable increases 
the fit of many of the regressions, the estimated beta-coefficients are largely 
unaffected. It is rather safe, then, to conclude that over the twenty-year-period labour 
relations in the UK regions became more flexible and more so in the more inflexible 
regions, resulting in real convergence in labour market flexibility.111   
 The third regression corresponding to each measure of flexibility tests the 
“where most needed” hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, one would expect that 
labour market flexibility would advance faster in the more backward regions, i.e., the 
regions with the lowest levels of GDP per capita. The evidence obtained from this set 
of regressions is not as straightforward as in the previous case. Overall labour market 
flexibility has grown faster in less favoured regions. Figure 7.20 reveals a significant 
positive relationship between growth of overall labour market flexibility and output 
growth. Similarly, Figure 7.21 reveals a negative relationship between flexibility 
growth and the initial levels of regional output.  
 Nevertheless, the results presented in Table 7.2 suggest that this pattern is 
mostly related to three specific elements of labour market flexibility, namely internal 
functional flexibility, wage flexibility and flexibility in wage determination (trade 
unionism). In contrast to this pattern, external numerical flexibility and labour 
mobility seem to have grown faster in the more developed regions of the UK, while 
for elements like internal numerical flexibility and unemployment flexibility there is 
no evidence of a relationship between level of development and growth of flexibility 
in the labour market.  
                                                 
111
 We need to note here, however, that important reservations to the concept of beta-convergence have 
been expressed in the literature (see Quah, 1996; Cheshire and Magrini, 2000), reducing the 
confidence one can have in using this analytical tool.  
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Figure 7.20: Flexibility growth and regional GDP growth 
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Figure 7.21: Flexibility growth and regional GDP 
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 This finding gives some support to the third hypothesis, that of a random 
increase of labour market flexibility across space. Although one cannot draw firm 
conclusions and confidently approve one hypothesis over another, we think that the 
results obtained in Table 7.2 suggest that the cross-regional patterns of change in 
labour market flexibility are not universal for all of its elements. Specifically, some 
elements of flexibility, probably those related mostly to direct labour costs, show 
signs of regional convergence, in the sense that backward regions make increasingly 
more use of such forms of flexible labour relations.  
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In contrast, elements of flexibility related mostly to labour demand seem to 
have increased faster in more advanced regions. Although the finding regarding 
overall flexibility apparently supports the conventional policy view of deregulation 
fostering regional convergence, the findings obtained for the more detailed indexes 
are more compatible with institutional explanations regarding the social structure of 
economic behaviour. From such a perspective, it could be argued that labour market 
deregulation has allowed more advanced regions to adopt more flexible forms of 
labour use, while for more backward regions deregulation only facilitated the 
compression of labour compensation, thus reducing labour costs. The extent to which 
this was a necessary condition for the less favoured regions to catch up to the more 
advanced ones, is a question that the analysis performed here cannot answer.  
 
7.4.3. Labour market flexibility and regional economic dispersions 
 One way of obtaining insights into this issue is to assess empirically the role 
that changes in labour market flexibility and its regional variation had on regional 
dispersions in economic aggregates. If the differences in the patterns of regional 
evolution for the various elements of labour market flexibility are systematic -if in 
other words the scenario of deregulation leading backward regions to choose the 
“wrong” elements of flexibility is correct- then the empirical analysis should reveal 
an insignificant or a positive relationship between regional economic dispersions and 
labour market flexibility. For the regional convergence hypothesis to hold, it should 
be that regions converge with labour market deregulation and, consequently, with 
enhanced labour market flexibility.  
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Table 7.3.: The impact of flexibility on regional disparities 
Variables Unemploy
ment 
Real 
wages 
Empl. 
growth 
Empl/pop 
ratio 
GDP pc 
growth 
Invesment Prod/vity 
Constant -2.417 
(-1.30) 
-9.970 
(-0.28) 
0.218 
(0.43) 
0.099 
(1.04) 
0.006 
(0.05) 
-1322.77 
(-0.88) 
7.569 
(0.81) 
Lag of 
dependent 
0.614 
(4.09) 
0.094 
(0.26) 
-0.093 
(-0.35) 
0.215 
(1.08) 
0.331 
(1.29) 
0.424 
(1.89) 
0.146 
(0.60) 
Flex. in 
labour input  
5.105 
(1.27) 
-36.829 
(-0.90) 
0.310 
(0.52) 
-0.349 
(-2.87) 
0.178 
(1.17) 
928.43 
(0.59) 
-26.612 
(-2.13) 
Flex. in wage 
determination 
4.767 
(1.87) 
17.303 
(0.34) 
-0.263 
(-0.41) 
0.250 
(2.24) 
-0.054 
(-0.31) 
754.68 
(0.38) 
15.945 
(1.48) 
Flex. in wage 
bargaining  
-5.449 
(-2.98) 
41.090 
(2.08) 
-0.187 
(-0.72) 
-0.096 
(-1.88) 
-0.066 
(-1.06) 
1459.30 
(1.87) 
-4.725 
(-1.10) 
R-squared 0.93 0.51 0.05 0.88 0.35 0.76 0.74 
Heterosk/city 1.39 
0.24 
0.02 
0.89 
7.09 
0.01 
1.67 
0.20 
2.17 
0.14 
0.35 
0.56 
0.87 
0.35 
DW 1.84 2.01 1.98 1.82 2.35 1.77 1.67 
Notes: All regressions have been estimated using OLS. t-statistics in parentheses, probability levels in 
Italics. Heteroskedasticity is the Cook-Weisberg chi-square test. DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic.  
 
 Table 7.3 presents a set of regressions for the standard deviation of our main 
economic indicators, namely unemployment, employment growth, the employment-
population ratio, wages, investment, per capita output growth and productivity. Each 
dependent variable is regressed on the weighted (national) averages of three 
aggregated elements of labour market flexibility (flexibility in labour input, flexibility 
in wage determination and trade unionism).112 A lagged term of the dependent 
variable is also included in each regression to control for the possible non-stationarity 
of our series.113 Despite their simplicity, the performance of the regressions is very 
good. The fit of the regressions ranges from satisfactory (wages and GDP growth) to 
rather high. With the exception of the employment growth regression, the assumption 
of homoskedastic residuals cannot be rejected at any acceptable level of significance.  
 
                                                 
112
 We used these aggregations mainly in order to avoid problems of collinearity. Qualitatively, the 
results presented here are similar to those that we obtained using the more detailed indexes in 
backward selection regressions. 
113
 Due to the relatively small sample size of these time-series regressions, we avoided using more 
advanced time-series econometric methods and testing for unit roots and co-integration. The AR1 
specification, however, should correct much of the resulting bias in our estimates.  
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Further, in most of the cases the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that there is no 
serial autocorrelation in the residuals. The AR1 coefficients are rarely significant 
(only for unemployment and, less so, for investment), suggesting that non-stationarity 
is not a serious problem.  
As the results show, there is little evidence to support that increases in labour 
market flexibility are related to a narrowing of regional economic dispersions. Of the 
twenty-one flexibility coefficients that we estimated, only ten are negative and, of 
them, only four are significant. On the other hand, only another four coefficients are 
positive and significant at the 10% level. Flexibility in the labour input seems to have 
helped narrow regional dispersions in productivity and labour force participation. In 
the same way, the decline of trade unionism seems to have caused regional 
convergence in labour force participation and unemployment, although it helped to 
widen regional wage inequalities. In contrast, flexibility in wage determination has 
had the opposite effect, increasing regional disparities in unemployment rates and 
labour force participation. Overall, these results seem to offer stronger support to the 
first rather than to the second scenario, as explained above. This is a surprising 
rejection of the assumptions of regional policy, especially as the main benefits of 
labour market deregulation are expected to arise from enhanced wage flexibility, 
which we have found to be the element most strongly related to regional divergence. 
In light of these findings, it seems that regional specialisation in specific elements of 
flexibility (cluster convergence) than general convergence in the levels of flexibility 
is what characterised the UK and its regions over the last two decades.  
In the next section we review the evolution of some main economic 
aggregates for the regional economies of the UK over the period 1979-1998. The 
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discussion will focus mainly on the issue of regional disparities and on the relation 
between the evolution of the economic and labour market flexibility indicators. 
 
7.5. The regional economic performance of the UK, 1979-1998 
The 1980s and 1990s is a rather heterogeneous period in terms of both 
regional and national economic performance. The period begins with a serious 
recession in 1979-1982, followed by a period of recovery, while a new recession 
occurs in the early 1990s. Since then, economic recovery has been fast and a good 
economic performance has been sustained. However, regional economic performance 
has not been uniform. Although it can be argued that in many respects the UK regions 
behave like mini-economies with a common business cycle (Duranton and 
Monastiriotis, 2000), as the discussion of this section reveals, there are important 
differences over time and across space.  
One of the most important indicators of economic performance is 
unemployment. Unemployment in the UK has followed a cyclical path, with low 
values in the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s and high values in the mid 1980s and 
1990s. Consistent with the mini-economies hypothesis, this business cycle was 
followed by all regions (Martin, 1997). Regional unemployment shows some 
remarkable persistence in that regional rankings in terms of unemployment rates 
remain stable despite changes in average unemployment rates. The most significant 
exception is Greater London, which had the lowest unemployment rate in the early 
1980s but one of the highest unemployment rates in the mid-1990s. Figure 7.22 
presents regional unemployment rates for our three broad regions. Northern Ireland 
and the non-South regions of Britain have historically higher unemployment rates 
than the South. Figure 7.22 suggests that in the 1990s there was a trend towards 
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regional convergence in unemployment rates. However, this convergence was due to 
the much faster increase in unemployment in the South, rather than to a decline in 
unemployment rates in the rest of the country (Armstrong and Blackaby, 1998). It is 
also interesting to note that regional dispersions in long-term unemployment rates 
have remained rather stable until at least the early 1990s (Martin, 1993a). 
The evidence of slow convergence observed in Figure 7.22 can also be 
contradicted when taking a more careful look at regional disparities in unemployment 
rates. Figure 7.23 presents two measures of regional disparities. The right vertical 
axis measures the coefficient of variation (controlling for average unemployment 
rates), while the left vertical axis measures the standard deviation of regional 
unemployment rates. Although the evolution of the standard deviation measure 
indicates regional convergence in the early 1990s, as the evolution of the coefficient 
of variation illustrates, regional disparities in unemployment rates have steadily 
increased since the mid-1990s.114 Moreover, regional convergence was occurring in 
the early and mid-1980s, despite the overall increase in unemployment rates.  
 
 Figure 7.22: Regional unemployment 
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114
 Such an evolution was accurately predicted by some authors in the early 1990s (for example, 
Wilkinson, 1992 and Martin, 1993b).  
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Figure 7.23: Regional disparities in unemployment rates (12 regions) 
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 The same period (the 1980s) was also one of regional convergence in real 
wages. Since then, however, real wage disparities have increased and this trend 
continues today. This was mainly due to the South experiencing faster wage growth 
rates and house price inflation in the 1990s than the rest of Britain (especially 
between 1989 and 1993). N. Ireland, however, converged to the British real wages, 
experiencing a remarkable real wage growth in the period 1983-1993 (Figure 7.24).  
 
 Figure 7.24: Regional real wages  
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When looking at wage disparities, though, one has to note the following. 
Regional disparities in real wages form a very small component of overall wage 
inequalities in the UK. Most of the wage inequalities are located within regions and 
relate to individual earnings. As we have shown elsewhere (Monastiriotis, 2000), the 
vast increase in cross-personal wage inequalities has been due to a widening in wage 
differentials across occupations. Cross-regional differences in within-regions wage 
inequalities have declined over the last two decades, thanks both to a convergence in 
the price of human capital characteristics and of the distribution of these 
characteristics across regions. Duranton and Monastiriotis (2000) have shown that the 
wide increase in cross-personal wage dispersions over the period 1982-1997 has been 
mainly due to the very substantial increase of the returns to education over the period. 
Regional convergence in educational attainment rates has helped contain much of the 
increase within regions.  
 As Figure 7.24 shows, regional performance in terms of real wages is slightly 
less uniform than that of unemployment rates. The same is true for the cross-regional 
evolution of real productivity (real output per employee). The evolution of real 
productivity across regions strongly resembles that of real wages, with all regions 
experiencing real productivity gains in the 1990s (Figure 7.25). N. Ireland is again the 
exception, experiencing productivity growth in the period 1983-1993. After the early 
1990s regional disparities in real productivity have increased in Britain, as the South 
overtook the rest of the country in terms of productivity levels. The highest rates of 
productivity growth are observed in Greater London. The relation between 
productivity and wages has remained fairly stable since the mid-1980s in all regions. 
Nevertheless, the South has consistently higher wages -relative to productivity- than 
the rest of Britain, while N. Ireland is again at a much lower equilibrium. 
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 Figure 7.25: Regional real productivity  
15
18
21
24
27
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
Rest South NI
 
  
Figure 7.26: Growth rate of regional real per capita output 
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 Figure 7.27: Regional employment growth  
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As expected, there is little difference between the evolution of real 
productivity and the real per capita regional GDP (thereafter RGDRPpc). Compared 
to the rest of the UK regions, the South has consistently higher levels of RGDRPpc 
(with the exception of the period 1988-1991). However, one important difference is 
that the picture of RGDRPpc in N. Ireland is somewhat less impressive than that of 
real productivity, compared to Britain. This in effect is due to N. Ireland having 
significantly higher inactivity rates than Britain. Noticeable differences in 
employment-to-population ratios also exist between the South and the rest of Britain. 
 In Figure 7.26 we present the evolution of the growth rate of RGDRPpc, again 
for the three broad regions. Interestingly, the South performed worse in this measure 
during most of the 1980s, while it is also the region most hit by the 1990 recession. In 
contrast, N. Ireland was almost unaffected by this recession, a fact consistent with the 
more general conclusion that the degree of integration of this economy to the British 
economy is relatively small. Recovery, however, after the early 1990s was faster in 
the South, resulting in a widening of regional income disparities. These disparities 
have remained relatively constant since then. The evolution of regional employment 
growth is much more even, especially since the mid-1980s (Figure 7.27). In the 
1980s, employment grew faster in the South (which was also less severely hit by the 
1979-1982 recession). The early 1990s recession, however, resulted in greater 
employment losses in the South than in the rest of the country.115 For the second half 
of the 1990s employment grew faster in N. Ireland, but the South experienced almost 
identical rates of employment growth to the rest of Britain.     
                                                 
115
 This recession was not only felt most severely in the South, but it was also rather specific to the 
service sector. Martin (1993a) notes that “collectively, the northern regions of the UK actually 
experienced a slight rise in service employment over the recession” (p.800).  
Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Economic Performance 
 
263
 
7.6. Concluding remarks 
 Economic performance in the regions of the UK has in many respects 
followed that of the UK as a whole. Regional disparities in economic aggregates exist 
and in some cases have increased over the last two decades, although evidence of real 
convergence, especially in the economic characteristics of the regions (e.g., returns to 
education and employment-population rates) rather than in regional economic 
outcomes (e.g., productivity and incomes) has also been offered in the literature 
(Duranton and Monastiriotis, 2000). Overall economic performance at the end of the 
period under consideration has been satisfactory, with real productivity gains, 
increasing incomes and declining unemployment.  
 We could argue that this relative homogeneity in regional economic 
performance was accompanied by relative homogeneity in the evolution of regional 
labour market flexibility. According to our overall flexibility measure, labour market 
flexibility increased in all regions by approximately the same amount. N. Ireland has 
a much more rigid labour market, but the differences between the South and the rest 
of Britain have, if anything, declined. Convergence, although slow, has been 
observed in the cases of flexibility in the determination of wages, in labour mobility 
and in some elements of labour input flexibility. From this viewpoint it might not 
seem clear why a regional economic analysis of labour market flexibility is of 
substantial importance. If all regions follow a common path in both their labour 
market regulation (and actual flexibility) and their labour market performance, then 
the relationship between these two aggregates can plausibly be investigated in a 
national-level study without any loss of information.  
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Although such arguments are undoubtedly important, our discussion revealed 
that, despite their common evolution over time, there do exist rather persistent 
regional differences in the degrees and types of labour market flexibility. As we noted 
in section 7.4, the South of Britain seems to have higher levels of wage flexibility and 
flexibility in the mobility of labour compared to the rest of the country. Conversely, 
flexibility is higher in the rest of Britain in terms of the adjustability of labour inputs. 
So, rather than the South being more flexible than the rest of Britain, it is likely that 
different regions within the country utilise different forms of labour market 
flexibility. It would be very fruitful for further research to explore this issue and 
attempt to attribute specific developments of labour market flexibility to specific 
labour market (economic) and wider social conditions and historic characteristics.  
The present study does not directly examine these specificities. However, it 
uses the regional-level information to investigate the relationship between flexibility 
and economic performance controlling for these specificities. Using regional panel 
data, this is done for a large number of observations within a national economy, thus 
achieving a more homogenous environment of political and labour market regulation 
developments. Further, the regional-level analysis allows us to investigate and control 
for spatial dependence in the form of spatial autocorrelation. This can be particularly 
important if the identifiable qualitative differences across regions in labour market 
flexibility are producing cross-regional divisions and dependencies, which can affect 
overall (national) economic performance in ways that the national-level analysis 
cannot identify and measure.  
The relevance of our analysis here (in terms of the regional picture of labour 
market flexibility) to the topic of chapter six and our prior expectations of the 
regional differences in labour market flexibility should not go unmentioned. In 
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chapter six we claimed that common (national) deregulation policies might produce 
different levels of labour market flexibility across regions, with potentially different 
economic effects. Despite the relatively common regional trends identified in this 
chapter, regional differences were also found, mainly in levels of flexibility. More 
importantly, it is plausible that such differences are structural, in that regions of 
different economic (and social) structures differ in their intensity of use of the various 
forms of flexible labour relations. We interpret this as evidence supporting the 
validity and suitability of our regional approach. The econometric investigation of the 
next chapter (with its focus on regional fixed and random effects and on regional 
autocorrelation) will provide more information about the specific cross-regional 
dynamics generated by such structural differences.  
 Before closing this chapter, it is necessary that we discuss a last but very 
important issue. The empirical analysis presented in chapter eight and the discussions 
of the present chapter are based on a panel (cross-regional time-series) dataset of 
labour market flexibility indicators that we constructed from various sources of 
survey and published data. The construction of these indicators was not a simple task, 
nor was it problem-free. Unavoidably, in many respects the indicators reflect the 
subjectivity of the author. This is true for our selection of indicators, as well as for the 
categorisation of those indicators (although the latter is based on the relevant 
literature). Subjectivity is also involved in the technical decisions regarding the 
construction of the indexes (weighting, adjustments, etc.). In general, it could be 
argued that the quality of the indexes presented here needs to be proved before any 
inferences derived from the empirical analysis can be considered.  
Unfortunately, there is little empirical work on the measurement of labour 
market flexibility against which to test the quality of our indexes. Among the few 
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relevant attempts (always at the national scale), the ILO (for example, ILO, 1999) and 
OECD indexes (as used in the empirical work of chapter four) are the most detailed 
and consistent over time. These, however, are simply comparative rather than 
absolute measures and so do not permit comparisons between them. They also have 
limited reference to the seven theory-related categories of labour market flexibility 
presented above. Other studies (e.g., Burchell et al., 1999, based on the Job Insecurity 
and Work Intensification Survey) are grounded on micro-level information, which 
cannot be used in economy-wide studies and, more importantly, cannot be utilised for 
the evaluation of the indexes produced here. Finally, since the late 1990s the ONS 
produces a relatively consistent indicator of flexible forms of employment based on 
QLFS data. For 1998, this indicator is closely related to our more detailed indexes. In 
the absence of any relevant measures of labour market flexibility at the regional level 
over a sufficiently large number of years, despite our caveat about subjectivity and 
possible mistakes, the indicators constructed here must be seen as the best measures 
available for the evaluation of the extent and evolution of labour market flexibility 
(and of its various constituents) across regions and over time.  
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APPENDIX A.7.1: Employment relations legislation (UK, 1979-1999) 
 
 
 
Table A.7.1: Chronology of labour laws 1979-1999 
1980 Employment Act  Definition of lawful picketing restricted to own place of work  
80% ballot needed to legalise a closed shop  
Funds offered for union ballots  
Restricted right to take secondary action  
Code of practice (six pickets)  
Repeal of statutory recognition procedure  
Restricts unfair dismissal and maternity rights  
Unfair dismissal rights from 12 to 6 months in companies <20 
1980 Soc. Security Act Abolition of earnings related supplement (ERS) (1980-1982) 
1982 Employment Act 
(Norman Tebbitt) 
Restrictions on industrial action (eg: definition of trade dispute) 
Further restricted action to 'own' employer  
Employers obtain injunctions against unions (sue for damages) 
80% rule extended to ALL closed shops every 5 years  
Compensation for dismissal because of closed shop  
Removed union only labour clauses in commercial contracts 
1984 Trade Union Act EC elections every 5 years by secret ballot  
Political fund ballots every 10 years  
Secret ballots before industrial action 
1986 Public Order Act Introduced new criminal offences in relation to picketing 
1986 Soc. Security Act Extension of maximum period of benefit disqualification  
1986 Wages Act Wage councils only set overtime and single overtime wage rates 
Workers <21yrs not covered by wage councils 
1988 Employment Act Unions to compensate members disciplined for non-compliance 
with majority decisions  
Members can seek injunction if no pre-strike ballot  
Union finances to be open to inspection  
Unions prevented from paying members' or officials' fines  
Action to preserve post entry closed shop made unlawful  
New restrictions on industrial action and election ballots  
Ballots for separate workplaces and non-voting EC members 
Election addresses controlled - Independent scrutiny 
Establishment of CROTUM 
1989 Employment Act Tribunal pre-hearing review and proposed deposit of £150  
Removal of restrictions on work of women & young workers  
Exemption of small employer from providing details of 
disciplinary procedures  
Restricts time off with pay for union duties  
Written reasons for dismissal now require two-year tenure  
Redundancy rebates abolished  
Abolition of training commission 
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Table A.7.1. (continued) 
1990 Employment Act Unlawful to refuse to employ non-union member (closed-shop) 
All secondary action now unlawful  
Unions liable for action induced by ANY official unless written 
repudiation using statutory form of words sent to all members  
Selective dismissal of strikers taking unofficial action  
Extended power of CROTUM 
1992 Trade Union & 
Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 
Brings together all collective employment rights including trade 
union finances and elections; union members' rights including 
dismissal, time off; redundancy consultation; ACAS, CAC and 
CROTUM; industrial action legislation  
Does not cover individual rights like unfair dismissal, redundancy 
pay, maternity etc (covered by 1978 EPCA) 
1993 Trade Union 
Reform and 
Employment Rights 
Act 
 
Individuals can seek injunction against unlawful action  
Creation of commissioner against unlawful industrial action  
Members to be involved in ballot to be identified  
Restrictions on election, strike and industrial action ballots  
New powers for Certification Officer to check union finances  
Higher penalties against unions failing to keep proper accounts  
'Wilson/Palmer' Amendment (incentives for individual contracts) 
Maternity leave increased to 14 weeks with no length of service 
requirement  
Right to written statement within 8 weeks (if working >8hrs/wk) 
Unlawful to dismiss H&S rep in course of duties AND those 
walking off unsafe site  
Right of individual to challenge collective agreement in 
contravention of equal treatment terms  
Changes to Transfer of Undertakings Regulations  
Changes to redundancy terms (consultation)  
Abolition of Wages Councils  
Changes to Tribunals and EAT procedures  
1996 Employment 
Rights and Industrial 
Tribunals Acts 
Regulation on maternity leaves 
Regulation on bargaining arbitration 
Individualised employment tribunal rights 
1998 National 
Minimum Wage Act  
(Extended in 1999 and 2000)  
Introduction of minimum wage 
1998 Employment 
Rights Act 
(Dispute Resolution - 
Working Time Regulations) 
Limit to a max. of 48hrs/week (8hrs/day) of required work 
Right to 4-weeks annual paid leave 
Right to lunch-breaks if working>6hrs/day 
Regulations on dispute resolution and union recognition 
1999 Employment 
Relations Act  
Further regulations on maternity leave 
Regulation on unfair dismissal of strikers 
Extended standard labour rights to part-timers 
Sources: Institute of Employment Rights, Department of Trade and Industry and 
Blanchflower and Freeman (1994), amended by the author. 
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APPENDIX A.7.2: Construction of the wage flexibility indicators 
 
 
 Measures of wage flexibility are typically estimated as the wage elasticity of 
unemployment, using a standard Phillips-curve equation (Layard et al., 1991; 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994b). Wage growth is regressed on unemployment and 
expected inflation (usually inflation lagged one period) and the coefficient of 
unemployment is interpreted as a measure of wage flexibility. This standard 
procedure, however, can only produce a time-series of coefficients (when derived 
from cross-sectional regressions for each year) or a simple cross-section of 
coefficients (when derived from time-series regressions for each region). For the 
purposes of our research, it was necessary to obtain a panel of such coefficients, 
corresponding to each observation in our sample. To do so, two alternative 
procedures were employed. The two procedures resulted in quantitatively different 
results. For this reason we constructed two indicators of wage flexibility and then 
aggregated them into one composite index. The procedures are as follows. 
 
Procedure 1: Estimating average values  
 The first procedure we used involved the estimation of 32 Phillips curve 
equations, one time-series regression for each region in our sample (12 regressions) 
and one cross-sectional regression for each sample year (20 regressions). Thus we 
derived one wage flexibility measure for each year and one for each region. To 
calculate the year- and region-specific value of wage flexibility we then calculated the 
average of the two wage flexibility measures corresponding to each observation. For 
example, the wage elasticity measure for London in 1990 is the average of the 
coefficients for unemployment from the seventh time-series regression (London) and 
the twelfth cross-sectional regression (year 1990).  The problem with this procedure 
is that estimates for the wage elasticity of unemployment often vary significantly 
between cross-sectional and time-series regressions. Averaging may therefore 
produce values that are artificially constructed and do not correspond to the specific 
conditions characterising the specific region at the specific year. 
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Procedure 2: Estimating (the inverse of) individual contributions  
 An alternative procedure was also used. We first estimated a Phillips-curve 
equation for the whole panel of our data (240 observations). We then re-estimated the 
same regression 240 times, each time dropping one single observation (corresponding 
to a specific region for a specific year). For each of the 240 obtained coefficients, we 
calculated the ratio of this coefficient to the one obtained from the full sample. We 
then subtracted these ratios from unity and obtained a new panel of coefficients. 
These coefficients measure the percentage change in overall (average) wage 
flexibility when a specific observation was excluded. Hence, this measure is rather 
relative (to the universally mean value) than absolute.  
 To illustrate this procedure better, an example can be used. The universal 
estimate of wage flexibility was –0.2 (which is slightly over but in line with wage 
flexibility estimates obtained by other researchers; see for example, Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1992; Abraham, 1996; Baddeley et al., 1999). Assume that excluding the 
value for London in 1990 resulted in a new estimate of –0.21. This would mean that, 
when not taking into account the specific situation of London 1990, the estimated 
wage flexibility increases. We can roughly interpret this as evidence that London in 
1990 had less flexible wages than all the regions throughout the period under 
investigation, on aggregate. It is further possible to quantify this difference. By 
calculating  
WFLEXL90=(WFLEXTOTAL-WFLEXexcl.{L90})/WFLEXTOTAL 
we obtain 1-(0.21/0.20)=1-1.05=-0.05. Therefore, wage flexibility in London in 1990 
was by an estimated value of 5% lower than the average value for our full sample. 
We attached the value of 0.95 (=1+WFLEXL90) to the corresponding observation. 
This procedure is intellectually appealing and produces quite plausible results 
(flexibility varies among the 12 regions over the 20 years period from 95% to 113%).  
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APPENDIX A.7.3: Construction of aggregate indexes 
 
 
For the calculation of the aggregate (broad-categories) indexes, the following 
procedure was employed. First, we projected the missing (in our example, temping) 
data backwards, assuming the same time-trend (that flexibility was growing during 
the missing years at the same pace that it was growing inside the sample years) and 
the same trend of regional convergence/divergence in terms of levels of flexibility 
(temping in this case). We then calculated a temporary index of internal numerical 
flexibility, as the un-weighted sum of all the detailed indicators. Then we calculated 
correlation coefficients between this temporary index and the full series (part-timing), 
one for the period for which all data were available and a second for the period for 
which we undertook the extrapolation. We then created the ratio (k) of the two 
correlation coefficients (smaller over greater, in absolute terms). We then used this 
ratio as a weight, multiplying the extrapolated series of the aggregate index with k 
and the original part-timing series (for the same period) with 1-k and adding the two 
products. This resulted in a series (for the “extrapolated” period) which was closer to 
the behaviour of the original part-timing data the more our extrapolation produced a 
lower correlation relative to the one in the “actual” sample.  
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APPENDIX A.7.4: Regional indexes of labour market flexibility (selected years) 
Table A.7.2: Regional indexes of labour market flexibility 
Y
ea
r 
Region 
 
Internal 
nume-
rical 
External 
nume-
rical 
Internal 
funct-
ional 
Wage 
flexi- 
bility 
Labour 
mobility 
 
Unempl.  
Flexi- 
bility 
Union  
flexi- 
bility 
Overall  
flexi- 
bility 
19
79
 
North 0.697 0.853 0.091 0.834 0.756 0.859 0.404 0.783 
York 0.683 0.721 0.135 0.867 0.774 0.858 0.543 0.798 
E. Midlands 0.739 0.606 0.117 0.944 0.812 0.853 0.583 0.811 
E. Anglia 0.555 0.614 0.125 0.911 0.882 0.850 0.752 0.817 
Gr. London 0.610 0.480 0.106 0.980 0.820 0.892 0.716 0.802 
RoSE 0.601 0.474 0.116 0.932 0.840 0.864 0.810 0.808 
Southwest 0.656 0.586 0.157 0.906 0.828 0.840 0.691 0.813 
W. Midlands 0.636 0.653 0.144 0.863 0.820 0.855 0.529 0.784 
Northwest 0.629 0.812 0.123 0.858 0.746 0.858 0.481 0.785 
Wales 0.650 0.662 0.119 0.857 0.773 0.854 0.453 0.761 
Scotland 0.662 0.596 0.114 0.845 0.731 0.863 0.468 0.746 
N. Ireland 0.656 0.526 0.077 0.799 0.634 0.809 0.456 0.689 
19
85
 
North 0.829 0.776 0.200 0.844 0.757 0.912 0.556 0.849 
York 0.794 0.724 0.275 0.865 0.853 0.914 0.670 0.888 
E. Midlands 0.766 0.673 0.237 0.926 0.875 0.908 0.703 0.887 
E. Anglia 0.708 0.721 0.201 0.902 0.989 0.916 0.843 0.920 
Gr. London 0.705 0.587 0.291 0.953 0.914 0.955 0.813 0.909 
RoSE 0.705 0.587 0.291 0.905 0.867 0.928 0.890 0.902 
Southwest 0.746 0.620 0.237 0.880 0.925 0.912 0.792 0.891 
W. Midlands 0.712 0.852 0.250 0.849 0.792 0.913 0.658 0.876 
Northwest 0.719 0.676 0.261 0.853 0.797 0.918 0.619 0.844 
Wales 0.771 0.667 0.247 0.853 0.799 0.912 0.596 0.844 
Scotland 0.799 0.642 0.189 0.864 0.776 0.922 0.609 0.837 
N. Ireland 0.689 0.460 0.145 0.821 0.689 0.882 0.598 0.746 
19
91
 
North 0.820 0.694 0.272 0.794 0.799 0.930 0.629 0.861 
York 0.783 0.567 0.319 0.807 0.804 0.929 0.730 0.861 
E. Midlands 0.778 0.556 0.405 0.863 0.861 0.932 0.759 0.898 
E. Anglia 0.747 0.590 0.354 0.834 0.914 0.936 0.900 0.919 
Gr. London 0.708 0.762 0.367 0.890 0.830 0.980 0.848 0.938 
RoSE 0.732 0.554 0.412 0.844 0.875 0.953 0.924 0.923 
Southwest 0.762 0.656 0.360 0.816 0.911 0.935 0.838 0.920 
W. Midlands 0.762 0.539 0.362 0.793 0.820 0.931 0.780 0.869 
Northwest 0.735 0.585 0.344 0.801 0.802 0.936 0.706 0.856 
Wales 0.781 0.591 0.230 0.800 0.867 0.925 0.671 0.848 
Scotland 0.829 0.583 0.274 0.796 0.739 0.936 0.692 0.845 
N. Ireland 0.745 0.483 0.168 0.762 0.692 0.900 0.678 0.772 
19
97
 
North 0.988 0.776 0.275 0.830 0.791 0.950 0.759 0.936 
York 0.941 0.674 0.145 0.839 0.807 0.950 0.835 0.905 
E. Midlands 0.867 0.720 0.146 0.892 0.915 0.951 0.899 0.939 
E. Anglia 0.915 0.816 0.314 0.861 0.911 0.955 0.949 0.997 
Gr. London 0.810 0.877 0.114 0.927 0.858 0.998 0.924 0.960 
RoSE 0.865 0.807 0.051 0.868 0.887 0.972 1.000 0.950 
Southwest 0.884 0.823 0.130 0.846 0.998 0.956 0.924 0.969 
W. Midlands 0.884 0.745 0.124 0.822 0.776 0.954 0.873 0.902 
Northwest 0.883 0.602 0.132 0.834 0.755 0.959 0.797 0.865 
Wales 0.957 0.698 0.310 0.834 0.794 0.949 0.722 0.917 
Scotland 1.000 0.709 0.158 0.827 0.702 0.956 0.810 0.900 
N. Ireland 0.792 0.520 0.790 0.809 0.509 0.928 0.734 0.886 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 In this chapter we turn to the empirical investigation of the regional economic 
effects of labour market flexibility in the UK. As we showed in the previous chapter, 
the behaviour of our labour market flexibility indexes reflects to a large extent the 
wave of labour market deregulation in the UK over the last two decades. However, 
the regional picture of changes in labour market flexibility has not been as uniform as 
policy might have wished. Further, for some elements of flexibility, the increase over 
the twenty-year period does not appear to be as significant as one might have 
expected.  
 Nevertheless, changes in labour market flexibility across regions and over 
time have occurred and this is expected to have had an impact on the regional 
economies of the UK. The theoretical discussions of the previous chapters have 
outlined the relations and dynamics that economic intuition attributes to changes in 
labour market flexibility. In chapter one we argued that the flexibilisation of labour 
markets is a response to the increased openness, volatility and uncertainty of the 
economic system. Despite being based on an ideological shift, this response is 
pragmatic in that it attempts to facilitate flexibility in production by enhancing 
flexibility in labour inputs and their price. Flexibility in these, is expected to increase 
labour and total factor productivity, increase profitability and investment and thus 
labour demand and incomes. Critics of such an analysis suggest that the deregulation 
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of labour relations and the compression of labour compensation can have adverse 
long-run effects on the economy and society at large. Although it is not possible to 
test the validity of such arguments with the data we have available, it is important 
empirically to investigate the shorter-run effects of labour market flexibility in order 
to assess the validity of the mainstream analyses of the economic impact of labour 
market flexibility. As was discussed in chapters two and three, orthodox economic 
theory and relevant empirical studies find that labour market flexibility increases 
productivity and employment growth and reduces labour costs and unemployment. 
Other analyses, however, reviewed in chapter three, underline the potential adverse 
effects of flexibility on investment in physical and human capital –and, hence, on 
productivity- and on incomes and product demand. In chapter five it was shown that, 
under specific conditions, specific elements of labour market flexibility can raise 
wages while simultaneously reducing labour costs and increasing profitability (and, 
by implication, investment and output), increasing, however, inequalities in labour 
incomes and working conditions. Although the empirical investigation of chapter four 
was not able to produce conclusive results (largely due to data quality and sample 
size), some evidence was obtained of some significant effects of flexibility on the 
economy. These effects were mainly related to a few elements of labour market 
flexibility and, sometimes, different elements of flexibility appeared to have opposing 
and even offsetting effects.  
 Of more interest to our regional economic analysis is the discussion of chapter 
six, which indicated that many of the expected economic effects of labour market 
flexibility are not necessarily uniform across space. Labour market deregulation and 
flexibility can alter the regional balance and cross-regional equilibria in ways that can 
affect the overall impact of flexibility on the (national) economy. In chapter seven we 
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provided some preliminary evidence consistent with this argument. Despite the 
general pattern of increasing and regionally converging labour market flexibility, it 
was shown that some degree of regional specialisation in specific elements of 
flexibility has occurred over the last two decades. This leads us to expect that labour 
market deregulation and the (regionally uneven) trends of flexibilisation that it 
generates will have a regionally variable impact on the economy. In this chapter we 
formally investigate this hypothesis, trying to associate specific regional economic 
developments to changes in labour market flexibility.  
 To do so, the empirical analysis uses a large number of economic indicators. 
Our dependent variables are real wages, unemployment, employment growth, the 
employment-to-population ratio, investment, real per capita output growth, 
productivity and wage inequality. By using such a long list of dependent variables, 
what we want to achieve is to gain the widest picture possible of the economic impact 
of labour market flexibility.  
Since the nature of our data and the size of our sample (that will be presented 
later) do not allow a formal econometric investigation of the direction of causality in 
the relationship between labour market regulation and the economy, the investigation 
of a large number of relationships can partly substitute for that, allowing some 
causality inferences to be made. To clarify this, the following example can be used. 
Assume that flexibility is found to have a positive impact on wages. This can be 
either because of the mechanisms described in our model of chapter five (effectively 
a reduction in labour costs), or because of a positive effect of flexibility on 
productivity. By examining the impact of flexibility on productivity, we can gain 
more information on the structural mechanisms that are behind the economic impact 
of labour market flexibility. If the effect of flexibility on productivity is positive, the 
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mechanism predicted by mainstream economic analysis (wage increases following 
productivity gains that are due to enhanced flexibility) cannot be rejected. In any 
other case (insignificant or negative flexibility effects on productivity) this common 
wisdom will be challenged. In such a case it would seem more plausible that wages 
increase to compensate the workforce for its reduced employment security and the 
higher uncertainty in the labour market.  
 It is important to note the differences implied by these two mechanisms. For 
the first, wage increases are the outcome of the efficiency- and productivity-
enhancing role of labour market flexibility. For the second, wage increases are 
activated by the cost-minimising strategies that become available with labour market 
deregulation. Apparently, the long-run implications of these two mechanisms are very 
different. This clearly relates to the discussion of chapters two and three. While the 
first mechanism would enhance the dynamism and competitiveness of the economy, 
the second mechanism would threaten it. Similar scenarios can be assumed for other 
sets of dependent variables, as well, and will indeed be discussed later, together with 
the presentation of our empirical findings.  
 Before the presentation of these findings, in the next section we present the 
economic (selection of variables) and econometric (selection of estimation method) 
specification of our estimating regressions and note some further theoretical 
considerations.116 Section 8.3 presents the main body of our empirical results for the 
relationship between labour market flexibility and economic performance. In section 
                                                 
116
 It must be noted here that the presentational approach we use is slightly uncommon. We start by 
discussing the economic specification of our regressions (variable selection) and present the results for 
one of our dependent variables (productivity). Then we present the process of econometric 
specification, using again the case of the productivity regression as our example. Then, in section 8.3 
we formally present the results from the whole set of regressions, based on the best performing 
economic and econometric specifications, as have been selected in section 8.2. Finally, the analysis for 
the case of wage inequality is, as in chapter four, presented separately, in section 8.5.  
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8.4 we extend the empirical analysis with an investigation of the form and nature of 
spatial dependence, both in the determination of economic outcomes and in the 
economic effects of labour market flexibility. Additionally, we take a closer look at 
the impact of unemployment flexibility on productivity and on how this impact is 
transmitted through migration. Our empirical investigation concludes with the 
estimation of the labour market flexibility effects on wage inequalities, in section 8.5.  
 
8.2. Theoretical and technical considerations 
8.2.1. The explanatory variables 
As explained earlier, the empirical analysis involves the examination of the 
impact of labour market flexibility on eight economic indicators. In specific, we run 
eight sets of regressions, one for each of our dependent variables, as listed in the 
previous section (see also Appendix A.8.1). Naturally, a large number of explanatory 
variables had to be used as controls for each of the estimating regressions. To meet 
this goal, the main problem was data availability, especially due to the regional-level 
and rather long time-series sample of our analysis. For example, data on regional 
capital stocks are not readily available and difficult to construct, even compared to 
constructing a national series of capital stock. We complemented the data that we 
obtained from public sources (published ONS series) with some data that we derived 
from the Labour Force Survey and Family Expenditure Survey series. Our sample is 
two-dimensional, including twenty annual observations for each of the twelve 
Standard Statistical Regions of the UK, reaching an overall sample size of 240 
(20x12) observations in a balanced panel.  
Our explanatory variables include some standard economic indicators, some 
of which have also been used as dependent variables in some of the regressions. For 
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example, real investment, which is the dependent variable in the investment 
regression, is included as a control variable in the employment growth regression. 
Other explanatory variables, derived from ONS publications, include inter-regional 
migration and the regional employment shares of banking and finance and 
manufacturing.  
All the nominal series were deflated using a regional price index (which was 
also used to calculate the regional inflation rates) constructed with data obtained from 
the Reward Group, which reports a consistent time series of regional prices for 
different household types since 1973. Regional prices were adjusted for regional 
household compositions, using data derived from the FES series. This inflation series 
has been used in Duranton and Monastiriotis (2000). The same study was the source 
for two other variables, used in the wage inequality regressions (section 8.5). These 
variables are education (average number of years in full-time continuous education of 
the regional labour force) and a variable proxying regional “demand for skills”, which 
is effectively the estimated returns to education from a panel of regional Mincer 
(1974) type wage equations based on FES data.  
As stated, an alternative data source was the LFS series. Based on that, we 
constructed our data for professional employment (share of professional occupations 
in total regional employment) and (the inverse of) technological intensity. The last 
variable is calculated as the manuals-to-non-manuals ratio, following the work of 
Leslie and Pu (1996) and effectively measures the manual-employment intensity in 
production. A number of variables were impossible to construct in a reliable way for 
the full sample. Such variables include regional exports, a measure of skills for the 
regional work-forces, and an index of industrial diversity and specialisation. Despite 
that, a substantial number of control variables was collected and used in the empirical 
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analysis. The control variables perform well, explaining in most of the regressions 
more than 80% of the variation of the dependent variables. The data used are more 
fully described in Appendix A.8.1.  
 
8.2.2. Modelling considerations 
8.2.2.1. General considerations 
Naturally, when building an economic model at a regional level it is important 
for the cross-regional interactions and dependencies to be taken into account. 
Conventionally, this can be achieved either by explicitly modelling the cross-regional 
flows and dynamics or by allowing for some sort of spatial dependence 
(autocorrelation) in the econometric specification. Given the panel nature of our data, 
regional dynamics are only important when they exhibit both spatial and temporal 
variation. Clearly, if regional interactions are constant over time, they will be 
successfully captured by region-specific fixed effects. Correspondingly, if they are 
constant across space (for example, if they are determined by a common national 
aggregate), they should be successfully captured by the constant (i.e.: space-invariant) 
time effects. We will expand on such considerations in the next sub-section, when we 
will present the econometric specification. Here our focus will be on the selection of 
the basic control variables for each of our regressions and on the process of the 
economic specification (model-building).  
For each of the dependent variables we have two sets of control variables. The 
first is more closely related to economic theory, including variables that are derived 
directly from an economic modelling process. The second set includes variables that 
perform well in the estimating regressions, both in terms of their statistical 
significance (and stability of results) and in terms of their economic interpretation. 
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Below we present the modelling considerations for both sets of control variables for 
each one of our dependent variables. For presentational reasons, special focus will be 
placed on the specification of the productivity regressions.  
 
8.2.2.2. The productivity regression 
Table 8.1 presents a number of regressions for labour productivity, which also 
illustrate the course of modelling that was followed for the other dependent 
variables.117 The first column presents a simple incentive (effort) based model, where 
productivity is assumed to be a function of labour shortages (differentiated by gender 
and proxied by the employment-population ratio and the female labour force 
participation rate) and of the probability of being laid-off (proxied by the 
unemployment rate). Such a model was considered superior to a standard production-
function-based specification that would make productivity a function of the capital-
to-labour ratio, as there is almost perfect capital mobility across regions and, hence, 
regional capital intensity of production can be justifiably taken to be endogenous. The 
underlying model, then, assumes that productivity is basically determined by labour 
effort. Effort increases with unemployment, as the latter increases the probability of a 
worker being laid-off. It declines with the employment-to-population ratio, as higher 
labour utilisation leads to more extensive use of less qualified (less employable) 
workers. Finally, it increases with female employment (when controlling for the 
labour shortages effect), as the latter signals economic expansion.  
 
                                                 
117
 The process of economic specification for the other regressions is not presented here The best 
performing regression for each of our dependent variables is presented in section 8.3.  
Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Economic Performance 
 
281
 
Table 8.1: Economic specification (productivity regression) 
Productivity Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 
  
12.413 
(3.68) 
9.066 
(2.96) 
-51.625 
(-2.33) 
-38.453 
(-2.03) 
-64.553 
(-5.05) 
10.780 
(0.56) 
Urate 
  
0.343 
(4.26) 
0.642 
(8.96) 
0.663 
(7.73) 
0.666 
(8.58) 
0.658 
(9.75) 
0.469 
(5.90) 
Empl/pop 
  
-21.691 
(-5.85) 
-12.758 
(-3.99) 
-12.967 
(-3.90) 
-12.763 
(-4.00) 
-13.901 
(-4.63) 
-18.894 
(-5.13) 
Female 
employment 
32.095 
(9.77) 
9.311 
(2.40) 
7.365 
(1.79) 
7.308 
(1.91) 
14.259 
(3.82) 
9.675 
(2.11) 
Manufact. 
  
 41.699 
(8.74) 
43.139 
(7.89) 
42.790 
(8.92) 
30.670 
(6.18) 
35.336 
(5.95) 
Tech. intensity  -1.092 
(-1.50) 
-1.235 
(-1.70) 
-1.218 
(-1.70) 
-0.803 
(-1.19) 
-2.262 
(-1.64) 
Migration   151.216 
(6.99) 
130.823 
(5.70) 
132.883 
(5.99) 
107.202 
(4.97) 
 
Ext. Numerical   2.512 
(2.80) 
2.404 
(2.75) 
  
Int. Numerical   2.929 
(1.30) 
   
Int. Functional   -0.233 
(-0.29) 
   
Wage Flex.   4.859 
(0.63) 
   
Unempl. Flex.   46.818 
(2.28) 
39.078 
(2.10) 
 5.538c 
(0.79) 
Union Flex.   11.486 
(3.32) 
10.996 
(3.38) 
  
Mobility   -1.030 
(-0.55) 
   
Overall Flex.     162.861 
(5.81) 
 
Square of 
Overall Flex. 
    -90.133 
(-5.64) 
 
Region£ 
  
11.50 
0.000 
24.31 
0.000 
13.92 
0.000 
18.96 
0.000 
29.94 
0.000 
17.59 
0.000 
Year£ 
  
39.86 
0.000 
41.35 
0.000 
18.97 
0.000 
26.78 
0.000 
43.78 
0.000 
26.83 
0.000 
R2 0.922 0.949 0.954 0.953 0.957 0.934 
Adj. R2 0.909 0.940 0.943 0.944 0.949 0.922 
Hetterosk. 
  
1.68 
0.1954 
0.03 
0.8558 
0.69 
0.4074 
0.39 
0.5312 
2.31 
0.1282 
1.18 
0.2775 
Normality 
  
2.976 
0.0015 
0.131 
0.4478 
-0.079 
0.5316 
-0.333 
0.6306 
1.322 
0.0931 
0.114 
0.4547 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Figures in italics show significance levels. All regressions have been 
estimated with OLS. Alternative estimation methods (FE/RE; PSAR1-SARE; 2way-FE PSAR1-
SARE) produced qualitatively very similar results (see Tables 8.2, A.8.2 and A.8.3). The test for 
heteroskedasticity is a chi-square test developed by the Cook and Weisberg (1983). The test for 
normality is the Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data. £: This is an F-test for the joint significance of 
the fixed effects. c: This term is lagged one period.  
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The results presented in the first column of Table 8.1 justify our theoretical 
model.118 Productivity is indeed found to increase with unemployment and female 
employment and decline with the employment-to-population ratio. The second 
column of Table 8.1 amends the original model, trying to control for some additional 
structural variables. Including in the model migration, technological intensity and the 
share of manufacturing employment in the model improves its performance by almost 
a third (the adjusted R2 increases from 0.91 to 0.94). With the exception of the 
coefficient for female employment (which drops to almost a third of its initial value in 
both significance and magnitude, possibly indicating that this variable was capturing 
some capital intensity and labour quality effects), the other coefficients are very 
stable. Manufacturing employment is strongly related to higher productivity, 
capturing the capital-intensity effect. In-migration is also positively related to 
productivity, indicating that migration is mostly related to the more skilful part of the 
workforce. Finally, as expected, technological intensity is also found to improve 
labour productivity (the negative sign is due to the definition of the variable as the 
inverse of technological intensity).  
Overall, the performance of the regressions is very satisfactory, producing a 
very good fit and homoskedastic and normal residuals. Following, in the third model 
we added the flexibility indicators. As not all indicators are significant, we further 
applied an iterative backward deletion selection procedure (including also quadratic 
terms of the flexibility indicators), ending up with the model presented in the fourth 
column. In model 5 we replaced the detailed flexibility indicators with the aggregate 
                                                 
118
 All regressions in Table 8.1 have been estimated with the specification approved in section 8.2.3 
(two-way error component model), where the econometric specification of the estimating regressions 
is considered.   
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index of overall labour market flexibility (as presented in chapter seven). We will not 
comment on the findings obtained from these regressions, as this will be done in 
section 8.3, together with the results from the other regressions. Further, note that the 
model in the last column refers to a specific hypothesis relating to the productivity 
effects of unemployment benefits that will be discussed in detail in section 8.4.3, and 
is only included here for economy of space. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning at 
this stage that the estimated coefficients for our control variables are remarkably 
insensitive to the inclusion of the flexibility indicators. 
 
8.2.2.3. Specification of the remaining relationships 
 Following the presentation of the productivity regression, we continue with 
the discussion of the economic specification of the remaining regressions. The next 
models refer to the specification of the employment regressions.119 For both the 
employment-to-population and employment growth regressions the underlying model 
is a labour demand equation (Table 8.3 in section 8.3.1). Employment is assumed to 
be a function of regional wages and regional GDP. The first term captures the cost 
considerations of labour demand, while the second refers to the size effect, 
representing the size of the economy and changes in product demand. Employment 
also depends on the availability of external pools of workers, a variable captured by 
net in-migration. Finally, two variables proxying for the technological intensity effect 
on labour demand are also included, namely our technological intensity indicator and 
the employment share of manufacturing. Following these considerations, the 
estimating model for the employment-to-population ratio includes the following 
                                                 
119
 To economise space, the model specification for the remaining regressions is not presented here, as 
it is completely analogous to that of labour productivity as presented in Table 8.1.  
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variables: real regional per capita GDP, technological intensity, the net in-migration 
rate, female employment and unemployment.120 The last two variables have been 
included as further controls, as they improve the performance of the estimating 
regressions. Equivalently, the employment growth regression has been specified as a 
function of real output growth, real wage growth, technological intensity, net in-
migration, manufacturing growth, female labour force participation and investment. 
The last variable controls for the dynamic (inter-temporal) substitution between 
capital and labour and is thus included only in the employment growth equation.  
 Turning to the unemployment equation, this has been specified as an inverse 
wage equation (see Table 8.3 in section 8.3.1), including inflation as a control for 
wage mark-ups and the manufacturing share as a control for sectoral differences in 
productivity. Under such a specification, both inflation and manufacturing 
employment should be negatively related to unemployment, while the relationship 
between the latter and real wages should be positive. Additional control variables 
include the net in-migration and employment-to-population rates, each capturing a 
different aspect of the economic dynamism of each region. Unemployment is hence 
expected to decline with each of these two measures.  
 The specification of the estimating wage equation (Table 8.4 in section 8.3.2) 
is slightly differentiated, mainly because of the fact that real wages is a clearly 
trended I(1) variable in its time-dimension. Hence, while both inflation and the 
unemployment rate are as before included to control for factor costs and demand 
pressures, real productivity has been added in the model to control for the endogenous 
                                                 
120
 The real wage variable had to be dropped from the estimating regressions as it was highly collinear 
with the per capita GDP variable. In this respect, the estimated coefficient for the latter highly 
underestimates the GDP effect, as it also includes the wage effect which apparently moves to the 
opposite direction.  
Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Economic Performance 
 
285
inter-temporal wage growth. The inclusion of productivity in the model has rendered 
the labour demand and supply variables (employment-to-population and migration) 
insignificant. Consequently, these variables were excluded from the estimating 
regressions. Female employment was in contrast included, to control for gender wage 
differentials.  
 Given the quality problems with the investment data and the fact that the units 
of analysis are regions in time rather than industries, we thought that it is better to 
specify the investment regressions in a Keynesian framework (Table 8.4 in section 
8.3.2). Hence, investment is made a function of real GDP, unemployment and 
inflation. Real GDP is included to control for the size of the economy and should be 
positively related to investment. Inflation captures a liquidity (or expansion) effect 
and is thus also expected to positively affect investment. Finally, unemployment 
captures the business cycle effect and should have a negative coefficient.  
The last relationship that we empirically investigate in the next section is the 
determination of real GDP per capita growth (Table 8.4 in section 8.3.2). For this 
model a specification that closely resembles to a production-function approach was 
employed. GDP growth is made a function of the growth of the main factors of 
production, proxied by the investment share and employment growth. To control for 
the cross-sectional dynamics and cross-regional differences in resources, the net in-
migration and unemployment rates are also included. These two last factors should be 
positively related to output growth as for both factors a higher value indicates a 
greater availability of unutilised resources in the region.  
It is important to note at this point that the primary concern in the 
specification of the models described above is to control for the variation of the 
dependent variables and not to build a structural model. Although the considerations 
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made had a theoretical base, in some cases it can be plausibly argued that the model 
specification is incomplete. On the other hand, the estimating regressions that were 
developed perform very well and at least do not suffer from any major econometric 
problems. Hence, they seem sufficiently appropriate for the exercise that we pursue in 
the next section, namely the measurement of the impact of labour market flexibility 
on the economy. Before presenting the results from this exercise, in the next sub-
section we discuss the econometric specification of the models presented here.  
 
8.2.3. Econometric specification 
The nature of our data and the relationships under investigation make the 
econometric specification of our estimating regressions a very complicated task. Our 
series have a long time-dimension and, thus, serial autocorrelation must be controlled 
for and wiped-out. The cross-sectional dimension and the fact that the unit of analysis 
is (regional) open economies make it necessary to test and control for spatial 
autocorrelation. Additionally, the panel nature of our data allows (but also 
necessitates) the models to be specified in ways that will control for (fixed or random) 
regional and time effects. Further, although the construction of each model was 
independent from the specification of the other models, one cannot assume that in 
reality the relationships under investigation are independent from one another. 
Consequently, endogeneity is a potential source of bias in the estimation results. This 
refers to both the control variables and the flexibility indicators, although for the latter 
we can reasonably assume that they are exogenous, as they are not independent of the 
(exogenous) regulations that govern labour markets. Finally, further considerations 
had to be made regarding the decision about the functional form of the estimating 
regressions.  
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The starting assumption on which the analysis proceeds is that the data are 
poolable across regions and through time. This is not a controversial assumption. As 
we discussed in chapter seven, the UK regions have noticeable differences in their 
economies but follow in general terms a common national trend. Regarding the time-
dimension, although the UK has experienced two clear business cycles over the last 
two decades, it is not unreasonable to argue that the major economic dynamics have 
not changed.121 The existence of regional disparities in economic outcomes and the 
changes in the business cycle in the course of time make it necessary that both region-
specific and time-specific effects are taken into account in the relationships under 
investigation. Consequently, the starting-point econometric specification is likely to 
be a two-way error component model or, in other words, a simple OLS with fixed 
spatial and temporal effects.  
Using this as the starting specification has the merit of simplifying the whole 
process, as the fixed temporal and regional effects allow for some limited form of 
temporal and spatial autocorrelation. Specifically, the regional error components 
(fixed effects) induce a form of temporal autocorrelation, while the temporal error 
components include a form of spatial autocorrelation (Anselin, 1988). This is because 
the fixed effects are constant across each single layer of the panel and, hence, are 
correlated with the equivalent autoregressive term. For the case of spatial 
autocorrelation, the time-specific fixed effects will be perfectly collinear with the 
autoregressive term if the only source of spatial dependence is that of spatial 
homogeneity (Arora and Brown, 1977). For example, if regional outcomes are jointly 
determined by a national aggregate, this effect will be captured entirely by the time-
                                                 
121
 These include, for example, the dominance of services and the decline in manufacturing, the 
dominance of the London economy and the North-South divide, migration trends and fiscal flows. 
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effects. On the other hand, if spatial dependence is in the form of pure spatial 
autocorrelation (in the sense that outcomes in one region are contemporaneously 
determined by outcomes in another region), the region-specific fixed effects will only 
be partially correlated with the spatial autoregressive terms. In any case, the inclusion 
of the fixed effects will reduce the bias resulting from neglecting the autoregressive 
relations. It is of course possible that the true relationships have both fixed effects and 
autoregressive terms acting in different directions. In such a case the estimated fixed 
effects will be biased and unreliable. However, the econometric problems related to 
not controlling for spatial and temporal autocorrelation will still be reduced.  
In Table 8.2 we present a number of alternative econometric specifications for 
our base productivity regression (model 2), as presented in Table 8.1. These 
specifications help illustrate the point about the (limited) complementarity between 
the error component and autoregressive specifications. The simple OLS specification 
produces few significant results, with only three of the estimated coefficients having 
the correct signs. As this model does not control for the fact that the estimating 
sample is a panel, these results cannot be considered reliable. The second model 
controls for this fact by applying a within error component specification (estimated 
using OLS and including regional dummies). The results are slightly strengthened but 
qualitatively unchanged. The region-specific fixed effects are highly significant and 
the fit of the model is significantly improved. Nevertheless, the Breusch-Pagan and 
Hausman tests indicate that the random-effects model (corresponding to a feasible 
GLS specification with non-stochastic errors) is inferior to the fixed-effects 
specification. 
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Table 8.2: Econometric specification of estimating regressions  
Productivity 
(Model 5 in 
Table 8.1) 
Simple 
(OLS) 
RE/FE 
(GLS/OLS) 
2way-FE 
(OLS) 
2way-FE 
AR1(OLS) 
PSAR1-SARE 
(3-step GLS) 
2way-FE 
PSAR1-SARE 
(3-step GLS) 
Constant 
  
8.116 
(1.92) 
11.115 
(2.29) 
9.066 
(2.96) 
7.993 
(2.77) 
18.955 
(10.08) 
9.747 
(5.14) 
Urate 
  
-0.026 
(-0.43) 
-0.118 
(-1.98) 
0.642 
(8.96) 
0.529 
(8.55) 
-0.031 
(-0.52) 
0.488 
(8.23) 
Empl/pop 
  
-16.048 
(-3.25) 
-21.683 
(-3.86) 
-12.758 
(-3.99) 
-10.476 
(-3.67) 
-26.132 
(-11.61) 
-20.326 
(-10.05) 
FLFPrate 
  
48.820 
(10.64) 
47.141 
(10.13) 
9.311 
(2.40) 
7.364 
(2.14) 
25.605 
(12.91) 
11.184 
(6.84) 
Manufact. 
  
-13.423 
(-4.17) 
-18.875 
(-4.88) 
41.699 
(8.74) 
29.229 
(6.33) 
2.266 
(0.91) 
29.258 
(9.22) 
Tech. intensity 0.682 
(0.65) 
2.802 
(2.31) 
-1.093 
(-1.50) 
-2.109 
(-2.03) 
0.965 
(2.88) 
0.115 
(0.55) 
Migration  62.803 
(1.65) 
64.476 
(1.57) 
151.216 
(6.99) 
103.848 
(5.49) 
50.540 
(3.22) 
53.917 
(5.29) 
Region 
  
 
 
8.91£ 
0.000 
24.31£ 
0.000 
13.89£ 
0.000 
 
 
77.13$ 
0.000 
Year 
  
 
 
 
 
41.35£ 
0.000 
25.77£ 
0.000 
 
 
263.29$ 
0.000 
R2 0.642 0.752 0.949 0.963 41.43+ 
0.000+ 
329.06+ 
0.000+ Adj. R2 0.633 0.733 0.940 0.956 
Log-likelihood     -177.585 -72.340 
Wald 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2582.94 
0.000 
138430.36 
0.000 
Hetterosk. 
  
1.65 
0.1991 
0.86 
0.3529 
0.03 
0.8548 
0.01 
0.9295 
 
 
 
 
Normality 
  
1.237 
0.1081 
2.348 
0.0094 
0.131 
0.4478 
0.754 
0.2255 
 
 
 
 
AR1  
 
 
 
 
 
0.289    
(9.06) 
Panel-specific 
 
Panel-specific 
 
SARE     Yes Yes 
B-P 
  
 
 
46.80 
0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hausman 
  
 
 
59.90 
0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: t-statistics (z-statistics for the GLS regressions) in parentheses. Figures in italics show 
significance levels. B-P is the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test for random effects. 
Hausman tests for random against fixed effects, using the Hausman’s (1978) specification test. RE/FE 
is the GLS random (fixed) effects estimation method. Wald is a chi-square test for the joint 
significance of the slope coefficients. PSAR1 (SARE) shows that the panel GLS estimation allowed 
for first-order panel-specific serial autocorrelation in the errors (spatially autocorrelated 
heteroskedastic errors). £: This is an F-test for the joint significance of the fixed effects. +: This is a 
LR-test for the joint significance of the regressors. $: This is a LR-test for the joint significance of the 
fixed effects. See also notes in Table 8.1. 
 
Following Baltagi (1995), we take this as an indication of a possible joint 
existence of significant spatial and temporal effects. To test and control for this 
possibility, we expand the estimating model to include both time- and region-specific 
fixed effects. The two-way error component model presented in the third column is 
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identical to the one reported in Table 8.1 and performs significantly better than the 
previous models. Compared to them, the inclusion of the temporal effects changes 
some of the estimated coefficients dramatically. Unemployment now has a strong 
positive impact on productivity, as one would naturally expect.122 In the same 
manner, the labour demand effects are much weaker and technological intensity and 
manufacturing employment are now positively related to productivity.   
The next step is to consider the case of serial autocorrelation, especially given 
the rather large time-dimension of our sample. The fourth model allows for serial 
autocorrelation in the dependent variable, by including an additional lagged term. The 
obtained results are strengthened further and this time remain qualitatively the same, 
despite the fact that the inclusion of this term can generate some multicollinearity in 
the estimating regression (Baltagi, 1995).123 The autoregressive term is highly 
significant and its value is much below one, suggesting that much of the serial 
autocorrelation in the dependent variable is captured by the fixed effects (note the 
decline in the significance of these effects between models three and four). 
Nevertheless, although the temporal and spatial fixed effects are still highly 
significant, explicitly controlling for serial autocorrelation improves significantly the 
performance of the regression (the unexplained variation of the dependent variable 
drops by around a third).  
 
                                                 
122
 Possibly, the negative unemployment coefficient obtained in the previous specifications was due to 
the endogenous relationship between unemployment and productivity across our sample units: high 
unemployment regions are usually also regions with low levels of labour productivity. This 
observation is particularly relevant to our discussion below, of the way that we decided to treat any 
potential endogeneity problems. 
123
 This is particularly true for samples with small time-dimensions (Perssons, 2001). With 20 
observations over time, any estimating bias caused by the inclusion of the lagged term is significantly 
diminished.   
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In the fifth column we pursue a different specification, dropping the spatial 
and temporal controls and instead allowing for spatial and temporal dependence to 
affect the stochastic terms in the regression. Specifically, we apply a 3-step GLS 
estimation procedure, assuming a general autoregressive and heteroskedastic structure 
for the regression residuals. The residuals are allowed to follow a region-specific 
first-order autoregressive pattern, with cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and a simple 
form of spatial autocorrelation.  
Due to the estimation method, the overall performance of the regression is not 
directly comparable with that of the previous models.124 Nevertheless, the likelihood-
ratio test (LR-test) for the joint significance of the slope coefficients, although 
significant, is much weaker than the corresponding F-test applied in the OLS 
regressions (not shown). Unemployment has the “wrong” sign and is highly 
insignificant, as is manufacturing employment. Overall, it seems that the PSAR1-
SARE model is less efficient, compared to the two-way error component 
specifications of columns three and four. This, of course, does not come as a surprise, 
for the following reasons. First, we have already seen that serial autocorrelation is not 
a severe problem in the regressions (compare models three and four). Second, we 
have already established that the fixed effects capture much of the spatial and 
temporal dependence in the relationship under investigation. Last, the form of spatial 
dependence allowed in the PSAR1-SARE model (pair-wise contemporaneous 
                                                 
124
 The PSAR1-SARE regressions have been estimated using STATA 6.0 for Windows. The 
programme applies a 3-step feasible Generalised Least Squares procedure, as follows. First, simple 
OLS residuals are used to calculate panel-specific autocorrelation coefficients. These are then used to 
transform the original model into one with serially independent errors. The new residuals are used to 
calculate pair-wise spatial autocorrelation coefficients for the errors, assuming panel heteroskedasticity 
(Parks, 1967). In the third stage the corrected residuals are used to transform the original model into 
one which has spherical errors (so that it can be estimated with simple OLS). For a critical exposition 
of the PSAR1-SARE method and a correction for higher accuracy see Beck and Katz (1995).  
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autocorrelation) is too general to control for the specific forms of spatial 
autocorrelation that one would expect to characterise the UK regions.  
Given these observations, naturally the PSAR1-SARE model has to be re-
formulated in an error component specification. This is reported in the last column of 
Table 8.2. The results for this model support our analysis about the econometric role 
played by the fixed effects. Given the two-way error component specification, the 
PSAR1-SARE formulation makes little difference (compare model six with models 
three and four). Moreover, the performance of the regression is now significantly 
improved (compare the LR-tests and Wald tests for models five and six). Apparently, 
although the existence of spatial (and, to a lesser extent, temporal) dependence cannot 
be ruled out, the two-way fixed effects model appears as the most parsimonious 
specification.   
Despite the fact that it originates from a completely different source, the issue 
of endogeneity is not irrelevant to our discussion about the error component and 
autoregressive terms. Conventionally, to control for the potential endogeneity of some 
of the explanatory variables, the estimation method would have to include 
instrumented variables (IV). However, the application of IV in the estimation of panel 
regressions with possible spatial and temporal autocorrelation creates a large number 
of econometric problems. The main problem is that both the fixed effects and the 
autoregressive errors will be correlated with the instruments used in the first-stage 
regressions. Their correlation will be higher the more constant (either across space or 
over time) the instruments are. In an extreme (but not very unlikely) case, some of the 
instruments in the first-stage regressions will be perfectly collinear with some of the 
regressors in the second-stage regressions. This will definitely be the case if fixed 
effects are included in the first-stage regressions (as they should be).  
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Apart from the pure econometric problems, there are good economic reasons 
for not using IV as an estimation method. This method is applied to correct the bias in 
the estimated coefficients generated by endogeneity. As we are not directly interested 
in the coefficients of our control variables, any amount of bias will be acceptable, as 
long as this is not transmitted to the estimates of the coefficients for our labour 
market flexibility indicators. Hence, the use of IV as an estimation method is only 
necessary if one has reasons to believe that the flexibility indicators are endogenous. 
As mentioned already, although this possibility cannot be entirely dismissed, it is 
reasonable to assume that labour market flexibility is independent of the year-to-year 
(or region-to-region) variation in economic outcomes. As we graphically illustrated in 
chapter two, labour market flexibility is jointly determined by existing labour market 
institutions, changes in labour market regulations and wider economic conditions in 
the region. Moreover, all these factors are to some extent shaped by the actual forms 
and levels of flexibility that prevail in each labour market, with the implication that 
one cannot isolate one single factor that can be assumed to be strictly exogenous to 
the former. Under such a perspective, it is not at all clear why (and how) one should 
instrument the labour market flexibility indicators with some economic or political 
variables. The empirical experimentation with the IV regressions produced results 
that were rather sensitive to the selection of the instruments, but were in general not 
making much difference to the simple OLS and GLS results and is thus not presented 
here. 
Concluding this section, we feel that the experimentation with the 
econometric specification of the estimating regressions should increase our 
confidence in relying on the two-way error component specification. The fixed effects 
capture much of the spatial and temporal dependence and explicitly modelling the 
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latter does not add much information. This conclusion is further strengthened by the 
results obtained from the regressions specified for the other dependent variables, that 
we do not report here to avoid repetition. In the next section we proceed with the 
analysis of the estimation results for our whole set of regressions, based on the two-
way error component specification. In section 8.4 we extend the empirical analysis, 
explicitly introducing spatial autocorrelation in the dependent and flexibility variables 
and investigating the geography of the estimated fixed effects. Our main conclusions, 
however, are drawn from the two-way error component regressions, presented in the 
next section.  
The last point that needs mentioning before presenting the empirical results, 
relates to the functional form of the estimating regressions. It is common in empirical 
research to use log-linear approximations of the theoretical relationships in order to 
control for possible non-linearities in the data. Instead, in the regressions presented 
here, we have used simple linear functional forms. There was a simple reason for 
doing so. The empirical investigation attempts to establish a relationship between 
labour market flexibility and economic performance and test for possible non-
linearities in this relationship. Hence, rather than imposing a non-linear relationship, 
we included squared terms of the flexibility indexes in the estimating regressions, 
testing whether they were significant. As our interest is in these coefficients and not 
on the structural variables, it is of little importance if the relationships under 
investigation are non-linear in their structural variables, as long as the fit and overall 
performance of the regressions is satisfactory enough for confident conclusions about 
the role of labour market flexibility to be drawn.  
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8.3. Empirical results 
The empirical analysis treats each regression independently of the others for the 
reasons discussed in the previous section. However, for presentational reasons we 
have identified two sets of regressions: those that refer to the determination of 
employment outcomes and those that refer to the wider economic performance 
indicators. For this reason the present section is split into two sub-sections, each 
discussing the results obtained from each of the two sets of regressions. A third sub-
section concludes by attempting to put the evidence together and draw some general 
inferences. As stated already, the focus is on the impact of labour market flexibility 
and not on the determination of economic outcomes. Hence, attention is 
disproportionately put on the former and less so on the structural explanatory 
variables.  
 
8.3.1. Labour market flexibility and employment 
Our basic estimating models for the employment regressions were discussed 
in section 8.2.2. There, the employment-to-population ratio was made a function of 
real GDP per capita, unemployment and migration. Employment growth was 
specified as a function of output growth, wage growth, investment and manufacturing 
growth. Additionally, both relationships also included female employment and our 
measure of technological intensity. Finally, unemployment was made a function of 
real wages, inflation, the share of manufacturing employment, migration and the 
employment-to-population ratio. Table 8.3 presents the results obtained from these 
three models, estimated with OLS in a two-way error component specification, 
following our considerations in section 8.2.3. For each model, two regressions are 
presented. The first includes some of the detailed labour market flexibility indexes 
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(and, for some, their squares), as selected in a backward deletion stepwise selection 
procedure. The second regression replaces the detailed flexibility indexes with the 
overall measure of labour market flexibility. For each model, the two regressions 
correspond to models four and five, as presented in Table 8.1 for the case of 
productivity.  
The first two columns of Table 8.3 present the results for the employment-to-
population regressions. As expected, in both regressions employment is found to 
increase with output and technological intensity. It is negatively related to 
unemployment, female labour force participation and net in-migration, all of which 
signal labour shortages. The estimated coefficients are satisfactorily stable between 
the two specifications. Moreover, the temporal and spatial fixed effects are significant 
in both cases, as the reported F-statistics show (ranging from 4.49 to 8.66). Further, 
the fit of the regressions is rather high (R2 is around 0.91), despite the fact that 
heteroskedasticity seems to be a problem.125  
The fit of the employment growth regressions (columns 3 and 4) is equally 
satisfactory (R2 is around 0.89), despite the fact that here the regional fixed effects are 
not significant and heteroskedasticity and normality are again a problem. The 
coefficients for the basic explanatory variables (output growth, wage growth and 
migration) have the correct signs, although wage growth fails to be significant in any 
of the regressions. Female and manufacturing employment, investment and 
technological intensity are all negatively related to employment growth, as we 
expected, following our discussion in section 8.2.2. The effect for manufacturing 
                                                 
125
 Note that the most likely cause of heteroskedasticity here is the presence of spatial dependence 
which we only partially control for (by including the fixed effects). We deal with this problem later, in 
section 8.4. 
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growth is particularly strong, indicating the lack of economic dynamism that 
characterises the manufacturing sector. 
Unlike the first two employment regressions, the model specified for 
unemployment performs very well in all respects. The fit of the regressions is 
excellent (R2 around 0.98) and the normality and heteroskedasticity tests suggest no 
violation of any assumptions. The fixed effects are highly significant as are the 
estimated slope coefficients. Moreover, all explanatory variables enter with the 
correct sign. Unemployment is found to increase with wages, but declines with 
inflation, manufacturing employment, employment participation and in-migration.  
Of the seven labour market flexibility indexes, only one is not significant in 
any of the regressions. Specifically, external numerical flexibility does not appear to 
have any impact on any of the employment outcomes. Although somewhat surprising, 
this is consistent with the estimated impact of internal numerical and internal 
functional flexibility, both of which seem to affect only unemployment and not 
employment participation or employment growth. Internal flexibility has a significant 
negative effect on unemployment. 
This finding suggests that flexibility in the labour input, in contrast to 
conventional expectations, is not a tool for employment expansion. Rather, it seems 
to be related to shorter-run considerations about cost-saving strategies and 
adjustments to economic conditions. As with numerical and functional flexibility, 
wage flexibility is surprisingly unrelated to longer-run employment outcomes. 
Moreover, its estimated impact is counter-intuitive, suggesting that unemployment is 
higher in areas (or periods) where wages are more responsive to unemployment.126 
                                                 
126
 Of course, it is possible that this effect is spurious. This would be the case if the relationship 
between wages and unemployment is non-linear. As this is only a minor finding compared with the 
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Equally counter-intuitive is the finding about the unemployment effects of 
unemployment flexibility, which are found to be (concave and) positive. Flexibility in 
the treatment of the unemployed (lower replacement ratios) increases unemployment 
and reduces employment growth, in contrast to the expectations of economic theory, 
according to which, unemployment benefits are detrimental to employment. On the 
other hand, the estimated positive effect on employment participation seems to offer 
some support to the argument that a generous treatment of the unemployed is an 
incentive for unemployed people to stay in unemployment for longer. 
Labour mobility is a significant determinant of unemployment and the 
employment-to-population ratio. Labour mobility measures the flexibility in labour 
movements (between regions, sectors, occupations and jobs) and is found to increase 
both employment participation and unemployment (in a non-linear fashion). Since we 
have already controlled for labour migration flows, we view this result as indicating 
that higher labour turnover is related to higher employment participation but also 
lower employment security. Finally, flexibility in trade unionism (measured 
effectively as the inverse of union density) has a robust negative effect on 
unemployment and the employment-to-population ratio, but a positive effect on 
employment growth. We interpret this finding as capturing the tendency for trade 
unions to increase unemployment (the “insider” role of unions) and retain in the 
labour force people that would otherwise be out of it (probably through redundancies 
or early retirements), rather than as indicating a positive employment-dynamism 
effect for unions. 
                                                                                                                                           
bulk of empirical results presented here, we prefer to simply treat it as inconclusive and not try to 
control for the possibility of simultaneity. The same applies to the case of the unemployment flexibility 
coefficient obtained in the unemployment regression.  
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Table 8.3: Labour market flexibility and employment 
 Empl/pop ratio Employment growth Unemployment 
Detailed Overall Detailed Overall Detailed Overall 
Constant 
  
-3.609 
(-4.03) 
1.502 
(5.68) 
0.036563 
(0.29) 
-0.542 
(-1.90) 
-68.389 
(-2.17) 
14.324 
(6.79) 
Real GDP pc** 
  
6.65E-06 
(2.05) 
1.98E-05 
(6.26) 
0.202 
(2.12) 
0.208 
(2.18) 
  
Real wages** 
  
  -0.304 
(-1.22) 
-0.306 
(-1.23) 
0.025 
(7.59) 
0.035 
(10.69) 
Empl./pop/ ratio 
  
    -17.797 
(-7.88) 
-18.193 
(-9.64) 
Fem. LF part. -0.732 
(-28.10) 
-0.736 
(-26.21) 
-0.121 
(-3.66) 
-0.115 
(-3.44) 
  
Control variable* 
  
-0.012 
(-9.33) 
-0.014 
(-9.76) 
-1.48E-06 
(-1.51) 
-3.18E-06 
(-3.35) 
-6.030 
(-4.21) 
-4.892 
(-3.12) 
Tech. intensity  
  
-0.020 
(-1.41) 
-0.029 
(-1.92) 
0.043 
(3.33) 
0.040 
(4.18) 
  
Manufacturing**   -3.13947 
-34.113 
-3.136 
(-33.62) 
-19.146 
(-7.95) 
-20.578 
(-8.98) 
Migration -0.777 
(-1.66) 
-1.359 
(-2.90) 
1.813 
(3.89) 
2.227 
(5.48) 
-83.087 
(-5.53) 
-106.134 
(-7.09) 
Int. Numerical     -6.322 
(-4.14) 
 
Int. Functional     -1.591 
(-3.21) 
 
Wage Flex.     17.878 
(3.34) 
 
Unempl. Flex. 11.118 
(5.29) 
 -0.288 
(-1.95) 
 200.188 
(2.60) 
 
Union Flex. -0.302 
(-4.26) 
 0.382 
(2.85) 
 -14.401 
(-6.09) 
 
Mobility 0.060 
(2.04) 
   28.213 
(3.84) 
 
Square of 
Unempl. Flex.  
-6.648 
(-5.39) 
   -133.826 
(-3.03) 
 
Square of 
Union Flex.  
  -0.247 
(-2.73) 
   
Square of 
Mobility 
    -18.824 
(-4.19) 
 
Overall Flex.  -1.729 
(-2.79) 
 1.408 
(2.10) 
 -7.760 
(-3.28) 
Square of 
Overall Flex. 
 0.968 
(2.73) 
 -0.829 
(-2.12) 
  
Region£ 
  
7.92 
0.000 
8.66 
0.000 
  17.99 
0.000 
75.39 
0.000 
Year£ 
  
4.49 
0.000 
6.41 
0.000 
11.22 
0.000 
11.34 
0.000 
46.04 
0.000 
96.54 
0.000 
R2 0.923 0.912 0.896 0.893 0.980 0.972 
Adj. R2 0.914 0.904 0.881 0.878 0.976 0.967 
Hetterosk. 
  
25.33 
0.0000 
52.85 
0.0000 
17.7 
0.0000 
14.66 
0.0001 
5.27 
0.0217 
1.13 
0.2885 
Normality 
  
4.28 
0.0000 
5.27 
0.0000 
4.943 
0.0000 
4.943 
0.0000 
0.014 
0.4946 
1.469 
0.0709 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Figures in italics show significance levels. £: This is an F-test for the 
joint significance of the fixed effects. *: The control variable is unemployment, investment and 
inflation for the three models, respectively. **: The growth rates rather than the levels of these 
variables have been included in the employment growth regressions. See also notes in Table 8.1. 
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 Overall, the effects of labour market flexibility on employment outcomes are 
rather mixed. Most of the detailed elements of flexibility reduce unemployment, in 
consistence with the view of flexibility as providing incentives for increased labour 
supply (exits from unemployment) and demand. There are limited effects on 
employment growth that go to both directions, with reductions in unionism fostering 
employment expansion. The flexibility effects on employment participation are much 
more puzzling, partly because of the existence of multiple effects on unemployment, 
inactivity and self-employment. Specifically, flexibility might be affecting dependent 
employment, unemployment, self-employment or inactivity. In general it is not clear 
which of these relations might be reflected by a positive or an adverse estimated 
effect on the employment-to-population ratio.  
The even columns of Table 8.3 present the results from the regressions where 
the detailed flexibility indexes have been replaced by the aggregate index. The impact 
of flexibility on unemployment is linear, implying that any increase in aggregate 
flexibility helps reduce unemployment. The effect on employment growth is non-
linear but always positive for meaningful values of aggregate flexibility. Apparently, 
the positive effects of labour market flexibility on employment expansion are 
maximised at intermediate levels of flexibility. The estimated effect for the 
employment-to-population ratio has the opposite direction. Given the unemployment 
and employment growth effects of aggregate flexibility, this suggests that flexibility 
has a worker discouragement effect, generating some trends towards inactivity and 
possibly self-employment. In other words, this finding suggests that higher levels of 
flexibility are responsible (at a diminishing rate) for lower levels of dependent 
employment by directing segments of the working age population either to self-
employment or to inactivity and informal employment. 
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These results offer strong support to the neo-classical approach to the 
economics of labour market flexibility. Despite the fact that some non-linearities have 
indeed been found, our estimates clearly suggest that labour market flexibility 
ameliorates labour market outcomes. On the other hand, it is equally clear that not 
every aspect of labour market regulation is a detriment to labour market performance. 
If anything, unemployment benefits, wage rigidities, as well as barriers to labour 
movements and to external numerical flexibility, seem to have had no adverse impact 
on the determination of labour market outcomes in the UK regions over the last two 
decades. We will discuss further the implications of these results in section 8.3.3. In 
the next section we present the results obtained for the flexibility effects on 
investment, wages, productivity and output growth.   
 
8.3.2. Labour market flexibility and economic performance 
 The impact of labour market flexibility on factors like wages and productivity 
is, as was the case with the employment effects, an intensively studied issue. On the 
other hand, its impact on investment and GDP growth is a somewhat less studied 
topic. Theory suggests that flexibility increases productivity and output growth, as the 
increased adjustability of production to economic fluctuations and the cost-saving 
technologies employed by firms improve the productivity of labour and foster 
economic expansion. For investment and wages, the expectations are much less clear-
cut. With economic expansion, naturally, investment and wages must go up. On the 
other hand, labour market flexibility is often associated with the suppression of labour 
compensation (together with the deterioration of labour standards), while investment 
might as well decline if labour costs are reduced (so that there will be a substitution 
effect between capital and labour). The results from our wage, investment and growth 
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regressions are presented in Table 8.4, while the results derived from the productivity 
regressions have already been presented in Table 8.1. Again, odd columns report 
models that contain the detailed flexibility indexes, while even columns report the 
results for the overall flexibility index.  
The first two columns report the results for the wage regressions. These 
regressions have been specified in a semi-log form, as this significantly improved the 
performance of the estimates. Two-way fixed effects have been included and are 
highly significant in both wage regressions. Probably due to the semi-log 
specification, normality is an issue. However, the regression errors are homoskedastic 
and the overall fit of the regressions is excellent (R2 around 0.98). With the exception 
of unemployment in the first regression, all estimated coefficients are significant and 
have the correct signs. As expected, productivity is strongly and significantly related 
to real wages, while inflation enters with a negative coefficient. Higher female 
employment shares are related to lower average wages.  
 The performance of the investment equation strongly resembles that of the 
wage equation. For both investment regressions the coefficient of determination is 
very high (around 0.98). Again normality is an issue, but heteroskedasticity (although 
present) seems to be less of a problem. Both region-specific and time-specific fixed 
effects are highly significant. As explained in section 8.2.2, investment is made a 
function of real output, inflation and unemployment, following a loose Keynesian-
type specification. All three explanatory variables are statistically significant and 
have the expected signs. Unemployment and inflation have, respectively, a negative 
and a positive impact on investment, indicating a positive demand effect on the 
growth of physical capital. Output captures the (positive) size effect for investment, 
as the dependent variable has been specified in levels rather than as a share of GDP. 
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Table 8.4: Labour market flexibility and output 
 Log wage Investment Output growth 
Detailed Overall Detailed Overall Detailed Overall 
Constant 
  
2.417 
(4.57) 
4.354 
(43.50) 
-13.704 
(-2.20) 
12.434 
(3.09) 
-0.682 
(-0.98) 
0.874 
(1.96) 
Productivity 
  
0.526 
(19.94) 
0.490 
(15.67) 
    
Output 
  
  
5.39E-05 
(10.40) 
6.27E-05 
(13.75) 
  
Empl growth 
  
  
  0.085 
(2.58) 
0.082 
(2.30) 
Inflation 
  
-0.152 
(-2.81) 
-0.206 
(-3.22) 
1.919 
(2.55) 
2.085 
(2.70) 
  
Unemployment 
  
-0.003 
(-1.77) 
0.004 
(1.97) 
-0.098 
(-3.84) 
-0.064 
(-2.68) 
0.009 
(3.78) 
0.009 
(4.06) 
Fem. LF Part. 
  
-1.037 
(-16.04) 
-0.990 
(-12.78) 
    
Investment share 
  
  
  -0.642 
(-2.65) 
-0.725 
(-2.90) 
Migration 
  
  
  0.315 
(0.43) 
0.691 
(0.90) 
Ext. Numerical 0.071 
(3.24)  
    
Int. Numerical 0.130 
(2.38)  
-1.472 
(-1.96) 
 0.209 
(2.82) 
 
Int. Functional 
  
-0.746 
(-3.17) 
 -0.119 
(-2.63) 
 
Wage Flex. 
  
  -1.459 
(-5.47) 
 
Unempl. Flex. 2.313 
(4.61)  
21.433 
(3.06) 
 1.637 
(2.38) 
 
Union Flex. -0.314 
(-3.90)  
-2.228 
(-2.02) 
 0.722 
(3.16) 
 
Mobility 0.172 
(4.77)  
    
Square of 
Union Flex.   
  -0.437 
(-2.34) 
 
Square of 
Int. Functional   
  0.154 
(2.27) 
 
Overall Flex. 
 
0.313 
(3.38) 
 -25.194 
(-2.72) 
 -1.878 
(-1.88) 
Square of 
Overall Flex.   
 13.672 
(2.57) 
 0.997 
(1.75) 
Region £ 
  
7.16 
0.000 
40.94 
0.000 
16.43 
0.000 
26.01 
0.000 
3.83 
0.0001 
1.3 
0.226 
Year £ 
  
20.53 
0.000 
26.55 
0.000 
7.09 
0.000 
10.99 
0.000 
31.36 
0.000 
29.28 
0.000 
R2 0.982 0.974 0.982 0.980 0.838 0.803 
Adj. R2 0.973 0.964 0.978 0.977 0.805 0.768 
Hetterosk. 
  
5.30 
0.019 
0.35 
0.552 
9.25 
0.002 
7.11 
0.008 
0.08 
0.778 
6.09 
0.014 
Normality 
  
4.57 
0.000 
3.15 
0.000 
3.459 
0.0003 
4.353 
0.00001 
4.003 
0.00003 
2.607 
0.005 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Figures in italics show significance levels. All regressions have been 
estimated with OLS. £: This is an F-test for the joint significance of the fixed effects. See also notes in 
Table 8.1. 
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 The regressions for output growth were those with the worst fit among the 
seven models that we specified. The R2 in the two regressions is just above 80%. On 
the other hand, the residuals from these regressions are much better behaved. The 
basic structural variables (employment growth and investment share) are both 
significant and their coefficients are very stable across specifications. The value of 
the employment growth coefficient is somewhat low, however, while that of the 
investment share (which serves as a proxy for capital growth) is negative.127 
Unemployment and in-migration are both positive, in accordance with our 
expectation that they proxy for the availability of unutilised labour in the area. 
Migration is however insignificant, possibly implying that the major source of 
economic expansion in terms of labour utilisation comes from within the local 
(regional) economies.  
 We now turn to our estimates of the effects of the labour market flexibility 
indicators, as estimated across the set of regressions presented in Tables 8.1 (model 4) 
and 8.4. External numerical flexibility is this time significant, unlike the case of the 
employment effects, with a positive effect on both real wages and productivity (see 
model four in Table 8.1). Although the productivity effect could be interpreted as 
evidence for a positive efficiency effect on labour-use, the wage effect (which is after 
controlling for productivity) suggests that there are further benefits from this type of 
flexibility, beyond the expected productivity gains. Moreover, the argument about 
external numerical flexibility reducing the overall efficiency of the economy is not 
supported by our results.  
                                                 
127
 This negative coefficient is quite standard in the investment share approximation and indicates the 
existence of mean reversal in the growth of physical capital. 
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As with external numerical, internal numerical flexibility is also a significant 
determinant of real wages and, this time, investment and output growth. Its effect on 
wages is positive, as is its output growth effect. This is a conventional result, as the 
more intensive use of internal labour resources is naturally expected to ameliorate 
economic performance and increase labour incomes. The negative investment effect 
probably indicates that the intensification of labour-use can substitute for physical 
capital investment. Unlike numerical flexibility, functional flexibility (internal) is not 
found to have any impact on productivity or wages. This casts doubt on the prior 
expectation that functional flexibility (especially internal) improves the efficiency of 
production and, hence, labour and total-factor productivity. Moreover, this type of 
flexibility is found to have adverse effects on both investment and output growth, 
with the implication that the use of functionally flexible work arrangements is a cost-
saving strategy rather than a dynamic expansion policy and it somehow cancels or 
postpones new investments, thus hindering growth.128  
 Surprisingly, wage flexibility seems to have no impact on either productivity, 
wages or investment. Further, it appears to have an adverse effect on output growth! 
This result clearly favours the non-orthodox approaches to the issue, for which the 
downward adjustability of wages is a tool for passive cost-saving technologies that 
hinder economic performance and has no impact on productivity or investment. This 
argument has been presented in more detail in chapter two and we do not need to 
expand more on it here. In contrast with wage flexibility, flexibility in the treatment 
                                                 
128
 This explanation of the estimated negative coefficients favours the post-keynesianist and neo-
institutionalist approaches to the economics of labour market flexibility. However, due to the way that 
our internal functional flexibility indicator was measured, it is possible that the negative effect is 
spurious in that we failed to totally control for the cyclicality of within-job occupational mobility. 
Moreover, the estimated growth effect of internal functional flexibility is convex, resulting in a 
positive growth effect for extremely high levels of flexibility. For this reason, we treat this finding as 
simply indicative and we do not want to push the argument any further.  
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of the unemployed has a positive effect on all economic indicators. Its effect on 
productivity (and, by implication, on investment and output growth) is in accordance 
with mainstream economic analysis as well as with efficiency wage considerations, 
showing that generous unemployment benefits make the workforce less productive. 
The positive wage effect casts some doubt on the efficiency wage considerations, but 
might be spurious in that our measure of unemployment flexibility is by construction 
positively related to the average wage. 
 Labour mobility is only associated with wages, having a strong positive effect. 
This is again a conventional finding, suggesting that –other things equal, including 
union densities- mobility across jobs, sectors, occupations and regions increases the 
average returns to labour (apparently, through an allocation efficiency or “matching” 
effect). Finally, union flexibility is found to have a strong effect on all four measures 
of economic performance. Wages decline with union flexibility, verifying the wage-
increasing role of unions. However, union-induced wage increases are not 
accompanied by productivity gains. Rather, as shown in models three and four of 
Table 8.1, unionism is strongly associated with lower levels of labour productivity. 
Consequently, output growth is also inversely related to unionism, although this 
relationship is not monotonic (but is negative for all meaningful values of union 
flexibility), as the results in the fifth column of Table 8.4 suggest. On the other hand, 
in line with the argument of the post-keynesian and neo-institutionalist approaches, 
union flexibility is found to have a linear adverse effect on physical capital 
investment. Following this argument, it seems that unionism leads to higher levels of 
investment, as it forces firms to employ more dynamic forms of competition (and 
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constantly modernise their capital structure) and limits their ability to compete on the 
basis of low labour costs.129 
 Aggregate labour market flexibility is found to have mixed effects on the 
economy, as was the case with the more detailed flexibility indexes. Aggregate 
flexibility has a strong positive effect on wages and productivity. The wage effect is 
linear, while that on productivity becomes non-monotonic for very high levels of 
flexibility. The wage effect is after controlling for productivity and is thus a direct 
effect of flexibility on labour compensation. This result might seem surprising, as in 
many respects flexibility is associated in theory with a deterioration of the position of 
labour in the labour market. It is however very robust and rather plausible given our 
estimates on the individual effects of the detailed labour market flexibility indexes 
(especially of numerical flexibility). On the other hand, aggregate flexibility is 
negatively related to investment and output growth. The fact that both estimated 
relationships are convex suggests that intermediate levels of flexibility are inferior to 
extreme cases, a result which stands in contrast with previous findings both in this 
chapter and in the literature (see, for example, Dorwick, 1993). 
Our findings on the investment and growth effects suggest that the benefits of 
flexibility are not universal and come at a cost. In the next sub-section we will discuss 
further these results and make some inferences about the overall role that labour 
market flexibility plays in the economy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
129
 It has to be acknowledged that such an argument is not refuted by all orthodox economic analyses. 
Specifically, the negative role of unions is attributed to their reluctance in accepting new forms of 
production organisation (for example, functional flexibility), rather than opposing new investments.   
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8.3.3. Synopsis of findings 
The results presented in Tables 8.1 to 8.4 are derived after a thorough 
specification analysis, using advanced econometric techniques. Overall, these results 
comply with our prior expectations about the relationships under investigation, 
although not all of them are conventional. Here we attempt to review the obtained 
results in their totality, in order to identify the main conclusions that can be drawn. 
In general, aggregate labour market flexibility has a non-linear impact on 
regional economies. This implies that the debate about the importance of labour 
market flexibility is not a dualistic dilemma, but rather a question of the appropriate 
levels and combinations of specific labour market flexibility elements. Aggregate 
labour market flexibility is beneficial to employment, wages and productivity. 
Regions (and periods) with high levels of flexibility have experienced –controlling 
for a multiple of other factors- higher rates of employment growth, lower 
unemployment, higher labour productivity and higher average wages. On the other 
hand, the same regions (or periods) were characterised by lower levels of investment 
and employment participation, as well as lower rates of economic growth. These 
findings are somewhat puzzling, in that one would expect a productivity-enhancing 
effect also to lead to higher rates of output growth. However, it seems that the effects 
of flexibility are mainly related to the organisation of labour use within production, 
rather to the wider performance of an economy. Specifically, labour market flexibility 
seems to assist a re-configuration of the role of labour in the production, which 
accommodates the expansion of (less secure) employment and the intensification of 
labour use (with consequent increases in labour productivity and wages). However, 
these changes do not foster wider economic expansion. Investment and employment 
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participation decline in this process and, with them, the economy grows at a slower 
rate.  
Of course, this is not a deterministic effect that labour market flexibility will 
always have. The specific quality and mix of flexible labour market arrangements that 
prevail in the economy and the socio-economic context in which they are introduced 
has a direct effect on what the economic impact of aggregate labour market flexibility 
will be. The results relating to the more detailed labour market flexibility indicators 
point to exactly this conclusion. 
As we have already noticed, not all elements of flexibility affect all economic 
indicators. Instead, it is specific elements of flexibility that are found to have an 
impact on specific aspects of economic activity. External numerical flexibility 
(alternatively, the easiness with which firms can utilise external pools of labour 
without fully integrating them into their production process) has no effect on 
employment or output. The direct effects of flexibility on employment are limited 
only to unionism, unemployment benefits and labour mobility. In the same way, it is 
only unemployment flexibility and flexibility in wage bargaining (unionism) that 
have a direct effect on productivity. Internal numerical flexibility reduces 
unemployment and has a positive impact on wages and output growth, despite the 
fact that it is related to lower levels of investment. The effect of functional flexibility 
is very similar, although its income effects are more mixed.  
In contrast to expectations, wage flexibility has very limited effects on the 
economy. Moreover, those that are (statistically) significant are all adverse effects. 
While the unemployment-increasing effect could be spurious (despite our efforts to 
remove any possible simultaneity, as explained in chapter seven), the growth-
Ch.8: Empirical Results 
 
310
decreasing effect leads one to conclude that wage stickiness might have after all some 
positive effects on growth, as Keynesian theory has suggested.  
The most controversial findings are related to the estimated impact of 
unemployment flexibility (the inverse of the effective replacement ratio). Flexibility 
in this element is found to have a positive effect on wages, productivity, investment 
and growth, but also an adverse effect on employment. Among all our flexibility 
measures, this element is the most likely to suffer from endogeneity due to the way 
that it was constructed. Hence, one should be somewhat cautious with interpreting the 
results related to this element of flexibility.  
What seems to have a robust and reliably estimated effect, is flexibility in 
wage bargaining (union flexibility). The decline of unionism and union power 
reduces employment participation, wages and investment, but also unemployment. It 
has a positive impact on employment growth, productivity and the growth of output. 
This is generally in agreement with the view of unions as institutions that increase 
production (labour) costs, reduce employment and economic dynamism, but increase 
investment and –under specific conditions- can help firms adopt more competitive 
methods of production organisation. Finally, labour mobility (across jobs, regions, 
sectors and occupations) increases employment participation and labour incomes, but 
is also related to higher unemployment rates. Again, this last effect is possibly 
spurious, reflecting the impact of different employment opportunities on labour 
mobility, despite that this measure has been adjusted for regional unemployment.   
To conclude, although aggregate flexibility seems to have a positive impact on 
employment and productivity, this is not transmitted to the economy as a whole, as 
the impact on output growth is negative. From the detailed flexibility measures, the 
impact of flexibility in the labour input (numerical, functional and mobility) is 
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limited. Wage and unemployment flexibility, despite their central position in the 
literature, are the least important factors, at least at the aggregate level of analysis 
employed here. Unionism is the most important factor, as has been typically found in 
related empirical studies.  
We will return to the findings presented here later in the next section, when 
we will discuss how our results change when explicit considerations about spatial 
dependence are taken into account in the econometric specifications. It is only after 
this exercise that we will turn to the issue of wage inequalities, where we will contrast 
the estimated efficiency effects of flexibility presented here, with our estimates of its 
inequality effects, as presented in section 8.5.  
 
8.4. Extensions of the empirical analyses 
The empirical investigation presented so far has focused on estimating the 
economic effects of labour market flexibility at the regional level for the UK 
economy over the last two decades. In this section we extend this analysis in three 
independent dimensions. First, we look at some alternative specifications for the 
estimating regressions presented so far, in order to take a closer look at the issue of 
spatial dependence. By using these alternative specifications we also test the 
robustness of the findings obtained from the two-way error component regressions. 
Related to that, the second dimension focuses on the nature of the estimated regional 
fixed effects. We perform a ranking of these effects and compare them across 
regressions and between specifications, thus reaching interesting inferences about 
their geographical distribution and its implications. Finally, we extend our 
investigation of the economic impact of unemployment flexibility by testing a 
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hypothesis that was developed in chapter six, about the role of this form of flexibility 
on regional migration and labour productivity.   
 
8.4.1. Further insights into spatial dependence 
To check the robustness of our empirical results, further analysis of the 
possible form and role of spatial dependence has to be undertaken. As we concluded 
in section 8.2, although the performance of the two-way error component 
specification is undoubtedly satisfactory, the possibility of serial autocorrelation and 
spatial dependence cannot be rejected. Following this, we re-estimated our seven final 
aggregate flexibility regressions (presented in Tables 8.1 to 8.4) using feasible 
Generalised Least Squares and simultaneously allowing for serially and spatially 
autocorrelated and heteroskedastic errors (PSAR1-SARE model) and for temporal 
and spatial fixed effects (two-way FE model). We refer to these regressions as the 
2FE/PSAR1/SARE models. Further, we estimated two more models for each of our 
regressions, introducing alternatively a spatial autoregressive term 
(2FE/SAR/Dependent models) and a spatial lag of the aggregate flexibility index 
(2FE/SAR/Flexibility models). For these two last sets of regressions the standard 
two-way error component specification used earlier was employed.  
The models that include a spatial autoregressive term test directly for the 
presence of spatial autocorrelation, while the ones including the spatial lag of 
aggregate flexibility test for the existence of spatial dependence in labour market 
regulation conditions.130 For the construction of spatial lags we used a spatial weights 
                                                 
130
 Although it would be convenient, it is not possible to include both spatial lags in the same 
regression, due to problems of simultaneity and collinearity.   
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matrix based on a standard distance decay function.131 A number of different beta-
coefficients were tried for the distance decay function. With the exception of the 
productivity and output growth regressions, the flatter function (smaller beta-
coefficient) produced the most significant spatial lags and was thus used in the 
empirical analysis. For productivity and output growth the spatial lag was defined 
with a much steeper distance decay function. Before presenting and evaluating the 
results of the 2FE-SAR regressions, it must be noted that the better performance of 
the flatter distance decay function (against steeper ones) indicates that the pattern of 
spatial dependence –if any- is not as much related to neighbouring effects, as it is 
related to wider economic conditions, or to possible regional clustering (e.g.: the 
“North-South divide”). We will return to this observation later in this section.   
 Table A.8.2 (see Appendix A.8.2) presents the three alternative specifications 
for the employment regressions (as presented in Table 8.3), while Table A.8.3 
presents the same specifications for the regressions on the other economic 
performance indicators (as presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.4). Each triplet of columns 
refers to the three alternative specifications for each dependent variable. The 
2FE/PSAR1/SARE regressions (first column in each triplet) perform very well, with 
most of the estimated coefficients exhibiting an increase in their statistical 
significance, compared to the simple 2FE results. The signs of the estimated 
coefficients do not change under this specification, with the exception of the 
technological intensity and investment coefficients in the employment-population and 
employment growth regressions, respectively (Table A.8.2). Generally, the values of 
                                                 
131
 Distance between regions (say, A and B) was measured as the travel time (in hours) between the 
main urban agglomeration of region A and that of region B. Distances and travel times were obtained 
on-line from the Shell GeoStar “path-finder” (available at www.shellgeostar.com). 
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the estimated slope coefficients are now lower, compared to the regressions presented 
in Tables 8.1-8.4, but this is mainly due to the fact that a larger part of the variability 
of the dependent variables is now explained by the imposed structure of the residuals 
(heteroskedastic, spatially and serially autoregressive errors). Interestingly, despite 
the general increase in the statistical significance of the estimates, the significance of 
the aggregate flexibility index (and its square) in most of the cases declines. Quite 
heroically, this can be interpreted as evidence suggesting that the estimated flexibility 
coefficients in the 2FE models of the previous section capture some of the spatial 
dependence in the determination of the dependent variables.132  
 The second column in each triplet reports the results from the models that 
include both spatial and temporal fixed effects and a spatial lag of the aggregate 
flexibility index. The results in this case are effectively identical to the ones obtained 
in the regressions presented in the previous section, and so is the overall fit of the 
regressions. The spatial lag of flexibility is only significant in the productivity 
regression (second column in Table A.8.3), where it has a positive sign, indicating a 
positive spatial spill-over effect. It is marginally insignificant for the cases of (log) 
wages, unemployment, employment growth and employment participation, while it is 
totally insignificant for the cases of investment and output growth. Despite their 
(marginal) insignificance, the estimated spatial flexibility lags for the wage, 
employment-to-population and unemployment regressions indicate the existence of a 
spatial re-enforcement (spill-over) effect, with higher flexibility in neighbouring 
regions strengthening further the local flexibility effect. It is only in the employment 
                                                 
132
 We do not wish to stress this point further, but it is worth mentioning that the results obtained from 
the second set of regressions (2FE/SAR in flexibility) at least do not reject this assumption.  
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growth regression that a negative effect is found, in the sense that local employment 
grows slower the more flexible the neighbouring labour markets.  
As this could be taken to suggest that part of the non-linearities in the 
investigated relationships have a geographical origin, it is important to note that the 
inclusion of the spatial lag of flexibility does not reduce the significance of the 
quadratic term for the local flexibility variable in any of the regressions. Hence, it 
seems that the spatial spill-over effects of flexibility are not responsible for the non-
linearities observed in the relationship between labour market flexibility and 
economic outcomes.  
In contrast to the spatial lag of flexibility, the spatial autoregressive term 
included in the third model of each triplet (spatial lag of the dependent variable) is 
always significant. This finding is as expected, suggesting at first sight that regional 
economic outcomes are not determined in isolation from the surrounding regions. 
Positive spatial spill-overs exist for productivity, wages and output growth. On the 
other hand, a negative spatial autoregressive coefficient is found for the cases of 
investment, unemployment, employment-to-population and employment growth. This 
result suggests the presence of a competition effect among regions. Specifically, it 
seems reasonable to infer that, as far as it concerns evolutions about investment and 
employment, neighbouring regions compete with each other for the necessary 
resources.  
These two findings, of a positive spill-over effect in terms of incomes and 
productivity and of a negative neighbourhood effect in terms of employment and 
investment, relate well to our earlier distinction between two possible forms of spatial 
dependence. We view the positive spill-overs as an indication of spatial homogeneity, 
where outcomes are determined at a national level and then diffused to the regional 
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economies. In contrast, we consider the negative spill-overs as capturing a pure 
spatial dependence effect (spatial correlation), with neighbouring regions competing 
with one another for the allocation of capital and labour. This explanation is 
consistent with our discussion earlier in chapter six of the two possible (but not 
mutually exclusive) forms of spatial dependence but shows the limitations of the 
assumption that the UK regions can be treated as mini-economies. This, despite the 
fact that, having said that, the exclusion of the spatial autoregressive terms does not 
seem to result in any significant loss of analytical accuracy.   
 
8.4.2. The nature of the fixed effects 
 Throughout this chapter it has been argued that there is some complementarity 
between spatial dependence and fixed effects. In the previous section we saw that 
both possible forms of spatial dependence (spatial homogeneity and spatial 
correlation) are present in the determination of economic outcomes. Additionally, in 
all estimating regressions, significant temporal and regional effects were found. 
Naturally, the question arises as to the nature and geography of these effects.  
 Although the size of our sample does not allow a thorough investigation of the 
determinants of the regional fixed effects, it is still possible to explore their 
geographical distribution. Such an exercise can possibly offer further insights into the 
forms of spatial dependence as discussed in the previous section. While the absolute 
value of the estimated fixed effects as such is of little interest (among others, for 
reasons related to measurement), their relative value shows the position of each 
Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Economic Performance 
 
317
region in the distribution of bottom-line economic conditions.133 Table 8.5 presents 
the ranking of the UK regions according to the spatial fixed effects as they have been 
estimated from the simple two-way FE regressions (top panel) and from the two-way 
FE-SAR regressions with spatial autocorrelation (lower panel).134 It also presents a 
number of correlation coefficients showing the association between the two sets of 
rankings, as well as that between these two sets and two economic structure 
indicators, namely the share of manufacturing employment and the share of 
employment in the banking and financial sectors (bottom panel).  
 At first, the ranking of the fixed effects does not reveal any straightforward 
pattern. For example, Greater London and the rest of the South East have the highest 
bottom-line levels of productivity and real wages and the lowest levels of 
unemployment. On the other hand, their ranking on employment participation and 
investment is reversed. Nevertheless, a closer inspection allows one to identify a 
weak geographical clustering in the rankings, with southern regions doing better in 
terms of unemployment, productivity and wages but worse in terms of investment.  
As discussed in previous parts of this chapter, the fixed effects estimated from 
the 2FE regressions might be capturing some of the spatial and temporal 
autocorrelation in the models. If this is true, the rankings of the second panel, which 
refer to fixed effects estimated from the spatially autoregressive 2FE models, should 
                                                 
133
 By the term “bottom-line” we mean the conditions that are specific to each region before the effect 
of any of the identified determinants (explanatory variables). This, of course, assumes that the 
estimated models do not suffer from any omitted variables problems.  
134
 Northern Ireland has been excluded from the results reported in Table 8.5. Although the inclusion 
of Northern Ireland does not affect the substance of the arguments developed here, it does artificially 
weaken the correlations presented in the last panel of Table 8.5, as this region behaves in many 
respects as an outlier. In their analysis of the regional evolutions of the prices of labour market 
characteristics, Duranton and Monastiriotis (2000) find N. Ireland to behave similar to London, 
although in terms of its economic structure and performance it much more closely resembles the more 
backward regions of the UK. Also, note that no results are presented for the (employment and output) 
growth equations, as the region-specific effects were not always significant for these cases.  
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measure more accurately the true regional fixed effects. Moreover, if the form of 
spatial dependence captured by the autoregressive term is the only form of spatial 
dependence present, one would expect the fixed effects -if significant- to be randomly 
distributed across regions.  
 
Table 8.5: Regional fixed effects from 2FE and 2FE-SAR regressions 
 Employment-
to-population 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
Real 
productivity 
Log of real 
wage 
Real 
investment 
(1) Fixed effects from 2FE models 
Smaller East Anglia Gr. London West Midlands East Anglia East Anglia 
 
RoSE RoSE North West North South West 
 
Wales East Anglia North East Midlands Gr. London 
 
East Midlands South West Wales Wales Wales 
 
South West Scotland East Midlands York East Midlands 
 
York Wales York West Midlands North 
 
West Midlands East Midlands Scotland Scotland West Midlands 
 
Scotland York South West South West RoSE 
 
North North West East Anglia North West York 
 
North West West Midlands RoSE RoSE North West 
Larger Gr. London North Gr. London Gr. London Scotland 
(2) Fixed effects from 2FE-SAR (autoregressive term) models 
Smaller North Gr. London West Midlands North East Anglia 
 
Scotland RoSE North West York South West 
 
York East Anglia North Wales Gr. London 
 
North West South West Wales East Midlands East Midlands 
 
East Midlands Wales East Midlands Scotland West Midlands 
 
Wales East Midlands York West Midlands RoSE 
 
South West Scotland Scotland East Anglia Wales 
 
East Anglia York South West North West North 
 
West Midlands North West East Anglia South West York 
 
RoSE West Midlands RoSE RoSE North West 
Larger Gr. London North Gr. London Gr. London Scotland 
Correlations  
(1) - (2) 0.210 0.996 0.999 0.946 0.924 
(1) - Manuf. -0.200 0.737 -0.749 -0.649 0.125 
(1) – B&F 0.524 -0.656 0.654 0.951 -0.192 
(2) - Manuf. -0.555 0.726 -0.730 -0.695 0.189 
(2) – B&F 0.896 -0.681 0.655 0.890 -0.271 
Notes: The last panel presents correlation coefficients between the distribution of the estimated fixed 
effects ((1) and (2)) and the regional employment shares of manufacturing and banking and finance 
(B&F).  
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In contrast, as we observe from the second panel of Table 8.5, the evidence 
for geographical clustering in the rankings of the fixed effects is stronger for the 
spatially autoregressive regressions. Evidence of clustering is now obtained also from 
the fixed effects of the employment participation regression, which is the regression 
with the strongest spatial autoregressive term. The ranking of the fixed effects for this 
regression changes significantly between the two specifications (compare the 
correlation coefficients in the first row of the third panel). In other words, when 
controlling for spatial dependence, the evidence of a spatial proximity (clustering) 
effect is amplified. Southern regions have -everything else set equal to zero- higher 
employment-to-population ratios, higher wages and productivity, and lower levels of 
investment and unemployment. Northern regions exhibit the reverse economic 
conditions, while the midlands stand somewhere in the middle. We are led to 
conclude that, if anything, there is clear evidence of a North-South divide, especially 
after controlling for spatial dependence. 
It is, of course, somewhat puzzling that the evidence of spatial clustering is 
stronger when we control for spatial autocorrelation. One reasonable explanation for 
this is that there is more than one form of spatial dependence characterising our data 
(and, hence, the determination of economic outcomes in Britain). To examine this 
possibility, we correlated the estimated fixed effects with two measures of industrial 
composition (employment shares of manufacturing and banking and finance). The 
results presented in the last panel of Table 8.5 indicate a clear positive correlation 
between the employment share of banking and finance and the fixed effects and a 
clear negative correlation between the latter and the share of manufacturing 
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employment.135 Bottom-line productivity and wages are higher in the more service-
oriented regions, while unemployment is higher in regions where manufacturing is 
relatively more dominant. It is only the fixed effects of investment that seem not to be 
related to the industrial structure of the regional economies. 
This finding has a very strong implication. There is a form of spatial 
dependence manifesting itself as geographical clustering (the North-South divide) and 
being strongly related to the industrial structure of the regional economies. This is 
successfully captured in our estimating regressions by the regional fixed effects. On 
the other hand, another form of spatial dependence is also present. This is captured by 
the spatial autoregressive terms in the 2FE-SAR regressions (as presented in Tables 
A.8.2 and A.8.3) and is related to economic proximity (spatial autocorrelation).  
We can contrast this observation to our conclusion of the previous section to 
reach an overall conclusion about the nature of spatial dependence that characterises 
the relationships we investigated. A spatial homogeneity effect transmits national 
outcomes to the regional economies. This procedure is filtered through some regional 
fixed effects, which take the form of a geographical clustering (the North-South 
divide) and which are related to the industrial structure of the regional economies. 
Another form of spatial dependence -that of economic proximity- is also present, as 
regions compete with one another to attract factor flows -namely of labour and 
capital-, with a positive development in one region having adverse effects to its 
neighbouring regions. The spatial homogeneity and geographical clustering effects 
are stronger for some macro-economic indicators, like unemployment, productivity, 
                                                 
135
 Note that the significance of the estimated correlations does not imply that the original regressions 
are mis-specified. Rather, it suggests that industrial structure, apart from any slope effects it has on 
economic outcomes has also a threshold effect.  
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wages and output growth. In contrast, the spatial autocorrelation effect is more 
specific to the factor-demand side of the economy, particularly employment growth 
and investment.   
 
8.4.3. Unemployment flexibility, migration and productivity 
We take now a closer look at the role of unemployment flexibility. We saw in 
chapter six that the treatment of the unemployed can have an impact on a regional 
economy, which goes beyond the direct economic and spatial proximity effects, as 
these have been estimated in sections 8.3 and 8.4.2. Specifically, there is the 
possibility of a second-level economic effect of unemployment flexibility that 
operates through migration. This effect is twofold. First, higher levels of 
unemployment flexibility, apart from their direct productivity-enhancing effect, can 
generate out-migration, as they reduce the returns to unemployment in the region. 
This can create labour shortages in the region and pose problems to further economic 
expansion. Second, everything else equal, out-migration is associated to outflows of 
human capital, as -for constant across regions wage premiums related to skills- the 
probability of migrating is positively correlated to skills. In other words, low 
unemployment benefits might be contemporaneously associated with higher levels of 
productivity but, by not withholding the (skilful) temporarily unemployed inside the 
region, they result to declines in labour productivity in subsequent periods.  
Effectively, this rationale leads to two research hypotheses that can be 
examined either simultaneously or in isolation. First, one can investigate the effect of 
unemployment flexibility on migration. Then, one can assess the relationship between 
lagged unemployment flexibility and labour productivity, taking into account the 
effect of the former on migration. Examining simultaneously these research 
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hypotheses requires the application of IV, which is not without problems, as 
discussed in section 8.2. Hence, we estimated the two regressions related to the 
research hypotheses independently, although we also experimented with the IV 
estimations, as discussed below.  
 
Table 8.6: Unemployment flexibility and migration  
In-migration rate OLS RE/FE 2-FE 2-FE 
Constant 0.0104 
(3.95) 
0.0021 
(1.13) 
-0.0078 
(-1.94) 
0.1912 
(3.91) 
Real Wage -0.00002 
(-3.27) 
-4.8e-06 
(-0.96) 
0.0001 
(3.72) 
0.0001 
(4.61) 
Unemployment -0.0004 
(-3.88) 
-0.0001 
(-1.06) 
-0.0010 
(-4.76) 
-0.0011 
(-5.02) 
Output per capita growth 0.0142 
(2.60) 
0.0025 
(0.55) 
0.0009 
(0.14) 
-0.0004 
(-0.07) 
Unemployment flexibility - - - -0.2240 
(-4.08) 
Region - 31.45+ 
0.000 
31.09+ 
0.000 
9.52+ 
0.000 
Year - - 1.45+ 
(0.108) 
2.38+ 
(0.002) 
R2 (Adj. R2) 0.08 
(0.07) 
0.08 
(-) 
0.68 
(0.63) 
0.70 
(0.66) 
Heterosk. 24.67  
0.000 
- 25.64 
0.000 
26.52 
0.000 
Breush-Pagan - 676.02++ 
0.000 
- - 
Hausman - 0.001++ 
0.999 
- - 
Notes: +: This is an F-test for the significance of the fixed effects. ++: The Brausch-Pagan and Hausman 
tests approve the fixed-effects model against the random-effects model and against the no-effects 
model.  
 
Table 8.6 presents the empirical investigation of the role of unemployment 
flexibility on migration, as discussed in section 6.4. In the first three models we try 
different econometric specifications, starting from a simple pooled regression 
estimated with OLS. When we test for region-specific effects (second column) the 
Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests indicate that the performance of the model is 
improved when region-specific fixed effects are also included. Employing a two-way 
error component specification (third column) improves further the performance of the 
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estimating regression. Hence, the final model, where our measure of unemployment 
flexibility is introduced, is estimated using a two-way fixed effects specification.  
As we have already discussed, according to economic orthodoxy high 
unemployment benefits (lower levels of unemployment flexibility) must make local 
unemployed workers more reluctant to migrate (while they will also make some 
unemployed people from other areas migrate in the high-benefits – low-flexibility 
area). If this was the case, we should find a significant negative relationship between 
unemployment flexibility and immigration. Indeed, this is what the empirical results 
show, as higher unemployment flexibility is found to reduce net in-migration. The 
stability and signs of the other coefficients increases our faith on the robustness of 
this finding.136 Hence, the rationale suggesting that “high-benefit areas are also high 
unemployment areas from which people out-migrate” (implying a positive 
relationship between flexibility and in-migration) is not supported by our data. It is 
still possible, however, that high benefits have a positive impact on productivity by 
retaining the temporarily unemployed in the region, until they get a new job. As the 
most likely to migrate are the high-skilled, this possible withholding could result in 
discouraging the outflow of the region’s human capital (“brain drain”), thus 
increasing labour productivity in the next period.  
This possibility is not directly rejected by our data, although it was impossible 
to find a significant negative relationship between lagged unemployment flexibility 
and labour productivity. The last column of Table 8.1 (section 8.2.2) reported a 
regression of labour productivity on the one-year lag of unemployment flexibility. 
When holding constant the impact of migration, unemployment flexibility has a clear 
                                                 
136
 Note that in the approved specification (2-way FE), the sign of the wage coefficient is correct 
(positive).  
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positive impact on productivity (column 4), indicating a motivation relationship, 
where high unemployment benefits encourage workers to shirk and discourage them 
from investing in human capital. When not controlling for migration, unemployment 
flexibility fails to be significant at any level (model 6). Further, our preliminary 
experimentation with the IV regressions (not reported), where migration is 
instrumented with unemployment flexibility and the control variables of Table 8.6, 
suggested that the (positive) productivity effect of migration is much stronger when 
its endogeneity is controlled for, implying that unemployment flexibility has a 
negative productivity effect operating through migration. These results indicate that 
although the motivation effect of unemployment flexibility on productivity seems to 
dominate, the withholding effect is also present.  
 
8.5. Labour market flexibility and wage inequalities 
In this section we turn our focus to the issue of wage inequalities. We first look 
at the different forms of wage inequalities that might be of interest to economic 
research and then perform an empirical investigation on the impact of labour market 
flexibility on one specific form of wage inequalities. Our focus is on cross-personal 
inequalities in wages, although cross-regional inequalities in average wages and in 
within-regions wage distributions are also considered. The next sub-section discusses 
these issues.  
  
8.5.1. Forms of wage inequalities 
The last two decades have witnessed a well-reported increase in cross-
personal wage inequalities, both in the UK and elsewhere. As we discussed in more 
detail in chapters two and four, changes in female labour force participation, 
Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Economic Performance 
 
325
technology and international trade explain only a limited amount of either the trends 
or the levels of cross-personal wage dispersions. The role of institutional factors, 
mainly trade unionism and minimum wage legislation, has also been investigated in 
the literature. As our empirical investigation of chapter four showed, for a sample of 
OECD countries, the decline in trade unionism (in terms both of size and power) is 
the single most important factor, among all labour market institutions, responsible for 
the widened wage inequalities in the OECD.  
Of course, labour market institutions, as well as the other factors identified in 
the literature, are possible determinants not only of inequalities among persons, but 
also of inequalities among regions. Labour market flexibility in particular can 
generate regional inequalities in two ways. First, there is the possibility of an effect 
operating through average wages. If flexibility increases (or reduces) average wages, 
regional differences in labour market flexibility -other things equal- will produce 
regional differences in average wages, resulting to regional wage dispersions. Second, 
if labour market flexibility is responsible for wider wage inequalities across people, it 
is possible that regions with different skill, occupational and gender compositions of 
their labour forces will exhibit different average wage levels. Again, this effect will 
manifest itself as regional wage dispersions.  
There is also a third domain of wage inequalities where labour market 
institutions can have an impact, that of regional differences in within-region (cross-
personal) wage inequalities. Recent evidence for the UK (Monastiriotis, 2000) 
suggests that regional wage differentials are only a minor part of cross-personal wage 
inequalities. The major part of the latter is related to occupational and educational 
wage differentials. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the structure of such 
wage differentials differs across regions. In other words, there are relatively small 
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regional dispersions in the first moments (average regional wages), but rather 
substantial regional dispersions in the second moments (standard deviation of 
regional wages). Figure 8.1 reproduces the evolution of regional differences in 
within-regions wage dispersions for the British regions from Monastiriotis (2000).  
 
  Figure 8.1: The evolution of regional differences in wage dispersions  
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As it can be seen, this form of regional inequalities has risen during the 1980s 
and declined in the 1990s (“total effect”). There is a strong trend towards regional 
convergence in the distributions of measured characteristics (gender composition, 
education and experience) and their prices (returns) throughout the period 
(“characteristics effect” and “price effect”, respectively). This trend is slowed down 
(while in the 1980s it was totally cancelled) by the increase in unexplained regional 
differences (“residual effect”, including the sectoral and occupational distribution of 
regional employment and the returns to occupational and sectoral characteristics). 
Although intuitively labour market institutions and labour market flexibility in 
particular could be considered as possible determinants of this evolution, our 
preliminary investigation, as well as the more detailed evidence presented in 
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Monastiriotis (2000), suggest that the effect of the latter on this form of regional 
inequalities is minimal, if significant at all.  
With this observation, the interest as far as it concerns regional dispersions 
turns to the impact of labour market flexibility on regional inequalities in average 
wages. As stated already, changes in labour market flexibility can generate changes in 
the levels of cross-regional wage inequalities by affecting differently average wages 
across regions. In the light of increasing (or, at least, non-decreasing) regional wage 
inequalities, we wanted to test the role played by increasing labour market flexibility. 
Duranton and Monastiriotis (2000) have presented detailed evidence suggesting that 
the increase in regional inequalities in the UK over the last two decades is solely 
attributable to national labour market developments. Cross-personal and cross-
regional wage inequalities have risen following the significant increases in the returns 
to experience and education and females labour force participation. Although all these 
factors exhibited regional convergence over the same period, this led to increased 
regional wage disparities, as a result of the uneven distribution of human capital 
(experience and education) across regions.  
The finding that wage inequalities (across both regions and people) have 
increased because of increases in the returns to human capital is consistent with the 
argument about skilled-biased technological change (see for example, Berman et al., 
1998 and Kiley, 1999). It is also consistent with an explanation stressing the role of 
labour market flexibility. Specifically, it is reasonable to assume that the deregulation 
of labour relations had a liberating role for the supply and demand forces and that, 
consequently, labour market flexibility allowed the returns to human capital (and thus 
wage inequalities) to increase. We tried to test this possibility by performing a 
number of time-series regressions on the standard deviation of regional wages. 
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Although most of the economic factors were not significant in explaining the 
evolution of regional dispersions over time, the variables measuring regional 
variations in female labour force participation rates as well as national returns to 
education and experience (human capital) were found to be significantly and 
positively related to regional wage disparities.137 Interestingly, these three variables 
explained more than 80% of the evolution of regional wage dispersions in our sample 
years.138 In contrast, the inclusion of the labour market flexibility variables (either the 
detailed or the aggregate indexes) did not improve the performance of the regressions. 
All forms of labour market flexibility were insignificant in all specifications, 
including quadratic and log-linear models. By implication, we had to conclude that 
labour market deregulation has not been responsible for the evolution of regional 
wage inequalities over the last two decades.  
 In the light of these results, our focus turned on the impact of labour market 
flexibility on cross-personal wage inequalities within regions, which is presented in 
the next section. This investigation is analogous to the one presented in chapter four, 
for the OECD countries. However, the results from these two exercises are not 
directly comparable, as the structure of the labour market flexibility indicators differs 
among them, as do the measures of wage inequality that we use (a measure of range 
in chapter four and the standard deviation of regional wages here).  
 
 
                                                 
137
 Among the other factors that we tried were productivity, technological intensity, industrial 
composition and migration. The non-significance of such variables is not particularly puzzling, 
especially given the results obtained for the returns to human capital. Returns to education and 
experience have been estimated from a large number of regional wage equations, based on data derived 
from the Family Expenditure Survey, as explained in Duranton and Monastiriotis (2000).  
138
 Additionally, the overall performance of the regressions was satisfactory, as there was little 
evidence of any problems associated to heteroskedasticity or serial autocorrelation.  
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8.5.2. Cross-personal wage inequalities 
 As was also discussed in section 4.4, there is little information in the literature 
about the possible ways in which one could model the determination of cross-
personal wage inequalities at an aggregate level. Economic theory and economic 
intuition suggest that factors like international trade and technological change might 
play a significant role. However, for our cross-regional (panel) analysis, such factors 
were either constant across space or impossible to quantify. In the first case, this does 
not result in any bias in the estimation of the regressions, as the constant-across-space 
effects, if they are significant, will be successfully captured by some time-specific 
fixed effects. In a similar way, some significant spatially variable determinants of 
wage inequalities (e.g.: openness to trade) might be successfully captured by region-
specific effects or by some other explanatory variables.139 On the other hand, theory 
identifies a number of possible determinants of cross-personal wage inequalities at 
the micro-level. Such factors include female labour force participation, the skill and 
occupational composition of the workforce and labour mobility. These factors are 
indirectly derived from a standard wage equation framework, where an individual’s 
wage is a function of her education, skills, occupation, sector of employment, and 
labour market experience (or age).  
Under these considerations, our model made wage inequalities a function of 
some measures of regional workforce characteristics. Consequently, the original 
model included the following variables: professionals as a share of total employment, 
to control for the occupational composition of employment; education (average years 
                                                 
139
 Think of the openness to trade case. If openness is the result of some structural characteristics that 
are quite constant over time (e.g.: a country’s capital is normally more integrated to the international 
economy than most of the country’s regions), region-specific effects will be sufficient controls for this 
effect. Also, if openness is related to the industrial structure of a region, the latter will be sufficient in 
controlling for the effect of the former. 
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of schooling), to control for the skills of the regional workforce; the female 
employment share, to control for the presence of (typically, less well-paid) females in 
the workforce; the share of manufacturing employment, to control for industrial 
composition; and the share of employment in banking and finance, to control for the 
typically higher labour compensations in the business services sector. Additionally, 
the following variables were originally included, to control for less workforce-
specific determinants of wage inequalities: regional unemployment rate, net in-
migration rate and a measure of the demand for skills in the region.140 Unemployment 
is included as a control for the possibility that workers accept a more unequal pay 
(e.g., compensation below the minimum wage) when their probability of finding 
alternative employment is lower. However, unemployment could also reduce average 
wages and thus artificially lead to a narrowing of wage dispersions inside the region. 
In-migration is assumed to control for the availability of external pools of labour, but 
it could also be capturing an element showing the attractiveness of the regional 
economy. In this respect, both the impact of unemployment on wage inequalities and 
that of in-migration can go either way. Finally, the demand-for-skills variable is 
included as a proxy for skill biased technological change and is expected to enter with 
a positive sign in the estimating regressions.  
Following the results obtained in the previous section, the original model was 
specified as a two-way error component model, including both region-specific and 
time-specific fixed effects. However, the fixed effects were always insignificant, 
despite our experimentation with different functional forms and econometric 
specifications, including log-linear and semi-log models, as well as spatially and 
                                                 
140
 The “demand for skills” variable, obtained from Duranton and Monastiriotis (2000), is derived from 
a panel of wage equations and calculated as the estimated returns to skills in each region for each year.  
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temporally autoregressive models. Moreover, not all explanatory variables from the 
original model were found to be significant. Specifically, the female, manufacturing 
and banking employment shares were always insignificant, despite our prior 
expectations. The growth of employment in banking and finance was in some 
specifications significant, but its overall performance indicated that this variable 
offered little additional information and should, therefore, be dropped. In any case, 
this did not affect our estimates of the labour market flexibility effects.  
These results have significant implications. The insignificance of the sectoral 
composition variables and of the temporal effects indicates that international factors 
like (openness to) international trade and globalisation have had little impact on 
within-regions wage inequalities in the UK over the last two decades. The 
insignificance of the regional fixed effects suggests that the same forces that generate 
and perpetuate wage inequalities in the UK operate in all regions. Finally, the 
insignificance of the female employment variable verifies the results found elsewhere 
(Machin, 1998; Monastiriotis, 2000; Duranton and Monastiriotis, 2000) that the 
increase in cross-personal wage inequalities is mainly the effect of changes in the 
distribution of, and returns to, skills and occupational status.  
Table 8.7 presents the main results from our cross-personal wage inequalities 
regressions. The first column reports the results for the basic model, excluding the 
theoretical variables that were always insignificant, as discussed above. As the fixed 
effects were also insignificant, the basic model has been estimated with simple OLS. 
The fit of the regression is satisfactory and typical for such kinds of exercises. All the 
micro-level structural variables are highly significant and have the expected signs. 
Cross-personal wage inequalities increase with education, professional employment 
and the demand for skills. The last effect is an indirect verification of the role that 
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skill-biased technological change can have on wage inequalities (Berman et al., 
1998). Unemployment and in-migration are at the margins of significance and both 
enter with a negative sign, possibly indicating that for each variable both effects 
considered earlier are in operation, with the wage-reducing effect for unemployment 
and the attractiveness effect for migration dominating. 
The model in the second column adds some of the detailed labour market 
flexibility indexes to the original model. Some of those indexes, like external 
numerical flexibility and labour mobility, were not significant in any specification 
and have thus been excluded. The estimated coefficients for our control variables are 
very robust to the inclusion of these indexes, increasing our confidence on the model 
specification. The inclusion of the flexibility indexes increases the fit of the 
regressions by more than 10%, while the regression residuals are well behaved 
(normal and homoskedastic). Internal flexibility is found to increase within-regions 
wage inequalities although the effect of internal functional flexibility is non-linear 
and, for extreme values, becomes negative. In contrast, the impact of wage and 
unemployment flexibility is negative, although at the margin of (in)significance.  
The wage-inequality effects of unemployment and wage flexibility are highly 
surprising, as we would expect that wage stickiness and generous unemployment 
benefits would lead to a more equivocal distribution of wages across the workforce. 
This result is also in contrast with our findings of chapter four, but is very robust 
across different specifications.141 Quite surprising is also the result obtained for 
unionism flexibility. This variable has the correct sign (positive) but is not significant 
                                                 
141
 One possible explanation is that the estimated unemployment flexibility coefficient is capturing the 
effect at the middle-to-top part of the wage distribution. It is possible that unemployment flexibility 
increases the range of the wage distribution but reduces its standard deviation, by compressing wage 
differentials across workers receiving close-to-average wages. Such an explanation is compatible with 
both the results presented here and those presented in Table 4.5.  
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at any acceptable level, in contrast with the findings in chapter four and numerous 
relevant studies in the literature. More striking is the finding that aggregate flexibility 
is not significant in the determination of wage inequalities (results not shown here). 
Given the statistical insignificance of some of the detailed flexibility indexes, 
however, we view this result as being specific to our sample (and, thus, to the specific 
mix of flexible labour market arrangements).  
The models presented in the next three columns of Table 8.7 deal with further 
specification issues, specifically with the issue of temporal autocorrelation and spatial 
dependence. The regression in the fourth column introduces spatial dependence in the 
form of spatial autocorrelation in the dependent variable (using a rather steep distance 
decay function, which was found to perform better than flatter ones). The fourth 
model uses an alternative specification for spatial dependence, replacing the spatially 
autoregressive term with a spatial lag of overall (aggregate) flexibility, which has the 
same distance decay function as the spatially autoregressive term. As it can be seen, 
the spatially autoregressive term is highly insignificant, while the spatial lag of 
aggregate flexibility is marginally significant. The positive coefficient indicates a 
clear neighbourhood domino effect, where proximity to flexible labour markets (but 
not local labour market flexibility) generates wider wage inequalities. This result calls 
for a more careful investigation of the spatial effects of specific elements of labour 
market flexibility. However, this would require an extensive investigation of possible 
forms of spatial dependence and is thus left for future research. This decision is 
further strengthened by the fact that the estimated spatial-lag effect is only significant 
at the 10% level.   
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Table 8.7: Wage inequalities and labour market flexibility 
Regressors OLS OLS OLS-SAR OLS-SAR PSAR1-SARE 
Constant 
0.1681 
(3.25) 
6.1972 
(1.94) 
6.2266 
(1.94) 
6.4875 
(2.04) 
4.9934 
(3.48) 
Professionals 
0.1857 
(3.18) 
0.1864 
(2.88) 
0.1936 
(2.97) 
0.1934 
(3.01) 
0.1633 
(3.81) 
Education 
0.0175 
(4.02) 
0.0167 
(3.31) 
0.0158 
(3.06) 
0.0108 
(1.84) 
0.0128 
(4.23) 
Unemployment 
-0.0014 
(-1.53) 
-0.0021 
(-1.26) 
-0.0019 
(-1.16) 
-0.0024 
(-1.49) 
-0.0008 
(-0.95) 
Migration 
-1.0832 
(-1.69) 
-1.6737 
(-1.84) 
-1.6806 
(-1.85) 
-1.7845 
(-1.98) 
-1.5968 
(-3.09) 
Demand for skills 
1.2869 
(8.13) 
1.1862 
(7.15) 
1.1518 
(6.74) 
1.1277 
(6.73) 
1.0249 
(9.52) 
Internal numerical  
0.0816 
(2.03) 
0.0627 
(1.37) 
0.0497 
(1.15) 
0.1197 
(5.08) 
Internal functional  
0.1596 
(2.77) 
0.1625 
(2.81) 
0.1544 
(2.69) 
0.1977 
(6.33) 
Wage flexibility  
-0.1000 
(-1.62) 
-0.0941 
(-1.51) 
-0.1669 
(-2.36) 
-0.0198 
(-0.64) 
Unemployment flexibility  
-12.627 
(-1.83) 
-12.7719 
(-1.85) 
-13.3268 
(-1.95) 
-10.1298 
(-3.29) 
Unionism flexibility  
0.0385 
(0.90) 
0.0328 
(0.76) 
0.0367 
(0.87) 
0.0572 
(2.66) 
Square of unempl. flex.  
6.5930 
(1.78) 
6.6527 
(1.80) 
6.8809 
(1.87) 
5.2204 
(3.16) 
Square of int. functional  
-0.1908 
(-2.65) 
-0.1988 
(-2.74) 
-0.2032 
(-2.83) 
-0.2084 
(-4.91) 
Spatial lag   
0.1519 D 
(0.85) 
0.3085 E 
(1.91) 
 
R-squared  
(Adj. R2) 
0.373 
(0.357) 
0.424 
(0.388) 
0.426 
(0.387) 
0.435 
(0.396) 
342.19 
0.00 F 
Heteroskedasticity 
0.05 
0.823 
0.02 
0.900 
0.05 
0.819 
0.01 
0.933 
 
Normality 
2.85 
0.002 
2.25 
0.012 
2.32 
0.010 
2.38 
0.009 
 
Notes: t-statistics (z-statistics for the GLS regressions) in parentheses. Figures in italics show 
significance levels. As the fixed effects and 2-way fixed effects models were rejected at all levels of 
significance, all but the last regressions have been estimated with OLS. The FGLS regression (last 
column) allowed for first-order serial autocorrelation for the dependent variable, with panel-specific 
autocorrelation coefficients (PSAR1), and for spatially autocorrelated heteroskedastic errors (SARE).. 
D: Spatial lag of the dependent variable. E: Spatial lag of the aggregate flexibility index. F: This is a LR-
test for the joint significance of the regressors 
 
Given these considerations, as well as the fact the inclusion of the spatial lags 
does not add much information to the original model, in the last column we report the 
results from an alternative model, which applies a feasible GLS estimation, allowing 
for a general form of spatial autocorrelation and panel-specific serial autocorrelation 
in the regression errors. As it can be seen from comparing the significance of the 
regressors, the performance of the regression is substantially improved when both 
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spatial and temporal residual autocorrelation is introduced. Further, some of the 
results become now more compliant with our prior expectations. Professional 
employment, education and the demand for skills are still highly significant and 
remarkably stable. Interestingly, unemployment becomes now totally insignificant, 
while the in-migration effect is now strengthened. More importantly, wage flexibility 
is in this case insignificant, which is a much more plausible scenario compared to the 
negative effect estimated before. Above all, union flexibility has now a highly 
significant positive coefficient, which is in accordance to both intuition and the vast 
majority of findings in the literature. Finally, the impact of internal flexibility (both 
numerical and functional) remains positive and significant, as before. Still, overall 
flexibility is insignificant (results not shown).  
 
8.5.3. Synopsis of findings – implications  
 In this section we attempted to estimate the impact of labour market flexibility 
on wage inequalities. There are various forms of wage inequalities that one could 
consider. The three forms that we considered here were inequalities between regions, 
within regions (across people) and between regional wage distributions. Our 
preliminary investigation revealed that labour market flexibility offers little 
information in the explanation of regional wage inequalities, in both the first (average 
wages) and second (standard deviation of wages) moments. In other words, labour 
market flexibility was not found to be significant in the determination of regional 
wage inequalities or of regional differences in within-regions wage inequalities. This 
finding is also supported by the limited relevant empirical findings in the literature 
(Taylor, 2000; Monastiriotis, 2000).  
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On the other hand, specific elements of labour market flexibility are 
significant in explaining wage inequalities within regions. Our empirical investigation 
has shown that the increase of this form of wage inequalities in the UK over the last 
two decades is partly attributable -along with other factors identified in the literature, 
predominantly skill-biased technological change- to the decline in trade union 
densities and the increase in internal flexibility (both numerical and functional). 
Unemployment flexibility has a rather counter-intuitive (negative) effect on wage 
inequalities, while also unexpected was our finding that external numerical flexibility 
and flexibility in the mobility of labour are not significant.  
The results obtained here share many similarities with those obtained in 
chapter four, under a rather different specification. Above all, the most striking 
similarity is that in none of the cases have fixed effects been found to be significant. 
This is a clear indication that developments in wage inequalities are determined at a 
scale wider than the region or even the nation. Local factors matter, but only because 
of their differences across spatial units. In other words, had all countries and regions 
had the same levels (and qualities) of labour market flexibility, demand for skills and 
occupational and skill compositions, inequality levels would be remarkably uniform 
across space.  
Probably the most interesting finding is that aggregate flexibility is not a 
significant factor explaining wage inequalities. Specific elements of flexibility have 
specific and rather diverse effects, but overall levels of flexibility exhibit no 
association with the dispersion of wages across people. The extent to which this 
conclusion is specific to our sample is, of course, not known. It is conceivable, 
however, that the specific mix of labour market flexibility arrangements matters, in 
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the sense that the individual elements of labour market flexibility can cancel or re-
enforce the (negative or positive) wage inequality effects of aggregate flexibility.  
Irrespectively of that, however, our finding that internal flexibility and the 
decline in unionism have resulted in higher levels of cross-personal wage inequalities 
is highly important, raising an issue of equity-versus-efficiency. Both union 
flexibility and internal flexibility have been found to have some positive effects on 
productivity, employment, or growth. Although the debate about inequality and 
growth (equality versus efficiency) occupies a distinct part of the economics literature 
on its own, our impression is that it is mainly a policy question as to which of the two 
is of higher priority. Moreover, in line with the conclusions of other researchers 
(Nickell, 1997a; Siebert, 1997), our empirical analysis suggests that, as far as it 
concerns labour market flexibility, this is not a dilemma between two mutually 
exclusive alternatives. Rather, policy can concentrate on enhancing those forms of 
flexibility that are found to improve economic performance, while guaranteeing at the 
same time such a mix of flexible arrangements and labour market institutions that can 
help overcome the possible adverse flexibility effects on labour incomes and their 
distribution. 
 
Ch.8: Empirical Results 
 
338
 
APPENDIX A.8.1: List of variables  
 
 
 Table A.8.1: List of variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variable name Variable description 
Dependent variables 
Productivity 
 
Real regional output per worker 
Output per capita  
 
Real regional output divided by regional population 
Wage 
 
Real average regional wage 
Empl/pop ratio 
 
Share of employees to total regional population 
Investment  Real gross fixed capital formation (private investment) 
Unemployment Regional unemployment rate: share of unemployed to 
economically active population (registration-based) 
Employment growth 
 
Annual logarithmic change of regional employment 
Wage dispersion 
 
Standard deviation of real regional wages (FES-based) 
Explanatory variables 
Female employment Share of female employees to total regional 
employment 
Manufacturing Share of manufacturing employees to total regional 
employment 
Technological intensity Ratio of manual to non-manual employees (inverse 
measure) (FES-based) 
Migration Net in-migration rate: share of net immigration to 
regional population 
Inflation 
 
Annual logarithmic change of regional price index 
Investment share Share of real gross fixed capital formation to regional 
output  
Professionals Share of professional employees to regional 
employment (FES-based) 
Education Average years of full-time continuous education of the 
regional employees (FES-based) 
Demand for skills Estimated real returns to education from a panel of 
wage equations 
Flexibility The flexibility indicators have been described in 
detailed description in chapter seven (LFS-based) 
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Table A.8.2: Fixed effects and spatial dependence in the employment regressions 
 
2FE PSAR1-
SARE 
2FE-SAR 
(flexibility) 
2FE-SAR 
(dependent) 
2FE PSAR1-
SARE 
2FE-SAR 
(flexibility) 
2FE-SAR 
(dependent) 
2FE PSAR1-
SARE 
2FE-SAR 
(flexibility) 
2FE-SAR 
(dependent) 
 Employment-population ratio Employment growth Unemployment 
Real GDP pc* 
 
6.37E-06 
(4.94) 
2.00E-06 
(6.32) 
-2.76E-07 
(-0.13) 
0.203 
(4.35) 
0.205 
(2.15) 
0.166 
(2.14)  
  
Real wage* 
  
  -0.385 
(-3.14) 
-0.305 
(-1.23) 
-0.285 
(-1.41) 
0.023 
(11.57) 
0.036 
(10.77) 
0.036 
(10.89) 
Empl/population ratio 
  
     -18.821 
(-14.46) 
-18.314 
(-9.70) 
-16.899 
(-8.39) 
Unemployment** 
 
-0.008 
(-13.68) 
-0.140 
(-9.79) 
-0.007 
(-7.51) 
4.95E-06 
(2.45) 
-0.003 
(-3.00) 
-0.003 
(-3.24) 
-0.729 
(-1.36) 
-4.497 
(-2.82) 
-5.202 
(-3.32) 
Migration 
 
-1.022 
(-6.50) 
-1.289 
(-2.74) 
0.131 
(0.45) 
0.521 
(1.36) 
2.245 
(5.53) 
1.235 
(3.60) 
-38.298 
(-5.64) 
-102.06 
(-6.66) 
-108.95 
(-7.27) 
Female LF 
participation 
-0.699 
(-65.96) 
-0.736 
(-26.38) 
-0.386 
(-15.48) 
-0.136 
(-5.21) 
-0.121 
(-3.60) 
-0.088 
(-3.25)  
  
Technology intensity 
 
0.008 
(2.15) 
-0.027 
(-1.81) 
-0.014 
(-1.54) 
0.054 
(3.52) 
0.041 
(4.25) 
0.027 
(3.50)  
  
Manufacturing  
Share*  
  -3.124 
(-53.42) 
-3.136 
(-33.66) 
-2.144 
(-17.52) 
-20.672 
(-13.60) 
-20.631 
(-9.01) 
-19.466 
(-8.23) 
Overall Flexibility 
 
-0.372 
(-1.49) 
-1.530 
(-2.42) 
-1.289 
(-3.46) 
2.748 
(8.47) 
1.732 
(2.40) 
1.534 
(2.82) 
-4.138 
(-4.59) 
-11.693 
(-2.95) 
-8.000 
(-3.40) 
Square of 
Overall flex. 
0.235 
(1.67) 
0.819 
(2.23) 
0.752 
(3.53) 
-1.566 
(-8.22) 
-1.053 
(-2.45) 
-0.877 
(-2.78)  
  
Spatial lag of  
Overall flex.  
-1.067 
(-1.50) 
-3.805 
(-18.98) 
 -1.241 
(-1.23) 
-2.589 
(-10.30)  
-57.579 
(-1.23) 
-0.756 
(-1.78) 
Year 
 
3355.51 
0.000 
6.56 
0.000 
36.70 
0.000 
3624.09 
0.000 
7.03 
0.000 
20.41 
0.000 
31983.94 
0.000 
95.70 
0.000 
13.44 
0.000 
Region 
 
533.82 
0.000 
7.61 
0.000 
11.90 
0.000 
   1208.52 
0.000 
63.72 
0.000 
76.41 
0.000 
R2 + 930.87 0.91 0.97 707.51 0.89 0.93 45.94 0.97 0.97 
Heteroskedasticity  
51.09 
0.000 
7.55 
0.011 
 19.17 
0.000 
5.72 
0.024  
1.51 
0.220 
0.64 
0.421 
Normality ++ 
29442.92 
0.000 
4.93 
0.000 
2.04 
0.019 
31205.16 
0.000 
5.001 
0.000 
1.572 
0.063 
115036.41 
0.000 
1.409 
0.079 
0.778 
0.223 
Notes: t-statistics (OLS) and z-statistics (FGLS) in parentheses. Figures in italics show significance levels. *: the growth rate of this variable (rather than its level) has been 
included in the employment growth regressions. **: Investment and inflation (rather than unemployment), for the employment growth and unemployment regressions, 
respectively. +: For the 2FE-PSAR1-SARE regressions, the log-likelihood rather than the R-square is reported. ++: For the 2FE-PSAR1-SARE regressions, a Wald-test for 
the joint significance of the regressors is reported instead of the normality test.  
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Table A.8.3: Fixed effects and spatial dependence in the output regressions 
 
2FEPSAR1-
SARE 
2FE-SAR 
(flex.) 
2FE-SAR 
(depend.) 
2FEPSAR1-
SARE 
2FE-SAR 
(flex.) 
2FE-SAR 
(depend.) 
2FEPSAR1-
SARE 
2FE-SAR 
(flex.) 
2FE-SAR 
(depend.) 
PSAR1-
SARE 
2FE-SAR 
(flex.) 
2FE-SAR 
(depend.) 
 Productivity Real Wage Investment Output growth 
Productivity * 
 
   
0.364 
(18.75) 
0.479 
(14.94) 
0.454 
(15.00) 
7.29E-05 
(20.34) 
6.26E-05 
(13.57) 
5.16E-05 
(10.83)    
Inflation ** 
 
   
-0.277 
(-10.45) 
-0.217 
(-3.39) 
-0.174 
(-2.87) 
0.854 
(3.95) 
2.081 
(2.66) 
2.393 
(3.30) 
-0.685 
(-8.28) 
-0.6372 
(-3.86) 
-0.5747 
(-3.62) 
Empl/population  
ratio * 
-18.688 
(-9.14) 
-13.726 
(-4.60) 
-18.622 
(-5.28)       
0.093 
(8.63) 
0.0819 
(2.33) 
0.0982 
(2.89) 
Unemployment 
 
0.510 
(9.89) 
0.6531 
(9.75) 
0.5736 
(7.67) 
0.003 
(2.66) 
0.005 
(2.14) 
0.001 
(0.33) 
-0.062 
(-5.04) 
-0.064 
(-2.67) 
-0.020 
(-0.85) 
0.008 
(5.78) 
0.0053 
(3.45) 
0.0047 
(3.38) 
Migration 
 
55.676 
(5.31) 
104.279 
(4.86) 
108.998 
(5.11)       
0.624 
(1.67) 
1.3650 
(2.71) 
1.4732 
(3.07) 
Female LF participation 
9.127 
(5.59) 
14.5386 
(4.86) 
15.6615 
(4.20) 
-0.706 
(-15.46) 
-0.970 
(-12.37) 
-0.910 
(-12.18)       
Manufacturing share 
 
34.026 
(11.51) 
30.2413 
(6.14) 
26.7765 
(5.20)          
Overall Flexibility 
 
50.313 
(2.68) 
156.506 
(5.59) 
156.277 
(5.62) 
0.191 
(6.08) 
0.401 
(3.69) 
0.214 
(2.40) 
-9.626 
(-2.42) 
-25.285 
(-2.62) 
-38.119 
(-4.23) 
-1.552 
(-2.82) 
-1.6531 
(-1.94) 
-1.698 
(-2.24) 
Square of 
overall flex. 
-28.029 
(-2.65) 
-86.193 
(-5.40) 
-86.540 
(-5.46)    
5.091 
(2.23) 
13.751 
(2.33) 
21.596 
(4.15) 
0.835 
(2.72) 
0.9461 
(1.83) 
0.9741 
(2.21) 
Spatial lag 
 
 
26.3606 
(2.04) 
0.2908C 
(2.48)  
1.491 
(1.53) 
0.764 
(5.14)  
0.830 
(0.03) 
-2.349 
(-5.34)  
-0.2884 
(-0.21) 
1.3202C 
(4.25) 
Year 
 
3649.85 
0.000 
44.46 
0.000 
11.36 
0.000 
2957.75 
0.000 
26.72 
0.000 
7.20 
0.000 
2701.47 
0.000 
8.99 
0.000 
6.69 
0.000 
5944.73 
0.000 
28.49 
0.000 
1.14 
0.322 
Region 
 
811.45 
0.000 
26.79 
0.000 
29.02 
0.000 
466.10 
0.000 
33.05 
0.000 
47.84 
0.000 
513.04 
0.000 
25.74 
0.000 
26.90 
0.000 
30.17 
0.000   
R2 + -18.15 0.958 0.958 789.76 0.972 0.972 172.85 0.980 0.983 702.52 0.789 0.805 
Heteroskedasticity 
 
 
1.41 
0.242 
1.25 
0.261  
0.17 
0.681 
2.45 
0.120  
7.10 
0.011 
1.32 
0.253  
4.59 
0.032 
0.51 
0.481 
Normality ++ 
 
112*103 
0.000 
1.603 
0.051 
1.818 
0.033 
24610.3 
0.000 
3.33 
0.000 
2.52 
0.011 
91763.2 
0.000 
4.346 
0.000 
4.375 
0.000 
86770.7 
0.000 
3.831 
0.000 
3.646 
0.000 
Notes: t-statistics (OLS) and z-statistics (FGLS) in parentheses. Figures in italics show significance levels. *: Real GDP instead for productivity for the investment 
regressions and employment growth instead of the employment ratio in the output growth regressions. **: Investment share instead of inflation in the output growth 
regressions. +: For the 2FE-PSAR1-SARE regressions, the log-likelihood rather than the R-square is reported. ++: For the 2FE-PSAR1-SARE regressions, a Wald-test for 
the joint significance of the regressors is reported instead of the normality test. C: For this regression a steeper distance decay function (beta-coefficient –0.7) has been 
used for the calculation of the spatial lag, as this improved the performance of the regressions. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The empirical investigation of the impact of labour market flexibility on 
regional economic performance in the UK over the last two decades concludes our 
inquiry into the nature and economic effects of labour market deregulation and 
flexibility. In this final chapter we summarise the main points of our inquiry, 
synthesise our empirical results, draw some implications for policy and theory and 
discuss directions for future research. The chapter is organised into four sections, but 
our primary focus throughout is the role of labour market flexibility for the economy 
and society at large. 
 
9.1. Overview of the study 
The main purpose of this study has been to identify and measure the regional 
economic effects of labour market flexibility in the UK over the last twenty years. 
Because of the complexity of the issue and the relative absence of a coherent 
analytical background on which to base the empirical investigation, this analysis was 
effectively divided into two parts. The first part dealt mainly with theoretical issues. 
This provided a framework for analysing (i) the concept of labour market flexibility, 
(ii) the evolution of flexibility over time and (iii) the theoretical expectations and 
empirical evidence regarding its impact on the economy. The second part focused 
explicitly on the main research question, attempting to measure the changing levels of 
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flexibility in the UK over the last two decades (at a regional level) and link them to 
regional economic performance.  
Limited by sample size (data availability) and the panel nature of our data, the 
empirical investigation focused solely on the short-run economic effects of flexibility. 
As the last two decades have been a period of significant change in the UK and global 
economies alike, it is possible that the long-run effects of flexibility might have been 
very different from the short-run effects we observed. However, our examination of 
the flexibility effects on a large number of economic indicators allows us to speculate 
on the possible long-run effects. For example, the positive wage and productivity 
effects estimated in our short-run specifications are at odds with the negative 
investment and output growth effects. Our expectation is that in the long-run 
productivity and wages will stabilise or decline if the adverse short-run effects of 
flexibility on investment and growth cannot be offset.  
We return to this issue in the following sections of this chapter. In this section 
we summarise the four main research questions that our study attempted to answer. 
The first referred to the conceptualisation of labour market flexibility.  
 Which are the forces that necessitate labour market deregulation and 
flexibility?  
 Which are the elements that characterise a flexible labour market?  
 What are the targets of labour market flexibility and which is the strategic 
framework within which these targets are derived?  
These questions were dealt with in chapters one and two. We reviewed the wider 
socio-economic, political and technological developments that created the conditions 
for enhanced flexibility in the labour markets. We provided alternative definitions for 
labour market flexibility and identified its main elements through an analytical 
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decomposition of the term. We also discussed the alternative developmental models 
that the search for enhanced labour market flexibility is assumed to reflect, according 
to different theoretical approaches. Finally, we reviewed the OECD experience of 
labour market deregulation and changes in flexibility.   
The second question inquired to the economic impact of labour market 
flexibility.  
 What do theory and empirical evidence suggest about the economic role of 
labour market institutions and their regulation?  
 Which are the main relationships; which are the direct and which are the 
indirect effects?  
 Do these effects differ between the short and the long-run?  
 Is there a trade-off between efficiency and equality in the effects of 
flexibility? 
 Finally, can we construct a behavioural microeconomic model, where the 
predicted impact of labour market deregulation and flexibility will 
successfully reflect patterns observed in reality?  
In chapter three we reviewed the main literature on the economic impact of labour 
market flexibility, dividing our review into analytically distinct parts. Thus, we 
examined separately the labour market, macroeconomic, static, dynamic, and 
equality effects of labour market flexibility. Chapter four presented original 
empirical evidence from an international sample, showing that at the 
macroeconomic level there is little evidence of an economically significant 
relationship between labour market flexibility and economic performance. 
However, strong evidence was provided for a positive relationship between 
aspects of flexibility and within-country wage inequality. Finally, in chapter five 
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we developed a detailed theoretical framework and a corresponding formal model 
to examine the impact of changes in labour market regulation. Such changes 
created the conditions for enhanced labour market flexibility. Under plausible 
assumptions, the latter led to gains in economic efficiency but also generated 
inequalities among workers. These predictions of the model are consistent with 
the stylised facts and empirical evidence reviewed earlier. 
The work then proceeded to examine the two core research questions. First,  
 What was the evolution of labour market flexibility in the regional labour 
markets of the UK, given the far reaching programme of labour market 
deregulation followed since the early 1980s?  
 What evidence is there to suggest that labour market flexibility increased in 
the UK over the same period?  
 How did the regional distribution of flexible working arrangements change, 
if at all, over the last twenty years?  
 What patterns can be identified and what inferences can be drawn?  
To answer these questions we had to introduce the spatial aspects of the issue and 
discuss the relevance of the various possible spatial scales of analysis. This was 
undertaken in chapter six, where we stressed the importance of spatial analysis and 
discussed the possible spatial dynamics that can affect the regional economic impact 
of labour market flexibility. This allowed us to “regionalize” our earlier theoretical 
considerations and laid the foundations for the regional empirical analysis of chapters 
seven and eight. In chapter seven we examined the changes in flexible labour market 
arrangements across the UK regions over the last two decades. We found evidence of 
cluster convergence (group specialisation) in different elements of flexible 
arrangements and verified the widely held belief that overall labour market flexibility 
Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Economic Performance 
 
345
had increased in the UK since the late 1970s. Nevertheless, our evidence for the 
relative importance of each type of labour market flexibility also revealed that some 
arrangements have penetrated the social relationships of the labour market faster than 
others. For example, internal numerical flexibility increased faster than 
unemployment flexibility in all UK regions between 1979 and 1998. 
Our last but central research question was dealt with in chapter eight.  
 What was the specific impact that the flexibilisation of the UK labour 
market(s) had on its own regional economies? 
 Which elements of flexibility have affected which economic outcomes and by 
how much?  
 Did all effects move in the same direction?  
 Is there any evidence of non-linearities, either due to size or due to spatial 
dependence?  
 Has clustering (specialisation) altered the severity of the economic effects of 
flexibility and if so, under which mechanisms has this happened?  
The empirical analysis produced a rich set of findings. Overall, these suggest that it is 
somewhat simplistic and not particularly helpful to consider labour market flexibility 
as a single and indivisible thing. Specific elements of flexibility have had specific 
effects on specific indicators of regional economic performance. Overall, labour 
market flexibility was found to have had a positive impact on some main economic 
indicators, while on aggregate it was not responsible for the increase in cross-personal 
wage inequality. However, it significantly contributed to lower levels of investment 
and slower output growth. Furthermore, spatial dynamics were present, but they were 
neither uniform across space nor were they singular: distinct forms of spatial 
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dependence and clustering were identified and seemed to operate differently across 
the various sets of relationships.  
Because the issue of the economic impact of flexibility is the most important 
addressed in this study, it is important to synthesise these empirical results and their 
implications at greater length. The next section attempts to provide such a summary. 
In section 9.3 we return to the conclusions drawn from the theoretical discussion and 
provide some implications for theory and policy.  
 
9.2. Empirical findings 
The main body of the empirical analysis referred to the estimation of the 
economic effects that labour market flexibility had on the UK regions during the 
1980s and 1990s. Reflecting the theoretical analysis, the empirical investigation split 
flexibility into seven categories, quantified in the following indexes: (i) internal 
numerical flexibility, (ii) external numerical flexibility, (iii) internal functional 
flexibility, (iv) unemployment flexibility, (v) wage flexibility, (vi) flexibility in wage 
bargaining (union flexibility) and (vii) labour mobility.142  
Mainstream economic theory suggests that all of these elements should be 
positively related to economic outcomes. On the other hand, theoretical approaches 
more sceptical of labour market flexibility generally expect flexibility to produce both 
beneficial and adverse economic effects. One of the few cases were a consensus can 
be identified across theoretical approaches, refers to the expectation that the economic 
impact of flexibility would usually be non-linear. For this reason, we investigated the 
existence of non-linearities by introducing in the regressions quadratic terms of the 
                                                 
142
 Definitions for these indexes and the corresponding theoretical categories have been provided in 
sections 7.2 and 2.2, respectively. See in particular Tables 7.1 and A.2.1. 
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flexibility variables, but otherwise tried to keep our estimating models as unrestrictive 
and general as possible. 
Our empirical evidence clearly supported the expectation about the non-linear 
flexibility effects. With the exception of wages and unemployment, “overall” labour 
market flexibility affected all economic indicators in a non-linear fashion.143 The 
effect of the quadratic term always counteracted that of the linear term, suggesting 
that for very high levels of flexibility its economic impact flattened out. On the other 
hand, the evidence for non-linearities for the detailed elements of flexibility (the 
constituents of the “overall” index, individually) was much weaker and applied only 
to a few indexes. Furthermore, the estimated impacts of the detailed flexibility 
indexes were not all in the same direction. Opposing effects for different indexes 
were found.  
These two pieces of evidence (the non-linearity of the effects for overall 
flexibility and the variability of the effects for the detailed indexes) provided strong 
support to our prior expectation that the economic impact of flexibility is basically an 
issue of composition. In other words, that it is generally related more to the 
appropriate mix of flexible arrangements than to a hypothetical optimal amount of 
flexibility. Take the example of the investment regression (Table 8.4). The impact of 
overall flexibility is non-linear (fourth column). In contrast, the investment effects of 
the detailed flexibility indicators are all linear (third column). These effects are 
limited to internal flexibility (numerical and functional), unemployment flexibility 
and union flexibility. Clearly this suggests that the obtained non-linear effect is the 
                                                 
143
 Note, however, that the wage regression had by construction a semi-log specification and so the 
insignificance of the quadratic flexibility term cannot be interpreted to suggest the absence of non-
linearities.  
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result of the specific composition of flexible arrangements in our sample.144 Thus, 
instead of looking at the optimal levels of flexibility or simply at generally enhancing 
overall flexibility, policy optimisation should consider the optimal composition of 
flexible working arrangements in order to maximise the economic returns of overall 
flexibility.  
Putting aside for the moment the issues of composition and of the appropriate 
policy responses, the most interesting finding of our empirical investigation is that not 
every aspect of labour market flexibility matters in the determination of every 
economic outcome. Overall, labour market flexibility affects each and every one of 
our economic indicators, but specific elements of the composite indicator affect only 
specific aspects of the economy. Table 9.1 summarises the results obtained from the 
empirical analysis of chapter eight.  
 
Table 9.1: Summary of empirical results from chapter eight 
Economic Index 
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External numerical B    B    
Internal numerical    B B A B A 
Internal functional    B  A A A 
Wage flexibility    A   A B 
Unemployment flexibility B B A A B B B B 
Union flexibility B A B B A A B A 
Labour mobility  B  A B    
Overall flexibility B A B B B A A  
Notes: A shows an adverse effect (e.g.: a positive effect on unemployment or a negative effect on 
investment); B shows a beneficial effect. For wage inequality B corresponds to a negative effect. 
Empty cells indicate an insignificant relationship. Results are based on Tables 8.1, 8.3, 8.4 and 8.7.  
                                                 
144
 In particular this effect is probably due to the fact that unemployment flexibility in the UK regions 
has risen faster than internal and union flexibility. Because the estimated impact of unemployment 
flexibility is positive (in contrast with the other statistically significant elements), a non-linear effect is 
obtained for the overall flexibility index. 
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External numerical flexibility, contrary to the predictions of mainstream 
analysis, is only weakly related to the economy and does not seem to enhance labour 
demand (employment) and production (output). Internal numerical and internal 
functional flexibility enhance the short-run dynamism of the economy by reducing 
unemployment and increasing wages and rates of output growth, but have a negative 
effect on investment. Moreover, they have a robust positive effect on wage 
inequalities, with the implication that their positive wage effects are not equally 
distributed across the workforce. Overall, then, such types of flexibility (which 
together constitute what we called earlier “labour-input flexibility”) can be regarded 
to benefit the economy, as suggested by mainstream economic analysis. However, 
although not dominant in our estimating sample (the UK regions over the last two 
decades), our evidence also suggested the existence of an investment substitution 
effect (which can have potential negative economic effects in the long-run) and of an 
inequality effect (which can potentially generate social tensions). These two effects 
are consistent with more institutional theoretical approaches.  
Regarding wage flexibility (the unemployment elasticity of wages), its impact 
was found to be surprisingly small and at odds with economic intuition. Wage 
flexibility is related to higher unemployment and lower rates of economic growth. 
Although the possibility of inverse causality in the estimating relationships cannot be 
easily dismissed, the empirical evidence suggests that this type of flexibility should 
not be viewed as a possible remedy for economic backwardness. At least for the case 
of the UK regions during the period of labour market deregulation, this was not the 
role played by wage flexibility.  
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In contrast, flexibility in wage bargaining (union flexibility) was found to have 
a strong positive effect on employment and employment growth, output growth and 
productivity. It was also found to reduce unemployment, although it had a negative 
impact on wages and investment and was also significantly associated with the 
increase in cross-personal (within-region) wage inequalities over the last two decades. 
Although the wage effect is rather standard in the literature, the negative (short-run) 
investment effect can be seen as an indication that this type of flexibility can impact 
negatively on the long-run dynamism of the economy, as was the case with the two 
types of internal flexibility. Such a negative effect can be due either to investment 
substitution (cost-saving strategies employed by non-unionised firms), or to worker 
discouragement (similar to what we called in chapter two “the low pay – low 
productivity trap”, especially given the impact of union flexibility on wage 
inequality).  
Unemployment flexibility (lower unemployment benefits) has important 
positive effects on productivity, growth, wages and investment. It is associated, 
however, with higher levels of unemployment and lower levels of employment 
growth. Interestingly, this type of flexibility appeared to be associated with lower 
levels of wage-inequality.  
Taking the impact of the three types of flexibility in wage determination (wage, 
unemployment and union flexibility) together, there are two general conclusions. 
Flexibility in wage bargaining and flexibility in the treatment of unemployed (union 
and unemployment flexibility, respectively) have positive effects on the economy, 
although long-run dynamism can be possibly threatened by their adverse investment 
effects. In addition, increasing the responsiveness of wages to the unemployment rate 
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(wage flexibility) seems of little relevance for -and may even be detrimental to- 
economic performance.  
Finally, the impact of labour mobility (including occupational, regional and job-
mobility) is found to be more relevant for the workforce than for the economy at 
large. Labour mobility is related to higher wages and levels of employment, but is 
statistically unrelated to any of the other economic indicators included in our analysis. 
In this sense, the encouragement of labour mobility in more flexible labour market 
settings might be an important complement to other types of flexibility, in that it can 
reduce the latter’s potentially adverse effects on workers (e.g., wage losses), while not 
affecting the main economic indicators.  
Interestingly, the overall effect of aggregate flexibility reveals a somewhat 
different story, compared to the results based on the detailed indexes. The experience 
of the UK regions over our period of analysis suggests that aggregate labour market 
flexibility played only a limited role in improving economic performance. Increases 
in overall flexibility seem to have led to higher levels of labour productivity, 
employment growth and wages, and kept unemployment at levels lower than what 
would have otherwise obtained. On the other hand, there is a clearly negative (albeit 
non-linear) effect on investment, labour force participation and output growth. 
Consequently, one can interpret these effects as attributing again a dual role to labour 
market flexibility. On the one hand, flexibility can enhance short-run dynamism by 
increasing productivity, labour incomes and employment. On the other hand, the 
negative effects of investment substitution and labour discouragement, also found 
earlier for the specific cases of union flexibility and labour-input flexibility, seem to 
have led the regional economies of the UK to growth rates below their long-run 
potential.  
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We will return to the discussion of the implication of this duality (between the 
short-run microeconomic type of effects of aggregate flexibility and its long-run and 
more macroeconomic effects) in the next section. For now, we close this section with 
some conclusions about the spatial relationships that were identified. Labour market 
flexibility seems to generate supra-regional clusters of specialisation, as its effects are 
transmitted across neighbouring regions. This is indicated by the fact that the spatial 
lags of aggregate flexibility (see Tables A.8.1 and A.8.2) had, in most cases, the same 
signs as the local flexibility coefficients. This pattern was reversed only for the cases 
of investment and employment growth, which correspond to the temporal evolution 
of the two main factors of production (physical capital and labour). In these two 
cases, spatial dependence took the form of negative autocorrelation, revealing a 
picture of competition among regions. Regions with more flexible labour markets 
seem to lose out in capital growth and gain in terms of employment growth in relation 
to neighbouring regions with more rigid labour markets.  
  
9.3. Policy implications 
In this section we combine the conclusions drawn from the various parts of the 
analysis and draw out a number of policy implications about the role of labour market 
flexibility. Our question here is how the empirical findings relate to and inform the 
theoretical discussion in the previous chapters, in relation to: (i) the forces that seem 
to have driven the wave of labour market deregulation over the last twenty years, (ii) 
the theoretical considerations on the economic role of labour market flexibility, (iii) 
our model of the labour market effects of deregulation in labour standards and (iv) the 
evolution of flexible labour arrangements in the UK regions.  
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In chapter one we argued that increasing labour market flexibility constitutes a 
pragmatic response to a changing global economic environment, characterised by 
greater uncertainty, volatility and competition. This response was formed under 
specific political conditions that provided ideological justification for the shift of 
policy from equality and income stability towards efficiency and growth. We also 
argued, however, that such a response is not necessarily optimal in the long run. 
Tensions and contradictions related to the disorganisation of the social relations of 
production and the externalisation of the social costs of investment in human and 
physical capital could arise, harming long-run economic dynamism and possibly 
cancelling the short-run benefits of deregulation. Admittedly, these arguments had a 
clear ideological component. 
However, in chapter two, a more organised discussion of the forms, types, 
manifestations, targets and sources of labour market flexibility provided the necessary 
analytical framework for the arguments made earlier. By attempting to define and 
analytically decompose the terms flexibility and deregulation, we showed that they 
referred to a redistribution of power towards those who organise production. We 
argued further, that the forms of socio-economic re-organisation that these terms 
reflect, include the introduction of new sets of institutional arrangements rather than 
the complete withdrawal of policy intervention (i.e., labour market regulation). By 
identifying the array of elements believed to comprise labour market flexibility, we 
also argued that many of these elements may conflict by pulling the organisation of 
the relations of production in opposite directions thus posing a potential threat to the 
coherence and stability of the socio-economic system.  
Our main example in chapter two referred to the “flexible firm” model and the 
conflicting needs of a highly skilled and immobile core workforce (internal labour 
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markets and functional flexibility) and of a relatively unprotected and highly mobile 
peripheral workforce (secondary labour markets and numerical flexibility). These 
conflicting needs can generate either internal contradictions (which, as such, are 
unsustainable in the long-run) or duality in the labour market (which can lead to 
labour market segmentation and probably segregation and social exclusion). The 
presence of such inconsistencies and contradictions may well explain the comparative 
failure of alternative theoretical approaches (e.g., the “flexible firm” model, or other 
humanitarian and structuralist approaches) to account for the processes that generate 
the specific forms of labour market arrangements observed in contemporary 
economies.  
Our review of the country experiences with respect to labour market 
deregulation strengthened our conclusion that such forms of labour market 
arrangements (and, thus, increasing labour market flexibility) are largely the random 
outcome of a range of well-intended reactions to a changing economic order (as 
opposed to being a systemic response to the latter). As such, they require a self-
regulating framework in order for their internal contradictions to be overcome. Such a 
perspective is compatible with the plethora of qualitatively different combinations of 
flexible working arrangements observed in reality (across countries and workplaces). 
It is also consistent with the variety of -often conflicting- effects of labour market 
institutions identified in the theoretical and empirical literature, as reviewed in 
chapter three.  
As was discussed in section 3.5, the literature review raised two issues. First, 
that the firm-level and short-run effects of flexibility can be different from its 
economy-wide and longer-run effects. It is perfectly possible that flexibility can 
increase wages, employment, productivity and profitability in the short-run, while 
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simultaneously having a negative long-run effect on human capital accumulation, 
investment, income distribution and consumption. The second issue is that flexibility 
can increase efficiency only at a cost, which is related to the removal of regulations 
that have been in place largely to protect the workers and achieve social as well as 
economic goals. Under such a perspective, it is a matter of choice as to which effects 
and relationships one wishes to focus on: possible increases in (part-time) 
employment, or (equally) possible reductions in job-security and educational 
attainment. To overcome this problem, we concluded in chapter two that the issue of 
flexibility and labour market deregulation should really be viewed as the selection of 
carefully structured and appropriately implemented regulations, so that both 
economic and social goals could be achieved.  
The empirical evidence presented in chapter four, drawn from the scarce 
quantitative information available internationally, supported these two points raised 
from the literature review. Furthermore, it cast doubt on the widespread belief that 
countries with more flexible labour markets necessarily perform better economically 
than others. It showed that different elements of flexibility have conflicting effects on 
economic performance and (wage) inequalities and revealed only weak relationships 
between flexibility and such economic indicators as unemployment, labour supply, 
productivity, and output growth.     
In an attempt to explain the conflicting effects identified and the resulting 
uncertainty about the overall impact of flexibility on the economy, in chapter five we 
returned to theoretical considerations. We developed a model which introduced 
labour standards in an efficiency wages framework. This model showed how (and 
when) labour market deregulation can lead to enhanced flexibility in labour markets. 
It also showed how enhanced flexibility might lead to the emergence of duality and 
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non-standard forms of employment, thus generating inequalities in wages, working 
conditions and employment opportunities. Despite these possible adverse effects, the 
model allowed for increases in average wages, employment levels and profitability to 
follow the deregulation of labour relations. This was consistent with the conclusions 
drawn from the preceding discussion.  
In chapter six we turned to the spatial dimension of our analysis by introducing 
the notion of space into our earlier theoretical considerations. Our discussion showed 
that labour market flexibility can have a cumulative causation-type of effect on 
regional economic disparities. The economic backwardness of less favoured regions 
can be sustained while more advanced regions (and possibly the country as a whole) 
can experience improvements in their economic performance. Interestingly, by 
employing a regional economic perspective, the contradictions between short-run 
efficiency and long-run sustainability of labour market flexibility (this time, between 
short-run gains in regional economic performance and widening regional economic 
disparities in the longer-run) were exacerbated.  
Our review in chapter seven of the specific experiences of the UK regions in 
terms of labour market flexibility suggested that despite the presence of a general 
(national) trend followed by all regions, regional specialisation in specific forms of 
flexible labour arrangements was clearly identifiable. We understood the presence of 
such patterns of specialisation to represent an empirical illustration of the following 
notion: that the “appropriate” mix of labour market institutions and regulatory 
arrangements is specific to the tradition, history, economic circumstances and socio-
economic structure of a particular (regional) economy. Naturally, the question of 
flexibility is not how much flexibility is enough, but rather what are the appropriate 
regulations and what mixture can guarantee the “reproducibility” of the socio-
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economic system (social justice and economic stability) and also achieve 
improvements in short- and long-run economic performance.  
The empirical results presented in the last chapter offered further support for the 
above observation. Labour market flexibility has indeed on average played a positive 
role in the overall economic performance of the UK regions. Moreover, the sharp 
increase in wage inequality is only partly attributable to increased flexibility, since it 
is only specific to elements such as internal and union flexibility. Nevertheless, 
investment and output growth were lower in regions and periods of greater labour 
market flexibility. Some regions improved their relative position due to the specific 
mix (and qualities) of flexible labour arrangements that prevailed there as the 
outcome of regional responses to the national deregulation programme. On the other 
hand, some regions fell further behind, as the flexibilisation of their labour markets 
did not assist their economic dynamism.  
Given our theoretical discussion and analysis, we posit that labour market 
flexibility is in some sense a necessity in advanced contemporary economies. The 
relatively recent international forces producing greater uncertainty, increased 
competition and accelerating technological progress have altered the endurance and 
efficiency of older rigid systems of labour market regulation. But, interestingly, many 
of the components of labour market flexibility also produce adverse economic 
outcomes. 
It is probably unwarranted to argue that such adverse effects could threaten the 
stability of the economic system and of the social networks upon which markets 
operate. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the new forms of flexible labour 
arrangements have altered the social relationships that govern labour markets. To 
facilitate change and adaptation while simultaneously sustaining the smooth operation 
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of the socio-economic system, the deregulation of labour relations must take specific 
regional conditions into account. The specific social and economic structure of each 
(regional) economy must be examined before the appropriate combinations, qualities 
and quantities of labour market regulations can be approved, in order for them to 
guarantee the smooth and efficient functioning of both the economy and the society. 
In this respect, of course, the specific experience (and empirical evidence) of the UK 
regions over the last two decades is of little relevance for other economies, 
characterised by different political and historical traditions, economic structures, 
cultures and aspirations.  
For the UK, however, it seems that some prescriptions can be made. Internal 
(functional and numerical) flexibility, unemployment flexibility and labour mobility 
seem to be important assets for a well-functioning economy. However, their increase 
would appear to require extra attention to be paid to redistribution policies, social 
security, educational provision and the encouragement of investment, in order to 
alleviate any adverse social and economic effects. Trade unions have played a mixed 
role, by harming short-run economic performance but apparently by increasing long-
run efficiency. As in chapter four, our conclusion here is that specific effort must be 
directed so that the deregulation of union power does not promote the disappearance 
of unionism but instead strengthens the co-operative, productivity-enhancing “face of 
unions”. In contrast, external flexibility and wage flexibility, although important from 
a theoretical micro-economic perspective, apparently have not had any significant 
beneficial effects on the UK economy and should not be considered as crucial for the 
improvement of national or regional economic performance.  
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9.4. Extensions – epilogue 
We have here engaged in a detailed analysis of the concept of labour market 
flexibility and, by measuring the levels of flexibility in UK regional labour markets 
and employing a detailed econometric analysis, have hopefully provided useful 
insights into the issue of labour market regulation and policy intervention. Two 
important contributions can be obtained from this study. First, the empirical analysis 
of the economic effects of labour market flexibility was based on a detailed 
theoretical discussion. As a result, the specific indexes used in the empirical analyses 
are directly related to theory and exhibit a degree of homogeneity that is often absent 
from related macroeconomic studies. Second, and more importantly, this study 
provides a direct and sufficiently precise measurement for a large number of elements 
that comprise labour market flexibility, at a regional level over a twenty-year period 
for one of the most advanced countries in the world. It is not an exaggeration to say 
that this exercise is unique in the literature. Equally unique is the nature of the 
empirical analysis. By utilising a panel of data, the study was able to focus on one 
single country over a significant time period. The technical experience gathered here 
might prove to be very useful for future research on the issue.  
There are, however, limitations that this study was not able to overcome. A 
significant number of aspects that can be theoretically included in a measure of labour 
market flexibility were not included in the indexes derived here, as it was not possible 
to collect or quantify every relevant piece of information. The empirical analysis 
therefore did not take into account union power and recognition, union-employer co-
ordination, unemployment duration, external functional flexibility, the extent of use 
of multi-tasking in the production, the quality of specific labour standards and 
working conditions, and other aspects that might have been of interest. And, as we 
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have already mentioned, the construction of the indexes must inevitably reflect the 
author’s subjective judgements, since there are no objective guidelines as to how to 
combine available information into specific indexes of flexibility.  
At another level, it was effectively impossible to investigate empirically certain 
research questions that the theoretical discussion (especially of the neo-institutionalist 
literature) raised. Clearly, the impact of the specific regime of labour market 
regulation on the stability of the economic system, or the impact of deregulation on 
worker attitudes and family structures, are issues that cannot be investigated with a 
twenty-year-period dataset derived from general-purpose surveys. Furthermore, 
specific econometric problems and sample size did not allow us to investigate other 
interesting questions. For example, what is the direction of causality between labour 
market flexibility and economic outcomes, the degree of spatial co-integration145 in 
terms of flexible labour arrangements, or even the significance of dynamic terms in 
the estimating regressions.   
The last issue is clearly important and it is fair to say that it has been rather 
underplayed here as well as more generally in the literature. It is entirely possible that 
the impact of labour market flexibility on the economy is not contemporaneous, but 
rather operates with a lag structure. Specific econometric limitations did not allow for 
the estimation of dynamic panel regressions with simultaneous controls for fixed 
effects and spatial autocorrelation. The investigation of dynamic effects had to be 
limited to controlling for serial autocorrelation in the dependent variables. It must be 
noted, however, that we examined the impact of flexibility on a wide range of 
economic indicators, to substitute for our inability to examine explicitly the dynamic 
                                                 
145
 The term “spatial co-integration” is the spatial equivalent of time-series co-integration. It relates to 
the complementarity in the movement of economic aggregates across spatial units. For an empirical 
application of this not yet fully developed technique, see for example Lauridsen (1999).  
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relationship between flexibility and economic performance. By looking at the various 
impacts of flexibility on the economy one is able to draw wider conclusions about the 
dynamic mechanisms that are behind the observable static effects.  
Probably the most important limitation of the present study, however, is the fact 
that we did not enter into a detailed investigation of the specific regional socio-
economic conditions that uniquely shape the prevailing forms of flexible labour 
arrangements and their effect on economic performance. All we were able to do was 
examine the estimated regional fixed effects and attempt to associate them with the 
wider economic structures of the UK regions. 
Naturally, what appear to be the limitations of our study present a challenge for 
future research to analyse and understand. Further research might address the regional 
specificities responsible for the particular combinations of flexible labour 
arrangements prevailing in a regional economy along with their economic impact. 
Given the comparative availability of pertinent data for the London economy and the 
international character of London, future research could focus on this economy and 
associate the specific developments in terms of labour market flexibility in London 
(which are distinctive when compared to the rest of Britain), to its social, economic 
and cultural structures, probably in comparison with other characteristic areas of the 
UK.  
Future research could also focus on the mathematical model developed in 
chapter five. Using specific information on worker attitudes and production costs by 
cost category, the model can be directly tested and, if required, amended. Such an 
analysis could provide a better understanding of the relationship between changes in 
the provision of labour standards and equilibrium levels of employment, wages and 
economic opportunities. Additionally, the technical development of a regional 
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economic version of this model, taking into account the points made in chapter six, 
could significantly contribute to the analysis of the economic role of labour market 
flexibility. We believe that such extensions of the present study could potentially lead 
to the development of an economic theory of labour relations, organising the not yet 
fully developed discussion on the issue.   
We hope that the analysis undertaken here and the contributions made will 
constitute a solid basis for further investigation into the issues addressed. Our results 
provide coherent evidence that the social and economic implications of labour market 
flexibility are not an issue that can be easily resolved with aggregate data and 
country-level comparative studies. Rather, these implications can only be understood 
in conjunction with the peculiarities and uniqueness of each specific place and the 
appropriate social infrastructure that these characteristics require.  
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